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ABSTRACT 
 
“AN ARMY OF WORKING-MEN:”  
MILITARY LABOR AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN EMPIRE,  
1865-1915 
Autumn Hope McGrath 
Stephanie McCurry 
 
This dissertation is a labor history of the United States army in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. It argues that soldiers constituted a partially-unfree labor force 
essential to the advance of U.S. imperialism. The project draws on government reports, 
military records, court-martial testimonies, memoirs, letters, and newspapers. It examines 
the U.S.’s military labor regime in pre-statehood California, the Reconstruction South, 
the trans-Mississippi West, and the southern Philippines.  
Military labor, often performed under duress, allowed the United States to extend 
its authority across North America and around the world. Soldiers built roads and 
telegraph lines; mapped territory; supervised elections; assisted railroads and other 
private companies; and governed subject populations. This state-sanctioned labor regime 
relied on coercive and violent practices. Soldiers were paid less and enjoyed fewer rights 
and protections than their civilian counterparts. They were subject to physical 
punishments and humiliations for various infractions. In the most telling difference 
between military and “free” labor, soldiers could not leave their assignments even one 
day short of their enlistment period; “quitting” the army was criminalized as desertion. 
	   	  
	  
	  
viii 
As the United States extended its influence over new parts of the world, its military labor 
regime also expanded to include local populations. This study examines the army’s 
attempts to exploit the labor of soldiers and indigenous populations as well as resistance 
to these efforts.  
This project reframes the army’s contributions to U.S. imperialism. Beyond the 
battlefield, soldiers worked, often under duress, on behalf of an ambitious and 
expansionary state. By focusing on the army’s labor regime, it demonstrates the centrality 
of both the military and unfree labor to the construction of an American empire in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
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1	   
INTRODUCTION 
	  
In 1873, a group of military dignitaries celebrated the groundbreaking for a new 
telegraph line in Arizona Territory. Army officers and local leaders gave speeches, and 
the Twenty-Third Infantry Band provided music. Women played a conspicuous, if 
symbolic, role in the affair. The wife of Civil War hero and famed Indian-fighter George 
Crook “turned” “the first sod,” according to the Army and Navy Journal. The chief 
quartermaster’s wife, a Mrs. Dana, broke a champagne bottle over the first pole. It was a 
joyous occasion, and “a large and appreciative throng of observers” had come out to 
witness the event. Speakers heralded the new technology, which promised to “unite 
Arizona with the outside world.” Among the speakers was one Captain A. H. Nickerson, 
adjutant-general of the military department. He “alluded gracefully to the labors 
performed by our Army in the cause of science and civilization,” and noted that “while its 
sword was ever ready to defend our country’s glory in time of war, its services were no 
less efficient in time of peace, whether in exploring new routes for railroads in the 
Yellowstone country or in building telegraphs in Arizona.”1  
The following year, Minnesota Republican Mark H. Dunnell took to the floor of 
Congress likewise to praise the army’s work in the West. Dunnell, originally from Maine 
and briefly a colonel with the 5th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment in the Civil War, 
spoke passionately about the army’s importance. The West held enormous prospects and 
great riches, Dunnell told his fellow statesmen. As part of a longer defense of federal 
expenditures in support of “settlement” along the “frontier,” he insisted that the army 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This account of the day and Nickerson’s remarks is taken from “A Telegraph to Arizona,” Army and Navy 
Journal [hereafter ANJ], vol. 11, September 27, 1873.  
	   	  
	  
	  
2 
made it possible for “the American citizen” to exploit the promises of the West. Dunnell 
declared: 
‘Westward the course of empire holds its way,’ and it is too late to say that the 
adventurous men of the East shall not find their way into the Territories of the 
country. These surveying parties are the prospectors to find out where lies the 
wealth of the country, and if it takes one hundred soldiers or five hundred to guard 
a surveying party, they are doing more service to the country than any other same 
number of men in the service and are the most productive men in the whole 
country.2  
The “service” of soldiers guarding such surveying parties could not be underestimated, 
the Minnesota congressman reminded his colleagues. The “wealth of the country” – and 
the future of the American empire – depended on the army. 
A handful of army officers and politicians recognized the significance of military 
labor. Yet such paeans to routine military labor were rare. Instead, the army’s activities 
beyond the battleground were usually deemed peripheral to its true mission; more often 
they were simply ignored. This dissertation examines the U.S. army’s labor regime  in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It argues that soldiers constituted a partially-
unfree labor force essential to the advance of American imperialism. Military labor 
allowed the United States to extend its authority across North America and around the 
world. Soldiers built roads and telegraph lines; mapped territory; supervised elections; 
assisted railroads and other private companies; and governed subject population. This 
state-sanctioned labor regime relied on coercive and violent practices. Soldiers were paid 
less and enjoyed fewer rights and protections than their civilian counterparts. They were 
subject to physical punishments and humiliations for various infractions. In the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 43rd Congress, 1st Session, February 4, 1874, 1169. 
 
	   	  
	  
	  
3 
telling difference between military and “free” labor, soldiers could not leave their 
assignments even one day short of their enlistment period; “quitting” the army was 
criminalized as desertion. Although many aspects of the army’s labor regime were 
remarkably consistent over time, it did change as the U.S. extended its reach around the 
globe. Soldiers in the outposts of empire continued to perform a great deal of manual 
labor, but they also became overseers of large local populations whose labor was bought, 
leveraged, or compelled by the U.S. government. The story of the U.S. army’s labor 
system reflects the persistence of unfree labor many decades after the end of chattel 
slavery in the American South.  
This study begins in pre-statehood California, moves to the Reconstruction South, 
extends to the trans-Mississippi West, and concludes with the period of U.S. military rule 
in the southern Philippines. During and immediately following the Mexican-American 
War, the U.S. army occupied and governed California before Congress incorporated it as 
the thirty-first state in the Union. In the post-Civil War South, enlisted men served as 
police, supervised elections, and adjudicated disputes among civilians. In the West, they 
built roads and telegraph lines, escorted railroad surveyors, and mapped territory. Their 
labor opened up vast new areas to capital investment, while they helped dispossess 
indigenous peoples of their land and resources. After the Spanish-American War, the 
U.S. army carried out many of these same functions in its growing overseas empire. In 
the southern Philippines, for example, American troops built roads, surveyed land and 
created maps, collected taxes, and mediated between local populations. These 
responsibilities were familiar to officers and soldiers who had performed similar 
occupational work in North America.  
	   	  
	  
	  
4 
This project reframes the army’s contributions to U.S. imperialism. Although the 
army is hardly understudied, military history has become an increasingly isolated subfield 
within the historical profession. Within that subfield, however, military historians have 
demonstrated the diverse range of activities undertaken by the army in the post-Civil War 
era. Not only were soldiers assigned to “reconstruct” the occupied South, but they were 
also at the frontlines of battles against organized labor, from the anthracite mines of 
Pennsylvania to the Pullman factory in Chicago.3 Even the “Indian-fighting army” was in 
reality so much more. In historian Michael Tate’s words, it was a “multipurpose army” 
that contributed to important developments in exploration and mapping, transportation, 
communication, law enforcement, and medicine and public health.4 The story of the 
army’s efforts to crush Native resistance, whether through extermination, conquest, or co-
optation, was an essential part of its mission in the West. A consideration of the army’s 
ancillary duties, such as its function as a major employer and builder in the West, 
enhances our understanding of the larger context for these military activities. 
A reconsideration of the army’s many roles contributes to recent scholarship 
focused on the trans-Mississippi West in the nineteenth century. Although the army 
played a crucial and complex role in the West, the “new western history” has sadly taken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Jerry M. Cooper, “The Army as Strikebreaker— the Railroad Strikes of 1877 and 1894,” Labor 
History 18, no. 2 (March 1977): 179–96; Joshua B. Freeman, “Militarism, Empire, and Labor Relations: 
The Case of Brice P. Disque,” International Labor and Working-Class History no. 80 (October 1, 2011): 
103–120; Grace Palladino, Another Civil War: Labor, Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Regions of 
Pennsylvania, 1840-68 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Priscilla Murolo, “Wars of 
Civilization: The US Army Contemplates Wounded Knee, the Pullman Strike, and the Philippine 
Insurrection,” International Labor and Working-Class History 80, no. 01 (2011): 77–102. 
4 See Tate, The Frontier Army. A useful review of scholarship on the frontier army, much of it on the 
army’s economic role in the West, is Bruce J. Dinges, “New Directions in Frontier Military History: A 
Review Essay,” New Mexico Historical Review 66 (January 1991): 103–116. 
	   	  
	  
	  
5 
little note of the army and its activities.5 According to one scholar, “A check of standard 
publications by and about the New Western Historians reveals an almost total neglect of 
the frontier army as an element in the westering story.”6 Developments within social and 
political history may have shifted attention from the military in recent decades. Historian 
Sherry L. Smith, who has written about how enlisted men and officers viewed Native 
Americans, argues that in the post-Vietnam era, historians felt that “research on the army 
of the West implied sympathy with the military.” Even in more recent scholarship that 
avoids the racist pitfalls of earlier work, “the tendency to focus solely on the army 
reinforced the perhaps unconscious notion that only the white stories mattered.”7 The 
army, however, is essential to understanding the political, social, and economic history of 
the West. 
Greater attention to the army also promises to illuminate the role of the state in 
the nineteenth-century. This has long been one of the major concerns of new western 
historians as well as a growing cohort of historians and political scientists.8 Writing back 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The historiography of the “new western history” is extensive. The paradigmatic work remains Patricia 
Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2006). See also the collection of essays Trails: Toward a New Western History, eds. Patricia 
Nelson Limerick, Clyde A. II Milner, Charles E. Rankin (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 
1991). For a recent assessment of new western history, its achievements and its future prospects, see David 
M. Wrobel, “Introduction: ‘What on Earth Has Happened to the New Western History?’,” Historian 66, no. 
3 (2004): 437–441. For a detailed argument about the importance of greater attention to the state in western 
history, see Karen R. Merrill, “In Search of the ‘Federal Presence’ in the American West,” The Western 
Historical Quarterly 30, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 449–73.  
6 Michael L. Tate, The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2001), xiv.  
7 Sherry L. Smith, “Lost Soldiers: Re-Searching the Army in the American West,” The Western Historical 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1998): 151. Military historians have also recognized the diversity within the army. The 
rank-and-file included European immigrants and African-Americans, as well as native-born white men, and 
Native Americans served as auxiliaries or “scouts.” For an overview of recent currents in military history, 
see R. M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” The American Historical Review 
112, no. 4 (October 1, 2007): 1070–1090.   
8 On new western historians’ concern with the state, see, for example, Alan Brinkley, “The Western 
Historians: Don’t Fence Them In,” New York Times, September 20, 1992 [accessed 2 July 2013]. 
	   	  
	  
	  
6 
against the romantic and myopic view that the West had been “settled” solely by hardy 
frontiersmen and pioneers, scholars including Patricia Nelson Limerick and Richard 
White have demonstrated the myriad ways the central state helped shape the western 
economy and politics. White is perhaps most responsible for disabusing Americans of the 
notion that the West was the terrain of individual initiative. “The American West, more 
than any other section of the United States, is a creation not so much of individual or 
local efforts, but of federal efforts,” White writes. “More than any other region, the West 
has been historically a dependency of the federal government.” Despite this attention to 
the federal government’s importance in the West, the army – perhaps the most powerful 
and certainly the most numerically significant of state-sponsored institutions in the region 
– has not attracted much attention. This study focuses attention on how the U.S. army 
extended the influence and authority of the American state in the South, the West, and 
overseas. Although it does not offer an assessment of state capacity per se, it 
demonstrates how a relatively small national army carried out a variety of sweeping 
political and economic functions in the nineteenth century.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For the original call to “bring the state back in,” see Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda 
Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For differing 
perspectives on the size and scope of the American state in the nineteenth century, see Richard Franklin 
Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion 
of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Brian 
Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-century America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Richard R. John, “Rethinking the Early American State,” 
Polity 40, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): 332–39; William J. Novak, “The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in 
Nineteenth-Century America,” in The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political 
History, eds. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009), 85-119. Although his work predates the new western history and scholarship in American Political 
Development (APD) by several decades, William Goetzmann demonstrated the crucial role of the army and 
the federal government in exploring and surveying the West throughout the nineteenth century. He focused 
on large-scale studies and surveying projects more so than routine scouts. See William H. Goetzmann, 
Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); 
	   	  
	  
	  
7 
The activities of soldiers and officers contributed to broad economic 
transformations in North America. This project shines new light on the relationship 
between the federal government and private interests, underlining the centrality of 
government-backed construction projects to the expansion of private investment long 
before the Keynesian economic policies of the mid-twentieth century. It also contributes 
to recent conversations about the persistence and importance of unfree labor in capitalist 
economies by focusing on the labor of soldiers.10 Indeed, this study shows how the army 
was riven by conflicts over the proper work of soldiers and their rights and privileges. Of 
course, the army was not a monolithic or hegemonic force. Enlisted men were neither 
architects of federal policy nor masters of their own fates. Whatever their personal 
opinions about the army’s mission, soldiers had very little control over the terms of their 
own labor. Instead, they were part of an American working class experiencing firsthand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Exploration and empire: the explorer and the scientist in the winning of the American West (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966). For a call for more research on Reconstruction and the American state, see 
Gregory P. Downs, “The World the War Made: The ‘Disturbing Tendencies’ of the Civil War and the New 
Map of Reconstruction,” Reviews in American History 40, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 88-95. 
 
Scholars of England and the Atlantic World have paid more attention to the relationship between the 
military and state formation. See, for example, John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the 
English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989); and John Donoghue, “‘Out of the Land of 
Bondage’: The English Revolution and the Atlantic Origins of Abolition,” The American Historical Review 
115, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 943–74.  
10 On the new history of capitalism, see Jeffrey Sklansky, “Labor, Money, and the Financial Turn in the 
History of Capitalism,” Labor 11, no. 1 (March 20, 2014): 23–46; “Interchange: The History of 
Capitalism,” Journal of American History 101, no. 2 (September 2014): 503–36; Seth Rockman, “What 
Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy?” Journal of the Early Republic 34, no. 3 (2014): 439–66; 
Jennifer Schuessler, “In History Departments, It’s Up With Capitalism,” The New York Times, April 6, 
2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/education/in-history-departments-its-up-with-capitalism.html. 
For a fairly recent and thorough overview of scholarship on U.S. empire, see Paul A. Kramer, “Power and 
Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” The American Historical Review 116, 
no. 5 (2011): 1348–91. 
For recent debates on the relationship between slavery and capitalism, see Scott Reynolds Nelson, “Who 
Put Their Capitalism in My Slavery?” The Journal of the Civil War Era 5, no. 2 (2015): 289–310, for a 
critique of the recent literature. For an early statement of what has become the new orthodoxy on the 
relationship between slavery and capitalism, see Walter Johnson, “The Pedestal and the Veil: Rethinking 
the Capitalism/Slavery Question,” Journal of the Early Republic 24, no. 2 (2004): 299–308. 
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the growing pains of capitalism and the demands of an aggressive imperialism. Oddly, 
soldiers were both members of an exploited proletariat and the shock troops of 
capitalism, objects of imperial aggression and agents of empire.11  
Historians have recently begun to recognize the importance of military labor, 
particularly in the context of U.S. imperialism.12 The editors of a recent volume on labor 
and imperial history write, “No one would question whether factory workers are workers, 
but labor historians have only just begun to incorporate military personnel into a broader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Charles Sellers might dispute this point. He wrote, “Lawyers were the shock troops of capitalism” – a 
designation that I also believe has great merit, especially for the antebellum period about which he writes. 
Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 47. 
12 See, for example, the articles in a special edition of International Labor and Working-Class History 
devoted to exploring the relationship between militaries and labor: Joshua B. Freeman and Geoffrey Field, 
eds., “Labor and the Military,” special issue, International Labor and Working-Class History 80, no. 1 
(2011): 3-147. For a recent compilation of essays with truly global perspectives on military labor, see Erik-
Jan, Zürcher, ed., Fighting for a living: a comparative history of military labour 1500-2000 (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2013). 
 
For accounts of the nineteenth-century U.S. army in the West that acknowledge the importance of labor, 
see Kevin Adams, Class and Race in the Frontier Army  : Military Life in the West, 1870-1890 (Norman, 
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), and Janne Lahti, Cultural Construction of Empire: The U.S. 
Army in Arizona and New Mexico (University of Nebraska Press, 2012). 
 
For a careful study of military labor in the context of the U.S.-Philippines War, see Justin Jackson, “The 
Work of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Making of American Colonialisms in Cuba and the Philippines, 
1898-1913,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2014). Mary Renda shows how the U.S. military 
supported the construction of infrastructure during its occupation of Haiti in the early twentieth century, but 
as cultural history of the occupation her book does not look carefully at the actual building of infrastructure 
or the organization of labor under American military rule. See Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military 
Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001), 117-119. 
 
Other historians have demonstrated links between soldiers and workers in civilian society by examining 
how labor organizing influenced soldiers’ behavior. Christopher Capozzola shows how broader 
developments among workers in Manila shaped the way Philippine Scouts understood their rights and 
sparked their protest in a military context. See Capozzola, “The Secret Soldiers’ Union: Labor and Soldier 
Politics in the Philippine Scout Mutiny of 1924,” Making the Empire Work, 85-103. Of course, being able 
to recognize such evidence of worker solidarity and organizing among soldiers requires that historians first 
acknowledge that soldering was (and is) labor.  
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narrative of working-class history.”13 As labor historians explore the ways in which U.S. 
power was exercised both domestically and overseas, they are beginning to recognize the 
centrality of military work – not just military might – to the expansion of American 
influence. By treating soldiers as workers, this study builds on excellent studies of 
soldiers as “war-workers” in the British empire. 14 It also speaks to histories of American 
soldiers in the twentieth century and their complex relationship to working-class culture 
and politics more broadly.15 Historians of the nineteenth-century U.S. have been less 
willing to see soldiers as part of the U.S. working-class or to explore their service as a 
form of labor than their eighteenth-century counterparts. Yet the military labor regime in 
the post-Civil War period was a state-sanctioned regime of coerced labor. This study 
therefore suggests new ways of understanding the federal government’s role in arbitrating 
between the competing claims of free and unfree labor, and it adds another dimension to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Daniel E. Bender and Jana K. Lipman, “Introduction: Through the Looking Glass: U.S. Empire through 
the Lens of Labor History,” in Making the Empire Work: Labor and United States Imperialism, eds. Daniel 
E. Bender and Jana K. Lipman (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 11. 
14 My thinking has been especially influenced by the work of historian Peter Way, who has argued that 
soldiers in the eighteenth-century British army must be understood as “war workers.” See Peter Way, 
“‘black service…white money’: The Peculiar Institution of Military Labor in the British Army during the 
Seven Years’ War,” in Workers across the Americas: The Transnational Turn in Labor History, ed. Leon 
Fink (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 74. The phrase “war workers” is from Way, ibid., 62. 
There is a large literature on the culture and politics of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century maritime 
workers, including sailors in national navies but also merchant seamen, pirates, and others. For example, 
see Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the 
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000).  
15 In the twentieth century, a study of the working-class backgrounds of Vietnam veterans and how their 
class identity shaped their responses to both the war and the anti-war movement is Christian G. Appy, 
Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1993). For a fascinating account of how the U.S. army adopted the language of jobs and career to 
address the challenges of recruiting a volunteer army, see Beth L. Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-
Volunteer Force (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), and Bailey, “Soldiering as work: The all-
volunteer force in the United States,” in Fighting for a Living, 581-612. See also Kimberley L. Phillips, 
War! What Is It Good for?: Black Freedom Struggles and the US Military from World War II to Iraq 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), on the experiences of black working-class soldiers. 
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the landscape of coercion that historians of contract, convict, and padrone labor have 
sketched in the American West and West.16  
This study connects the army and its soldiers to the larger sweep of continental 
and imperial U.S. history. It is not a regional history, but it draws heavily on scholarship 
on the South, the West, and U.S. empire. The chronological and geographic scope of the 
study is vital to its argument: that the labor of soldiers contributed to the imperial 
development of the United States. Tracing the army’s movements also helps bridge the 
tenacious historiographical divide between the continental “expansion” of the nineteenth 
century and the imperial age of the early twentieth century. Only by looking at the army 
as it moved across the continent and across oceans can historians understand its global 
significance. The project of linking American continental imperialism – or, 
euphemistically, manifest destiny – with events in the late-nineteenth century is anything 
but recent. In 1969, William Appleman Williams argued that an ideological faith in the 
marketplace gave coherence to American expansion in the nineteenth century. Explaining 
the shift from continental to overseas expansion, Williams writes, “Given their strong 
traditional commitment to the marketplace conception of reality, and the experience they 
could so easily interpret as confirming that conception of the world, American 
agriculturalists moved from a continental to an overseas imperial outlook with relatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 On unfree labor in the American West after the Civil War, see Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: 
Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North American West, 1880-1930 (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age 
of Emancipation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Stacey L. Smith, Freedom’s Frontier: 
California and the Struggle over Unfree Labor, Emancipation, and Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
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little intellectual difficulty or emotional shock.”17 Although adherents of the Wisconsin 
School differed among themselves about the key moments in this history, Williams and 
his counterparts agreed that the “roots of American empire” began to grow long before 
the Spanish-American War.  
By linking the South, West, and “imperial” Pacific, this study connects 
geographically disparate phases of U.S. imperialism in order to demonstrate ideological 
continuities in the overall project. In doing so, it also underlines the centrality of the U.S. 
army and military labor to various incarnations of the U.S. imperial project. Beyond the 
battlefield, soldiers worked, often under duress, on behalf of an ambitious and 
expansionary state. Drawing on government reports, military records, court-martial 
testimonies, memoirs, letters, and newspapers, this study demonstrates the key role of 
unfree military labor to the construction of an American empire in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The first half of the study moves geographically from 
California in the 1840s, back to the South after the Civil War, and once again to the trans-
Mississippi West in the 1870s and 1880s. In the second half, it follows the army to the 
southern Philippines, where officers and enlisted men encountered new challenges. 
However, one of the surprises of this journey is how little changed and how many 
methods and ideas developed in the continental U.S. were repurposed on the Pacific 
“frontier.” The first chapter, “Army of Occupations: The U.S. Army in the West and 
South,” explores the army’s experience of postbellum occupation and governance in the 
1840s and 1860s, following the Mexican War and the American Civil War. It also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and 
Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1969),  271. 
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examines how political conflicts over the army’s role in the South during Reconstruction 
helped shape its western assignments on the Plains. Chapter 2, “‘More laboring than 
soldiering:’ The U.S. Army as a Labor Force,” argues that the labor of soldiers provided 
significant benefits to private individuals and investors in the West. It shows how the 
infrastructure soldiers built directly benefited certain landowners, ranchers, and 
speculators. Chapter 3, “‘A slave in Uncle Sam’s service’: The Army and the Problem of 
Labor in the Gilded Age,” makes clear that military service constituted a form of coerced 
labor that was increasingly exceptional in the late-nineteenth century. It reveals how 
soldiers protested their own exploitation by drawing on new ideas and expectations about 
labor and citizenship.  
The second half of this project moves to Mindanao, a majority-Muslim region in 
the southern Philippines. Even after hostilities were declared over in most of the 
Philippines, U.S. troops continued to battle insurgents in this region. As a result of 
continued fighting and Americans’ assessment that these Muslims and animists were not 
ready for civilian government, the U.S. created a special military government in 
Mindanao. The fourth chapter, “‘A Despotic Machine:’ Labor and the Imperial Project,” 
argues that the control of laboring populations was a top priority for army officers trying 
to establish a government in this region. Guided by a specific vision of economic 
development and a narrow, Eurocentric civilizational mandate, they attempted to fashion 
new labor systems that involved control over soldiers as well as local populations. 
Chapter 5, “‘Two million industrious laborers’: Military Dreams of a Plantation Colony,” 
looks at how army officials promoted the private plantation economy in the Moro 
Province as well as the resistance they faced. Officers tried to attract American 
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investment by holding fairs and exhibitions and tailoring their military maneuvers to 
support planters’ agendas. But the Moros’ embrace of plantation agriculture was anything 
but enthusiastic. Labor shortages, evasion, and outright violence plagued American 
attempts to promote the plantation export economy. The sixth and final chapter, “‘Our 
Indian wards in the southern Philippines’: Colonial Rule and the Labor of Ideas,” 
explores the intellectual labor of the military elite. Army officers contributed to the U.S. 
imperial project by crafting narratives of American benevolence and indigenous and 
Filipino inferiority. Their writings and publications helped shape popular and academic 
understandings of the United States’ place in the world. Taken together, these six 
chapters outline the broad and crucial role of military labor in the nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. 
* * * 
In 1906, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard implored his fellow Americans to 
appreciate the army’s important work. The public, Bullard believed, took for granted that 
soldiers expanded the reach of the United States and its empire. “All over this country, in 
the great West especially, there are thousands of miles of high-road that were originally 
laid out and made by the soldier, and today in use by his countrymen with no thought, be 
it not a sneer, for him who broke the way,” Bullard wrote. He estimated the roads built by 
soldiers would “doubtless twice span this continent.” The army was responsible for 
“opening” the West to “civilization.” Bullard also credited the army with trying to 
civilize Native Americans and making possible the advance of the transcontinental 
railroads. Furthermore, as he wrote these words in the early twentieth century, Bullard 
insisted that soldiers they were replicating these accomplishments around the globe. 
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“Soldiers,” he declared, “have located, laid out, and, by the labor of their own hands 
under killing heat, stalking disease, the awful cholera, have built in the Philippines great 
roads that are letting in the light upon their dark places. Soldiers have covered the islands 
with a network of telegraph lines that are subduing them to civilization.” Echoing a litany 
of chores soldiers performed decades earlier in the trans-Mississippi West, Bullard 
reminded readers that soldiers in the Philippines were “on guard day and night against a 
treacherous enemy, camping, marching and fighting, surveying and building roads, 
building bridges of iron and wood, logging, building and operating sawmills, quarrying, 
erecting barracks and quarters, building ships’ docks, raising sunken steamers, building 
and operating telegraph lines, establishing and running government – a dozen businesses 
and professions at once.”18 Bullard expected that, as in the North American West, 
soldiers would receive little credit for their labor in the Philippines. 
It is not necessary to employ Bullard’s nineteenth-century rhetoric of 
“civilization” to recognize that soldiers transformed the North American continent and 
many overseas territories through back-breaking and thankless work. The army’s regime 
of military labor helped push forward the capitalist development of the United States and 
contributed to its emergence as an imperial power. Yet as he lamented, the work of 
soldiers has been overlooked, perhaps willfully. Ideologies of nationalism, masculinity, 
and honor have played a part in obscuring the unglamorous aspects of soldiering. By 
excavating the army’s labor regime, this study throws new historical actors into bold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 R.L. Bullard, “In Times of Peace,” Overland Monthly [Overland Monthly and Out West Magazine] 47, 
no. 2 (February 1906). Bullard’s writing recalls the first words spoken in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness: “‘And this also,’ said Marlow suddenly, ‘has been one of the dark places of the earth.’” Joseph 
Conrad, Heart of Darkness (New York: Dover Thrift Editions, 1990), 3.  
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relief: we find a small but effective military force, transforming the continent on behalf 
of private interests; a federal government working hand in hand with capital; soldiers 
whose decades of protest and resistance has largely been ignored; and armies of exploited 
workers laboring on behalf of the American empire. 
The chapters that follow explore this labor. Following soldiers beyond the 
battlefield, taking note of the roads they built and the roads they supervised being built by 
others, finding soldiers doing dozens of unexpected tasks, may yet change the way we 
understand such fundamental aspects of the nineteenth-century United States as war, 
peace, and work.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Army of Occupations: The U.S. Army in the West and South 
 
In his first message to Congress as President, Andrew Johnson explained why he 
had restored the former states of the Confederacy to the Union. The decision rested, in 
part, on his opposition to military rule. “Now, military governments, established for an 
indefinite period, would have offered no security for the early suppression of discontent, 
would have divided the people into the vanquishers and the vanquished, and would have 
envenomed hatred rather than have restored affection.”19 Republican representative 
Thaddeus Stevens took issue with the President’s action in restoring the states to the 
Union. Stevens insisted that only Congress could determine the new relations between 
states of the former Confederacy and the United States. Yet despite his opposition to 
Johnson, in 1865, Stevens also spoke out against military rule. “Since the conquest [these 
states] have been governed by martial law,” Stevens said. Although the South was, in 
essence, a “conquered province,” and by the “law of nations,” the U.S. could decide what 
type of government it should have, Stevens thought an end should come to military rule. 
“Military rule is necessarily despotic, and ought not to exist longer than is absolutely 
necessary,” he admitted. Rather than being admitted as states, he argued that the 
rebellious states should be organized into “territorial governments.”20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Senate Journal. 39th Cong., 1st sess., 11 (1865). 
20 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 72 (1865). On Stevens’ ideas concerning territorialization, see 
Brooks D. Simpson, “Land and the Ballot: Securing the Fruits of Emancipation?” Pennsylvania History: A 
Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 60, no. 2 (1993): 176–88. There is some evidence that freedpeople may 
have believed that the southern states would be turned into territories. In 1865, a black man named Aaron 
Bradley was brought up on charges of “using insurrectionary language.” Bradley was accused of “publicly 
proclaim[ing] that the Rebel or Seceded States were now in the condition of Territories, and that the 
colored people had a right to squat on and take possession of the lands therein, and no power less than an 
Act of Congress could remove them.” General Orders, No. 40, Savannah, Georgia, December 16, 1865, in 
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Congress did not adopt Stevens’ plan to reorganize the former Confederate states 
as territories. Instead, just over a year after Stevens’ speech calling military rule 
“despotic,” he championed a new piece of legislation. In “An act to provide for the more 
efficient government of the rebel States,” Congress proposed the reestablishment of 
military rule in the South. In his remarks accompanying his veto of the act, Johnson 
denounced the legislation that would place the former Confederate states “under the 
domination of military masters.” This “military despotism” would ultimately lead to 
something even worse – “Negro domination.” Furthermore, Johnson warned, military 
government would “totally subvert and destroy the form as well as the substance of 
republican government in the ten States to which they apply. It binds them hand and foot 
in absolute slavery, and subjects them to a strange and hostile power, more unlimited and 
more likely to be abused than any other now known among civilized men. It tramples 
down all those rights in which the essence of liberty consists, and which a free 
government is always most careful to protect.” On March 2, 1867, Congress passed the 
legislation, now better known as the First Reconstruction Act, over Johnson’s veto.21  
Johnson and Stevens were not the first American statesmen to debate whether 
military government conflicted fundamentally with American republican government. In 
the wake of the Mexican War, lawmakers and residents looked askance at the military 
government established in California. Nor was Reconstruction the last time U.S. troops 
would be tasked with duties normally associated with civilian government. This chapter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series 3, Vol. 1, Land and Labor, 1865, 
eds. Steven Hahn, Steven F. Miller, Susan E. O’Donovan, John C. Rodrigue, Leslie S. Rowland (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 468. 
21 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: HarperCollins, 
2011), 271-280. 
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explores the army’s role as an occupying and governing force in the nineteenth century. 
It argues that the labor of occupation was central to the army’s mission as the United 
States extended its boundaries across the continent and put down rebellion within its 
borders. The first section discusses one of the major overlooked precedents for 
Reconstruction – the military occupation and government of California from 1846-1850. 
The second section follows debates in Congress over the distribution of troops after the 
Civil War. It shows how the U.S. army was engaged in two simultaneous 
“reconstructions” – one in the former Confederacy, and other one in the trans-Mississippi 
West. Rather than an exceptional and unprecedented use of military power in a civilian 
context, southern Reconstruction was one of several attempts by the American state to 
use its military forces to incorporate new territory and peoples into the nation.  
As the United States conquered and reconquered territory throughout the 
nineteenth century, soldiers played a variety of roles during occupations. These were not 
the traditional duties of soldiers on the battlefield: instead, they oversaw elections, 
managed city governments, protected freedpeople, dispensed aid, and assisted local 
police forces. Few historians, however, have treated the U.S. army as an army of 
occupation. Furthermore, Reconstruction scholars have not tried to connect postwar 
military occupation to previous military governments, such as the ones the United States 
administered during and after the Mexican-U.S. War.22 In The United States Army and 
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Reconstruction, 1865-1877, James E. Sefton portrays Reconstruction as an aberration 
from soldiers’ other assignments in the nineteenth and twentieth century. “In historical 
perspective the role of the Army in the South from 1865 to 1877 was unique. There were 
no precedents for the task the soldiers faced, and the experience they gained was largely 
unneeded in the years following Reconstruction,” Sefton writes. Robert Coakley argues 
that the army “played an abnormal role in civil government” during Reconstruction. He 
writes, “Never before or after, within the continental boundaries of the United States, did 
it exercise police and judicial functions, oversee local governments, or deal with domestic 
violence on the scale it did in the eleven ex-Confederate states from 1865-1877.”23  
The nation indeed made novel demands of its military in the wake of the Civil 
War. The emancipation of four million black slaves – what W.E.B. DuBois called “easily 
the most dramatic episode in American history” – and subsequent Union victory created 
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significance of the army in protecting the rights of freedpeople where it had troops on the ground, 
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revolutionary possibilities for the South and the nation as a whole.24 Soldiers became 
arbiters of a new political economy based on free labor, and in many cases they were 
responsible for defending the lives and property of ex-slaves. Nevertheless, 
Reconstruction was not the first time the U.S. had fought a war and assigned the army to 
handle civil affairs for an interim period. The history of the army’s work in the 1840s 
points to key imperial precedents for the army’s occupational duties in the Reconstruction 
South. Despite the truly unique aspects of the army’s role in Reconstruction, military 
occupation itself was a constant feature of the expansion of the American state as the 
army remained in place in conquered territories to carry out national policy after wars had 
ended. By paying attention to those features of southern Reconstruction that resembled 
prior and future occupations, historians can begin to revise one of the most stubbornly 
exceptionalist narratives in U.S. history.  
Imperial Precedents: The Army in California  
  
In the summer of 1846, American forces raised the U.S. flag in California. They 
continued to face resistance the rest of that year until the remaining Mexican troops 
surrendered in January 1847. Still, despite near-constant agitation for civil government, 
the U.S. army ruled California until 1849, in an early, little-known episode of military 
rule. Military historian Joseph Dawson III observes that the U.S. captured half of 
Mexico’s territory in the course of the Mexican-American War – territory that would 
subsequently become California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah. “Rather than 
simply occupying these captured territories temporarily, the army administered them as a 
prelude to United States civil government. The army’s control was so complete and so 
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pervasive that it was more than just martial law; it was military government,” Dawson 
writes. In fact, the U.S. army confronted many of the same challenges in California that it 
would later face in occupying the South and the trans-Mississippi West. One of the major 
challenges in California, as it later would be in the Confederacy, was the opposition of 
some locals to military rule in the first place. In the summer of 1846, while the U.S. was 
still at war with Mexico, American emigrants established a weekly newspaper, the 
Californian, that advocated strongly for the establishment of a civil government. In its 
first editorial, the newspaper called for “the establishment of a colonial government in 
California.” The proponents wanted “a formal recognition of the territory of California,” 
a legislature, and a delegate sent to Congress.25 Throughout its rule, the military faced 
challenges to its authority in California, including an “uprising” in Los Angeles that, 
according to historian Theodore Grivas, “almost resulted in a full-scale war.”26 
Subsequent military commanders promised the eventual formation of civil government in 
1846 and 1847, and residents in San Francisco went as far as to hold a public meeting in 
March 1847 calling for the establishment of representative government; they even held 
elections.27  
These attempts at establishing civil government were complicated by ongoing 
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hostilities between the U.S. and Mexico and by the fact that California’s political status 
was inextricably tied up in the national debate over slavery. As late as January 1850, 
President Zachary Taylor wrote hesitantly about his own role in determining the status of 
California. In his message to Congress accompanying over 900 pages of documents 
related to the military governments of California and New Mexico, Taylor wrote: “On 
coming into office, I found the military commandant of the department of California 
exercising the functions of civil governor in that Territory....I thought it best not to 
disturb that arrangement....I therefore did not interfere with the powers of civil governor 
as before; but I made no such appointment, conferred no such authority, and have 
allowed no increased compensation to the commandant for his services.” Taylor did, 
however, insert himself into the national debate over slavery. He said the people of 
California should determine their own “domestic institutions.” Taylor warned, further, 
that many in California are “native citizens of the United States, not inferior to the rest of 
our countrymen in intelligence and patriotism.” He believed such “American freemen” 
would react poorly to any attempt to dictate the terms of their incorporation based on the 
slavery question and would regard such any attempt as an “invasion of their rights.”28   
Opposition to military rule was not limited to the residents of California. As early 
as 1846, the issue of military government was hotly debated in Washington. Members of 
Congress were particularly concerned that President Polk had authorized military 
commanders to establish what amounted to territorial governments in California and New 
Mexico. In December 1846, the House passed a resolution asking the President to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 U.S. Congress. House, Presidential Message Transmitting Information on California and New Mexico, 
31st Cong., 1st sess., H.Ex. Doc. 17 (1849), Serial No. 573. Washington: 1850, 3. Hereafter, 573 H.exdoc. 
17. 
	   	  
	  
	  
23 
provide copies of all communications regarding the governance of California and New 
Mexico. The debate on the floor focused on the President’s power as well as the 
justification for military rule. Whig representative Garrett Davis of Kentucky blasted 
Polk for “establishing, in a word, the whole machine of civil government” in California 
and New Mexico.  
What! Was our American President an emperor, sending forth his Agrippa and his 
Marcellus and his pro-consuls, to establish and to govern the provinces they might 
conquer by force of arms? Was the President of the United States, an officer 
deriving his breath and being from the Constitution of the United States, to 
authorize his satraps and his tetrarchs to set up governments at their pleasure, and 
prescribe to them laws and regulations at their discretion? 
 
If this were the case, Davis demanded to know “by what imperial or regal authority his 
majesty undertook to act” in such a way.29  
The subsequent debate underlined the varied interpretations for what California 
and New Mexico were and how they could be governed. Stephen A. Douglas, 
representative from Illinois, defended Polk and the military on the basis of wartime 
powers. When the U.S. conquered Mexico’s territory, “the government of Mexico over 
those provinces of course ceased to exist,” Douglas argued. It “became not merely the 
right, but the imperative duty” of U.S. forces to establish a government in place of the 
Mexican one that he been “superceded.”  The justification for this action came from “the 
law of nations.” It was most definitely “a military government,” Douglas insisted. “Such 
a government was ‘military’ in its origin, and military in its maintenance; yet it might 
relate also to affairs civil and municipal, as well as to matters purely military.” Douglas 
went farther than other Congressmen in the discussion to delineate the parameters of 
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military government. Such a government “might take care, and was bound to take care, 
that justice was administered to the conquered inhabitants; that their rights and privileges 
in regard to life and property were duly respected, and that all internal affairs of the 
people were suitably arranged and provided for.”30 Douglas further asserted that all 
territory taken by “conquest” was automatically annexed to the United States. “[I]f we 
should conclude a treaty with Mexico without boundaries,” Douglas declared, “all these 
conquered provinces, New Mexico, New Leon, Tamaulipas, California, would be and 
remain part of the territory of the United States. They would be ours by conquest, and 
they remain ours, unless receded.”31 His fellow congressmen did not all agree with 
Douglas’ expansive view of what constituted the nation’s territory. South Carolina’s 
Robert Rhett, for one, believed that if conquest necessarily implied incorporation, then 
the President had no right to make any territorial government for California or New 
Mexico. But the passionate South Carolinian insisted that these lands did not yet belong 
to the United States.  
Was it true that California or New Mexico formed a part of the United States? We 
had, it was true, military occupation of both. But it was by arms that we held them, 
and by arms alone we had any right to control them. Inter arms silent leges. If the 
President commanded them at all it was a satrap -- he was a despot, so far as they 
were concerned: he wielded his power over them by the sword, and enforced it by 
the sword alone. Sic volo sic jubeo was his role, so far as law was concerned…He 
was a despot: he might do what he pleased -- might cut off the head of a judge if he 
so pleased.  
 
It was the state of war that justified the President’s despotism – a point of view firmly 
rejected by the Kentucky congressmen, Garrett Davis. To underscore his contention that 
the nation’s democratic government applied to these conquered provinces, Rhett asked a 
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rhetorical question that anticipated later debates about how far the Constitution extended. 
Rhett insisted that he “utterly denied to any man such authority as this over any territory 
within the limits of this Union; but California and New Mexico are not part of the Union 
-- the Constitution of the United States does not extend over them.” To prove his point 
that the Constitution does not apply to these territories, Rhett challenged his colleagues 
with an absurd proposition: “Would any gentleman here say that every Mexican there had 
a right to the trial by jury?”32  
The debate in Congress in late 1846 pitted Whig congressmen against Democratic 
colleagues and a Democrat in the White House. Sectional politics intensified the conflict. 
The discussion involved more than rhetorical charges of imperialism. When Davis 
accused Polk of sending his “pro-consuls” to “the provinces,” and Rhett defended the 
Polk’s right to be a “satrap” and “despot,” the heated oratory reflected real concerns that 
territorial expansion was turning the United States into an empire. Unlike Rhett, Polk did 
not embrace his identity as a “despot.” On the contrary, he tried to deflect charges that he 
had sanctioned the establishment of anything but the most bare-bones administrative 
government in the West. In a responding to the House’s resolution, the President issued a 
special message to Congress on December 22, 1846. In it he emphasized that the military 
personnel had been instructed to establish nothing more than “temporary governments.” 
He admitted that some of the documents conveyed to Congress “purport[ed] to ‘establish 
and organize’ a permanent Territorial government of the United States over the Territory 
and to impart to its inhabitants political rights which under the Constitution of the United 
States can be enjoyed permanently only by citizens of the United States.” He insisted, 
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however, “These have not been ‘approved and recognized’ by me.”33 In January 1847, 
Polk sent Kearny new instructions that recommended a more circumscribed role for 
military personnel in establishing civil government. It is not surprising that Polk and his 
military commanders struggled to define and justify their power on the ground in these 
“conquered” lands. As John Mack Faragher writes, “There was no provision in the 
Constitution for the establishment of an American empire. Polk’s men were making it up 
as they went along.”34 
These debates did little to clarify the boundaries of military power for the officers 
trying to govern California. Colonel Richard B. Mason, commander of the 1st U.S. 
Dragoons, served as California’s second military governor from May 31, 1847 to April 9, 
1849. Mason’s tenure overlapped with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the 
discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill – two events that dramatically transformed the nature 
and exercise of U.S. power along the Pacific. Upon assuming office, while the war with 
Mexico was still ongoing, Mason explained, “This is a military government, and the 
supreme power… is vested in the senior military officer of the Territory.” That power 
derived from California’s territory as the spoils of war, but it was limited until the terms 
of surrender were made. “Pending the war, our possession gives only such rights as the 
laws of nations recognize; and the government is military, performing such civil duties as 
are necessary to the full enjoyment of the advantages resulting from the conquest, and to 
the due protection of the rights of persons and of property of the inhabitants.” Mason 
tried to make clear that the residents of California did not enjoy full membership in the 
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United States. He continued, “No political rights can be conferred on the inhabitants thus 
situated, emanating from the constitution of the United States.”35 The same month, he 
told another Sonoma resident that “many of my countrymen in California labor under a 
mistake in believing that, because we are in possession of the country, we are under the 
constitution and laws of the United States.” Still, Mason believed it was only a matter of 
time before the people did enjoy the benefits of the Constitution. Once peace was 
declared, Mason believed “to a certainty, to a great and moral certainty, California will 
forever belong to the United States, and we all shall enjoy the blessings of our own 
constitution and laws.”36 
Tidings of peace did not immediately bring the “certainty” Mason anticipated. 
News of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed on February 2, 1848, finally reached 
California that August. At that point Mason implored his superiors in Washington for 
more explicit instructions regarding the army’s proper role in the far West. In a letter 
dated August 19, 1848, to the Adjutant General in Washington, D.C., Mason quoted from 
instructions he had received “to take proper measures with a view to its (Upper 
California) permanent occupation.” Notwithstanding the long delay in receiving news, 
Mason expressed his confusion over exactly what he was supposed to do as a military 
governor now that war was over. He hoped his superiors would send more specific orders 
regarding the establishment of a civil government and clarify California’s standing in the 
Union. He continued,   
The above are the only instructions I have received from the department to guide 
me in the course to be pursued, now that the war has ceased, and that this country 
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forms an integral part of the United States. For the past two years no civil 
government has existed here, save that controlled by the senior military or naval 
officer, and no civil officers exist in the country, save the alcades appointed or 
confirmed by myself. To throw off upon them, or the people at large, the civil 
management and country of the country, would most probably lead to endless 
confusion, if not to absolute anarchy; and yet what right or authority have I to 
exercise civil control in time of peace in a territory of the United States? or if 
sedition and rebellion should arise, where is my force to meet it?  
 
Mason’s supervision of the alcades was a major part of his work upholding the 
governmental structure the U.S. had inherited when it began to rule California. Literally 
translated “mayor,” the alcade was in fact much more. Myra K. Saunders explains, “As 
the sole civil officer, the alcade could serve as mayor, arbitrator, justice of the peace, trial 
judge, and, in some instances, legislator.”37 He promised the adjutant general that he 
would continue to “exercise control over the alcades appointed” and “maintain order” 
until a civil governor arrived.38 He planned to appoint temporary customs collectors so 
that the U.S. would benefit from trade passing through the California ports, and he would 
continue to supervise alcades and carry on governmental duties as before. All the same, 
he worried that he would not be able to actually enforce American sovereignty should he 
and his men face resistance. 
 Secretary of War William L. Marcy tried to clarify the situation for Mason. It was 
true, Marcy agreed, that with the war over the military government no longer “derive[d] 
its authority” from “the laws of war.” But the treaty still “left an existing government -- a 
government de facto -- in full operation.” It would continue until Congress “shall provide 
a government for them.” Marcy further explained the source of the government’s 
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prerogative now that the war was over. 
The consent of the people is irresistibly inferred from the fact, that no civilized 
community could possibly desire to abrogate an existing government where the 
alternative presented would be to place them in a state of anarchy beyond the 
protection of all law, and reduce them to the unhappy necessity of submitting to 
the dominion of the strongest.39  
 
In the meantime, however, before receiving further instructions from the War 
Department, Mason issued a proclamation “To the people of California,” upon receiving 
word of the peace treaty. Mason assured his audience that military government would not 
last long. Congress “will soon confer upon the people of this country the constitutional 
rights of citizens of the United States; and, no doubt, in a few short months we shall have 
a regularly organized territorial government: indeed, there is every reason to believe that 
Congress has already passed the act, and that a civil government is now on its way to this 
country, to replace that which has been organized under the rights of conquest.”40 Yet 
again, Mason was more optimistic than circumstances warranted. He continued to 
languish without definite instructions from Washington while he tried to manage an 
increasingly tense political situation in the ostensibly “peaceful” American outpost.   
Soldiers in the Far West had the difficult task of asserting U.S. sovereignty over a 
vast territory with limited manpower. Colonel Mason’s authority as the military governor 
nominally extended across all of California, an area of roughly 164,000 square-miles. But 
as he expressed anxiously to his superiors back east, he lacked the soldiers necessary to 
actually enforce American sovereignty should it be challenged. Mason had dismissed the 
volunteers whose terms of enlistment had expired, and he would soon have only “two 
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companies of regulars” in the whole of California. In June 1847, Mason explained that 
he had only one thousand troops in the whole state, spread across seven posts “at a long 
distance from each other.” Secretary Marcy wrote, “Under almost any circumstances, this 
force can hardly be regarded as sufficient to answer the purpose for which troops are 
required in that country. Though all is now quiet there, and no serious apprehension is 
entertained of disturbance, yet the country in our occupation is extensive, embracing 
many positions which should be garrisoned, and the Indian race is there numerous, with 
the propensity and habit of depredating.”41 In July, Colonel Jonathan D. Stevenson, a 
subordinate stationed in the south, informed Mason of an upsetting situation. Stevenson 
believed that the army would have to abandon its post at San Diego unless reinforcements 
could be sent from the north or from the Navy. Soldiers of the Mormon Battalion did not 
plan to reenlist, and without their service there were insufficient forces to garrison the 
post.42 This was a particularly unfortunate time to withdraw troops, according to 
Stevenson. He worried about the possibility of attack from Mexico and an insurrection 
among the Californios. Some of these land-owning Hispanic families opposed the 
American occupation and, Stevenson believed, they were planning a rebellion in Los 
Angeles. Meanwhile, he told Mason that the loyal Californios in San Diego had 
“expressed great dissatisfaction” at the news that U.S. troops were going to leave the fort 
there. “All consider it advisable to keep up a proper and well organized force at the Chief 
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Seaport, towns and especially this Pueblo,” Stevenson wrote his commanding officer.43 
The military had long struggled to keep order and maintain even its major 
garrisons and important fortifications in California. Mason reported to the Adjutant 
General at the end of 1847 that regulars would be stationed in San Francisco and 
Monterey “to guard the large depots of powder and munitions of war, which cannot be 
removed.” He warned that “should the people refuse to obey the existing authorities, or 
merchants refuse to pay any duties, my force is inadequate to compel obedience.” Still, 
Mason was optimistic if apprehensive. “I do not anticipate any revolution or rebellion on 
the part of the Californians, although the southern district must be entirely abandoned by 
the military force now there; and, in fact, the minds of all men are so intently engaged 
upon getting gold, that, for the present, they have not time to think of mischief.” He 
hoped to receive more explicit instructions about the establishment of a civil government 
“as soon as possible.”44 Mason’s limited forces were spread thin. 
Once word of the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Fort spread, the army’s situation 
became desperate. It had been challenging to keep troops stationed everywhere they were 
needed in 1846 and 1847. By mid-1848, however, as reports of the great riches to be had 
in California travelled across the U.S. and around the world, it became impossible for the 
army to keep its soldiers away from the mines. Mason and his successor, Brevet 
Brigadier General Bennet C. Riley, tried to convey the critical nature of their situation to 
authorities in Washington. Governor Mason wrote, 
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The discovery of these vast deposits of gold has entirely changed the character of 
Upper California. Its people, before engaged in cultivating their small patches of 
ground and guarding their herds of cattle and horses, have all gone to the mines, 
or are on their way thither; laborers of every trade have left their work-benches, 
and tradesmen their shops; sailors desert their ships as fast as they arrive on the 
coast, and several vessels have gone to sea with hardly enough hands to spread a 
sail; two or three are now at anchor in San Francisco with no crews on board.45  
 
Mason was not alone in recognizing the labor crisis caused by gold. A young William T. 
Sherman served as an adjutant (an administrative assistant to another officer) in 
California during the Mexican War, and he later recalled the drain upon the army caused 
by the gold rush. “At that time so demoralizing was the effect of the gold-mines that 
everybody not in the military service justified desertion, because a soldier, if free, could 
earn more money in a day than he received per month,” Sherman wrote in his Memoirs. 
The entire edifice of society seemed ready to collapse as gold fever swept the region. 
“Not only did soldiers and sailors desert, but captains and masters of ships actually 
abandoned their vessels and cargoes to try their luck at the mines. Preachers and 
professors forgot their creeds and took to trade, and even to keeping gambling-houses.”46 
As Sherman and the other military officials recognized, the discovery of gold had 
completely altered the landscape of labor in California. It caused a reshuffling of the 
social order as educated people “forgot their creeds” and dug for gold.  
The army was vulnerable to these pressures on labor as well, revealing the extent 
to which the military operated within a larger market for labor. Like other employers, the 
army could not maintain its labor force. Colonel Mason reported that twenty-six soldiers 
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had deserted from Sonoma, twenty-four from San Francisco, and twenty-four from 
Monterey. “For a few days the evil appeared so threatening that great danger existed that 
the garrisons would leave in a body,” he noted. “Laboring men at the mines can now earn 
in one day more than double a soldier’s pay and allowances for a month, and even the 
pay of a lieutenant or captain cannot hire a servant. A carpenter or mechanic would not 
listen to an offer of less than fifteen or twenty dollars a day. Could any combination of 
affairs try a man’s fidelity more than this?” It was not only enlisted men who were 
tempted by the mines. “No officer can now live in California on his pay. Money has so 
little value, the prices of necessary articles of clothing and subsistence are so exorbitant, 
and labor so high, that to hire a cook or servant has become an impossibility, save to 
those who are earning from thirty to fifty dollars a day.”47 Just a few months later, Mason 
wrote the Adjutant General that it did not make sense to send any more soldiers to 
California. “So long as the gold mines continue to yield the great abundance of metal 
they now do, it will impossible to keep soldiers in California; and it is of no use to send 
them here.” While soldiers made seven or eight dollars a month, “laborers and 
mechanics” earned up to $100. Indeed, a ship was sitting in the San Francisco harbor 
without a crew because sailors could not be found for $100 a month.48  
In 1849, the secretary of war reported that two-fifths of the initial force of 1,200 
troops stationed in California had deserted eight months later. The army could not 
quickly respond to the labor shortage by raising wages, but it tried to implement other 
measures to retain its own labor force. The commanding officer had adapted to the 
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conditions by allowing “short furloughs” to small numbers of soldiers so they could 
work their individual placers. The ad-hoc policy, however, did not solve the crisis. Brevet 
Major General Persifor F. Smith, commander of the Third Military Division in the West, 
wrote from San Francisco in the spring of 1849 that “the extent and richness of the gold 
region have not been exaggerated.” Likewise “the exorbitant prices paid for labor, rent, 
and subsistence, have hardly been fully set forth.” Smith also noted that the commanding 
officers were instituting new policies to try to adapt to the labor shortage. In addition to 
giving their soldiers leaves of absence to work their placers, Smith also issued 
instructions that the quartermaster could hire back these same soldiers at the civilian rates 
“as labor is hard to get.” Nevertheless, he did not want to see “large bodies of the men to 
go to the mines.” It was one thing to grant leaves and “reward good conduct,” but Smith 
was worried that the enlisted men might interpret liberal policies as concessions or signs 
of weakness. Worse, they might begin to doubt the justice of the army’s demands on their 
labor at all. “General” policies “would be either to acknowledge the right of the men to 
modify their obligations as they please, or to confess our inability to enforce their 
fulfillment.” Colonel Mason readily admitted that he could not retain soldiers; desertion 
was rampant. But other officers, like Smith, were reticent to admit that gold had given 
labor – and in this case, military labor –enormous leverage in California.49  
The new military governor, Bennet Riley, urged the adoption of a stronger – and 
harsher – policy: capital punishment for desertion. In advocating for “the restoration of 
the war penalty,” Riley argued that, “I can see no difference between desertion now and 
desertion in the face of an enemy; nor any good reason why the extreme penalty of the 
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law should not be restored.” Recognizing that the War Department may be unwilling to 
take such a step, he also suggested that deserters be disqualified as citizens and forced to 
forfeit their property, along with “confinement at hard labor upon any of the public 
works, or in any penitentiary of the country.” In addition to these harsher punishments for 
desertion, Riley also asked the secretary of war to provide greater inducements for 
service, including a pay increase and “ a bounty of 320 or 640 acres of land…to all 
soldiers who may serve faithfully the full period of their enlistments.”50 Riley’s 
recommendations were not adopted. At the end of 1849, the secretary of war reported 
glumly that “the evil of desertions consequently continues to exist.”51 
The discovery of gold caused global demographic shifts, brought thousands of 
immigrants from around the world to minefields, and created new social and cultural 
worlds in a matter of months.52 But at the same time as it depleted the ranks of the army 
tasked with governing California, it also amplified the need for the army’s services. In the 
same letter explaining why it was useless to send any more troops to California, Mason 
also admitted that lynch law was a common response to widespread violence in the 
territory. He described thefts and murders related to gold and how groups of local people 
had determined justice and carried out hangings on their own. “You are perfectly aware 
that no competent civil courts exist in this country, and that strictly speaking there is no 
legal power to execute the sentence of death,” he wrote to officials in Washington. “But 
the necessity of protecting their lives and property against the many lawless men at large 
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in this country, compels the good citizens to take the law into their own hands. I shall not 
disapprove of the course that has been taken in this instance.” Rather than apologize for 
“this state of affairs,” Mason believed it “illustrate[s] the absolute necessity of 
establishing a territorial government here as early as practicable. Common humanity 
demands it.”53 His successor, Governor Bennet Riley, echoed the sentiment. He blamed 
in part the type of people who had been drawn to California in search of gold. “The 
discovery of the gold placers has attracted hither thousands of foreign adventurers, many 
of them from the lowest classes of society, and has produced a state of affairs here that 
will require [a] much stronger controlling force to preserve order than I can now 
command.”54 Gold had intensified the need for more soldiers while also making it 
impossible for the army to retain its military labor-force. Nevertheless, Congress was no 
closer to establishing a civil government for California.  
In spite of their small numbers and lack of clarity about their role, the meager 
troops assigned to California ultimately carried out a wide variety of tasks. Stephen W. 
Kearny, the first military governor appointed in February 1847, appointed alcades (the 
civil administrators) and issued decrees and decisions regarding land disputes. Kearny, 
who served for just one hundred days, also appointed Indian agents and port collectors. 
He instituted mail service between San Francisco and San Diego, assigning two soldiers 
to the job. Citizens could use the military-run express free of charge, and the service 
continued until replaced by the U.S. mail.55 Kearny’s successor, Mason, ruled for longer 
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and oversaw the transition from a wartime to a peacetime government. The following 
account of the army’s diverse duties in California suggests important similarities between 
that assignment and the subsequent occupation of the post-Civil War South:  
[Mason] appointed all officers and ‘regulated’ or removed them form office, 
called elections or declared them null and void. He determined the scope of 
military and civil jurisdiction, enforced the law, and interpreted or abrogated it. 
Monitoring the decisions of courts and referees, he approved, mitigated, or 
rejected the verdicts rendered. He instructed judges and alcades and assisted them 
in making arrests, organizing tribunals, and executing their judgments. He made 
investigations, appointed special boards, courts, and commissions, ordered a 
prisoner to Monterey for trial, and set court fees. He restricted immigration, 
imposed or prevented the collection of military contributions, and, with the 
cooperation of the naval commander, regulated import duties. He legalized the 
acceptance of gold dust at the customhouse in lieu of specie and launched an 
informal census of the population and resources of the country.56 
 
In many ways, the army’s work in 1840s California was a combination of what 
they would undertake later in the postbellum South and West. Officers and soldiers 
monitored the political situation and regulated elections. Men like Kearny and Mason 
oversaw the type of civil affairs that would make Reconstruction duty in the South so 
complex and often unpopular. The situation in California also resembled Reconstruction 
in that commanders lacked clear orders about their role. The military governors, 
particularly Mason, found themselves in murky legal waters, and like officers assigned to 
Reconstruction duty, they faced sharp criticism from the people they were charged with 
ruling. They also dealt with Indian affairs, appointed Indian agents, and tried to keep 
peace between the Native population and local ranchers and landowners. At the same 
time, troops in California also performed labor characteristic of “frontier posts.” They 
helped scout and explore territory, identifying potential resources, and they regulated 
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trade. Sherman recalled that soldiers spent a great deal of time in construction work. In 
his memoirs he described an example of such quotidian military labor: “The company of 
artillery was still on the hill, under the command of Lieutenant Ord, engaged in building 
a fort whereon to mount the guns we had brought out in the Lexington, and also in 
constructing quarters out of hewn pine-logs for the men.”57 In San Diego, the members of 
the Mormon Battalion were favorites among the locals because of “their constant 
employment on the public works.” Colonel J. D. Stevenson told Mason that their labor 
had made them “very popular with the people.” He continued, 
[I]f they are continued they will be of more value in reconciling the people to the 
change of government than a host of Bayonets; they have made Bricks, dug and 
bricked up eight or ten wells and furnished a town heretofore almost without 
water at certain seasons of the year with an abundant supply. They are about to 
build a brick Court house, the fees of the Court are already accumulated and the 
Inhabitants paying for the materials and the Mormons doing the work, in short 
when within 80 miles of the place the inhabitants of every rancho asked 
permission for some of the good Mormons to come and work for them, to build an 
oven, a chimney, or repair the roofs of their houses, and I have been[,] in 
consequence of this good feeling[,] the more desirous to have them remain.58  
 
The construction work performed by the troops ingratiated them to the local population, 
particularly Californios who were not always in favor of the American occupation. 
Stevenson’s observation that their work had done more than “a host of Bayonets” to 
“reconciling the people to the change of government” echoes and anticipates many 
subsequent twentieth- and twenty-first century plans to win over local populations to 
military occupation through public works. 
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While some troops were kept busy, other military personnel, particularly officers, 
did not have enough to do in California. In his memoirs Sherman captured some of the 
boredom so typical of “frontier duty” at an isolated western post. He recalled that he 
“spent much time in hunting deer and bear in the mountains back of the Carmel Mission, 
and ducks and geese in the plains of the Salinas.” Once gold was discovered and the 
ranks of enlisted men depleted, officers had even more time on their hands. In 1849, 
stationed at the department headquarters at Monterey, Sherman was truly underworked. 
“With the few soldiers, we had next to nothing to do.” Later, when he became an aide to 
Brevet Major General Persifor Smith, he took side jobs. “As there was very little to do, 
General Smith encouraged us to go into any business that would enable us to make 
money.” Indeed, Smith had reported to the secretary of war that the dearth of enlisted 
men had made it impossible to engage in any major construction projects. “The high rate 
of labor here would seem (for it is likely to last some years) to render all heavy public 
works here unadvisable.”59 Following Smith’s advice, Sherman and a few other officers 
helped survey land for “a newly-projected city of ‘New York of the Pacific,’ situated at 
the mouth of the San Joaquin River.”60 Sherman was far from the only military man who 
decided to “go into…business.” In fact, historian Paul W. Gates writes that Sherman was 
one of the last of his cohort of army officers in California to do so. Gates writes about 
several naval and army officers who speculated in land and mining interests while on 
duty in California. From the highest-ranking officers like Stockton and Mason to 
subordinates like Halleck and Sherman, Gates shows that speculating and investing in 
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what promised to be valuable land and mining interests was widespread among the 
military and naval elite. He even suggests that apart from the desire to make money, 
officers speculated and invested because they did not have enough military work to keep 
them busy. Gates writes, “Like Sherman, Ord, and other officers sent to California in 
1846-1849 who had time on their hands and few responsibilities, George H. Derby, a 
lieutenant with the Topographical Engineers, arrived in San Francisco in 1849 and for the 
next seven years, with short periods of action, took up various outside tasks to keep him 
busy. He surveyed ranchos, for which his compensation was lots or acreage, drew up 
plans for extensive land speculations, and became a newspaper columnist, an editors, and 
well-known humorist.”61 Army officers would continue to invest in the local economies 
of the places they occupied, whether in the trans-Mississippi West or the far western 
frontier of the Philippines.  
The surplus time that officers like Sherman enjoyed should come as a surprise 
given the many duties that demanded the army’s attention in Gold Rush California. Most 
of the major theaters of action in the Mexican-U.S. War were not in California. 
Nonetheless, the army faced potential threats from Hispanic Californios as well as 
Americans who opposed military rule. Mason’s troops also had to contend with rumors of 
secessionist movements. In the spring 1848 rumors abounded of a group that planned to 
attack the Monterey prison and release the prisoners, hoping to recruit them to their 
movement to create an independent government for California. Secretary of State Henry 
W. Halleck and other leaders dismissed such rumors as unimportant or unfounded. 
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Historian Theodore Grivas says they were “never considered seriously as a threat.”62 
More serious, however, was the violence that broke out in 1849. “Nothing more clearly 
demonstrated the impotence of military rule in California than the wave of lawlessness 
and intimidation by mob rule that swept San Francisco during the first six months of 
1849.” Many of these “ruffians and vagabonds” were former soldiers who had been 
discharged in California. Calling themselves “Hounds” or “Regulators,” they united 
together to terrorize foreigners and non-Anglos and remove them from the gold fields. 
“They assumed a sort of military organization, complete with discipline, largely a result 
of the military background of many of the members.” The Hounds attacked Chilean 
miners, stole brazenly from restaurants, and “extorted payments of money and jewels 
from people as a price to exempt them from their raids.” Grivas writes, “Colonel Mason 
and his seriously decreasing number of troops stood helplessly by and made no effort 
stop the lawlessness in San Francisco.”63 This may well have been because the army 
simply lacked the personnel necessary to respond to events in San Francisco. 
 Apart from the interpersonal violence stemming from the gold fields, the army 
considered hostile Native Americans the greatest threat to peace and public order. At the 
time of the U.S. conquest of California, Native Americans made up a substantial portion 
of California’s population. Historian Albert L. Hurtado estimates that of approximately 
10,000 Indians were “an important part of the California labor force” in the 1840s. Prior 
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to the Gold Rush, California’s non-Indian population numbered about 14,000.64 The 
American military government was chiefly concerned with the alleged raiding carried on 
by Native Americans targeting ranches. Ranchers throughout California reported 
increased thefts and raiding, and the government received multiple requests for additional 
military troops to protect them and their stock. More than one group of ranchers 
threatened to abandon their property if the U.S. army did not send troops to protect 
them.65 But ranches were apparently not the only target of Indian raiding. In San Diego, 
Colonel J. D. Stevenson believed that “mission Indians” – or descendants of those 
Indians forced to labor on the mission properties – were stealing and vandalizing the 
mission at San Luis. He reported that they “are now advised and believe that all the 
Mission property of every kind, church furniture and all belong to them and hence they 
have a right to carry it off for their own use or destroy as they please.” He reported that a 
group of fifty Natives had recently come to the mission, carried off property and chased 
away cattle, and accosted the “old Indian Chief” who served as the mission’s caretaker.66 
Stevenson thought the government should appoint an Indian agent to deal with the 
problem and recommended, in essence, the reinstitution of the mission system. He 
thought the agent could “cause to be collected the most industrious and respectable 
portion of the Indians, set them to work, and while they provide comfortably for 
themselves by their labors on the [mission] property and take care of it.”67 The next 
month, however, Stevenson wrote Mason again – this time with a different report on the 
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same Indians. He had received a delegation of “the principal Chiefs and some Eighty 
Indians, originally of the San Luis Bay [Rey] Mission.” Nearly one hundred Native 
Americans called on Stevenson, “request[ing] proof for the charges that had been levelled 
against them of ‘Robbing the Churches [and] Inhabitants.’” They asked for an American 
agent to be appointed for them. Describing his meeting to Mason, Stevenson explained, 
“The Californians were their sworn enemies, and they could never be happy or at peace 
under his orders.” The Californios, meanwhile, were “very much incensed, and alarmed, 
at the boldness of the Indians coming here, in such force.” They demanded that 
Stevenson order the Indians to leave the town and “break up their camp.”  They also told 
the army officers that the Indians were “completely armed with Spears, Pistols, Knives, 
Rifles and plenty of Ammunition.” In order to investigate the situation, Stevenson 
gathered the Indians together and ordered them to present all their weapons. He found far 
less than reported and discovered that the story had been greatly exaggerated in order to 
get the U.S. military personnel to take action against the Indians. Stevenson promised the 
Indian delegation he would appoint an American agent for them within six weeks, and he 
sent them off with beef from the quartermaster. Meanwhile, he told Mason, “I really do 
not believe those Indians commit the depredations charged upon them, but that the wild 
Indians and perhaps some bad Christian Indians do much mischief to the Inhabitants 
there can be no doubt.”68 
 The military governors in California slowly developed an Indian policy and 
adopted various measures to address violence and raiding. They often expressed concern 
for the well-being of California’s Native population. In 1847, Governor Kearny 
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instructed Captain John A. Sutter, one of his new Indian sub-agents, to tell the Indians 
that the President of the United States is “their great father; that he takes good care of his 
good children.”69 His successors were likewise worried about the poor treatment of 
Indians, as when Governor Riley reported that a party of mountaineers had committed 
“most horrible barbarities on the defenceless Indians” [sic].70 Overall, however, the 
military government prioritized the needs of Hispanic landowners and then the American 
newcomers who sought a reliable workforce and protection from Indian raiding. Even 
benevolent policies stemmed from a desire to maintain public order and protect the 
interests of landowners. Hurtado writes, “When American officials acted to protect 
Indians from abuse and exploitation, they did so primarily to prevent Indian hostilities 
and to buttress landholders’ interests.”71 The army would experience many of the same 
pressures from landowners in later years who wished to secure a workforce in the post-
Civil War South. Indeed, many of the same concerns resurfaced: Stevenson, for example, 
suggested Mormon soldiers be assigned to help the Indian agent. They “would be of great 
service in instructing the Indians how to cultivate the soil, and would at the same time 
form a strong guard for the Agent,” he believed.72 Landowners similarly petitioned the 
army asking that Indians be required to carry documentation from their employer 
entitling them to carry weapons.73 The military government eventually did require 
Indians to carry passes if they traveled far from their homes.74 Important differences 
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distinguished the army’s mandate in the California from its later work in the 
Reconstruction South – namely the very different national policies towards Native 
Americans, ex-Confederates, and freed slaves. Nonetheless, the history of military 
government in California makes clear that Reconstruction was not the army’s first 
experience serving as interlocutor between laborers and landowners or its first efforts to 
regulate the flow of people in the service of an agricultural economy.75  
Military personnel, Californios, American settlers, and Native Americans no 
doubt wondered how long the U.S. military government would last. After the war with 
Mexico officially ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, the 
rest of the nation joined in the speculation about how California, as well as other territory 
gained in the war, would be incorporated into the Union. Would Congress create a 
territorial government for California, or would it enter the Union as a state? If the latter, 
would California be a free or slave state? In the summer of 1849, after Congress 
adjourned without deciding any of these issues, Governor Riley issued a proclamation 
calling for a convention to determine a civil government for California. Although Riley 
appears to have acted on his own with limited authority to do so, his instructions for the 
formation of a state convention closely resembled President Taylor’s wishes as well. 
Taylor wrote Congress that “my desire [is] that each Territory should, if prepared to 
comply with the Constitution of the United States, form a plan of a State Constitution and 
submit the same to Congress, with prayer for admission to the Union as a state.”76 
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Elections were held, and the people of California voted in favor of a state, rather than 
territorial, government. They elected a governor, secretary of state, and other officials, 
and they ratified a state constitution. This provisional civil government ruled until 
California was officially incorporated into the Union as a free state on September 9, 
1850.77 
In pre-statehood California, the army was the United States government. During a 
time of instability and uncertainty, troops on the ground represented federal authority. 
While the military governors of California did not establish regimes of the same scope or 
scale as those in the South during Reconstruction, they and the soldiers under their 
command served an army of occupation and government. In California as in the former 
Confederacy, soldiers performed a large assortment of duties. Their “labor of occupation” 
ranged from building quarters to surveying lands, from making arrests to collecting 
customs fees. With few explicit instructions from Washington, officers deployed their 
limited troops in ways they thought would support American plans for the region. And 
not for the last time, soldiers performed labor for far less pay than their civilian 
counterparts. Once gold was discovered, both officers and regulars received pay far 
below the “going rates,” leading to the rash of desertions that threatened to thoroughly 
undermine the military occupation. Nevertheless, the U.S. government continued to rely 
on the army to not only protect its newly-conquered territory but to incorporate it into the 
larger polity by establishing mail service, collecting revenue, regulating Native 
Americans, and enforcing laws. While small, the army was an effective labor and 
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occupational force that the federal government used to assert its sovereignty in 
California. 
“A State of Quasi War:” The U.S. Army after the Civil War 
In 1869, the highest-ranking officer in the U.S. army declared that his troops were 
at war. “While the nation at large is at peace, a state of quasi war has existed and 
continues to exist, over one-half its extent, and the troops therein are exposed to labors, 
marches, fights, and dangers that amount to war,” wrote William T. Sherman, a former 
adjutant in California who was now the army’s commanding general. “Were the troops 
withdrawn, or largely diminished, in Texas, the Indian Country, in Arizona, New Mexico, 
Montana, Idaho, or Alaska, as well as in some parts of our southern states, I believe a 
condition of things would result amounting to anarchy.”78 Just two years before, 
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens had described a similar state of affairs in the South. In 
calling for the passage of legislation that would set up military governments in the former 
Confederacy, he announced to the House of Representatives, “For two years [the 
southern states] have been in a state of anarchy; for two years the loyal people of those 
ten States have endured all the horrors of the worst anarchy of any country. Persecution, 
exile, murder have been the order of the day…”79 Although the Civil War was over, 
“anarchy” prevailed throughout the South and West in the years following Appomattox.  
This section explores how the U.S. army responded to demands emanating from 
the South and West after the Civil War. It points out continuities between the army’s 
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occupational duties in 1840s California and the Reconstruction South. It also 
demonstrates how debates over the army’s role in the South and West shaped policies in 
both “theaters.” The United States made diverse calls on the American military 
establishment in the post-Civil War era. Troops battled against Native Americans. They 
protected mail trains and railroad construction crews on the western plains. They 
patrolled the Rio Grande in search of horse- and cattle-thieves. They mediated labor 
disputes between freedpeople and planters in the Mississippi Delta. At first army leaders 
were optimistically naïve about their multiple assignments. In late 1866, General Ulysses 
S. Grant wrote, “On the whole, the condition of the States that were in rebellion against 
the government may be regarded as good enough to warrant the hope that but a short time 
will intervene before the bulk of the troops now occupying them can be sent to our 
growing territories, where they are so much needed.”80 Soon Congress would task the 
army with a much larger role in the South, and the army would continue to be split 
between its southern and western assignments.81 Scholars have tended to examine these 
disparate challenges in isolation: historians of Reconstruction have seen the army as one 
player in the dramatic upheaval of the post-war South, while military and western 
historians have found the army in the southwest or on the Plains responding to threats, 
supposed and real, from Native Americans. It has been difficult for scholars to place 
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Reconstruction and the Indian Wars together in a single narrative or analytical frame. 
Partly this is because the story of black emancipation and its aftermath has seemed so 
different from the nation’s genocidal policies towards Native Americans. Moreover, 
historians tend to portray the army’s role in Reconstruction as unprecedented – an 
unusual use of the nation’s military forces at an exceptional moment.  
In recent years historians have begun to expand the geographical and 
chronological boundaries of the Civil War and Reconstruction. They have produced new 
volumes dedicated to the Civil War in the trans-Mississippi West, and they have 
examined Reconstruction in terms of western issues. Historians have also begun to 
rethink categories like freedom, slavery, and citizenship by paying more attention to the 
West. For Elliott West, the Civil War and emancipation present a “paradox” when 
viewed alongside U.S. Indian policy, highlighting tensions over citizenship and 
belonging that had long been part of the American national story. In his study of the Nez 
Perce, he suggests that the emancipation of four million African-American slaves, the 
expansion of the territorial boundaries of the nation, and the bloody battles with Native 
Americans must be understood as part of the same period – what he calls “Greater 
Reconstruction.” The notion of a “greater reconstruction” illuminates many of the issues 
at work in the post-Civil War army. Calls for manpower from western “frontier” settlers 
created tensions for officers in places like Texas, where they also faced conflicts related 
to the recent civil war. But the army’s experience on these continental fringes had even 
more far-reaching effects, as the post-war settlement between the Union and Confederacy 
intersected with U.S. wars of expansion and empire. Steven Hahn suggests that these 
southern, western, and global processes help us better understand the emergence of a 
	   	  
	  
	  
50 
strong central state in the U.S. in the nineteenth century. Moving beyond regional and 
national frameworks, Hahn regards the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Indian wars as 
important for understanding “American empire and imperial nationhood.”82  
 The United States waged a series of military assaults in the mid-nineteenth 
century designed to extend its boundaries. Even after the army had successfully expanded 
the nation’s territory, it continued to face resistance and hostility in the South and West. 
The spoils of the Mexican War, referred to as the Mexican Cession, amounted to roughly 
529,000 additional square-miles under the American flag, making it second only to the 
Louisiana Purchase in terms of territory added to the Union since the founding. Conflicts 
with Native Americans in Texas were part of ongoing efforts to effectively incorporate 
this territory into the nation – to establish real sovereignty over both the land, its 
resources, and its people. In the 1860s and 1870s, however, the federal government also 
had to reincorporate the South into the Union. Considered in terms of land mass, the 
former Confederacy trumped the Mexican Cession at nearly three-quarters of a million 
square-miles and represented far more people and agricultural resources.  
The nation’s top military commanders communicated the scope and diversity of 
the army’s work in Reconstruction in their departmental reports. In 1867, the first year of 
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Military Reconstruction, the ten former Confederate states were divided into five 
military districts. As General Ulysses S. Grant, serving as interim secretary of war, wrote, 
“The powers of these commanders are both civil and military.”83 In the first military 
district, which included the former state of Virginia, all elections had been suspended. 
The district commander, Brevet Major General J. M. Schofield, was responsible for 
filling vacancies in state, county, and municipal governments. In addition, one of the 
army’s major tasks throughout Reconstruction was overseeing elections and selecting 
registrars. The legislation enacting Military Reconstruction specified that military 
commanders were to “appoint as many boards of registration as may be necessary, 
consisting of three loyal officers or persons, to make and complete the registration, 
superintend the election, and make return to him of the votes, list of voters, and of the 
persons elected as delegates by a plurality of the votes cast at said election.” If a plurality 
of voters voted for a convention, the commanding general would designate a time and 
place for the convention, advertise it publically, and the convention would “frame a 
constitution and civil government” according to the specifications outlined in First 
Military Reconstruction Act. Then the constitution would be ratified, again in a manner 
organized and approved by the commanding general.84  
These were the political duties that officers assigned to Reconstruction duty 
generally disliked. In Charleston, South Carolina, part of the second military district, 
there was a Bureau of Civil Affairs staffed by military personnel. The duties of the 
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bureau were described as “matters connected with registration under reconstruction 
acts.” However, A. J. Willard, heading up the bureau, “found their sphere largely 
increased” by the various legal questions that arose from carrying out the reconstruction 
orders. His account of the work carried out by the Bureau of Civil Affairs is quoted at 
length because it provides a sense of what duties devolved upon the army during the early 
years of Military Reconstruction: 
The subjects acted upon under this title [civil administration] related principally to 
the appointment and removal of civil officers and qualification for offices, the 
consideration of the power and duties of civil officers, as modified by military 
orders, questions related to taxation, tot the reparation of roads, bridges, &c, the 
qualifications and drawing of juries, the establishment of military tribunals, and the 
preparation of rules and regulations for the government thereof; and to 
communications involving the construction of orders relating principally to the 
following topics: the abolition of imprisonment for debt, distress for rent, and the 
staying suits and executions in certain cases.85 
 
Major General George G. Meade, commanding the Third Military District, illustrated his 
Reconstruction responsibilities in terms of the amount of correspondence it entailed. “The 
amount of labor performed in carrying on the civil and military administration of my 
command, independent of what specially related to the civil bureau…will be seen by 
reference to the accompanying statement of my assistant adjutant general.” In the ten 
months covered by said statement, Meade’s command had received 5,432 letters, and 
sent 1,883 letters and 6,084 endorsements “covering orders, instructions, and decisions.” 
The Third Military District included Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. All three states had 
been “admitted to representation” by the end of 1868, and Meade was relieved that his 
“detached and scattered” troops could be brought together and stationed at railroad 
depots. He optimistically declared “the cessation of all intervention on the part of military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 U.S. Secretary of War. Annual Report, 1867, 310. 
	   	  
	  
	  
53 
officers in civil affairs,” but that would prove far from true as paramilitary groups 
continued to organize in opposition to the U.S. army, freedpeople, and former 
Unionists.86   
Responsibility for civil affairs engendered much of the same confusion and 
hostility in the South as it had in pre-statehood California. As in California, the army 
officers assigned to Reconstruction duty complained they had not received specific 
instructions regarding the parameters of their power. In his brief remarks as commander 
of the Department of the South, Major General Henry W. Halleck asked that “the powers 
and duties of officers in interfering in civil affairs be more clearly defined by law and 
regulations.” He explained, “Officers are frequently ordered in general terms to assist 
certain civil functionaries in enforcing the civil laws, and these functionaries often expect 
them to perform duties which are not entirely undefined, and which have heretofore been 
regarded as not within the power of the military to perform.”87 Just over two decades 
earlier, Halleck had served as the secretary of the territory in pre-statehood California. In 
1871, he once again he found himself engaged in the uncertain position of assisting with 
civilian duties.   
 In addition to overseeing elections, patrolling the countryside, and arresting 
criminals, the army also worked closely with freedpeople. Major General Sickles in 
South Carolina was one of many army officers who thought the solution to the South’s 
problems would be found in reestablishing the plantation economy. In 1866 he wrote to 
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Washington, “When I assumed command in this State I found the labor question, the 
most important element of prosperity in an agricultural country, entirely unsettled. The 
freed people, the former laborers, and the only reliance for the immediate supply of the 
great desideratum, labor, were restless, unquiet and indisposed to make arrangements for 
continuous labor.” Meanwhile, the white landowners were “depressed, despondent, and 
hopeless” about the prospects of “securing sufficient labor to whiten the alluvial fields of 
the Mississippi valley once more with the great staple, cotton.” Sickles suggested to the 
assistant commission of the Freedmen’s Bureau that a circular be issued advising, but not 
requiring, freedmen to enter into labor contracts. “It was hence necessary to impress them 
with the sublime truths that freedom is not licentiousness; that it does not mean the right 
to do nothing and be supported by charity, whether national or individual; and that it is 
the duty of every human creature, possessed of the capacity, to work for his or her own 
support.”88 Across the South army officers and bureau agents tried to encourage 
freedpeople to give up their dreams of being freeholders and enter into contracts with 
white landowners, many times their former masters. But opinion was not uniform, even 
among the army brass. Brevet Major General Nelson A. Miles, serving as assistant 
commissioner for the Freedmen’s Bureau in North Carolina, for one, worried about the 
region’s overreliance on cotton. “Scanty crops” had taken their toll on the population, 
forcing the bureau to issue rations of “meat and breadstuffs.” Miles thought cotton was “a 
risk”: “It consumes time in cultivation, preparation, and realization, and the result is, that 
there being no bread in the land, the poor must starve or the Government support them.” 
A few months later, Miles issued a circular urging freedpeople to plant consumable crops 
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in addition to cotton. It “advise[d] and urge[d] the planting of cereals in preferences to 
cotton; much of the past and present destitution arises from an undue attention to the 
production of the latter staple, and hereafter the officers of this Bureau, if called upon for 
assistance, will always take into consideration the endeavors of communities or 
individuals to provide for the production of breadstuffs.”89 Individual army officers could 
exercise their own discretion in encouraging freedpeople to enter into contracts and plant 
certain crops. They also exercised discretion in responding to various appeals for 
assistance, whether stemming from material destitution or threats of violence.90  
 Another time-consuming duty for officers in the occupied South was dealing with 
uncooperative civilian officials. The First Reconstruction Act, passed over Johnson’s veto 
on March 2, 1867, made clear the power of the military district’s commanders over the 
civil authorities in the former Confederacy. The legislation stated that “any civil 
governments which may exist therein shall be deemed provisional only, and in all 
respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, 
modify, control, or supersede the same.” Additional legislation was passed on March 23, 
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again over Johnson’s veto, which underlined the supreme power of the military over the 
“provisional” extant governments. In case there was any doubt, the “supplementary act” 
stated it was “the true intent and meaning” of the First Reconstruction Act that “the rebel 
states…were not legal State governments; and that thereafter said governments, if 
continued, were to be continued subject in all respects to the military commanders of the 
respective districts, and to the paramount authority of Congress.” The district commander 
was empowered to “suspend or remove from office” whatever official as he saw fit.91  
 Despite the clarity of the decree, civil officials challenged district commanders’ 
authority. In Georgia, Major General John Pope threatened the provisional governor, 
Charles Jones Jenkins, with removal if he continued to oppose Reconstruction. Jenkins 
had gone to Washington to seek an injunction from the U.S. Supreme Court against the 
establishment of Military Reconstruction. (The Court denied to hear the petition for want 
of jurisdiction.)92 Pope wrote Jenkins, “In your address to the people of Georgia, which 
occasioned this correspondence, you denounce the acts of Congress, which I am sent here 
to execute, as ‘palpably unconstitutional’ and ‘grievously oppressive,’ and advise the 
people, whatever may be the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, to take 
no action under those laws. While you counsel them not to resist by violence, you at the 
same time, by open official denunciation of the law, invite the very action which you 
seem to deprecate,” Pope wrote. He told Jenkins in no uncertain terms that he could not 
continue to openly defy Reconstruction and still remain in office. “It is manifestly 
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impossible for me to perform the duties required of me by the acts of Congress while the 
provisional governor of the State is opening denouncing them and giving advice to the 
public in his official capacity.” Pope informed Jenkins that if this behavior continued, 
“the whole civil government of the State” would have to be “overthrown, and military 
substituted.”93 Pope was spared the nuisance of removing Jenkins; that duty fell to his 
successor, Major General George Meade. 
 One of more notable conflicts between military and civilian authority involved 
Major General Philip H. Sheridan. As commander of the Fifth Military District, Sheridan 
carefully monitored political events at the parish, city, and state level. He used the powers 
granted by Congress to remove officials he deemed antagonistic to Reconstruction. These 
included the governors of Texas and Louisiana as well as twenty-two councilmen in New 
Orleans, among many others. These actions earned him the ire of President Johnson, who 
wanted to limit the army’s – and Congress’ – power in the South. Despite the opposition 
of General Ulysses S. Grant, Johnson removed Sheridan from command of the Fifth 
Military District in August 1867. Later that fall, Sheridan was unapologetic about his 
actions. In his official report to Washington, Sheridan insisted that “nearly every civil 
functionary, from the governor down” in Texas and Louisiana had been “soldiers or 
aiders and abettors in the rebellion.” They were, he said, elected for the very purpose of 
opposing the United States government, and they continued to oppose “the law” and 
Sheridan himself. He defended himself on the grounds that these officeholders were 
essentially traitors and “aliens,” having opposed the Union and placed themselves outside 
of it. “There was only one reasonable course to pursue, and that was remove every civil 
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officer who did not faithfully execute the law, or who put any impediment in the way of 
its execution – and this course was adopted.”94 
 Politics during Reconstruction was not limited to courtrooms and governors’ 
offices. Violence was one of the defining features of political mobilization during this 
period. As historians have amply demonstrated, white southerners organized in 
paramilitary groups in order to terrorize African-Americans and suppress their political 
activities. In addition to African-Americans, they also targeted white Unionists.95 Jeffrey 
C. Davis, Brevet Major commanding the District of Kentucky, which fell outside the 
boundaries of Congress’ order and was not governed by the Reconstruction Act, 
nonetheless tasked his troops with responding to this threat. As early as 1866, he 
described “bands of ‘guerillas’ and ‘negro regulators’” who were intimidating people in 
the countryside. “The increase of robbery and lawlessness, and the ineffectual measures 
taken by the civil authorities to suppress these bands, rendered it my duty to offer to the 
citizens more protection from the military than I had before found necessary.” He 
assigned detachments of soldiers to accompany Freedmen’s Bureau agents and to arrest 
“desperadoes.” Davis would then turn over the criminals to civil authorities.96  
 Before his transfer, Sheridan described a similar state of unrest and violence in 
Texas. “The condition of civil affairs in Texas was anomalous, singular, and 
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unsatisfactory,” he wrote. Unfortunately, Sheridan could not rely on the support of civil 
authorities to protect the citizens of the state. He reported that Governor Throckmorton 
(whom Sheridan later removed from office) wanted to remove troops from east and send 
them to the frontier, confident that “justice would be done to freedmen, Union men, and 
our soldiers in the courts.” Sheridan insisted, however, “But justice is not done.” He 
recounted a recent incident in which two soldiers were shot to death. Although the grand 
jury would not indict their killers, they did charge another officer with burglary “because 
he broke into the house of some citizen in his attempt to arrest” the murderers. The 
situation was ludicrous, in Sheridan’s assessment. He wrote grimly, “My own opinion is 
that the trial of a white man for the murder of a freedman, in Texas, would be a farce.”97  
 The effect of this ongoing violence was, in many cases, to restore the South to 
conditions that had prevailed before the war. A freedmen’s bureau agent in Texas wrote 
about the “fearful amount of lawlessness and ruffianism” in his state. “Armed bands 
styling themselves Ku-klux, &c., have practices barbarous cruelties upon the freedmen. 
Murders by the desperadoes who have long disgraced this State are of common 
occurrence.” But the government simply did not have the resources on the ground to 
prevent such violence. “The civil authorities have been overawed, and, in many cases, 
even the bureau and military forces have been powerless to prevent the commission of 
these crimes….In consequence of this condition of affairs a kind of quiet prevails among 
the freed people lacking but little in all the essentials of slavery.”  
 Army officers believed that safety was a function of the location of bureau agents 
and army troops. In South Carolina, Major Gen. D.E. Sickles wrote that in parts of his 
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state, “a freedman has little security for life, limb, or property, apart from the presence 
and protection of a garrison of United States troops.” It was not only freedpeople who 
suffered violence. “Magistrates, constables, jurors, and witnesses, residing far from a 
garrison, are intimidated by threats of retaliation from enforcing the ordinary legal 
remedies against these bandits and guerillas.”98  The Texas bureau agent echoed these 
sentiments: “In the more remote districts, where bureau agents are 50 or 100 miles apart, 
and stations of troops still further distant, freedmen do not dare or presume to act in 
opposition to the will of their late masters.” As a result, freedpeople were not even trying 
to “exercise rights conferred upon them by the acts of Congress.”99 If people’s safety 
could not be ensured, then new laws were meaningless. Historian Gregory Downs affirms 
what these army officers expressed in their appeals for reinforcements. Downs writes, 
“But if proximity was at the heart of the army’s power, the military was nearly powerless 
in places it did not reach. In regions far from military stations, guerilla warfare raged.”100 
Despite the “intrusive, expansive occupation of the Southern countryside” that Downs 
describes, many regions were in fact too far from a garrison to enjoy the protection and 
security federal soldiers tried to provide. 
 The army worked to protect African-Americans and loyal citizens from pervasive 
violence, but commanders were well aware of their own limitations. Their reports are 
filled with requests for increased manpower. In 1868, General George G. Meade told 
General Grant that there were “unmistakable signs of disorder in [Georgia] and Alabama 
from secret organizations, such as have disturbed Tennessee.” Meade assured his superior 
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that he would issue “a very stringent order” and pursue other means to “check this evil.” 
But Meade, like so many other commanders in both South and the West, felt that his 
troops were “insufficient to control all parts of these States.” Meade was especially 
apprehensive about the upcoming elections. These were events that usually triggered 
attacks on freedpeople and Unionists as paramilitary groups sought to “intimidate 
voters,” as Meade himself recognized in this case. He wrote Grant, “If you can spare a 
regiment, any companies you can send will be of great value.”101 Too often, however, 
there were no regiments to spare.  
Southern and Western Occupations 
 
While the U.S. army carried out Congress’ mandate, serving as the governmental 
authority in the former Confederacy and preparing the way for the South’s 
reincorporation into the nation, it was also acting as an “army of occupation” in the trans-
Mississippi West. In the same reports that detailed the conflicts, intrigues, and 
administrative minutiae of Reconstruction, other officers reported on affairs along the 
border with Mexico, in the arid deserts of the southwest, and on the Great Plains. Their 
duties in the West largely concerned Indian hostilities, but in some places, army officers 
faced the challenges of Reconstruction alongside those of the “frontier.” This was 
particularly true in Texas. In 1865, a man in northeast Texas wrote Governor Andrew 
Jackson Hamilton to inform him that every day one could hear remarks such as, “the war 
is not over yet and that it will come up in a different form” and “the South is only held 
quiet by the bayonet and that as soon as the soldiers are dismissed the war will come up 
in a different form.” Expressions of hostility toward the Union were common. In nearby 
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Parker County, an American flag raised over the courthouse was “torn down and torn to 
peaces” [sic]. Although the “perpetrators of this outrage” were known, they eluded 
punishment. Echoing many similar petitions, this resident declared, “the Civil Law is 
powerless, Murder[er]s walk about with impunity. Horsestealing murder & robery are the 
order of the day.” Reflecting Texas’ position at the crossroads of the West and South, 
residents feared not only ex-Confederates but Native Americans as well. “Indian Raids 
are quite common in all the counties west of this and three or four have been made in the 
N.W. Portion of this County.” White people had abandoned their homes and fled the 
region. Distance and isolation only added to their troubles. The petitioner informed 
Hamilton that they had had “no mails and have not seen a news paper for 6 weeks.”102 
Places like Tarrant and Parker County, Texas, defy the neat regional narratives 
that have long distinguished “southern” and “western history.” Individuals like the one 
who petitioned Governor Hamilton felt both the violence of Reconstruction and the 
violence of the Indian Wars. Unionists there had survived – and won – the Civil War, but 
the war had not settled many critical issues. As this man wrote Hamilton, many who had 
taken the amnesty oath “openly advocate the restoration of slavery” and still kept their 
slaves in bondage. Even as they faced these “southern” problems, such communities also 
served as outposts of an expanding U.S. empire in the West. The withdrawal of troops 
from the Plains during the war years had provided breathing room for Native American 
tribes. It would take several years before the U.S. army was able to rebuild posts and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Birdville, Tarrant County resident to Governor Andrew Jackson Hamilton, October 30, 1865, Hamilton 
Papers, Box 301-50, Folder 30, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas. 
	   	  
	  
	  
63 
assert sovereignty over such places. In the meantime, indigenous peoples “hostile” to 
U.S. imperialism survived by assaulting such frontier communities.103  
The army in the West faced the same challenges of limited manpower as 
commanders in the South. Troops were charged with policing vast expanses of territory 
over which they were supposed to exert the sovereignty of the federal government. In the 
South, the threat came from bands of “regulators” or the “Ku Klux,” groups of former 
Confederate soldiers who continued to defy the authority of the federal government while 
terrorizing African-Americans and loyal “Union men” (and women). In the West, the 
threat was more dispersed but also considered a threat to national interests and the 
security of American citizens. After his transfer west, General Philip H. Sheridan 
continued to fulfill his duties with passion. General Sherman reported in 1868 that 
“General Sheridan in person was laboring with every soldier of his command to give all 
possible protection to the scattered people in that wide range of country from Kansas to 
Colorado and New Mexico.”104 Sherman and Sheridan believed Indian hostilities were 
holding back settlement and impeding the progress of the railroads. Peaceful compromise 
was out of the question. “It is idle for us longer to attempt to occupy the plains in 
common with these Indians,” Sherman warned. The West was made for grazing, not 
farming. The plains Indians were pastoral people and hunters; the two ways of lives were 
incompatible. Sherman explained, “All of our people there are necessarily scattered, and 
have more or less cattle and horses, which tempt the Indian, hungry, and it may be 
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starving for want of his accustomed game; and he will steal rather than starve, and to 
steal he will not hesitate to kill. Therefore, a joint occupation of that district of country by 
these two classes of people, with such opposing interests, is a simple impossibility, and 
the Indians must yield.”105 
Economic interests dictated that the Indians “must yield,” and remain on the 
reservations assigned to them. Sheridan was particularly concerned about the economic 
impact of raiding and Indian violence. He estimated that 5,000 head of cattle had been 
run off from their ranches and from freight trains. Ranchers had abandoned their lands. 
“Unless the Indians are crushed out, and made to obey the authority of the government, 
there will be a total paralysis of some of the best interests of this section of country. All 
confidence is destroyed.”106 Sherman had ordered two of his top generals to protect main 
lines of trade and transit – the Missouri River and the Union Pacific railroad – “with 
jealous care.” Other troops would make sure the Indians stayed on their reservations; 
otherwise, Sheridan was under orders to “destroy or punish the hostile Indians of his 
department” until they submitted to the U.S.’s reservation plans for them. 
Sheridan, Sherman, and the other architects of U.S. military policy did not lack 
resolve in dealing with Native Americans. They simply lacked the manpower to enforce 
their ambition to make their enemy “yield,” in part because the army was charged with 
increasing responsibility and an ever-larger territory to occupy, administer, and secure. 
Sherman recognized as much in 1868. He reminded his superiors in Washington of the 
very different circumstances he faced in the West. “You will observe that whilst the 
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country generally has been at peace, the people on the plains and the troops of my 
command have been constantly at war, enduring all its dangers and hardships, with none 
of its honors or rewards.” Part of the problem was that Americans were pushing the 
“frontier” of settlement further west before the army had “secured” it for them. “Our 
people continue as heretofore to settle on the exposed points of the frontier, to travel 
without precaution which a well known danger would suggest, and to run after every wild 
report of the discovery of gold or other precious metal, thus coming into daily contact and 
necessary conflict with discontented and hostile Indians.” The federal government did 
much the same when it “extend[ed] the surveys of public land westward.” Railroads and 
mail routes also pushed westward, preempting the army. “Over all these matters the 
military authorities have no control, yet their public nature implies public protection, and 
we are daily and hourly called on for guards and escorts, and are left in the breach to 
catch all the kicks and cuffs of a war of races, without the privilege of advising or being 
consulted beforehand.”107 The army, meanwhile, could not catch up to the demands 
placed on it. Even in terms of physical infrastructure, the army could barely house its 
soldiers. In 1870, the commanding general described an army of occupation stretched to 
its limits to deal with an expanding area of responsibility. “These men are stationed in 
forty-two States and Territories at two hundred and three organized military posts. The 
establishment of new posts as settlements advance is constantly rendered necessary, and 
the expense of providing temporary shelter in inclement regions of the country is 
unavoidably great. During the past year nearly one hundred and fifty buildings for 
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barracks, hospitals, and store-houses have been ordered to be erected.”108 As Chapter 2 
details, the expansion of the army’s sphere of responsibility transformed many enlisted 
men into little more than construction workers for the army of western occupation. 
At the same time as the army faced these growing demands, Congress slashed 
appropriations and reduced its strength. In 1866, the Army Appropriations Act limited the 
army to 54,000 men. Four years later, Congress reduced the army’s size to 37,313 by 
cutting the number of infantry regiments and line brigadiers. Another act in 1870 “of 
sweeping scope,” according to Robert Utley, further reduced the ranks and the officer 
corps. In 1874, Congress limited the enlisted strength the army to 25,000 men. “In five 
years Congress had cut the army in half,” Utley writes.109 Army insiders did not 
anticipate how much the army would change from its post-war high. In October 1865, the 
Army and Navy Journal reflected on the proposed cuts to army appropriations. The 
Journal, devoted to reporting on the interests of members of the two branches of the 
nation’s military establishment, claimed to support “economy” but thought it best that the 
U.S. retain an army large enough to answer the varied calls on it. “But we trust that no 
consideration of economy will inspire Congress with a penny-wise, pound-foolish 
[policy?] in regard to the Permanent Army.” The Journal believed it was “not 
necessary… to maintain a large establishment and a numerous Army.” Instead, they 
suggested Congress authorize a minimum of 50,000 troops and a maximum of less than 
100,000. “True economy will take pains that, while the Army is small, it may 
nevertheless be good, and, while it may not be numerically formidable, it shall be, at 
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least, efficient and vigorous,” the Journal opined.110 The Army and Navy Journal and its 
readership decried Congressional belt-tightening that ultimately brought the army to a 
strength of about 25,000 men. Nonetheless, even this reduced establishment was far 
larger than the army of 1860.  
The issue of army appropriations underscores how Americans understood the 
army’s role in responding to these different threats. Well into the 1870s, debates over the 
army, its size, scope, and functions, remained tied to broader conflicts over the post-Civil 
War reunification of the United States. While Democrats charged President Grant with 
using the country’s military to suppress liberty and uphold illegitimate governments in 
the South, other legislators defended troops stationed all over the continent. Still others 
contrasted the legitimate use of troops along the “frontier” with their illegitimate 
deployment in the South. In this way, the politics of Reconstruction and western 
imperialism intersected in debates over the future of the U.S. army. In both regions, the 
army was responsible for asserting the authority of the federal government and 
incorporating peoples and places at the periphery into the state’s orbit. In both, soldiers 
performed a diverse range of jobs off the battlefield – representing federal savings to 
some while embodying government waste to others.  
In February 1869, James A. Garfield, chairman of the Committee on Military 
Affairs and a future president, presented the committee’s proposal, H.R. 803, “making 
appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1870.” Garfield 
discussed changes in the size of the army since 1860, noting that according to the army 
reorganization bill of 1866, the authorized maximum of the army was around 80,000 men 
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and the minimum was about 47,000. By 1868, 52,948 troops served in the army. “The 
Army is now below the minimum,” Garfield told his colleagues. The Committee on 
Military Affairs did not recommend any reduction in the number of cavalry troops 
because these were needed for Indian-fighting, but it did think the infantry regiments 
could be reduced from forty-five to thirty regiments due to progress made in the South. 
“We believe that the work of restoration of the late rebel States has so far progressed and 
the more pacific prospects of the South under the incoming Administration will warrant 
us in making this measure of reduction in the line of the Army,” Garfield said. The 
committee also recommended reducing the number of officers in the army by 
reorganizing various staff departments. The proposed legislation did not specify the 
“precise extent” of the reductions, however, leaving that up to the President’s 
discretion.111 
After outlining some of the basic features of the proposed legislation, Garfield 
turned to the more controversial aspects of the army bill. Anticipating criticism, he boldly 
defended the officers of the army. Some officers would be made superfluous by the 
organization of the staff departments, but he insisted they needed to be respected rather 
than treated as leeches of the government’s largess. Army officers, he reminded the 
House, “are at this very time employed in important, perilous duties. We are in the midst 
of an Indian war; and a large portion of our Army is still required in the South to maintain 
the public peace. When faithful officers in the unreconstructed States are bearing the 
reproaches and scorn of unrepentant rebels, and suffering in the name of the Republic the 
indignity of those who hate it, their position will be a most wretched one, if to the 
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contempt of their enemies should now be added the neglect and injustice of their 
friends.” He quoted Fernando Wood, the former mayor of New York City turned 
congressman, who had earlier called officers “idle vagabonds” who lived off the “poor 
tax-payer.” Garfield defended the officers who had served in the Civil War, turning the 
issue of army appropriations into a question of Union loyalty. Referring to Wood’s ardent 
support for the Confederacy, Garfield declared: “It may become him, who has never had 
any sympathy with the Army when it was engaged in putting down the rebellion waged 
by his friends, to call them ‘vagabonds,’ but it does not become this House to indorse by 
its action so unworthy a sentiment.”112 Years after the end of hostilities, the Civil War 
continued to divide legislators in their opinion of the national army and its worthiness.  
Party lines did not always dictate how lawmakers felt about the army. Garfield 
received some of his sharpest criticism from a fellow Republican, Benjamin F. Butler, 
who proposed an amendment that would have cut the army far more drastically than the 
military affairs committee suggested. Butler’s plan limited the army to 25,000 men and 
cut the officer corps in half. Yet no one could charge Butler with having little “sympathy” 
for the army officers in the South or being one of those “unrepentant rebels” who wished 
for the collapse of the Union. Nicknamed “Beast Butler,” he had earned the scorn of 
southerners during his occupation of New Orleans. During his tenure in Congress, he 
became a leading Radical and he would go on to craft major pieces of Reconstruction 
legislation, including the initial version of the Enforcement Act of 1871. When Butler 
spoke in 1869, however, he spoke for reduction because he believed the army was 
unnecessary to protect the gains of the war. Referring to Grant’s upcoming inauguration, 
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he declared, “We will want no army in the South after the 4th day of March next. An 
event will then happen which will be more potent for peace than soldiers in every village 
and hamlet. It will then be understood that all disorder and riot and murder must cease.” 
As for the West, Butler did not think “the few thousand Indians in the field – perhaps I 
ought to say hundreds of Indians” required more than 25,000 soldiers.113  
Not all Republicans agreed that Grant’s election would bring peace to the South. 
Another Radical, Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, spoke instead of war. He thought there 
was still plenty of “insubordination, want of personal safety, danger of bloodshed, 
violence, assassinations, danger of proscription, [and] danger of interference with 
elections” in the South.114 Shellabarger spoke in favor of the milder cuts proposed by the 
Committee on Military Affairs, and he reminded his audience that Grant himself did not 
think the time was right for more severe reductions. Other Republicans were also 
concerned about the fragility of the southern peace. James Mullins, a staunch Republican 
from Tennessee, opposed the inclusion of $1,000 in the legislation for the construction of 
an arsenal in Georgia. He claimed the people of Georgia could not yet be trusted with an 
arsenal. “It is unsafe in every sense of the word. They are not reconstructed. They have 
defied the Government; they have looked you in the face and said ‘Your reconstruction 
law is without constitutional foundation.’ They have run rough shod over us, horse, foot, 
and dragoons; they have drive out the men that were loyal and elected those that suited 
their own notions of reconstruction,” Mullins insisted. “This goes into the hands of the 
enemy, and nowhere else… They treat you on the Kuklux system; they rob you, whip 
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you, burn you, and finally shoot you if they cannot get rid of you in any other way. Now, 
I do not want to give them the materials to shoot me and other loyal men in this Congress 
or out of it.”115 Mullins’ amendment to strike out the Georgia arsenal appropriation was 
not voted down.  
The fight over army appropriations went beyond Republican in-fighting. 
Congressman Benjamin Boyer, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, spoke on behalf of the 
reconstructed, giving voice to Mullins’ most dire admonitions. Referring to 
Shellabarger’s speech on the absence of peace in the South, Boyer agreed that it was the 
South that consumed the army’s attention – quite unjustly, in his opinion. “Ay, sir, it is 
the reconstruction policy of Congress which has necessitated the continuance of this vast 
Army at this enormous cost to the nation. We have an Indian war on the plains; but our 
Army is not there defending the frontier.” He claimed too many troops were in the South 
“acting as a body-guard for the bastard governments” of Reconstruction. There was no 
legitimate reason for troops to be stationed in the “quiet” South, apart from the “despotic 
government” (the United States). According to Boyer, Congress had to maintain a large 
army, not to ensure peace in the South, but to protect its tyrannical government. 
Reconstruction was a continuance of war, not a way to peace. It did not take long for 
Boyer to turn to the question of legitimacy. Reconstruction was not only illegitimate 
because it was robbed a “brave people” of their rights, but because it empowered African 
Americans. “At the South the natural order of things has been reversed. The social 
pyramid has been inverted. It has been made to stand on its apex, and is held in that 
unnatural position by the points of surrounding bayonets.” In only slightly different 
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words, the congressman from Pennsylvania expressed the same sense of dramatic social 
reversal as the former slave who told his former owner, “Bottom rung on top now, 
boss.”116 But for Boyer, there was hope because not all of the proper and legitimate 
leaders of the South had succumbed to Republican tyranny. “In Georgia, white men still 
hold out against the attempt to degrade them to the level of an inferior race.” Presumably 
he referred to the recent purge of black officeholders in Georgia. The previous fall, 
Democrats and some white Republicans joined together to have thirty-two African-
Americans unseated from the state house and senate. In response, a large group of 
freedpeople decided to rally in Camilla. They were met at the courthouse square by 
heavily armed whites, who dispersed the rally and killed at least nine African-Americans. 
While still early in the chronology of the state’s Reconstruction history, Camilla was “the 
beginning of the end for Republican rule in Georgia.”117 Yet Boyer spoke approvingly of 
Georgians’ brave resistance to the “degradation” of an “inferior race.” Such 
intransigence, he believed, explained why Republicans like Shellabarger opposed 
reducing the army any further.118  
Both Mullins and Boyer agreed to a certain extent about the centrality of the U.S. 
army to the course of Reconstruction. Both worried about how and in whose interest 
military power would be used in places like Georgia, which was far from peaceful. But 
they differed in their estimation of the legitimacy of the army’s continued occupation of 
the South. Mullins feared that arms could fall into the hands of the “unreconstructed” 
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people of Georgia, while Boyer praised the “brave” men who resisted the tyranny of the 
Republican Party and the “inferior race” it had empowered. Radicals like Butler became 
accidental allies of Democrats like Boyer. Skeptical of the army’s ability to maintain 
peace, Butler placed his faith instead in Grant’s election. He insisted that “Troops will not 
prevent murders and will not prevent riots in the South,” and instead called on Grant and 
civil authorities to restore and maintain order throughout the South.  
On March 3, 1869, Congress passed an appropriations bill that cut the number of 
infantry regiments and reduced the army to an authorized strength of 45,000 men. This 
would not be the end of “retrenchment” for the army, however.119 In the 1870s, 
opposition to Reconstruction intensified while westerners’ calls for protection and 
military aid increased. In the appropriations debate of 1870, James Brooks, a Democrat 
from New York, berated the army for its “suppression of human liberty and self-
government in eleven States of the Union.”120 By 1874, the criticism of the army’s 
activities in the South was even more severe, but its defenders in the West were more 
vocal. Samuel J. Randall spoke in favor of a “strict and legitimate economy” and vowed 
to authorize appropriations only for “absolutely legitimate purposes.” For Randall, a 
Pennsylvania Democrat who would go on to serve as speaker of the house, the army in 
the South did not meet his standards for legitimacy. He made the political geography of 
troop distributions clear: “The fault is not in the number of the Army; the fault is in the 
assignment of the Army. I say, take your Army from the South; take your Army from 
Louisiana, and put it to its legitimate purposes – for the defense of the lives of our 
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citizens, and not for the crushing of the liberties of our people.”121 Randall did not want 
the army defending the rights of African-Americans in the South, but he would support 
its use in the West. Fellow Democrat James B. Beck of Kentucky echoed Randall’s 
concerns. Beck insisted that the army could be reduced even further, to 20,000 men, and 
still carry out its duties in the West.122 For Congressional Democrats and their Republican 
allies who wanted to remove troops from the southern states, the issue of frontier 
protection worked in their favor. They could advocate “economy” and lower taxes while 
insisting that the army’s resources be assigned to “legitimate” purposes – the removal of 
troops from the South and their reassignment in the West.  
 No place could match the drama of Reconstruction in Louisiana, and no state 
better symbolized for Democrats the illegitimacy of federal military intervention in 
politics. Several factions vied for control of the state legislature and the executive office, 
and following the disputed election of 1872, a “Fusion” cabal of Liberal Republicans and 
Democrats had even set up a “shadow” government. President Grant ultimately 
recognized the Republican William Pitt Kellogg as governor, infuriating Democrats. 
Meanwhile, the countryside was heating up. In Grant Parish, a group of African-
American Republicans took control of a courthouse, laying claim to the reins of political 
power. Hundreds of militant whites, including members of the White League and the 
Klan, surrounded the courthouse with artillery and a canon. A few days later, they 
attacked the courthouse, leaving over one-hundred African-Americans dead. Kellogg, 
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concerned about the stability of Republican rule across the state and no doubt worried 
about saving his own neck, begged General Emory to send more federal troops.123  
 Meanwhile, in the winter of 1874, legislators invoked Louisiana as a powerful 
symbol for their respective assessments of federal power. Even Republicans who 
supported retrenchment believed troops were needed in Louisiana, while Democrats were 
willing to gut the army if only to get them out of Louisiana. John Coburn, a Republican 
from Indiana, spoke for the Committee on Military Affairs. He believed that the situation 
had so improved in the South as to make troops unnecessary throughout most of the 
region. “A few years ago, perhaps a few months ago, it was necessary to keep troops 
there on account of the prevalence of disturbances; but I feel that now a time has arrived 
when public policy, as well as sound sense, dictates that troops shall in a great measure 
be withdrawn from that country. I believe that troops are necessary in the State of 
Louisiana only; I do think that at New Orleans there is a necessity for an armed force, 
perhaps a regiment.”124 By 1874, approximately 3,200 troops were still stationed in the 
Division of the South, which ran from Kentucky to Florida and west to Louisiana (but 
excluded Texas).125 House Democrats, however, would not be satisfied until every 
federal soldier was transferred. Tammany Democrat Samuel S. Cox called the 300 troops 
stationed in Mississippi “a sham and a shame.” But he reserved his most acerbic criticism 
for Louisiana. “As to Louisiana. Louisiana! I would vote for an amendment to this bill 
that not a dollar shall be given to the Army, or, rather, not a soldier used, not a sword 
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drawn or bayonet fixed, for carrying out the godless tyranny and detestable usurpation in 
Louisiana,” Cox fumed. “Sir, the condition of Louisiana is a blazing outrage. The Senate 
knows it; the House knows it; the President himself knows it; the grangers know it; the 
very mouth of the Mississippi proclaims it. I will not vote to use our Army for any such 
illegitimate purpose.” Another Democrat from New York, Clarkson Nott Potter, called 
the army’s activities in Louisiana “not only the greatest outrage, but the greatest political 
crime of the time.” Asserting that Grant had used the army to prop up the Kellogg 
administration, rather than protect a lawfully elected executive, Democrats held up 
Louisiana as an example of the worst federal overreach. “So long as [troops] are liable to 
be used to dragoon a sovereign State by the fiat of the President and to override the will 
of its people, I am against any increase of the Army. I would rather see the Army of the 
United States without an enlisted man than see” a “repeat” of Louisiana. Yet despite his 
opposition to the military presence in Louisiana, Potter, too, wanted troops to be “put 
upon the border.”126 
By 1874, few Congressmen spoke out in favor of a broad, vigorous military 
presence in the South. But they still used Reconstruction to promote the army in the 
West. Charles W. Kendall of Nevada found common cause with Washington Whitthorne, 
a Tennessean who had served in the Confederate Army. The Nevadan agreed that “there 
is small necessity for a military force in most of the Southern States.” But Kendall 
insisted that the settlers “from Texas in the south to Montana and Washington Territory 
in the north” required the protection of the U.S. army. These were the hardy pioneers who 
had “found that vast country a wilderness, and have built up instead prosperous, 
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powerful, and advancing commonwealths.” He, along with James W. Nesmith from 
Oregon, disparaged the federal Indian policy and the religious reformers who had failed 
to civilize and convert Native Americans to Christianity. The delegate from Arizona 
Territory, Richard C. McCormick, heightened the sectional fervor, this time east versus 
west rather than north versus south. McCormick accused his eastern colleagues of trying 
to dictate western policy. He himself, as a delegate from a territory, lacked voting power 
– a fact that further underlined the West’s political subordination. 
Other Congressmen used their oratory to suggest the West’s grand commercial 
prospects. The wealth of the West, according to Minnesota Republican Mark H. Dunnell, 
would benefit the entire nation and deserved the full support of the federal government. 
Dunnell lamented the “disparaging remarks” that other congressmen had made about the 
frontier “as though it were indeed a costly portion of the country” and “as though it were 
costing us altogether too much to take care of it.” Instead, he declared the frontier “the 
most fruitful portion of the country.” But here, departing from the usual tribute to the 
valor of the individual pioneer, Dunnell praised the work of the army. Soldiers, he 
insisted, were essential to supporting “the genius of the American citizen.” Where they 
guarded surveying parties and prospectors, soldiers were “the most productive men in the 
whole country.”127 Dunnell invoked the army’s imperial mission as well. “‘Westward the 
course of empire holds its way,’” he declared. Here, empire-building might be an antidote 
to sectionalism: Congressmen from around the country could all appreciate the 
commercial prospects of the West and the “productive” work soldiers did there.  
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Eastern lawmakers also associated their support for the army with calls for the 
expansions of wealth and prosperity. Isaac W. Scudder, a Republican from New Jersey, 
expressed the hopes and concerns of eastern businessmen – he was a director of the New 
Jersey Railroad and later worked for the Pennsylvania Railroad – when he gestured 
towards the army’s western responsibilities. “Our commercial relations with all parts of 
the world are daily and hourly growing more intimate,” Scudder declared. He described 
the threats and dangers that would arise with intensifying global connections, predicting 
that new commercial relations linking “the city of New York… westward across this 
continent to the Pacific Ocean, and then…to the East Indies” would “bring about 
collisions” and continue to make military strength essential. Closer to home, Scudder, 
like his colleagues, spoke of the “vast frontier with Mexico” and the instability which 
continued to plague this neighboring country. Altogether, the U.S. faced a host of 
potential threats: “hostile Indians,” “a large and extended immigration,” and “the bold 
and restless young men of our own people seeking homes in the far West.” All these 
circumstances called for a generously funded and well-staffed army. “Under this state of 
circumstances, it seems to me hardly possible that we can safely rely on a permanent 
reduction of the Army,” Scudder concluded.128  
For many congressmen, the unprecedented nature of the American continental 
empire was enough to justify a sizable military establishment. In January 1874, 
Republican Charles Albright spoke out in favor of “economy” – a watchword of the day 
– but against slashing the army’s funding. He reminded his colleagues that 30,000 
American soldiers provided a host of services to the nation, all at bargain prices. Soldiers 
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were “clerks, messengers, watchmen, signal sergeants, commissary sergeants, hospital 
stewards” who “sav[ed] the Government large sums of money.” If soldiers did not do this 
work, Albright noted, the American state would still need to pay for these services – but 
at higher rates. Moreover, soldiers in 1874 had far more responsibilities than their 
predecessors because the nation itself had expanded in reach and in ambition. The 
recalcitrance of Native American tribes demanded a strong military presence throughout 
the trans-Mississippi West. “At no former period in our history did we have the same 
extent of territory to watch and guard over,” Albright continued. “Never before did we 
have to deal with all the Indian tribes at one and the same time. And hence there never 
was the same necessity for so many troops for this purpose. Never before did we have so 
large a border to take care of or such a long line of sea-coast to defend.”129 Conjuring up 
the image of “faithful” soldiers stationed across a vast American empire, the 
congressman from Pennsylvania described troops  
on the arid, barren, and burning sand-wastes of Arizona, or in the cold and 
howling regions of the Rocky Mountains, standing sentinel by turn over the 
Indian and the frontiersman, or guarding the great transcontinental thoroughfare, 
or protecting and escorting scientific exploring parties; in other instances guarding 
railroad engineer parties and railroad construction parties, or sent away up in the 
fog-banks of Alaska taking care of the fisherman, fur-trader, and Indian.130  
 
Albright captured well the contours of an imperial American state, and he was not 
alone in connecting army appropriations to empire-building. Military insiders had long 
made the same argument in speaking out against cuts to military spending. It was clear to 
the editors of the Army and Navy Journal as early as 1867 that Congress could not reduce 
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appropriations and at the same time expect troops to monitor and protect a constantly 
expanding domain. The Journal ran a front-page article detailing various proposals to 
annex additional territory to the United States: from Sonora in northern Mexico to British 
Columbia to St. Thomas and St. John in the Caribbean, and beyond. While Congressmen 
spoke of “economy and retrenchment,” they also entertained proposals “for the 
annexation of the greater part of the habitable globe, situate[d] between the Atlantic, 
Artic and Pacific Oceans and the Gulf of Mexico.” “[I]t seems that it is now proposed, 
simultaneously with depleting [the army] below a point where it is already too weak, to 
increase its duties and responsibilities; to annex territory in all the corners of the Western 
Hemisphere, continental and insular, from the frigid to the torrid zone,” the editors wrote. 
The army was already inadequate for the responsibilities Congress had thrust upon it in 
the South and in Indian country; how could it be expected to sustain further imperial 
expansions?  “We shall say nothing against Congress, if it abandon annexation, Indian 
government and military reconstruction. But while it proposes or endorses these plans, it 
is foolish to talk of cutting down the Army.”131 Of course, most of these plans faltered; 
the U.S. did not acquire the Danish Antilles until World War I, and British Columbia 
remained part of the northern dominion. But the Army and Navy Journal had cause to 
believe the United States was on an imperial spree, having purchased Alaska from Russia 
only a few months before. Just two years later in 1869, the Journal again decried 
retrenchment at a time of continental expansion. “We cannot play the part of empire-
founders, of continent-absorbers without being prepared to keep up an Army more than 
25,000 to 30,000 strong. The sentiment of our people, tired of war thought it may be, yet 
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sets strongly toward the acquisition of territory.”132 The editors believed it was “but a 
question of time” until Canada and Mexico were absorbed into the United States.  
Those specific plans did not come to pass, but imperial ambitions help prevent 
Congress from utterly reducing the army’s ranks. Congressmen like Durnell, Scudder, 
and Albright were leery of reducing the army too much as long as the U.S. fought to 
assert its sovereignty over recalcitrant Native Americans and protect the people and 
resources along the Mexican border. As a result, Democrats who opposed federal 
intervention in the South had to contend with others who wanted the U.S. to maintain a 
strong federal presence along the “frontier.” In Texas, where threats from Native 
Americans and instability in Mexico had long collided with Reconstruction politics, 
lawmakers defended the army against further cuts, acting in their “western” interests 
rather than going along with their southern colleagues. According to Robert Wooster, 
Senator Samuel B. Maxey and Representative Schleicher, two Texas Democrats, “agreed 
to oppose further military cuts in return for a large army presence along the Rio 
Grande.”133 In this instance, imperial commitments trumped southern fears of military 
occupation.  
The tension between the army’s southern and western duties continues to animate 
contemporary assessments of the nineteenth-century army. Some military historians 
consider the army’s post-war southern assignments a distraction from its true calling in 
the West fighting Native Americans. Robert Utley remains skeptical of Sheridan’s 
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argument that the army was needed more to protect African-Americans in Texas than to 
guard the lives and property of white settlers from Native violence. He argues that 
Sheridan as well as General Hancock were “preoccupied” with Reconstruction. On the 
other hand, the frontier situation “remained unappreciated by top commanders.” Utley 
seems unpersuaded by J.J. Reynolds’ argument that 384 citizens were killed in Texas in 
1867, but only twenty-six were killed by Native Americans. This, he insists, was “small 
consolation to frontier settlers who knew that huge property losses and constant 
insecurity were part of the reckoning too.”134  
James E. Sefton believes that only “extremists” expected more than 18,000 troops 
stationed in the South in the fall of 1868. More troops were not feasible, he argues, 
because of the army’s western duties. Sefton writes, “Since the bulk of the Army was 
needed for the Plains, any more thorough blanketing of the South than was in fact carried 
out would have required an increase in the size of the Army. Congress, however, was 
bent on a decrease rather than an increase.”135 Not only “extremists” in the 1870s but 
historians today lament the fact that more troops were not assigned to Reconstruction 
duty. William Blair argues that troops should have remained in the South until the turn of 
the century, pointing to instances of racial violence and intimidation as late as 1898. Yet 
like Sefton, Blair believes it would have been politically impossible for Congress to 
commit more troops to the South while fighting a war against Native peoples in the West. 
“Committing 10,000 to 20,000 troops to long-term occupation of the South was 
unthinkable for practical, economic, and political-ideological reasons,” Blair writes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 166, 168. 
135 Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 207-208.  
	   	  
	  
	  
83 
“Securing territorial expansion and settlements for white people in the West commanded 
a higher policy objective than protecting racial adjustment in the South.”136 More 
recently, historian Gregory Downs has suggested that the real tension was not between 
the South and the West, but between demands for more troops and demands for 
retrenchment. Politicians were committed to reducing the budget, and they often took aim 
at army appropriations. Downs argues that the federal government lacked the “capacity” 
to fully act on its “newfound powers and ambitions.”137  
Debates in Congress show that the withdrawal of troops from the South and their 
reassignment on the Plains were politically motivated. Democratic lawmakers staged a 
deliberate assault on Reconstruction by cutting military appropriations. But opposition to 
Reconstruction effectively ended up reducing the number of troops available for both 
western and southern duties.138 The rush of settlers to the West and intensifying conflicts 
with indigenous peoples certainly played into the hands of lawmakers intent on ridding 
the South of federal troops. They exploited the politics of western expansion to ensure 
that the troops who did survive their budget cuts would be stationed in the West and not 
assigned to peacekeeping and policing duties in the South. Although army commanders 
in the West did not always receive the additional troops they requested, the War 
Department did shift the majority of the nation’s soldiers to western assignments by 
1870.139 The army avoided even further cuts – and survived into the late-nineteenth 
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century at twice its 1860 size – due to growing support for its western duties. Even as 
members of Congress voted to reduce the size of the army, they preserved a far larger 
military force than the one their parents or grandparents had known in the name of 
American empire. Enough lawmakers agreed with the congressman from Minnesota that 
“Westward the course of empire holds its way” that the army survived the deep cuts 
advocated by many Democrats. Again the politics of expansion and sectionalism met in 
Texas, where Democratic lawmakers held off even more extreme cuts in order to 
preserve a military presence along the U.S.-Mexico border. Ultimately, Reconstruction 
helped shape U.S. imperial policies while those western concerns helped ensure that the 
boldest plans for reconstructing the South never came to fruition.  
Conclusion 
Military government, military rule, and military occupation became subjects of 
fierce debate at several moments in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. The idea of the 
military supplanting civilian government seemed to smack of tyranny, despotism, and 
imperialism. It should come as no surprise, then, that the debates over such use of 
military powers arose at times of continental expansion when the United States was, in 
fact, extending its sovereignty over new peoples and territories. The rhetoric of 
imperialism was often invoked at such moments, both in opposition and support of the 
U.S. empire. Whig congressman Garrett Davis meant to disparage President Polk and his 
allied Democrats when he exclaimed in 1846, “Was our American President an emperor, 
sending forth his Agrippa and his Marcellus and his pro-consuls, to establish and to 
govern the provinces they might conquer by force of arms?” The editors of the Army and 
Navy Journal, on the other hand, were excited to “the play the part of empire-founders, of 
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continent-absorbers.” At each of these moments, Americans looked to their history for 
precedents – prior experiences of military government and occupation to provide 
guidance and justification for their contemporary challenges.  
In the 1840s, William H. Halleck, the secretary of the territory, searched for 
precedents to help guide the army in dealing with military and civil affairs in California. 
Halleck, who was also trained in the law, referenced a Supreme Court case involving the 
early incorporation of Florida into the United States. Myra K. Saunders writes that the 
Florida decision led military authorities in California to suppress a new legal code 
military governor Colonel Richard B. Mason had drafted because it did not accord with 
the precedent they had discovered.140 Decades later, at the turn of the twentieth century, a 
handful of scholars “rediscovered” the military government of California. David Yancey 
Thomas, a historian who taught at Hendrix College in Arkansas, wrote A History of 
Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of the United States. Thomas penned 
chapters on Louisiana, east and west Florida, New Mexico and California. He then went 
on to examine contemporary military governments in Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, 
Porto Rico, Samoa, and Panama. While Thomas mentioned the unpopularity of military 
government of the South during Reconstruction in his preface, his book did not deal with 
the South. Perhaps Thomas, a southerner whose dissertation was supervised by William 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Saunders, “California Legal History,” 503. The case was American Insurance Company v. Canter, 26 
U.S. 1 Pet. 511 511 (1828). 
	   	  
	  
	  
86 
F. Dunning at Columbia, did not wish to elevate the Reconstruction governments in a 
book that treated military governments that were considered justified.141 
Nominally disinterested scholars like Thomas were not the only ones looking to 
the nation’s history of military government. In 1901, Charles Magoon, an architect of 
U.S. imperial policy who worked in the Bureau of Insular Affairs (within the War 
Department), published Reports on the Law of Civil Government in Territories Subject to 
Military Occupation by the Military Forces of the United States. At over 800 pages, the 
tome covered a variety of legal and political questions related to the country’s very recent 
imperial expansion as well as chapters on the Jefferson and Polk presidencies. He also 
devoted space to the history of military government in California and New Mexico.142 
The report was important enough to attract notice from academic and legal experts. But it 
also earned a review in the Chicago Daily Tribune, which noted, “The almost forgotten 
questions presented by the military governments of Arizona, New Mexico, and California 
are discussed at length.” The Tribune thought that in addition to lawyers, the report 
would also “be interesting to laymen who care to study the constitutional aspect of the 
question and the civil functions of armies of occupation. It is almost as important in these 
days to administer properly territory occupied by an army of invasion as it is to invade 
the territory and drive out the enemy.”143 The Chicago newspaper was prescient. For 
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decades to come, U.S. military and civilian officials would take enormous interest in 
post-conquest occupations.144  
The United States imposed military rule over territory in the wake of various 
imperial conflicts in the nineteenth century. Seen in the context of these other episodes, 
the use of military government in the South during Reconstruction no longer appears 
anomalous. Instead, it becomes clear that the federal government used military 
occupation and military governments to assert its authority over recalcitrant populations 
and valuable territory. In pre-statehood California, the post-Civil War South and the 
West, the U.S. army was an important source of labor. Soldiers performed not only the 
requisite “killing labor” of conquest but also carried out a wide range of administrative 
tasks that allowed the U.S. to cement and sustain its power. They served as manual 
laborers, escorts, election supervisors, labor arbitrators, and much more. These 
occupations suggest the importance of the military as a flexible administrative body that 
was especially useful as the United States fought and conquered territory, from the time 
of Jefferson forward. They also make clear that the stories of southern Reconstruction 
and western expansion belong to the same larger narrative, one about growth of an 
imperial American state.145 The next chapter examines the centrality of military labor in 
the late-nineteenth-century West as the army worked to secure its dominion on the 
region’s land and resources.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 “More laboring than soldiering:” The U.S. Army as a Labor Force  
 
Reflecting on his military service in the 1870s, Corporal Emil A. Bode declared, 
“There is more laboring than soldiering in the U.S. Infantry.” Such laboring included 
chopping and hauling wood, working at the lime kiln, cutting and packing ice, and, as 
Bode put it, “having the pleasure to try muscle in the rock quarry.” Bode, a German 
immigrant who enlisted in 1877, often found himself digging trenches for the 
construction of the military telegraph and laying “hot iron telegraph poles” in the sand 
and gravel in Indian Territory. “We were soon as well acquainted with handling a 
crowbar as we were in the manual of arms or any other military exercises,” the corporal 
recalled.146 Bode’s superiors agreed. Major General John Pope reported that soldiers in 
his Department of the Missouri spent so much of their time building, repairing, hauling, 
and chopping that posts were, essentially, “garrisoned by enlisted laborers rather than 
soldiers.”147 
 Bode was not alone, nor was his regiment exceptional in the amount of manual 
labor it performed in the course of its service in the West. In the decades after the Civil 
War, the U.S. army was an army of workers. Soldiers performed the quotidian chores 
with which armies of occupation were always tasked: they repaired quarters, prepared 
food, cared for animals, and dug holes for waste. But enlisted men, at the forefront of an 
expanding continental empire in the nineteenth century, also carried out a host of 
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ambitious infrastructural projects. Robert Wooster, in his study of Fort Davis in western 
Texas, writes that “the influence of the military forces that occupied the region quickly 
extended far beyond the battlefield…Soldiers escorted the travelers, improved the roads, 
laid the telegraph wires, and protected the railroads that linked the region to the outside 
world.”148 All across the West, in places where labor was scarce and civilian wages were 
high, the army was not only engaged in punishing unfriendly Native Americans and 
securing the Rio Grande border against cattle and horse thieves. It was also a relentless 
and dependable labor regime, committed to opening obscure corners of the West to 
settlement and investment. Soldiers, far from the battlefield and often overlooked by their 
civilian counterparts, quietly transformed the landscape of places like western Texas, 
Arizona, and New Mexico. Their labor yielded spectacular – and devastating – results. 
In the post-Civil War era, soldiers’ labor helped the U.S., reunited if not 
reconstructed, consolidate its hold over the trans-Mississippi West. The defeat of the 
slave South and the ascendance of capitalism around the world turned the fruits of 
soldiers’ labor into the spoils of empire. This chapter examines the work enlisted men 
performed, arguing that their labor was essential to the emergence of a stronger national 
presence in the West as well as new capitalist enterprises. Soldiers represented a reserve 
of not-quite-free laborers available for a wide range of projects: building forts, roads, and 
irrigation systems; escorting railroad surveyors and mail coaches; and mapping unknown 
territory. Rather than paying civilians, investors in private concerns depended on the 
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army for much of the infrastructure and protection they required.149 Furthermore, the 
military’s organization and disciplinary code perfectly suited the conditions for labor in 
the West, where the challenge of maintaining a labor force was exacerbated by the 
region’s vastness.150  
By focusing on the army, this chapter illuminates the crucial role of the state in 
the West, especially its contributions to capitalist development. New western historians 
have long argued that the federal government played an active part in the region. “The 
American West, more than any other section of the United States, is a creation not so 
much of individual or local efforts, but of federal efforts,” writes Richard White. “More 
than any other region, the West has been historically a dependency of the federal 
government.”151 Federal policies, especially those regarding land and Native Americans, 
decisively shaped the western political economy. The federal government, as an active 
presence in all things western during this period, was a key player in harnessing the 
region’s resources for use by eastern and foreign investors. The army was the most 
visible manifestation of federal power on the ground and involved in a range of activities, 
only one of which was doing battle with Native Americans. Examining soldiers’ labor is 
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a promising way to understand the entanglements between private capital and the 
American state in the nineteenth century.152 
As an enlisted man put it in 1888, the “U.S.A. is an army of working-men, not an 
army of soldiers.”153 For too long, such statements were regarded as irrelevant to the 
enormous changes happening in the West and around the world in the nineteenth century. 
This chapter argues that this “army of working-men” helped transform the United States 
and deserves further study. It does so first by tracing the debates in the 1860s and 1870s 
over the proper role of the U.S. army. In the aftermath of the Civil War, army officers, 
policymakers, and legislators disagreed about the mission of the peacetime army. These 
debates reveal a military establishment tasked with several different objectives. Second, 
the chapter explores the various types of labor soldiers routinely performed. It 
concentrates on three discrete areas of economic development in the southwest and how 
soldiers contributed to them: railroad construction, ranching, and mining. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by examining the activities of one army officer, Colonel Benjamin 
Grierson, whose career exemplified the “developmental vision” guiding the U.S. army 
between 1865 and 1890. 
The Post-Civil War Army 
When the last Civil War volunteers mustered out of the service, the U.S. army 
faced two formidable challenges: the Reconstruction of the South and the “Indian 
problem” in the West. Both tasks were frequently unpopular, and they were fraught with 
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conflicts over the military’s proper role in restoring law and order to the former 
Confederacy and in managing the interactions between Native Americans and restless 
white settlers. Historian Jerry M. Cooper writes, “The army needed policies defining its 
place and role in American life, indicating what civilians expected of the military. 
Neither Congress nor the executive branch provided a design for military policy.”154 In 
many ways this was because “the American people” wanted many different things from 
the military, depending on who and where they were. The unpopularity of the army 
among former Confederates was easy to understand; they were a defeated population 
living in under the military occupation of their erstwhile enemies. In the West, settlers 
demanded the army’s intervention and expected soldiers to eliminate Native tribes who 
continued to occupy valuable western land. The military brass, meanwhile, claimed 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s that what they could accomplish was limited by 
conflicting national policies.  
By 1870, managing the country’s indigenous population in the West demanded 
most of the army’s attention and resources.155 According to Robert M. Utley, the 
preeminent historian of the Indian Wars, “Indian service was the primary mission of the 
army.”156 As troops reoccupied western posts abandoned during the Civil War, the army 
was forced to reckon with its obligations to both white settlers and the Native Americans. 
“These Indians are universally, by the people of our frontier and of our isolated 
Territories, regarded as hostile, and we, the military, charged with a general protection of 
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the infant settlements and long routes of travel, have to dispose of our troops and act as 
though they were hostile,” Lieutenant General William T. Sherman, one of the army’s 
highest ranking officers, wrote in 1866.157 Yet civilian agents were responsible for the 
“guardianship” of these people, further complicating the military’s position. Were Native 
Americans the enemies of the United States or its wards? The boundary between 
“hostile” and friendly tribes was often unclear, and many military officers believed that 
federal policies intended to help the natives were hindering the army’s mission. In 1869, 
Lieutenant General of the Army Philip H. Sheridan remarked with characteristic scorn, 
“If a white man commits murders or robs, we hang him or send him to the penitentiary; if 
an Indian does the same, we have been in the habit of giving him more blankets.”158 The 
army leadership felt their efficacy was limited by policies dictated by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, and Sherman argued throughout this period that the bureau’s 
responsibilities should be transferred to the War Department so the military could 
properly manage “the Indian problem.”159  
Debates within the army and the government throughout this period took place in 
the context of Congressional budget cuts. At the very moment when the army confronted 
recalcitrant former Confederates, the threat of Mexico’s civil war spilling over its Rio 
Grande border, and mounting hostilities with Native tribes on the plains, Congress 
slashed the army’s budget and reduced its manpower. In 1868, the army faced “the first 
of a succession of cutbacks that severely weakened the army line.” A total force of 
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54,000 soldiers was initially reduced to just over 37,000. By 1874, additional legislation 
had cut the army to 25,000 enlisted men and 2,000 officers.160 It would stay roughly this 
size throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. Cooper writes, “Army leaders could 
only speculate as to their institution’s future place in American society, for the cuts were 
based on cost, not on some rational program aimed at long-range goals.”161 For most of 
the late-nineteenth century, this reduced force was scattered over a vast western territory. 
After 1870, when only a skeletal force remained on Reconstruction duty in the South, at 
least 70 percent of American soldiers were stationed in the West.162   
Military officers often spoke of their mission in the West in terms of the extension 
of “civilization,” and by this they meant the expansion of white Americans’ social and 
economic institutions. In their official reports and unofficial correspondence, the army 
brass made it clear that they believed Native Americans hopelessly impeded the advance 
of such institutions. In the first year of the Peace Policy, Sherman wrote to his brother 
John, a senator from Ohio: “The more we can kill this year, the less will have to be killed 
the next war, for the more I see of these Indians the more convinced I am that they all 
have to be killed or maintained as a species of paupers. Their attempts at civilization are 
simply ridiculous.”163 Nearly a decade later, his assessment had changed little. In his 
annual report to the secretary of war, Sherman referred to the Indian as “our inveterate 
enemy; the enemy to cultivation, to labor of any sort, and to all civilization; and that this 
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very weakness entails on the General Government the great cost of Indian wars.”164 
Occasionally army officers spoke of their duty to improve the condition of Native 
Americans, but if that was not possible, they were committed to removing them as 
obstacles to the progress of railroads, farms, and other emblems of American civilization.  
 For men like Sherman and Sheridan, the army’s role in eradicating the Indian 
problem meant decisively putting down Native resistance to the encroachment of white 
settlement. “Hostiles” were those who attacked emigrant trains, sabotaged railroads, and, 
after the launch of Grant’s “peace policy” in 1868, those who wandered from their 
assigned reservations. Sheridan summarized the mission of the frontier army in his 1873 
report as commander of the Division of the Missouri:  
To give protection to the citizens of the frontier against these Indians and to guard 
the long line of our Mexican border against robberies by Mexican citizens and 
Indians living in Mexico; to explore unknown territory and furnish escorts to 
surveying parties for scientific purpose and for projected railroads; to assist and 
guard the railways already built and other commercial lines of travel; to aid in the 
enforcement of the civil law in remote places; and to do generally all that is 
constantly required of our Army in the way of helping and urging forward 
everything which tends to develop and increase civilization upon the border, and 
at the same time to protect the Indians in the rights and immunities guaranteed 
them under existing treaties, has been the work of the troops in this military 
division for the past year, and that work has been successfully accomplished.165 
 
The particular nature of the “Indian problem” – the fact that Native Americans were an 
unconventional enemy in their style of warfare and that the army’s mission was couched 
in civilizational terms – meant that soldiers were involved in a range of activities that 
went beyond battlefield fighting. Utley calls the western army a “police force” and notes 
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that the army’s mission involved “much more than merely Indian fighting.”166 Combat 
was atypical, even if it has been the army’s best remembered and most celebrated work 
by subsequent generations. Instead, soldiers spent most of their time engaged in 
“punishing, unheroic, usually fruitless reconnaissance over hostile terrain, pounded by 
rain, snow, or scorching sun, searching for an invisible enemy.”167 One historian 
estimates that “every day spent in pursuit of hostilities [was] matched by fifteen or twenty 
given over to unvarying garrison duty.”168  
 Soldiers indeed spent little time in active pursuit of “hostiles.” Far more often 
they were engaged in various types of labor. Some of these auxiliary duties, such as 
cooking and maintaining their camps, were a necessary part of the soldier’s duty, while 
others, such as road-building, were generally considered distractions from the army’s 
“real” work. General Sherman called such chores “a kind of labor that ought not to be 
imposed on our reduced establishment.”169 Colonel J.J. Reynolds, commander of the 
Department of Texas, said “the varied calls made upon our soldiers for labor…unfit them 
for soldiers.”170 Despite the widespread consensus that the army’s labor regime was poor 
military policy and contributed to the army’s high rate of desertion (discussed further in 
chapter 3), the practice of assigning soldiers to non-military tasks continued throughout 
the Indian Wars. In part this was because the army was chronically underfunded. But it 
was also a consequence of the army’s broad mandate to “advance civilization” in the 
West, which necessarily involved soldiers in a range of activities.  
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Within the army, there was general agreement that soldiers were an important 
source of labor. Officers spoke often and openly about the “valuable service” provided by 
enlisted men. But increasingly in the decades after the Civil War, the amount of labor 
required for auxiliary assignments – building and fatigue as well as escort duties – 
became a source of concern for military brass. Top officers and the broader military 
community, reflected in publications such as the Army and Navy Journal, were worried 
about the future of the U.S.’s military establishment. What was the proper balance 
between manual labor and military preparedness? What was the American army’s 
mission? Was it an Indian-fighting army, or should it be prepared to face other states’ 
armies? One concerned party wrote the Army and Navy Journal, “Any and every military 
man must admit, and does admit, that it is impossible to set up, drill, and make a perfect 
soldier of a man whose time and attention is largely taken up with occupations and 
drudgery entirely foreign to the military profession. As a soldier he must always be a 
‘botcher’ in his business, and equally so as a mechanic.”171 The Journal’s editors were 
likewise among the most outspoken advocates for the development of more sophisticated 
American military presence, one on par with the great European powers like Prussia and 
France. Its pages often advocated improved training for troops and more advanced 
weaponry. But even the journal’s editors recognized that, due to Congressional 
parsimony, army commanders were between a rock and a hard place when it came to 
soldiers’ labor. This was an old problem, but one the army was unable to adequately 
address during the “frontier” period.  
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In 1871, the Army and Navy Journal explained that, “The inefficiency alleged 
against the Army in the Indian country arises from causes not inherent in the service, but 
contingent to it.” The problem of “poorly garrisoned” forts was compounded by the 
demand for labor, which soldiers had to meet. “The number of soldiers ready for field 
duty is still further reduced by the drafts constantly made upon the ranks for mechanics, 
laborers, teamsters, etc., in accordance with the orders that no civilian shall be employed 
about a military post in any work for which soldiers can be used. As there is always a 
great deal of work to be done about a post – cutting and hauling wood, hay, rebuilding 
and repairing quarters, barracks, corrals, etc. – it usually happens that there are barely 
men enough to exempt from ‘extra’ and ‘daily duty’ to furnish the ordinary escorts and 
guard mounts.”172 The same conditions existed twenty years later; the army failed to find 
a budget-friendly alternative to soldiers’ labor in the nineteenth century. 
Although often neglected in today’s western history, the army’s labor problem 
was not overlooked by contemporaries. The Army and Navy Journal recognized that 
there was a price to be paid for the army’s reliance on soldier-workers; the exigencies of 
frontier duty made many demands on the army, not all of which were strictly related to 
training and drilling. But however necessary, these demands seemed to impede the U.S.’s 
maturation into a world-class military power and even hampered its ability to address 
pressing security concerns at its borders. Why should soldiers build roads and saw lumber 
when hostile Native Americans, thieving Mexicans, and even unreconstructed 
Southerners terrorized citizens and challenged the authority of the U.S. government? For 
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many, the army seemed to be returning to its antebellum condition, unprepared to fill the 
role expected of a strong national army.  
The great irony is that those quotidian chores and “extra duty” details actually 
constituted the U.S. army’s most consequential work. Far from holding the U.S. back 
compared to its European peers, the army’s use of soldiers’ labor holds one of the keys to 
its ascent as a global power. Francis Paul Prucha writes about the antebellum frontier 
army, “The significant contribution that United States troops made to the development of 
the frontier was possible only because they constituted, above everything else, directed 
manpower. They were a labor force unequalled in compactness and unity of purpose by 
any group of frontiersmen.”173 After the Civil War, as western settlement accelerated, 
that “directed manpower” was trained on building transportation and communications 
infrastructure. Soldiers worked on roads, telegraph lines, and railroads. They also 
supported the new firms that looked to invest in the West, particularly in the areas of 
mining and ranching.  
By adopting a broader view of the army’s activities in the West, it is also possible 
to appreciate the importance of the American military labor to the great economic and 
political transformations of the late-nineteenth century. Even during the height of laissez-
faire, the American state played an active role in the expansion of capitalist enterprise 
through its army. While we tend to think of the military as somewhat peripheral in liberal 
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states, this is not always the case. As Peter Way writes about eighteenth-century Britain, 
“State, capital, and armed forces formed a triad, a military-commercial complex, that lay 
at the heart of the international process of primitive accumulation.”174 David Harvey has 
suggested “accumulation by dispossession” as a more accurate term for Marx’s primitive 
accumulation because it underlines the ongoing nature of the process rather than 
relegating it to a “primitive” or prehistoric phase of capitalism. The history of the U.S., 
particularly the experiences of Native Americans, certainly makes clear that the violent 
processes of dispossession were ongoing, geographically specific, and not limited to an 
“early” phase of capitalism.175 Harvey’s “accumulation by dispossession” provides a 
useful framework for understanding events in the latter part of the nineteenth-century 
West as the central state, through its military, worked hand in hand with small and large 
investors to open the region for different types of capital investment. Beginning in the 
1860s, the West, “the great natural-resource reservoir and the investment arena for 
eastern U.S. and western European capital,” became home to new mining ventures, 
extensive rail systems, and vast commercial ranching enterprises.176 The daily, nearly 
invisible labor of thousands of enlisted men underwrote this capital investment, in turn 
linking the region to financial and industrial sectors across the world. As historian Julie 
Greene writes, “The U.S. military served as a linchpin in the complex interconnections 
between capitalism and imperialism. The labor history of military service and the 
vicissitudes of capitalism intersected in numerous ways during the late nineteenth and 
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early twentieth centuries.”177 The army undertook work that was imagined to promote the 
advance of white settlement into remote corners of the West. In the process, enlisted men 
provided a variety of services to private investors and enterprises related to security, 
intelligence-gathering, and infrastructure-building. In some cases, companies benefited 
from the “unintended consequences” of the army’s activities in the West. In other cases, 
such as railroad company escorts, the army directly subsidized private enterprises 
because officers believed they served the larger civilizing mission. It was indeed an 
“extraordinary global economic transformation,” and in their own way, soldiers 
contributed to it.178  
The Work of Empire 
 Soldiers in the western army performed a vast array of chores ranging from 
skilled to unskilled. They often began by constructing the places where they and their 
officers would live. In Arizona and New Mexico, this meant forming adobe bricks; 
soldiers in western Texas operated lumber mills. Troops often spent weeks or months 
living under canvas while they constructed quarters for officers and erected their own 
barracks. Often the labor provided by troops was taken for granted. Colonel Ranald 
Mackenzie certainly assumed that the men under his command would frequently be 
occupied with non-military duties. In 1871, as part of a lengthy monthly report on the 
activities of enlisted men and officers at Fort Concho, Texas, Mackenzie wrote, “Besides 
the foregoing, much manual labor has been performed by the troops in the erection of the 
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buildings, and other exigencies incidental to a new and large Post.”179 At Fort Concho, a 
strategically important post near the Staked Plain, soldiers were often needed to build and 
repair buildings as much as they were expected to scout for hostile Native Americans or 
accompany a mail coach. 
Christopher C. Augur, a distinguished Civil War officer who commanded the 
Department of the Platte and later Texas, understood the value of soldiers’ labor to an 
underfunded and understaffed army. In 1873, he updated Lieutenant General Philip 
Sheridan on the progress of work at Fort Clark, a post on the lower Rio Grande that the 
army reoccupied after the Civil War.180 Augur’s letter gives a sense of the various duties 
soldiers performed, helping the military expand its influence in the West even during a 
period of economic retrenchment. He wrote,  
They [buildings] will have to be built of Stone - that being the cheapest material 
available - cheaper even than adobes, there being a stone-quarry easily worked, 
directly at the Post. The Stables are to be built entirely by the Companies 
occupying them and the only expense I have permitted to be incurred for them is 
the sheathing and shingles for roofs and for stalls and feedboxes. Most of the 
roofing for all the buildings is also to be put on by the troops and their services 
will be made available too, as far as practicable, in quarrying and laying the stone 
in the wall. All the Lumber and shingles will be hauled by our own teams, mostly 
from Austin or Cuero.181 
 
Augur allowed that he would have to hire “Civilian Masons and Carpenters and a few 
Experienced Quarrymen,” but the vast majority of the work would be completed by 
troops at Fort Clark. These men would quarry the stone and lay it for the buildings, haul 
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lumber and shingles from over 200 miles away, build stables for horses, and put roofs on 
the buildings. This state of affairs described the army’s labor regime throughout the West 
in the post-Civil War period.  
 Beyond their duties at their own posts, soldiers’ labor transformed the western 
landscape with new transportation and communications infrastructure. First, they built 
thousands of miles of road, usually through uninviting terrain. Much of this work was 
done by hand. As one historian of the western posts writes, “Troops used blasting powder 
but often paths were cut over rocky hills with picks and shovels. Troops rooted out 
persistent scrub cedar, mesquite, and prickly pear. Where a route led across a river or 
creek, men often had to cut down the banks to make an easier grade. Along hillsides they 
sometimes built stone retaining walls to prevent slides or washouts.”182 The mid-1870s 
were an especially active period for road-building in western Texas. Fort Griffin in 
northern Texas was one of the launching points for the army’s Red River War on the 
southern plains in 1874. That same year, however, when Lieutenant Colonel George 
Buell led troops from Griffin north and west to punish Comanches and Kiowas who 
attacked buffalo hunters at Adobe Walls, soldiers were building new roads in the vicinity. 
In February 1874, Buell reported, “1st Lieut John Whitney 11th Infantry with 2 non com 
officers and 20 privates Infantry one ambulance and eight 6 mule teams left post en route 
to Dallas Tex, there to purchase lumber for use at the post. Lt Whitney was ordered to 
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open a new and direct road from this post to Dallas measuring distances, grading…&c 
&c.”183 They were still absent two weeks later when Buell submitted the monthly report.  
Troops at the quieter Fort McKavett were frequently assigned to road-building 
duties. In April 1874, the commanding officer reported that men of the Fourth Cavalry 
and Tenth Infantry had left the post to “explore for a more direct and better road from this 
post to Fort Clark Texas via Fort Territt and the head spring of the West Fork of the 
Nueces.”184 They were absent just over two weeks and marched 258 miles in the course 
of their work. In December 1875, men from the Tenth Infantry and the Tenth Cavalry 
were “sent out to explore for a more direct road from this post to Fort Stockton, Texas.” 
They returned over a month later, having traveled 511 miles.185 In March of 1874, 
company “I” of the Ninth Cavalry “performed the usual Garrison duty at Fort Davis,” but 
then was assigned to detached duty “to open a road from (near) El Muerto to East-end of 
Bass Canon Texas and for scouting duty.” They arrived at their assigned post after 
marching 75 miles.  
The army’s concern with infrastructure also led to improved communication in 
the remote corners of the West. The telegraph was one of the earliest innovations in long-
distance communication that the army pioneered and made widely available for western 
settlers under the auspices of military necessity. The telegraph was first used extensively 
during the Civil War when Congress established the Signal Corps to undertake the 
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construction and repair of the device for use by the Union Army.186 Its advantages for a 
military force separated by enormous distances and challenging terrain soon became 
apparent. Historian Thomas T. Smith writes, “After the war, commanders and military 
administrators on the frontier were quick to demand a telegraph system for use as an 
instrument of command and control and as an apparatus for the quick dissemination of 
information in the vast region. On July 24, 1866, Congress called for the construction of 
government telegraph lines to be used by military and postal authorities in the West.”187 
However, Congress was slow to take action and appropriate funds to the construction 
project in the southwest.  
Construction of the telegraph proceeded quickly in Arizona and New Mexico. The 
army-built line from San Diego to Prescott and Tucson was completed in 1873 and “was 
used for private civilian purposes from the beginning,” according to historian William H. 
Lyon. This Arizona line was then linked to New Mexico’s military telegraph. The 
installation of the telegraph did not begin in earnest in Texas until 1875, but it made rapid 
progress thanks to the substantial details of enlisted men assigned to labor on it. In Texas, 
it took just eleven months to finish most of the line. In 1877, Secretary of War George W. 
McCrary reported that the troops had “nearly completed the lines in Arizona, New 
Mexico, and the Texan frontier,” with 3,200 miles of line in operation.188 By 1882, 1,565 
miles of telegraph line connected forts across Texas.189 Lyon, writing in 1968, recognized 
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that the army’s investment in the military telegraph was in fact significant to the 
development of a “corporate frontier” in the southwest. “In the field of communication,” 
he wrote, “the government provided direct aid…[The southwestern telegraph] 
represented a direct and important contribution to capital development.”190  
Enlisted men from local posts were assigned to lay the poles and stretch the wire 
that formed this extensive communications network, with the Signal Office overseeing 
the project. The work itself was grueling. On one occasion, Emil Bode of the 16th 
Infantry was sent to build the line between Forts Sill and Reno. In June 1878, he was 
assigned along with fifteen other infantrymen to dig three-foot holes for the poles; several 
civilian “wire stretchers” followed behind the enlisted men to place the wire. Bode 
recalled: 
Our hands were sore and blistered from handling the tools and hot iron telegraph 
poles for the first few days, but soon got accustomed to the work and burning sun. 
We moved along in pairs to the designated spots for the holes, here digging in 
loose sand, there in solid sandstone or gravel, or trying our muscles and temper on 
the sticky black sod of rich bottom lands. It was altogether a very dry and 
tiresome piece of work for our unaccustomed backs. But this lasted only a few 
days and we were soon as well acquainted with handling a crowbar as we were in 
the manual of arms or any other military exercises.191 
 
Troops spent months in the field laying the line. A company of thirty-one men from the 
10th Infantry, under the command of Lt. Charles L. Davis, was assigned to work on the 
line in August 1875. They did not return until October, when it was reported they had 
finished the line between Forts McKavett and Concho. But two months later, an officer 
and thirty enlisted men were sent back into the field, this time with orders to build the 
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line between McKavett and San Antonio. They did not return to their post until the 
following May.192 
Once installed, the telegraph lines required frequent maintenance and repair. They 
were the object of sabotage by Native American and other adversaries of the military, as 
well as the occasional casualties of reckless gunplay. Bode recalled several details to 
build and repair the lines. The lines were “constructed of wood poles between the fort and 
the border, consequently easily damaged by prairie fires and storms, which had to be 
repaired by details of troops sent by the military.”193 While stationed at Fort Davis, he, 
two recruits, and “a colored driver” – likely a civilian from the area – were assigned to 
repair the telegraph line that ran between Davis and Fort Quitman on the upper Rio 
Grande. “The fire had done its work. Telegraph poles, rotten and dry from long standing, 
were still burning while some of the stumps dangled on the wire. We replaced them with 
iron poles which had previously been distributed in different places along the road.”194 
The army learned from experience that the wooden lines were no match for the annual 
prairie fires, so they began building the line with iron poles and replacing wooden 
ones.195  
The maintenance of the lines strained the resources of the individual posts. Alfred 
L. Hough, the commanding officer of Fort Davis, wrote the adjutant general in 1882 
about the miserable state of the line west of his post. Lt. Col. Hough estimated that one 
hundred new poles would be needed to repair the line.  His report reflects the near-
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constant drain on the post’s manpower from such auxiliary duties. “A repairing party has 
been out for two thirds of the time since I Have been in command here,” he wrote. “To 
put up these, poles will require transportation for carrying rations, forage, and poles, and 
supplying water for the detachment, which this Post cannot now supply, and I can only 
send out a repairer with a pack mule for such partial work as may be actually required for 
temporary use.” As an alternative to repairing such a long distance of line, Hough 
suggested that a new line of eighteen miles to Marfa, following the Southern Pacific 
Railroad, be built instead.196  
The telegraph helped support the army’s strategic goals in the West. In the 
southwest especially, the new technology allowed soldiers to communicate rapidly from 
hundreds of miles away. Yet when army officers spoke about the benefits of the 
telegraph, they did not speak in purely “military” terms. The immediate context of the 
construction of this telegraph line was the frequency of raids carried out by Mexicans and 
Native Americans, particularly along the Rio Grande border. But stopping these raids was 
inextricably connected to a larger “civilizational” mission. In 1874, the chief signal 
officer, General Albert J. Myer, remarked that the telegraph in Texas would not only 
deter raiding, but be an “aid equally efficient to advance the civilization of the 
country....Little settlements will grow up, the military posts of the frontier and interior 
will not longer be isolated.” The telegraph, he argued, would further promote “the 
inducement to enterprise, to carry settlement forward.”197 In 1877, as construction of the 
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line continued in the southwest, the chief signal-officer echoed his earlier declarations 
about civilizing work of the telegraph: “There can be no constructions more important for 
holding a frontier or protecting the first steps of advancing civilization than the 
telegraphic lines.”  
For top army brass like Myer, it was impossible to distinguish between the 
military function of the telegraph – facilitating communication so that soldiers could 
better respond to attacks by raiding parties – and the larger goal of promoting white 
settlement in the isolated parts of the southwest. “Advancing civilization,” after all, 
meant advancing the line of white settlement and promoting the frontier economy, and 
the telegraph was essential to these goals. In the same report cited above, the chief signal-
officer noted the benefits accruing to those outside of the military. He wrote, “Aside from 
the benefits resulting from the connection of military posts,” the telegraph also provided 
“incidental protections the stations at frontier villages upon the lines give the country 
through which they pass, thus aiding its development and advancing the commercial 
interests.”198 Although contemporaries like Myer spoke in the language of “civilization,” 
they also made it clear that, for them, civilization meant the promotion of “commercial 
interests.” While the civilizational discourse entailed ideas and ideologies about white 
Americans’ cultural and social superiority, on a more material level Myer believed the 
army’s work supported the objectives of private business people. He and others within 
the military saw nothing wrong with the army providing services at a discount rate to 
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private individuals and investors. On the contrary, such support was inextricably tied to 
the army’s mandate to advance civilization.  
The military telegraph reflects a larger pattern in the army’s project of western 
conquest after the Civil War. The labor of enlisted men often led to golden opportunities 
for private firms, sometimes in unanticipated or unplanned ways. Anyone could send 
messages over the army’s telegraph system for a fee, and local people took advantage of 
this resource. In some cases, the telegraph carried more civilian messages than military 
ones. Civilians paid a higher rate than the government, and fees collected from this 
service helped defray, but not recoup completely, the army’s investment.199 But as time 
went on, the army’s initial investment in the communications infrastructure of the 
southwest paid even larger dividends to certain individuals. Thomas T. Smith writes, “By 
1883, the secretary of war was abandoning army telegraph lines when appropriate 
commercial lines were constructed to serve the same location, or auctioning off military 
lines to interested business enterprises.”200 Of course, such “interested business 
enterprises” were able to take advantage of the construction work enlisted men had 
already carried out. Furthermore, the army had already absorbed some of the initial risk 
of such an investment because civilians’ active use of the military telegraph had 
established the market for this service. Private firms who bought the telegraph lines from 
the army already had evidence that local people would be willing to pay for the 
communication service. Today, economists would point to the “positive externalities” 
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created by the army’s investment in this communications system.201 Through the army, 
the federal government provided the funding necessary for the construction and 
maintenance of a telegraph line. Private individuals and then businesses benefited from 
the availability of the communications infrastructure without paying the full value of the 
service and, later, of the infrastructure itself. From the perspective of army officers like 
Myer, this chain of events was completely proper because support for private businesses 
served the army’s tacit goal of “advancing civilization.” Yet by overlooking the 
important service the military provided such commercial interests, historians have failed 
to account for the ways the U.S. army, particularly through soldiers’ labor, contributed to 
private economic development of the region. 
“More than the usual claim:” Railroads and the Army 
The army’s relationship with the railroads furnishes another example of what one 
historian calls the “blurring of imperial and laissez-faire goals.”202 The 1870s and 1880s 
were the heyday of line-building in the southwest, but the military’s commitment to 
supporting the expansion of railways was established immediately following the Civil 
War. General Sherman spoke often about the many advantages the army would derive 
from the railroads, not only in terms of immediate material benefits, such as cheaper 
transportation for goods and troops, but in the larger civilizational function of the 
railroads. In his annual report to the secretary of war in 1867, Sherman discussed the 
support troops had provided the Omaha Pacific and the Kansas Pacific railroads, two 
“important enterprises, in which the whole civilized world has an interest.” He had 
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ordered troops in the region when the lines were building to “extend to both these roads 
as much military protection and assistance as the troops could spare.” Sherman noted the 
unusual nature of the army’s relationship with the railroads and felt it was necessary to 
justify his troops’ support of these private businesses. “These roads,” he wrote, “although 
in the hands of private corporations, have more than the usual claim on us for military 
protection, because the general government is largely interested pecuniarily.”203 
Railroads were lauded for reducing the army’s transportation costs, especially across the 
vast distances of the West. Sherman, while acknowledging these material considerations, 
had a larger vision of the railroads’ military purpose. Once the transcontinentals were 
completed, Sherman asserted, “then the solution of this most complicated question of 
Indian hostilities will be comparatively easy, for this belt of country will naturally fill up 
with our own people, who will permanently separate the hostile Indians of the north from 
those of the south.”204 By promoting the settlement of “our own people” at the expense of 
the Indians’ access to these lands, the railroads would allow the army to counter the 
threats from hostile Natives more effectively. Quite simply, the roads meant white 
settlement and the end of indigenous people’s dominion over the western plains.  
 Politicians shared Sherman’s enthusiasm for the great work of Indian-fighting the 
railroads would accomplish. In 1869, the report of a Senate committee investigating 
“government aid to additional railroads to the Pacific” declared that,  
Pacific Railroads will settle the Indian Question. They can only be permanently 
conquered by railroads. The locomotive is the sole solution of the Indian 
question…The railroads will settle the country as they progress…As the thorough 
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and final solution of the Indian question, by taking the buffalo range out from 
under the savage, and putting a vast stock and grain farm in its place, the 
railroads to the Pacific are surely a military necessity.205 
 
Both Sherman and the authors of the committee report called railroads the “solution” to 
the Indian problem. They believed railroads did more than facilitate military operations. 
The railroads served a larger political purpose, accomplishing technologically rather than 
militarily the army’s ultimate goal – the elimination of Native Americans from the West. 
Policymakers understood the Indian question as more than a military problem; it was a 
problem of political economy. The basic question was who would have access to the 
immense resources of the West. The goal of white settlement was clearly stated by the 
committee: Americans sought to “tak[e] the buffalo range out from under the savage” and 
replace it with ranching and farming operations. The committee members were tragically 
correct. The eventual subjugation of the Comanches on the southern plains in the 1870s 
fit this sequence of events. Pekka Hämäläinen argues that the Comanches’ defeat was 
“not a military but an economic one” brought about by the massive and rapid destruction 
of the buffalo in the early 1870s. The Comanches, he writes, “were a society fatally 
crippled by poverty, malnutrition, and a loss of cultural order,” and these larger issues 
predetermined their defeat at the hands of U.S. army troops.206 The railroads indeed 
played a role, according to Hämäläinen, because the Kansas Pacific Railroad connected 
professional buffalo hunters to eastern markets where they disposed of countless hides. 
Just as Sherman and the Senate committee members hoped, the railroads helped the army 
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accomplish its mission of ridding the Plains of Native Americans by undermining the 
tribes’ political economies. 
The editors of the Army and Navy Journal, the leading publication of the armed 
forces, echoed the committee’s words later in 1869 in a front-page feature entitled “Our 
Military Highway.” In characteristically grandiose language, the Journal lauded “an 
enterprise so remarkable for the vastness of its conception, the rapidity and energy of its 
accomplishment, and its wealth of possible results…the Pacific Railroad.” Insisting that 
the true value of the transcontinental lay in its “political, military, and strictly national 
importance” rather than its “commercial advantages,” the editors expressed what leading 
military figures like Sherman also recognized: that the railroads served a political 
function in a nation so recently rent by civil war. As the ANJ declared, the railroad “does 
something more than ‘link ocean and ocean,’ -- it grapples with hooks of steel the widely-
distance people, that live under one Government, three thousand miles and more 
asunder.” The journal editors went on to discuss the need for a transportation network 
linking far-distant peoples from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, and they noted the 
strategic value of such infrastructure should the army be needed in California. The war, 
they argued, made obvious the need for such linkages between the regions; had California 
gone with the South, or if the western states ever expressed secessionist impulses, the 
results would have been devastating for the Union. But the railroads happily put such 
fears to rest: “The Pacific Railroad and its many feeders, the other trans-continental 
railroads, and their branches, will soon form a powerful network of commercial interest, 
and will do more than anything else to produce what our Fathers desired, ‘a more perfect 
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Union.’”207 Here was a portrait of national harmony achieved through commercial ties – 
very similar, in fact, to the one envisioned by early national statesmen. James Madison, 
for example, hoped that a system of roads and canals would “bind[] together the various 
parts of our extended confederacy.”208 His “republican vision” was premised on western 
expansion and internal improvements – a political model in which transportation 
infrastructure helped connect and unify a far-flung population with different needs and 
interests.209 Madison’s concerns are usually associated with the debates of Jefferson’s 
presidency, but the need for the unity achieved through internal improvements was never 
more urgent than after the Civil War.  
The Army and Navy Journal, as the mouthpiece of the military establishment, saw 
in the railroads the best solution to two pressing “military problems”: the Native 
Americans and the Mormons. They did not offer an explanation of how the railroads 
would help to eradicate polygamy, the nation’s only objection to Mormonism according 
to the editors, but on “the Indian business,” they had clearer ideas. Much like the senators 
and General Sherman, the ANJ believed the answer was white settlement. They wrote, 
“the steady roll of the new tide of emigration will gradually crowd the Indian out of its 
path; civilization will spread west, as it has east, and the weaker will go to the wall; in the 
process, the Indian will probably be handled worse than ever hitherto – but it is destiny.” 
Here the editors voiced a certain amount of pathos about the fate of the Native 
Americans. Their tone would harden in the years to come, as Indian hostilities increased 
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and the resolution of the “problem” they represented ended up being less bloodless than 
expected. Nevertheless, army officers and Congressmen agreed that the transcontinental 
railroads served a larger political purpose – helping stitch together a nation torn apart by 
civil war – and therefore deserved the full resources and attention of the military. 
The army’s support for the railroads in the southwest followed from these 
policies, but they were adapted to the special challenges the army faced in the region. In 
1873, General C. C. Augur, commanding the Department of Texas, endorsed a petition 
from residents supporting the construction of rail lines between Austin and the Rio 
Grande. Augur explained his endorsement on the basis of the relationship between 
economic development and peace. By increasing the commercial connections between 
the U.S. and Mexico, he argued, the railroad would help mitigate raiding. Mexico would 
have more of an interest in stopping the raids and protecting the border if their northern 
provinces were more important economically. Augur wrote, “Open and unsettled borders 
have ever been the theater of violence and robbery, those intimately connected with 
commerce and business as a rule peaceful and friendly.”210 But his support for the 
railroads extended beyond letter-writing on their behalf. The next year, in 1874, Augur 
assured J. W. Throckmorton, a former governor of Texas and then a land commissioner 
for the Texas & Pacific, “We are so much interested in the completion of the Railroad 
that I am prepared to do anything in my power to further any movement that conduces in 
the least to that End.”211 What was in his power was to assign troops to escort 
construction and surveying crews, employed by the railroads, that worked throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 C.C. Augur, Endorsement, 4 January 1873, Box 3, Augur Papers, The Newberry Library, Chicago. 
211 C.C. Augur to Hon. J.W. Throckmorton,  10 July 1874, Box 3, Augur Papers, The Newberry Library, 
Chicago. 
	   	  
	  
	  
117 
Texas in the 1870s and 1880s. Historian Robert Wooster writes that the military officials 
“assisted the railroads every step of the way” in the state. Thanks to the protection 
afforded them by escort parties assigned from nearby posts like Fort Quitman and Fort 
Clark, lines of the Southern Pacific Railroad and Texas & Pacific Railroad were 
completed in the early 1880s.212  
The army’s relationship with the railroads had shifted substantially since the Civil 
War. In one of the most complete studies of the army’s ties to the railroads, Robert 
Angevine credits the war with “expand[ing] the role of the federal government and the 
military in the economy,” particularly with regard to railroads. He writes, “In 1862, 
Lincoln refused the Union Pacific’s request for a military escort and provisions for its 
surveying party on the grounds that ‘there was no authority for the Government to aid in 
making the surveys.’” The War Department changed its approach, however, and in 1865, 
“Secretary of War Edwin Stanton called for ‘the vigorous prosecution of the works of the 
railroads to connect the Mississippi Valley with the Pacific coast, as a military precaution 
and a measure of economy, deserving the fostering care of the government.’”213 Escorting 
parties, which Lincoln had denied the private companies, became a routine part of the 
army’s duties in the West after 1865. Sheridan, in a report for the Military Division of the 
Missouri, listed “to…furnish escorts to surveying parties for scientific purpose and for 
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projected railroads; to assist and guard the railways already built and other commercial 
lines of travel” among the primary duties of his troops in 1873.214 
General Augur first became tutored in a generous attitude towards the railroads as 
commander of the Department of the Platte in the 1860s. Native Americans were 
disrupting work on the Union Pacific in 1867, attacking railroad parties, and killing 
company workers, and they had even derailed a train. In response to appeals from 
Grenville M. Dodge, the Union Pacific’s chief engineer, Sherman and Augur deployed 
more soldiers to guard the line, hoping to reassure workers and maintain the pace of 
construction.215 But the army’s help extended beyond escorting parties. Angevine writes, 
In addition to protection, the army also provided the Union Pacific with supplies. 
‘The commissary department was open to us,’ Dodge later boasted…The army’s 
generosity surprised even Dodge. ‘There was nothing we could ask them for that 
they did not give, even when regulations did not authorize it,’ he marveled, ‘and it 
took a large stretch of authority to satisfy all our demands.’216 
 
Such practices were not unique to the Union Pacific. In Texas, one post commander 
“routinely issued rations and tobacco to the engineers and survey teams of the Texas and 
Pacific Railroad.” Those favors were frowned upon in that department, however, and 
eventually the officer was ordered not to issue any more rations to the T&P crews.217 
Nevertheless, the army’s assistance to railroads was not limited to sharing its provisions. 
Angevine describes the army as “a private police force working to protect the interests of 
the Union Pacific.” For example, in Cheyenne, Wyoming Territory, the army located 
bases near the UP construction sites and then responded when the railroad faced 
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opposition from locals who refused to recognize the company’s (unofficial) title to the 
lands it occupied.218 Elsewhere,  
Officers allowed civilian construction crews to secure timber and stone from 
military reservations without cost. They also permitted depots to be erected on 
post lands even though there was no clear legal authorization to do so. Patrols 
sometimes answered the call of executives to remove squatters from company-
owned land rants, and officers infrequently loaned army rifles and ammunition to 
vulnerable work crews.219  
 
In his study of the Union Pacific, historian Robert G. Athearn described Sherman and 
Sheridan’s enthusiasm and support for the railroads. They saw them as the key to western 
settlement and believed the military gained more from their construction than they 
contributed in terms of protection. In addition to the more diffuse benefits of 
“civilization” made possible by the transcontinentals, the War Department reported 
“dramatic” savings by using rail transportation rather than wagons, and expected to reap 
further financial benefits as more lines were built.220 The army also hoped to influence 
the placement of the lines, but according to Angevine, “the railroads exerted a greater 
influence on the army’s choices regarding locations and facilities than the army did on 
the railroads’ decisions.”221 Furthermore, by making lands accessible to white settlers, the 
railroads also expanded the territory the army needed to monitor and protect. In 1870, the 
secretary of war drew attention to this fact, saying, “with the opening to settlement of the 
wilder portions of the country, army posts are pushed further and further into the 
wilderness, and as the stations are extended the expenses of transportation are and will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Angevine, Railroad and the State, 182. 
219 Tate, Frontier Army, 77. 
220 Robert G. Athearn, Union Pacific Country (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 210. 
221 Angevine, Railroad and the State, 183. 
	   	  
	  
	  
120 
remain very great.”222 While officers like Sherman, Sheridan, and Augur lauded the 
railroads as helping them accomplish their mission in the West, in concrete terms it is 
more difficult to quantify the benefits which accrued to the military. It is certain, 
however, that the enlisted men who carried out the officers’ orders saved railroads like 
the Union Pacific and Texas and Pacific significant sums that, in their absence, they 
would have needed to pay out in fees to private security firms, leases, and ammunition 
and provisions.  
The Army and the Birth of Texas Ranching 
The army’s investments in the West fell into two major categories: infrastructure 
and knowledge. Roads, telegraphs, and railroad escorting parties fall into the first 
category. Here the labor of soldiers yielded concrete, material, and visible dividends for 
white settlers and capitalists who invested in the region. But soldiers also produced 
knowledge, manifested in maps as well as treatises on the region’s terrain and 
mineralogical and agricultural resources. This knowledge constitutes the army’s second 
major investment, one that was at least as crucial to the development of capitalism in the 
West.  
“To explore unknown territory” was often cited as one of the army’s primary 
tasks in the post-Civil War West, but its ambitious mission to study, map, and then 
transform the landscape was part of a long national project – one that reached back even 
to the eighteenth century and Thomas Jefferson’s employment of Lewis and Clark.223 In 
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the late-nineteenth century, American soldiers stood parallel to a host of colonial projects 
taking place simultaneously across the globe, including the British in India, the French in 
West Africa, and the Russians in their own hinterland of Siberia.224 In the U.S., historian 
William G. Robbins writes, “Perhaps the greatest of the early federal services – hence 
subsidies – to would-be financiers and potential investors in western enterprise were the 
U.S. Army reconnaissance and exploring expeditions of the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers, including the great railway surveys conducted in the 1850s.” These were not 
simply neutral fact-finding missions; they benefited first and foremost the investors – 
some American but also British – who were interested in western railroad development. 
As Robbins points out, these expeditions were not “disinterested exercises in scientific 
curiosity” but “the means for providing real and practical information for an expanding 
American empire.”225 
Although the U.S. had invested considerable resources in the exploration and 
mapping of the West before the outbreak of the Civil War, Americans still knew 
astonishingly little about what lay beyond the Mississippi. As William H. Goetzmann 
writes, “Despite the years of prewar experience in the West, and the monumental efforts 
of several generations of military and civilian explorers, there was still not enough useful 
and reliable geographical information about the country.”226 Historians have long 
recognized that the U.S. army was an important surveyor and map-maker. Large-scale 
expeditions such as Clarence King’s 1867 Fortieth Parallel Survey and John Wesley 
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Powell’s journeys through the Rocky Mountains and Grand Canyon attract the lion’s 
share of attention. Such wide-ranging, state-sponsored surveys were prerequisites for 
white settlement and capital investment throughout the nineteenth century. Thomas T. 
Smith writes, “Corps of Topographical Engineers were responsible for exploring, 
surveying, and mapping the military routes that would eventually form frontier Texas’ 
transportation and communication network…These lines of communication, although 
fiscally inexpensive, served as the foundation of the commercial infrastructure of north, 
central, and western Texas.”227 But perhaps because of the focus on these special 
branches devoted to map-making, such as the U.S. Geological Survey and the engineers 
corps, it has been easier to ignore the ways the regular army units, made up of enlisted 
men, contributed to the buildup of geographic knowledge about the West. 
One such routine but influential expedition in the southwest focused on the Staked 
Plain or Llano Estacado, the name given to the vast expanse of tableland in western 
Texas and New Mexico. The Llano is “perhaps the largest isolated, non-mountainous 
area in North America,” and its 30,000 square miles of “pure, featureless plain” had 
captured the imagination of European explorers, poets, and ambitious states since the 
sixteenth century.228 In 1875, Lt. Colonel William R. Shafter, commander of the Twenty-
fourth Infantry Regiment, was ordered to explore the Staked Plain, with instructions to 
rid the area of “hostile” Natives while making note of important topographical features 
that might contribute to the army’s knowledge of the enigmatic plain. The enormity of 
the Llano and its eerie topography contributed to Euro-American perceptions of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Smith, The U.S. Army, 8. 
228 John Miller Morris, El Llano Estacado: Exploration and Imagination on the High Plains of Texas and 
New Mexico, 1536-1860 (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1997), 2.  
	   	  
	  
	  
123 
danger and mystique, but these assumptions also helped explain why Native Americans 
had used the Llano as a refuge from Spanish and then American settlers for centuries. 
Shafter’s first mission was to hunt Indians, but it quickly became apparent that the larger 
purpose of the five-month expedition was to compile intelligence about what Shafter 
would call the “resources” of the Staked Plain. 
Shafter was not the first or even the most celebrated of the Llano’s explorers. That 
honor most likely goes to Captain Randolph B. Marcy, a career military officer who led 
an expedition in 1849 accompanying a group of emigrant gold-seekers traveling to 
California along the southern route via Santa Fe. Marcy and his group of soldiers and 
engineers traversed the northern Llano, and his descriptions of the plains yielded one of 
its most enduring epithets. His commentary on the region’s prospects for habitation are 
worth quoting at length because they shaped American perceptions of the Llano: 
When we were upon the high tableland, a view presented itself as boundless as 
the ocean. Not a tree, shrub, or any other object, either animate or inanimate, 
relieved the dreary monotony of the prospect; it was a vast illimitable expanse of 
desert prairie -- the dreaded Llano Estacado of New Mexico; or, in other words, 
the great Zahara of North America. It is a region almost as vast and trackless as 
the ocean – a land where no man, either savage or civilized, permanently abides; 
it spreads forth into a treeless, desolate waste of uninhabited solitude, which has 
always been, and must continue, uninhabited forever; even the savages dare not 
venture to cross it except at two or three places, where they know water can be 
found.229 
 
Marcy’s depiction of the Llano as the “great Zahara” destined to be “uninhabited forever” 
clashed with American hopes for the West. Unlike the lush prairie lands to the north, this 
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“treeless, desolate waste,” held out no prospects for settlement and civilization. It was a 
place even unfit for “savages.”  
Despite Marcy’s assessment, however, the U.S. army continued to explore parts 
of the Llano. In 1853, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis ordered an expedition to scout 
the 32nd Parallel, part of a fact-finding mission in support of a southern route for the 
transcontinental railroad. Captain John Pope, one of the officers commissioned for this 
work as part of the Pacific Railway Survey, ultimately spent nearly four years exploring 
the Staked Plain. Most of that time was devoted to an elaborate engineering project called 
“Pope’s Wells,” in search of an artesian water supply for the Great American Desert. In 
1858, Pope’s venture was finally abandoned, a failure, and soon thereafter the Civil War 
called Pope and other officers away from western Texas.230   
The army’s efforts to map and understand the Llano Estacado in the post-Civil 
War period were a continuation of these earlier efforts, but they took place in a different 
political and economic context. The question for army officers in 1870s was less about 
the route of the transcontinental railroad and more about the line of settlement, which was 
steadily moving west and south. While some ranchers, including Charles Goodnight, the 
“father of the Texas Panhandle,” had established operations farther north, they still 
avoided the Llano, but it was clear that white settlers would embrace an opportunity to 
spread out farther south. The timing of Shafter’s expedition also aligned with recent 
military events. The Red River War of 1874-1875, the army’s final assault against the 
powerful Comanches, had cleared most of the hostile Natives from the region, but 
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officers in Texas wanted to make sure there were no stragglers seeking refuge in their 
longtime haunt, the Llano Estacado.231   
Shafter, with almost 450 black enlisted men from the Tenth Cavalry and Twenty-
fourth Infantry, departed in July 1875 and returned in December. The soldiers were 
accompanied by a company of the so-called “Seminole-Negro Indian scouts,” led by their 
commander Lt. John L. Bullis, a group of Tonkawa scouts, “several medical officers, 
blacksmiths, packers, teamsters, and other civilian employees,” along with twenty-five 
mule teams, one hundred mules, and a beef herd to slaughter for meat.232 This motley 
assortment was “one of the largest scouting expeditions ever assembled in West Texas,” 
according to Shafter’s biographer, Paul H. Carlson. Shafter broke the enormous party into 
a few detachments charged with exploring different sections of the Staked Plain, along 
with instructions from department headquarters to make special note of watering holes, 
vegetation, and important topographical markers. Officers were instructed by Shafter to 
create maps of the areas they traversed, underlining the significance of intelligence-
gathering to this mission.   
Most of the country scouted by Shafter’s command had been visited, in one way 
or another, by European and American explorers before him. Shafter’s innovation was to 
examine this formerly sinister landscape with an eye towards the current preoccupations 
of his day – namely, the prospects for ranching on the Llano Estacado. As for Marcy, 
Pope, and others before him, the critical question was water. Shafter detailed the 
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availability of water as well as grass at various landmarks in a lengthy report on the 
expedition. Early in his travels he found the area surrounding Fort Concho nicely suited 
for grazing: “Commencing at Fort Concho, the valley of the North Concho for sixty miles 
is well adapted to grazing, having sufficient wood for all necessary purposes and good 
running water the entire distance.” The country there was “covered with excellent grass, 
considerable mesquite timber of small growth” and “having several streams and springs 
of good water.” He reserved even higher praise for the area near Fresh Fork canyon. 
There he expected “corn could be grown the whole length of the canyon without 
irrigation, except in unusually dry seasons,” and the grass was likely “excellent” and fuel 
“easily obtained.”233  
As Shafter moved north, he found even better prospects for settlement. Between 
the 32nd and 33th Parallel were a series of important springs and wells. Some of these 
had been visited but not thoroughly explored by his predecessors. In 1849, Marcy, for 
example, noted that Mustang Springs was probably a permanent watering place.234  J. H. 
Byrne, who kept the diary of Captain Pope’s 1854 expedition, wrote that the land around 
Big Spring “could, no doubt, be cultivated successfully if there was natural or artificial 
irrigation.”235 Shafter likewise touted the possibilities of grazing in this area. Sulphur 
Springs and Big Spring, about 30 miles apart, both featured “water excellent” and he was 
confident that “inexhaustible quantities by any amount of stock that can be fed within 
reach of them.” Paul Carlson notes that Lt. Baldwin, who led the expedition around Big 
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Spring, discovered sources of permanent water that would “support large herds of 
livestock.” Carlson writes, “His information made it easier for cattlemen later to locate 
water for their herds, and the area he covered soon filled in with ranches.”236  
Shafter reserved his highest praise for an area called “Moo-cho-ko-way country,” 
just north of Big Spring. Here he discovered mesquite timber, “sufficient for all necessary 
purposes of settler,” and “stone convenient for building.” The water was “excellent and 
inexhaustible” and the valleys, he believed, could be irrigated. Shafter confidently 
declared, “I do not think there is any doubt but corn could be raised without irrigation 
nearly every year.” Such pronouncements were a far cry from Marcy’s depiction of “vast 
illimitable expanse of desert prairie” or “a region almost as vast and trackless as the 
ocean.” Quite the contrary. Shafter spoke of an entirely different landscape, one perfectly 
suited to the ambitious, land-hungry settlers who sought to raise cattle and sheep on the 
Texas plains. He told his superiors, “As grazing country it is unsurpassed by any portion 
of Western Texas from the Gulf of New Mexico and Indian Territory.”237  
Shafter’s expectations about the prospects for cattle in the Llano proved prescient. 
In the next fifteen years, many of these areas became some of Texas’ most storied cattle 
country. In 1877, C. C. Slaughter established an operation near Big Spring that grew into 
one of the largest ranches in western Texas, encompassing over a million acres and 
stretching all the way to Lubbock and New Mexico. Slaughter became known as the 
“Cattle King of Texas,” a sobriquet of immense meaning in a region and era known for 
its cattle barons. Slaughter not only built a vast ranching empire, but he also established 
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ranching as a serious and powerful business in Texas. He was among the first to 
introduce barbed wire and new forms of mechanization to his operations, and he helped 
start one of the first cattlemen’s associations in the state.238  
The Big Spring area was not the only landmark on the dreaded Staked Plains to 
become a flourishing garden in the 1870s. To the north, Shafter discovered the 
considerable charms of the Double Mountain Fork of the Brazos. He wrote, “the whole 
country is covered with luxuriant grass, affording pasturage for immense herds of buffalo 
and would be sufficient to maintain thousands of cattle and horses.”239 Indeed, this area 
was part of Quitaque country, where one of the first cattle ranches south of the Palo Duro 
Canyon was soon established. In 1877, brothers George and Jim Baker established an 
operation with 2,000 cattle south of the caprock ridge, which they later expanded to cover 
140,000 acres in three counties. In the early 1880s, the Baker brothers sold their holdings 
to the JA Ranch, the legendary operation backed by the Scottish financier John Adair and 
managed by Charles Goodnight.240 The JA was one of the largest and most celebrated of 
the enormous Texas ranches, covering over 1.3 million acres at its height. The Bakers 
and then Goodnight found the country to be as amenable to grazing as Shafter had 
predicted.    
Another major ranch also moved into the area scouted by Shafter’s men. In his 
report Shafter noted that area around Casa Amarilla, about forty miles from the Double 
Mountain Fork, was similarly suited to grazing. He remarked upon a “large tank of fresh 
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water that I believe is fed from springs as I could not perceive any diminuition [sic] in it 
after using it for two days with my whole command.” He also noted some “large pools of 
living water, with plenty of wood” and declared it “an excellent place for sheep or 
horses.”241 The Yellow Houses area, as it would come to be called, turned out to be a 
prime location for cattle as well. In the early 1880s, ranchers began arriving at Yellow 
Houses. In a few years it became the southern headquarters of the XIT Ranch, the largest 
ranch in the West and “probably the largest fenced range in the world,” enclosing well 
over three million acres in Texas.242 In one month of 1887 alone, Yellow Houses received 
30,000 new head of cattle for the XIT.243 
 Shafter did not merely anticipate these developments – his expedition contributed 
to the establishment of cattle ranches in the Llano Estacado in the 1870s and 1880s. Word 
of Shafter’s findings spread through the publication of his official report. Historian 
William Leckie writes, “The report, widely circulated and read, spawned a swift 
movement of cattlemen, sheepherders, and homesteaders to claim and settle this last great 
home of the Southern Plains Indians.”244 In fact, it was reprinted in Homer S. Thrall’s A 
Pictorial History of Texas, from the Earliest Visits of European Adventurers, to A.D. 
1879, a popular account of the state’s history, geography, and notable figures, featuring 
illustrations of the state.245 Shafter’s report caught the attention of leading political 
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figures as well. J. W. Throckmorton, the former governor of Texas and railroad 
executive, now a congressman representing the state’s third district near Dallas, wrote the 
secretary of war asking for more information about Shafter’s findings. After referring to 
the official report, which he had read, Throckmorton requested a copy of the map Shafter 
had made. “A portion of the country explored and mapped by Col. Shafter, is embraced 
in my congressional district, and is hence of great interest to my constituents. I would 
there-fore respectfully request to be furnished with a copy of Col Shafter’s map, which 
will be of great service in enabling pioneers to utilize the valuable information obtained 
by Col. S especially in regard to the exact location of many watering places not before 
discovered.”246 It is not known exactly which “constituents” Throckmorton meant, but 
while serving in Congress, he remained in the employment of the Texas and Pacific 
Railway Company. The geography of the Llano would have been of interest to his 
railroad associates as well as other potential ranchers, investors, and land speculators.  
Reading the report, it is not difficult to understand why investors and cattlemen 
decided to move into the region. As William Leckie writes, “The colonel’s report and 
accompanying maps would surely have warmed the heart of a Staked Plains Chamber of 
Commerce had such existed.”247 Shafter’s narrative was especially crafted with cattlemen 
in mind, and his observations about the supply of water, timber, and stone helped revise 
the perception, developed over centuries and epitomized for Americans by Marcy’s 
writings, that the Llano was a barren wasteland. Instead, he advertised the abundance of 
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water and grass for grazing. Paul Carlson, a noted historian of western Texas, writes, 
“Knowing that Indians no longer ranged over the Llano Estacado, settlers, close on the 
heels of the Shafter expedition, invaded the empty land. Sheepmen, cattlemen, merchants 
and others pushed first into the canyons and river valleys of the High Plains before 
spilling into the tableland.” Stock-raisers came to the Canadian River Valley in 1875 and 
1876, but others went farther south to Yellow Houses. According to Carlson, “Most of 
the early settlers entered the region as a result of the success of the Shafter campaign.”248 
By the 1880s, the landscape of the Llano had been transformed. Marcy’s “great Zahara” 
was home to some of the West’s most extensive ranching operations, teeming with cattle 
destined for the great stockyards of Chicago and the eastern cities beyond.  
The most remarkable consequences of Shafter’s 1875 expedition had nothing to 
do with fighting Native Americans or defeating lawless bands of raiders – those aspects 
of the army’s role in the West that were most often discussed in official reports. But 
Shafter did have a “military” assignment: his instructions from department headquarters 
included an order to clear hostile Natives off the Staked Plain, which it was assumed they 
used as a refuge between raiding operations. Yet his men discovered very few Native 
Americans in the course of nearly five months. In fact, Shafter felt he needed to 
apologize for how little his report dealt with troublesome Natives. “I regret that so little 
actual damage was inflicted on the Indians – one killed and five captured being the extent 
in that direction,” Shafter wrote. “Of the destruction of their supplies the showing is a 
little better.” He boasted that his men had managed to destroy one large camp and one 
small camp that they encountered in their scouting. Overall, what Shafter’s expedition 
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revealed was how little the army and white settlers needed to fear the indigenous 
population of the Llano. Indian tribes that had once roamed the southern plains were 
defeated and their populations routed from at least this corner of the southwest. Shafter 
felt confident that there were no “Indian[s] east of the Pecos and south of Red river.” 
Furthermore, with the intelligence gathered about watering holes and the new roads 
enlisted men had constructed, monitoring the region would be much easier. Shafter 
recommended the army concentrate troops near “the more important watering places on 
the plains.” His final recommendation in his official report underscored how much 
perceptions of the Llano had changed thanks to his scouting operation. “I believe that if 
two or three permanent camps were established on the edge of the plains, of three or four 
companies each, that the frontier settlements in Western Texas would be advanced one 
hundred and fifty miles within two years.”249 His estimation may have been slightly 
ambitious, but in a few years the Staked Plain became an important part of the region’s 
economic scene.  
 Shafter’s mission was a fairly routine example of the army’s scouting duties in 
the southwest. It cannot compare in scale to the expeditions undertaken by the Corps of 
Engineers, but it represents more fully the “knowledge-labor” commonly produced by 
American soldiers. Like the military telegraph system, such scouting operations had an 
immediate military goal – in this case, to eliminate Native Americans from a particular 
region. But the army’s interest in private economic development formed the larger 
context of the mission, reflected in the instructions from Shafter’s superiors to make note 
of the region’s terrain and suitability for settlement. His mission was not unusual in 
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combining military and economic imperatives. Custer’s 1874 expedition in the Black 
Hills was “largely a military reconnaissance,” according to Richard White, but he also 
took with him a small group of civilian scientists whose interest was gold, not war-
making. Custer himself lobbied for a geologist to accompany his soldiers. He wrote 
General Terry, “The country to be visited is so new and believed to be so interesting that 
it will be a pity not to improve to the fullest extent the opportunity to determine all that is 
possible of its character, scientific and otherwise.”250 Military and economic objectives 
were inextricably connected for Custer as well as for Shafter. As with soldiers’ work on 
telegraph lines and railroads, the labor of enlisted men in such reconnaissance and 
scouting expeditions underwrote the development of the ranching and mining operations 
in the late-nineteenth century. 
Mining in West Texas  
 The army’s contributions to the mining industry in the western U.S. were wide-
ranging. Some officers used their postings at remote stations in the West as platforms for 
personal investment, and the prospects for money-making were considerable when it 
came to mining. Lieutenant John L. Bullis of the 24th Infantry was one such investor. 
Bullis served in western Texas as commander of a special group, the so-called 
“Seminole-Negro scouts,” and his scouting assignments gave him unique opportunities to 
gather information about the resources of the countryside.251 According to historian 
Bruce Dinges, Bullis was “among the largest of the soldier speculators.” Because he was 
“in the enviable position of commanding the military escort for railroad surveying 
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crews,” Bullis learned at the earliest stages where railroads were planning to build and 
hence what parcels of land would increase in value as a result. Furthermore, the 
government’s land grants to railroads helped them become large landowners in the West, 
providing incentive for the companies to prospect for mineral wealth as well. In 1879, for 
example, Bullis provided a 30-man escort for a “major expedition” of the International 
and Great Northern, Texas and Pacific, and Southern Pacific Railroad, which was looking 
for mineral deposits in the vicinity of Fort Davis. Bullis’ experiences on this trip paved 
the way for extensive land speculation in western Texas.252 
The companies who backed the expedition hoped to find lucrative deposits of 
silver in the region, but so did individuals like Lt. Bullis. Sam Woolford writes, 
“Railroads at that time were being offered sixteen sections of land for each mile of road-
bed constructed, and the railroads backing the mineral explorers in the Chinatis were 
heavy holders of land in the Big Bend country.”253 Burr G. Duval, a representative of the 
International and Great Northern Railroad who kept a fascinating diary of the 1879 
expedition, several times noted that Bullis, who accompanied the group solely to provide 
protection against an Indian attack, was himself interested in the mining potential of the 
Chinati Mountains. On February 12, he wrote, “Bullis had found a lead some 6 miles 
N.W. of camp, a picked specimen from which panned out about 10 oz. We are sinking a 
shaft in that quarter also.”254 On March 1, Duval, bored with life in camp and the 
unremarkable discoveries of the prospectors overall, wondered how Bullis was so busy. 
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While Duval had spent the day reading a “trashy love story” (“Reaping His Wild Oats”), 
he noted that, “Niccolls and Bullis have been out several days, surveying as it is said, 
Surveying what?”255 Two days later, he noted that Niccolls and Bullis returned from five 
days of surveying, “footsore and weary.”256 
Duval was right to wonder about the time Bullis spent scouting on his own. Years 
later Bullis bought land in the Big Bend region. Between 1882 and 1884, he placed 
claims on 53,520 acres of land in Pecos County.257 But Bullis’ break likely came just 
after the railroad company expedition had concluded. The following year, in 1880, John 
Spencer, who had been prospecting in the Chinatis since before the Civil War, shared the 
discovery of an ore deposit with Colonel William Shafter, who was stationed nearby. 
Spencer and Shafter decided to join in a business partnership with Bullis and Lt. Louis 
Wilhelmi of the 1st Infantry.  Together, the four officers bought nine sections of school 
district land in the vicinity where Spencer had found ore. Although the partners did not 
have the requisite capital to establish a mining operation themselves, they held on to the 
land until they were bought out by the California-based Presidio Mining Company. Legal 
troubles between the partners ensued when Bullis refused to sell sections of land he had 
bought in his wife’s name and on which silver had been found. Eventually the case, 
Presidio Mining Company v. Alice Bullis, was heard by the Texas Supreme Court in 
1887. The court ruled in the company’s favor, and Presidio launched a full-scale silver 
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mining operation on the land shortly thereafter.258 The mine established on the Bullis 
land continued to operate into the 1940s.  
 The army’s contributions to the development of mining in the West followed 
many of the patterns apparent in ranching. Scouting parties looked for “hostile” Native 
Americans, but they were also instructed to search for signs of mineral wealth and note 
the suitability of the terrain for agriculture. Edward O. C. Ord, commander of the 
Department of Texas, was well-pleased with soldiers’ work in the trans-Pecos region. He 
reported to the secretary of war that scouting parties had uncovered rich grazing country 
as well mineral deposits. He wrote, “Silver-lead, iron, and copper districts have been 
discovered, and specimens of both silver and gold ores brought in.”259 On a larger scale, 
General Custer hoped there might be gold in the Black Hills, and news of his party’s 
discovery created a veritable gold rush in 1874. Military officers believed that the 
exploitation of mineral resources by white Americans would complement the army’s 
goals of “pacifying” hostile Native Americans. Richard White writes that Custer’s gold 
“also served the strategic goal of undermining the Sioux economy and loosening their 
grip on their land.”260 But some officers also hoped to line their own pockets. Lt. Bullis, 
for example, was keen to supplement his army salary with profits from mineral 
prospecting and speculation. Yet his efforts to enrich himself were eclipsed by that of 
another “empire-builder” in western Texas.  
Benjamin Grierson and the Developmental Vision 
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Colonel Benjamin Grierson went beyond Bullis in the diversity of his 
investments, and he also distinguished himself in his efforts to involve other officers in 
his money-making schemes. Like so many of his contemporaries, Grierson emerged as a 
respected officer in the Civil War. But his real accomplishments came after the war, 
when he took up a variety of positions in Texas and the southwest.261 On one occasion, 
for example, Grierson tried to convince the army to expand Fort Davis by purchasing 
land bought by Lt. Mason Maxon, his niece’s husband and regimental quartermaster, and 
George A. Brenner, the regimental bandmaster.262 Grierson also invested in land – he 
owned at least 45,000 acres in western Texas at various times – and he used his personal 
relationships and his position as an army commander to help protect his investments. 
Michael Tate writes, “Grierson appointed Maxon regimental quartermaster in 1882, and 
in that capacity the lieutenant sometimes detailed soldiers to undertake repair projects on 
Grierson’s [sheep] ranch.”263 Like so many speculators of his era, Grierson also hoped to 
profit from the spree of railroad building in western Texas. In 1883, along with two other 
subordinate officers, two of his sons, and other “prominent citizens,” he incorporated a 
railway company with plans to build a narrow-gauge line between Marfa and Fort Davis. 
Unfortunately for Grierson, the troops were transferred away from Fort Davis and the 
railroad scheme collapsed.264  
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 Several historians have latched onto Grierson as an archetype of the officer-
investor in the western army. His story is all the more compelling because it is so 
unfortunate: most of his attempts at land speculation fell through, the Marfa railroad 
never materialized, and when Fort Davis was closed and Grierson’s command transferred 
to the Department of Arizona, his hopes for material wealth evaporated. He died a 
debtor.265 Yet Robert Wooster rightly points out that Grierson was much like his 
contemporaries in the officer class. He “took actions that were hardly unique – only the 
scope and intensity of his ventures distinguished Grierson from the norm,” Wooster 
writes. “Garrison members followed their commander’s example: land speculation, 
ranching, mining, and railroad development proved fertile fields for soldier-entrepreneurs 
during the 1880s.”266 Yet men like Grierson and Bullis were small-scale investors who 
looked to much larger capitalists to realize their financial ambitions. Bullis and Shafter 
eventually sold their land to a larger mining company, and when Grierson was attempting 
to build a short-line railway, he traveled to New York to meet with Collis Huntington, 
hoping for the railroad magnate’s backing. Army officers may have been important in 
attracting such investment to the remote corners of western Texas, but they operated on a 
small scale. Their significance lies not in their individual pursuits, but in their plans for 
the future of the southwest and the way they understood the army’s role in it.  
The pursuit of profit that Grierson exhibited in his personal activities was 
reflected in his official duties as a commander of the Tenth Cavalry and then the District 
of the Pecos. Grierson exemplified what might be termed a “developmental vision,” 
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shared by many of his fellow officers in the post-Civil War army. Through this 
developmental vision, Grierson and like-minded officers understood the army’s role in 
the West primarily in terms of preparing the region for settlement and investment by 
white Americans.267 Grierson dedicated himself – and his troops – to extending the 
influence of the army in remote corners of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. They did 
this by expanding posts, building roads, assisting the railroads, and scouting and mapping 
little-known regions. Grierson believed that these auxiliary duties were inextricably 
bound up with the U.S.’s military priorities in the region. To fight hostile Native 
Americans and secure the Rio Grande border, soldiers had to know the territory inside 
and out, and they needed a reliable network of roads and supply lines to support their 
expeditions. Although he did not amass a personal fortune in western Texas, Grierson 
was nevertheless one of the army’s “empire builders.”268 
Grierson’s career reflects the diverse, multivalent role of the army in the West. In 
1878, Major General Edward O. C. Ord formed the District of the Pecos, which included 
Forts Concho, Davis, and Stockton, largely in response to the threat posed by Victorio, 
the leader of a group of Warm Springs Apaches who had escaped from the San Carlos 
reservation. Grierson, appointed commander of the new district with his headquarters at 
Fort Concho, established a string of subposts at key watering places in western Texas 
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where it was assumed Victorio and his raiders would reenter Texas. Victorio was 
eventually killed in Mexico in 1880, and the army’s efforts to subdue the renegade 
Apaches dominated military accounts of this period.269 As important as the so-called 
“Victorio War” undoubtedly was to Grierson and other officers, a developmental vision 
guided his actions and informed even his approach to capturing Victorio. His first steps 
as commander of the new district centered on information-gathering and road-building. 
He ordered troops to not only scout the country in search of hostiles, but to map it as 
well. Grierson believed that a more thorough understanding of the terrain and a system of 
coordinated paths would, in the long run, enable the U.S. army to wage a successful 
campaign against its enemies.270 On some level, he understood that the remaining 
confrontations with Native Americans would be waged by wile, and superior firepower 
alone would not give the army a sufficient advantage; soldiers would also require a more 
intimate knowledge of the environment. 
In 1878, his first year commanding the new district, Grierson made several 
lengthy expeditions and inspected Forts Stockton and Davis, the other posts under his 
command. At the end of the year, he was able to report to Major General Ord that his 
subordinates had scouted nearly 25,000 miles and he himself had traveled more than 
3,000 miles.271 Ord was pleased and a little surprised with the results of Grierson’s 
explorations, the implications of which extended far beyond strictly military matters. In 
his 1878 report to the Secretary of War, Ord noted Grierson’s work in western Texas: “I 
have to report that the explorations by scouting parties of the mountain country west of 
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the Pecos have developed, unexpectedly, well-watered and quite extensive grazing lands, 
both plain and valley. Silver-lead, iron, and copper districts have been discovered, and 
specimens of both silver and gold ores brought in. A map of the country, which will give 
most valuable information, is now in preparation.”272 A few months later, Ord sent the 
promised map to the adjutant general. He was quick to take credit for the information 
garnered from these scouts: “Under instructions from these headquarters to the 
Commanding Officer, District of the Pecos, extensive explorations by scouting parties 
have been made. The valuable information this secured, has been embodied in a map of 
that district, compiled under the direction of the district Commander.”273 The activities of 
soldiers in the District of the Pecos underscores the centrality of intelligence-gathering 
and exploration to the army’s operations. Even at a time of heightened military 
preparedness and increased activity by hostile Native Americans, most soldiers were not 
employed in activities that directly involved hunting renegade Apaches or Mexican 
outlaws. Instead, their days were spent performing labor that uncovered the rich 
possibilities of western Texas for white settlement and investment.  
The “valuable information” condensed into Grierson’s map represented many 
weeks and months of labor by the enlisted men under Grierson’s command. Ord gestured 
towards this labor when he wrote the adjutant general, “In gaining the information thus 
embraced, a vast amount of work was done in the field by Officers, Companies, and 
detachments, the aggregate distance marched by the troops being 24,469 miles. The 
figures indicate the extent of the information, which has been transferred to the map now 
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transmitted, adding greatly to its value.”274 Before soldiers could map such remote areas, 
they first needed to find their way across the high plains and through the mountains, 
which meant clearing brush and building roads before thoroughly scouting the 
countryside. In these activities, Grierson took a particularly hands-on approach. In 1879, 
for example, Grierson spent about three weeks with three other officers and Company 
“F” of the 25th Infantry, an all-African-American regiment under orders to build a road 
from Fort Davis to Fort Clark. He personally instructed the black soldiers about the 
location of the road and oversaw their labor. In his report, Grierson noted that he adjusted 
the route initially proposed for the wagon road due to the “very dry and parched 
appearance of the country surrounding Stockton.” He traveled ahead of the company to 
scout out the path of the road, then looped back to the company and directed their route. 
Assigning Company F to work near Fairview Pass, he met up with Company G, 25th 
Infantry, and set them to work on the road at Mesquis Canon “where in one day a smooth 
good road around a very rough rocky bad hill was made.” After about twelve days of this 
work, Grierson returned to Fort Davis where he received a telegram from headquarters 
instructing him to stop work on the road from Pena Blanco to Clark. The next day, 
Grierson returned to Mesquis Canon, where he sent half of G Company to meet Captain 
Schooley and the other half to come with him to Pena Colorado “doing such work while 
en route as was necessary to put the road in excellent condition.” “While the command 
rested,” Grierson himself went ahead to scout the location for the road to Pena Blanco. “It 
was only after hard, persistent work, passing and repassing back and forth and climbing 
hills and mountains, that a practicable road could be found. I succeeded however, in 
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finding passes through the hills and mountains heretofor deemed impassable for 
wagons,” he wrote. Grierson was especially pleased with the road he mapped out, 
although he barely noted the actual labor performed by his troops. In his narrative of 
events, the great accomplishment was his success in finding a path for the road that 
avoided hills. Unmentioned but assumed is the back-breaking labor the 25th Infantry 
soldiers performed under the Texas sun. Grierson wrote: “completed the location of the 
road and am pleased to state that there is not even one hill over which the road passes for 
the entire distance from Mesquis Canon to Pena Blanco - the road too is over hard gravel 
and solid smooth ground and well supplied with wood, water, and excellent grazing 
which will make this road for all time to come, one of the very best in Texas.” Even the 
absence of a subject in this sentence elides the labor performed. Who completed the 
location of the road? The requisite army records tell us what Grierson himself failed to 
mention – that the black soldiers of Company E spent eight months and the men of 
Company G three months building “one of the very best” roads in Texas.275 
 Grierson continued on his way, accomplishing great feats of construction by proxy: 
“When returning to Concho I opened a direct route from Pena Colorado to intercept the 
one I opened last year from Stockton to Pena Blanco at a point where the latter enters the 
mountains, from the south.” But even this was not enough to satisfy Grierson’s ambitions 
for the trans-Pecos region. He enclosed a map drawn by Ordnance Sergeant Robert F. 
Joyce, U.S. Army, “under [his] careful supervision,” which included not only the roads 
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constructed but also those Grierson recommended. The “dotted lines indicate the 
proposed continuation of the road” which Grierson assured his superiors would be easy to 
complete. “I am confident from personal observations,” wrote Grierson, that “a proposed 
road....can be readily opened with but little trouble or labor.”276  
 Grierson estimated that the troops had marched a total of one thousand miles in 
the course of their detail. They had opened part of a road between the two posts, and he 
looked forward to the completion of the road. Of course, the ultimate reward of all these 
exertions extended far beyond the construction of a road for military use. He reminded 
his superiors that, should his advice be followed regarding the route of this new road, 
“much more valuable country [would be] opened up for travel and settlement.”277 Ord 
echoed Grierson’s observations about the developmental possibilities of the trans-Pecos. 
In 1879, Ord wrote in his report to the Secretary of War, “Americans are pushing west 
and northwest, and as soon as the new military road -- much nearer the river -- from Fort 
Clark to Fort Davis, now under construction by the troops of this department, shall have 
been opened, quite a number of cattle ranches will be established near and north of the 
Rio Grande, and along the Pecos.”278 Indeed, as detailed above, the 1880s would witness 
a remarkable burgeoning of the cattle industry in western Texas. Grierson had read the 
writing on the wall. 
Taken together, Grierson’s activities in his second year in command of the 
District of the Pecos represent in microcosm the developmental program carried out by 
soldiers’ labor. In 1879, Grierson sent a detailed summary of the work accomplished by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 B.H. Grierson to Asst. Adj. General, September 23, 1879, Box 4, Grierson Papers.  
277 B.H. Grierson to Asst. Adj. General, September 23, 1879, Box 4, Grierson Papers. 
278 U.S. Secretary of War. Annual Report, 1878, 91.   
	   	  
	  
	  
145 
his soldiers to the assistant adjutant general of the Department of Texas. A remarkable 
document for both narrative style and content, it demonstrates the scope of work 
undertaken by his troops. Early in the year, they built a telegraph office and repair station. 
In the spring Grierson was unexpectedly sent to New York City to serve on the Hazen-
Stanley court martial, but even during his absence, he was pleased that his troops “had 
generally been as active and energetic in the discharge of the duties assigned them as 
could be expected under the circumstances.” Grierson was anxious to return to his duties 
at the helm of a large construction operation in the trans-Pecos. The first agenda item was 
road-building. “From knowledge gained of the country to the southwest of Stockton and 
Davis last year (1878) I considered it very important in order to facilitate future 
operations, that a good wagon road be constructed from Davis, to Pena Colorado, with 
view of opening up the country towards the Rio Grande - Fort Clark and Presidio-del-
Norte.” In August, he assigned two companies to this “important work.” As noted in the 
September report discussed earlier, Grierson personally traveled to Pena Colorado “to 
push the work forward on the Davis and Clark road” and to explore the countryside in 
that vicinity. He recommended the construction of a new wagon road, but noted that it 
would be difficult and time-consuming to build west from the Pecos. “Captain 
Schooley’s company has been eight months working upon the road in Mesquis Canon 
near Fort Davis, and two other companies of the 25th Infantry, have worked for months 
upon it to the southward, and two others are now at work beyond the limits of my 
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District.”279 All told, his troops “opened” 300 miles of new roads and constructed 200 
miles of telegraph line between Fort Davis and Fort Quitman. 
Only a few scattered references throughout the report indicate that these are 
military troops and not construction crews. In June and then again in October, Grierson 
noted that his troops were called away from their regular duties to respond to threats from 
hostile Indians, but they quickly dealt with these distractions and returned to the pressing 
work of building and mapping. Beyond road work, soldiers had also built new lodging for 
officers and themselves. “Rough but comfortable stone quarters have been erected by the 
labor of troops, without expense to the Government.” At Grierson’s Spring, the Tenth 
Cavalry had constructed a forage house, telegraph office, and infantry quarters. At Pena 
Colorado, another subpost, the two companies of the 25th Infantry had erected “quarters 
for one Company of Infantry, Forage House and Corral.”  
The soldiers of the District of the Pecos had accomplished much impressive work 
in the year 1879. Grierson was eager for his superiors to take note of the far-reaching 
program of improvements he had carried out through their service. He ended his report 
with a reminder of the important work he had supervised: “The vast amount of valuable 
service rendered by the troops of this District, in scouting and exploring the country, 
working on roads, quarters and telegraph lines, may be more fully understood from this 
report.” In clear language, Grierson defines what counts as soldiers’ “valuable service” – 
he does not mention the “Indian problem” or “depredations,” even though the trans-Pecos 
region was prime raiding ground for Mexican, American, and Native horse and cattle 
thieves. Instead, Grierson hopes he will be rewarded for the army’s truly significant work 
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in the west – the work of development. In a none-too-subtle bid for recognition he 
concludes, “I trust that the earnest and successful efforts put forth to open up and develop 
the resources of the country, and give security to settlers, will be properly considered, 
appreciated and recognized, by those in higher authority.”280  
Grierson did not have to wait too long to receive confirmation that his 
achievements were valued. The following February, Assistant Adjutant General Thomas 
M. Vincent commended Grierson on his “arduous and energetic services of the past 
year.” He more than hinted that Grierson should expect to be recognized and rewarded by 
his superiors, even beyond Ord: “The services rendered…in scouting and exploring the 
country, working on roads and telegraph lines, thus marking earnest and successful 
efforts to develop the resources of the country, cannot, as to value, be well estimated; but, 
no doubt, they will be properly considered, appreciated, and recognized by the higher 
authorities, as they are now by the Department Commander.”281 Vincent echoed 
Grierson’s laundry list of army accomplishments, and he assured the faithful career 
officer that his troops’ labor – the scouting, exploration, building roads, laying telegraph 
line, and general development of “resources” – would earn him commendation.  
Grierson and his contemporaries shared grand ambitions. Although they were 
concerned with pay raises and promotions, military officers also felt themselves to be 
engaged in work of world-historical importance. They commanded more than ditch-
digging and road-building, after all: they were at the helm of a great national endeavor on 
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the western frontier. Vincent spoke to these aspirations when he reassured Grierson that 
his work would be duly appreciated: 
Thirty-four thousand four hundred and twenty miles of marches; three hundred 
miles of roads opened; two hundred miles of telegraph constructed, -- all, except a 
portion of the telegraph, consummated in one year, -- involve efforts which will 
lead to lasting results, of which, as tending, greatly, to advance civilization, 
yourself and command may well be proud.282 
 
Grierson was part of a milieu of nineteenth-century career military officers who believed 
deeply in the civilizational role of the U.S. army in the West. Indeed, it is clear from 
Grierson’s reports throughout his tenure as commander of the District of the Pecos that he 
understood his and the army’s role as pivotal to the settlement – even civilization – of this 
corner of the West.  
In this vein, Grierson’s biographers, Shirley and William Leckie, describe 
Grierson as a productive, rather than destructive, officer – a civilizer in the grand sense of 
the nineteenth century. They write, “By temperament a builder and developer rather than 
a destroyer, he set out to make his district not only safe, but attractive to potential settlers 
as well.”283 Yet even Grierson’s version of peaceful development was premised on the 
destruction of indigenous societies. Although he may not have relished killing Native 
Americans, there was no space for them in his vision of a prosperous and civilized West. 
In practice, Grierson’s developmental vision was an effective means of ridding the 
southwest of the recalcitrant Natives who had impeded for centuries the complete 
settlement of the region by states like Spain, Mexico, and the United States. Ultimately, 
however, the developmental program Grierson pioneered proved incredibly destructive of 
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indigenous societies, despite the words of one private in the Ninth Infantry, who wrote 
he was ‘…beginning to think the soldiers in the Department of the Platte know better 
how to handle pick & shovel than they do a gun.’”284 How did the soldier’s “pick and 
shovel” compare to a gun from the perspective of Native societies fighting off the 
encroachments of settlers and the American state? The pick and shovel were not obvious 
weapons, but they yielded many casualties nonetheless, including the Native economies 
and communities that could never coexist with the army’s developmental program.  
This “creative destruction,” coming as it often did cloaked in an ideology of 
progress and civilization, may in fact be the most significant “legacy of conquest” in the 
American West.285  At the highest level of leadership, the army believed its efforts had 
been secondary to rather bloodless technology. In 1880, Sherman pronounced, “The 
progress of settlement west of the Mississippi in the past fifteen years has been simply 
prodigious…This is largely due to the soldier, but in an equal, if not greater measure, to 
the adventurous pioneers themselves, and to that new and greatest of civilizers, the 
railroad.”286 Contemporary historians have also adopted this perspective. Robert Utley 
writes, “Despite all the wars of the Peace Policy, the Indians did not succumb to military 
conquest…More than the army, railroads, settlements, and all the numbers, technology, 
and other trappings of an aggressive and highly organized society brought defeat to the 
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Indians.”287 From a different standpoint Pekka Hämäläinen echoes Utley when he calls 
the Comanches’ downfall “not a military but an economic one.”288 For Hämäläinen, the 
real conquest involved the destruction of the buffalo, which in turn was facilitated by a 
railroad that linked buffalo hunters to eastern markets. In all these narratives, the army 
plays a role in the destruction of Native economies and societies, but usually by 
delivering the final blow; military defeat is premised on a weakening of Native societies 
brought about through other, non-military means. Yet the army contributed to the overall 
weakening of these societies in ways that cannot be captured by battlefield accounts. In 
places like the Llano Estacado, for example, the army scouted for Native American 
hideouts, but Shafter’s 1875 expedition yielded very few casualties in the short-term. 
Nevertheless, within a few years, the information Shafter and his troops gathered 
contributed more decisively to the end of Native raiding practices in western Texas than 
any single military maneuver. Likewise, although Sherman and others rightly recognized 
the importance of the railroads in limiting the space and resources available to Plains 
Indians, they downplayed the key role of the army in enabling the “iron horse” to run.  
Outright violence, perpetuated by the U.S. army, played an obvious role in 
clearing western lands of their Native inhabitants. In turn, the decimation and 
dispossession of Native Americans was a key component of the march of white 
settlement and capitalism across the North American continent.289 But perhaps because 
historians of the military and of Native Americans have trained their eyes on violent 
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confrontations – battlefields and massacres – they have been less likely to see the quieter 
but insidious means by which the army helped subjugate indigenous people. In his study 
of the army’s role in the northwestern frontier prior to the Civil War, historian Francis 
Paul Prucha argued that soldiers did more than provide security for settlers. In fact, it was 
the relationship between the army’s traditional “military” endeavors, such as fighting 
Native Americans, and its more prosaic activities, such as building roads, that deserved 
attention. Prucha wrote, “The twin blessings which the army posts offered nearby 
communities – economic opportunity and security from Indian attack – cannot easily be 
differentiated in importance.”290 Prucha’s study concentrated on the “frontier period” in 
the upper-northwest in the five decades before the Civil War. Many of his insights about 
the importance of the army as an engine of economic development apply to the late-
nineteenth century as well, but the context for the army’s activities changed after the 
Civil War. Although more and more production in the northeastern cities could be 
described as “capitalist” in the antebellum period, it was not until after the Civil War that 
serious investment capital poured into the trans-Mississippi West, largely for the 
development of railroads but also for the establishment of large ranching and mining 
operations in the 1880s. The army provided not only the requisite security, but also 
transportation and communications infrastructure, which made remote corners of the 
western U.S. attractive venues for capital. Without the protection, scouting, and map-
making provided by soldiers, the western landscape would have looked very different by 
1890. Private enterprises would have needed to pay for these services in the labor-scarce 
West, potentially delaying the establishment of cattle ranches, silver mines, and rail lines 
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by years or even decades. It is impossible to know with certainty how the western 
economy would have developed without the army’s dogged labors, but it is safe to 
assume that the capitalist transformation of places like the Llano Estacado would have 
taken longer and may have taken a different course entirely.  
The next chapter explains how the army managed to create and maintain a regime 
of unfree labor at exactly the time it helped make such systems of bondage, slavery, and 
coercion illegal and illegitimate in the United States. In an extraordinary twist, it was the 
army – the appendage of the state credited with emancipating the slaves and demolishing 
the Confederacy – that perpetuated a form of coerced labor in the West. The following 
chapter investigates this phenomenon of unfree martial labor, the wide-scale protests it 
elicited, and its relationship to the great showdowns between capital and labor throughout 
the Gilded Age United States.  
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CHAPTER 3 
“A slave in Uncle Sam’s service:”  
The Army and the Problem of Labor in the Gilded Age 
 
Like many young men in 1881, William Bladen Jett was adrift and looking for 
work. Recalling the frustration of those aimless days, Jett wrote, “I walked the streets of 
Baltimore hunting for work till my mind was weary and my finances were gone.” The 
doctor’s son from the Northern Neck of Virginia continued his search until one day he 
saw a notice in the Baltimore Sun: “Wanted, 100 men for U.S. Cavalry service out on the 
plains.” The romance of the West – and the prospect of a square meal – beckoned. Jett 
visited a recruiting office and enlisted. Early the next day, he overheard an officer 
“cursing a man” and “threatening to put him in chains and take him to St. Louis.” His 
disposition toward the army changed almost immediately, but his revelation came a day 
too late. “I wished I was well out of the army,” Jett wrote. “I never got over that wish 
during the five years I was a slave in Uncle Sam’s service.”291   
Corporal Jett was not the only soldier to lament loss of freedom in the post-Civil 
War. A major cause of dissatisfaction among enlisted men was the army’s relentless labor 
regime. Although they performed the work of common laborers, soldier-laborers enjoyed 
fewer rights and privileges than their counterparts in civilian society. The soldier was 
paid less than the average worker and was subject to special disciplinary and judicial 
regulations. Most important, the terms of his contract meant that he was not free to leave 
his “employer,” the U.S. army, until he had served every day of his enlistment. As a 
result, desertion – the soldier’s equivalent of quitting – reached epidemic proportions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Henry P. Walker, “The Reluctant Corporal: The Autobiography of William Bladen Jett: Part I,” The 
Journal of Arizona History 12, no. 1 (April 1, 1971): 4-5. 
	   	  
	  
	  
154 
several times in the late-nineteenth century. As resistance to the army’s labor demands 
mounted, the army scrambled to stem the tide of desertions without ever remedying the 
underlying causes of soldiers’ dissatisfaction. 
This chapter examines the conflicts generated by the U.S. army’s labor regime. It 
argues that military labor constituted a form of coerced labor that was at once exceptional 
in the post-Civil War world of “free labor” and emblematic of new unfree labor relations, 
particularly in the South and West.292 First, it explores soldiers’ understanding of the 
army’s labor regime and the ways they articulated their grievances. Some enlisted men 
simply made trouble at their barracks, others wrote petitions, and quite a few deserted. 
Desertion was an especially crucial form of soldiers’ resistance, and the debates 
surrounding desertion reflect public and official perceptions of peacetime soldiers and 
their role in American society. Second, this chapter places soldiers’ labor in the broader 
context of the political economy of the trans-Mississippi West after the Civil War. The 
region was home to a variety of coercive labor arrangements, including convict and 
contract labor. Military labor was yet another example of the not-quite-“free labor” 
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relations that dotted the western landscape. Ironically, while the U.S. army is rightly 
credited with helping destroy slavery in the South and enforcing the rights of ex-slaves 
during Reconstruction, it remained a vehicle for coercing the labor of soldiers. The 
army’s “enlisted laborers” thus provide a new way of assessing the persistence of 
coercive labor relations during a period of rapid economic expansion. By highlighting the 
way the army became a purveyor and manager of coerced labor, this chapter challenges 
assumptions about the vaunted status of soldiers and the close relationship between 
military service and the rights of citizenship in the nineteenth-century United States. 
Citizens, Workers, or “Loafers”: Soldiers in the Gilded Age 
Corporal William Jett was not the only young man to visit a recruiting office 
when his “finances were gone.” The army depended on the desperation of poor men to 
fill its ranks. Colonel Richard I. Dodge remarked that “the large majority are driven to 
enlistment by absolute want.”293 In fact, the army benefited from economic slowdowns 
and crises because more skilled men enlisted, explaining why national panics as well as 
“winter and hard times,” in the words of General William T. Sherman, helped attract men 
to recruiting depots. Jett was unusual in that he was from Virginia and the son of a 
professional: the majority of soldiers in the peacetime army were laborers who enlisted in 
northern cities. Immigrants continued to make up a significant portion of the military; 
one-half of new recruits between 1865 and 1874 were foreign-born, mostly Irish or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Quoted in Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-
1898 (Oxford University Press, 1986), 329. 
	   	  
	  
	  
156 
German, and over a third between 1880 and 1897 were foreigners.294 Corporal Emil 
Bode of the 16th Infantry described his compatriots in all their diversity: 
We found men without the least knowledge of the English language who had 
enlisted after unsuccessful attempts to obtain work. [One] said he wanted to join 
‘soldier boys,’ a very dubious honor, another had to leave on account of a girl. We 
found men of intellect and stupidity, sons of congressmen and sons of farmers, 
rich and poor, men who are willing to work and can not find it in civil life, men 
who are looking for work and hope that they never may find any: gamblers, 
thieves, cutthroats, drunkards, men who were formerly commissioned officers. 
 
If Bode was correct that the regular army included “sons of congressmen and sons of 
farmers,” there were certainly more of the latter than the former. Still, he conveyed the 
great range of human emotions and motivations that brought men to the army. Himself a 
German immigrant, Bode described this colorful patchwork of humanity with uncommon 
sympathy. He believed that the “combination and variety of stock” in the American 
military “had produced some of the best soldiers on the frontier.”295 Others were not so 
sure. 
 Most soldiers were accustomed to hard labor before they enlisted, and they soon 
discovered that soldiering also entailed a great deal of manual or common labor. This 
realization did not sit well with many enlistees. Jett recalled that he “had often dreamed 
both in my wakeful and in my sleeping moments of the great West and had a great desire 
to ‘go west,’ as Horace Greeley had advised young men to do.” In contrast to that 
idealized West of opportunity, however, men like Jett encountered the reality of 
demanding labor under western skies. His declaration that he was “a slave in Uncle 
Sam’s service” was an indictment of the army’s harsh labor regime. Indeed, soldiers 
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spent much of their time building and repairing barracks, clearing land for roads, and 
digging ditches. When troops returned west after the Civil War, they encountered forts 
badly in need of repair. New threats from hostile Native Americans and Mexican cattle-
thieves along the border also required the construction of entirely new posts. Soldiers 
became the construction workers of the West. Complaints about the military’s labor 
regime were ubiquitous, and not only from deserters. “‘Government workhouse,’ as a 
descriptive term for an army post, was in common use among soldiers of the Indian Wars 
period,” according to Don Rickey.296  
 The contrast between soldiers’ expectations and the reality of military labor is 
readily apparent in the men’s complaints about the army’s labor regime. Although most 
soldiers expressed their dissatisfaction through small, individual acts – perhaps in letters 
home or by grumbling about a superior officer – others voiced their objections in more 
organized ways. For example, in 1878 a group of unnamed soldiers penned an 
extraordinary petition to Senator (and former Union Army general) Ambrose Burnside, 
who was then attempting to craft legislation that would thoroughly reorganize the army. 
They wrote, “The undersigned, enlisted soldiers, desire to represent that the Army is now 
much too small to perform the services required of it, that it is not a ‘standing army’ but a 
traveling, working, fighting, and suffering army.” Much of this “suffering” was due to the 
fact that soldiers had no idea what lay in store for them when they enlisted in the army. 
The petitioners sought to highlight the extreme contrast between expectations and reality. 
“We first enlisted with the usual ideas of the life of a soldier; willing and anxious to 
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brave its dangers, hardships, and fatigues,” they insisted. They discovered, instead of 
adventure,  
we are obliged to perform all kinds of labor, such as all the operations of building 
quarters, stables, storehouses, bridges, roads, and telegraph-lines; involving 
logging, lumbering, quarrying, adobe and brick making, lime-burning, mason-
work, plastering, carpentering, painting, &c. We are also put at teaming, repairing 
wagons, harness, &c., blacksmithing, and sometimes wood-chopping and hay-
making. 
 
This “working” army stood in sharp contrast to the image of the brave frontier army 
facing “wild Indians.” In addition to such chores, soldiers also confronted additional 
perils above and beyond what ordinary laborers encountered. The petitioners continued, 
“Besides all this labor, we have to go on campaigns and long marches, and fight Indians, 
risking our lives and health from bullets, accidents, malaria, exposure, and fatigue.” Here 
were two sides of life as an enlisted man: They not only risked life and limb from hostile 
enemies, disease, and the elements, but they also endured a regime of arduous labor that 
had little to do with strictly military duties.297 
The petitioners did not object necessarily to the work itself, but they wanted fair 
pay. They asserted, “the pay is now certainly no more than a reasonable compensation for 
a soldier, and much less than would command men to perform our duties if they knew 
beforehand what they would encounter.” The men insisted that the variety of work they 
carried out was done “all for wages much less than those current in the regions where we 
serve, for anything like the same labor.” Here the petitioners defined their service as 
soldiers as labor, drawing an explicit parallel between the work of soldiering and “the 
same labor” they might be expected to do in a variety of other occupations. Rejecting an 
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understanding of martial labor as somehow exceptional, these enlisted men instead saw 
their work as comparable to many other jobs. Most soldiers were stationed in the West, 
where labor was scarce and wages famously high – a situation often credited with 
enticing soldiers from their posts and contributing to high rates of desertion. Even 
Sherman recognized that soldiers were not paid wages commensurate with civilians. In 
1883, he “urged the army to adopt a flexible extra duty pay system which would raise or 
lower the amount according to a comparable workers’ wages in particular localities.” 
Congress rejected Sherman’s proposal, and soldiers continued to earn less than laborers 
in most sections of the country where they were stationed.298 As a result, the petitioners 
were not alone in protesting their inadequate pay. Don Rickey writes, “Soldiers were 
likely to…chant such songs as the one that went ‘A dollar a day is damn poor pay, but 
thirteen a month is less!’”299  
Burnside commented on only one aspect of the petition he received: the topic of 
pay. “I know of no subject of discontent in the service felt to be so oppressive by the 
soldier, as the cutting off of extra duty pay,” wrote the senator. “The complaint that 
enlisted men are made to do everything (frequently) but military duty would be covered 
so far as their claims are concerned, by extra pay.” Burnside believed that most of 
soldiers’ grievances had to do with issues of compensation. They lamented their 
transformation into laborers, but might be more comfortable with their extra-duty 
assignments if their labor was acknowledged and appreciated with just wages. The fact 
that the army did issue extra pay for certain special services, such as blacksmithing, 
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underlined the fact that they performed labor that could be sold on a market for higher 
wages than they received as soldiers. Burnside, however, overlooked the fact that only 
specific tasks were classified as “extra duty,” while soldiers felt like they deserved higher 
wages for all the labor they were expected to perform.  
This unusual petition arrived on Senator Burnside’s desk at a particularly volatile 
moment in the history of global capitalism. The Panic of 1873 had led to a long 
depression in the United States and Europe, and conflicts between labor and capital grew 
more frequent and violent. When the soldiers wrote Burnside, the United States had just 
experienced one of the worst labor confrontations in memory. The Great Railroad Strike, 
which began in West Virginia, swept across the eastern seaboard and ultimately engulfed 
workers deep in the Midwest. Eighty-thousand railroad workers and up to half a million 
workers in other industries took part.300 In the summer and fall of 1877, army officers 
worked closely with railroad and mining executives to end the strike. They commanded 
federal troops stationed in West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, and 
Missouri who were ordered to intimidate strikers and protect strikebreakers. The 
involvement of federal troops ultimately helped end the strike.301  
The soldiers petitioning the government felt their own exploitation as workers and 
linked their experiences to that of the broader American working population. They wrote, 
“We desire to say that we are mostly laboring men, that we sympathize with them as a 
class.” This sympathy between soldiers and “laboring men” evidently raised some 
potential problems for the soldiers; they went on to reassure the senator that they would 
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perform the duties required of them. They promised Burnside they would “be always 
ready and willing to put them down and to keep the peace between contending parties 
until reason can resume its sway.” The soldiers insisted they were law-abiding men who 
“believe in the ballot-box for the righting of wrongs” and were “opposed to rioting and 
mob violence.”302 Even so, in a further expression of solidarity with their civilian 
counterparts, they cautioned Burnside that they would not abuse their fellow workers. 
Because of their sympathy with workers “as a class,” they told Burnside, “there is no 
danger of our being used to oppress them.”  
Writing in the late 1870s, these enlisted men wanted Burnside to feel confident 
they could be counted on to defend law and order, even against other workers. In the 
present climate this meant they would not hesitate to escort “scabs” into the coal mines or 
beat back strikers on the Baltimore & Ohio. But like their counterparts in the broader 
working class, the soldiers also wanted to improve their working lives. Like workers 
struggling in other industries, the soldiers noted, “there is no eight-hour law for us.” Here, 
referring to a demand for an eight-hour work day long sought by the Knights of Labor, 
the soldiers tied their own grievances to the larger world of labor organizing. Given 
recent events, the petitioners, despite their reassurances, may have given Burnside pause. 
After all, soldiers were even more exploited than the average worker: they labored under 
more difficult circumstances, away from family and friends; and they were often paid less 
than other workers for the same job. By invoking the recent labor uprisings in an appeal 
about soldiers’ labor, the petitioners reminded the senator of the potentially high costs of 
alienating the army’s labor force.  
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Relatively few soldiers received a hearing for their grievances at such high levels. 
But those who did, like the Burnside petitioners, provide an instructive example of 
soldiers’ perception of their own rights and the army’s response to these expectations. In 
their letter to Burnside, soldiers made sure to profess their allegiance to democratic 
principles. The senator, by contrast, questioned their right to make such an entreaty. His 
response reflects a broader attitude toward the army and its ambivalent relationship to the 
nation. Burnside remarked that the “‘town-meeting’ form” of their petition could set “a 
dangerous precedent in the service.” He continued, “Besides [the petition] treats of 
matters that the soldier should not be the judge of.”303 Soldiers, on the other hand, 
apparently thought they should be able to judge a great many issues. In “Desertion and 
Some of its Causes!!!”, a letter sent to the Army and Navy Journal, a reader calling 
himself “Jones” explained one of the reasons new recruits became dissatisfied with army 
life. “Recruits, on first coming to their companies, are also imbued with the idea of ‘being 
a free American citizen,’ allowed to do and decide for himself, that he can hold an 
indignation meeting and by a resolve decide what shall and shall not be done.” But the 
actual conditions of army life soon disabused him of these notions. Jones continued, “In 
this he finds his mistake, that such meeting having for its object praise or censure are 
detrimental to good order and military discipline; he also learns that the commanding 
officer also gives the orders.”304 The right to free assembly, one cherished by the “free 
American citizens” that green recruits assumed themselves to be, was easily confused for 
mutinous behavior in the army.  
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The freedoms to petition and assemble were not the only rights soldiers 
surrendered when they enlisted. The military also instituted an entirely different system 
of laws and courts. Not a few soldiers found themselves subject to this alternate justice 
system; an estimated 48 percent of soldiers were court-martialed up until the 1890s, when 
the figure reached a staggering 60 percent.305 General Sherman defended the army’s 
“totally different system of jurisprudence” on the basis of the distinctive aims of civilian 
and military law. In a letter to General W. S. Hancock, published along with lengthy 
remarks on military law in 1880, Sherman wrote, “The object of civil law is to secure to 
every human being in a community all the liberty, security and happiness possible, 
consistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to govern armies composed 
of strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the largest measure of force at the will of 
the nation.”306 The army was not a democracy, and its legal system aimed not at 
individual liberty or happiness but national defense. If soldiers wondered if they forfeited 
some of their rights as citizens when they enlisted, the short answer was yes – and that 
was the way Sherman and the military brass meant for it to stay. 
Soldiers, however, claimed the mantle of citizens when they challenged the 
army’s labor regime. In this they were like their civilian counterparts in the labor 
movements of the 1870s and 1880s. The Knights of Labor, agrarian radicals, and their 
allies were also criticizing the burgeoning capitalist order on both political and economic 
grounds. William Forbath argues that Gilded Age labor activists felt that the time was 
ripe for a complete reorientation of the American economy in favor of workers. Hadn’t 
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the Civil War and Reconstruction overthrown the formidable planter class and 
empowered the southern working class – African-American slaves – at the same time? 
The Knights and fellow-travelers likewise believed it was possible to rethink and 
reorganize the nation’s political economy, creating wealth through “ownership of 
productive property,” not so-called “wage slavery.” They believed theirs was a vision 
grounded in Jeffersonian republicanism and Constitutional principles.307 When soldiers 
petitioned Burnside, organized meetings to express grievances, or even deserted, they 
were not seeking to overthrow the military or the nation – far from it. But they were 
asserting their rights in an era when the balance of power between workers and 
employers was constantly at issue, and their struggles, narrow as they may have been, 
were part of a larger terrain of conflict in the nineteenth century over work and its 
rewards.  
The fact that soldiers appealed for the rights of citizens but were often denied 
them suggests the need to rethink some longstanding claims about the association 
between military service and citizenship. Without doubt, the U.S. has promised a set of 
rights to its soldiers, assuring them that their service would be rewarded with inclusion in 
the body politic. According to Linda Kerber, “Military service has infused the concept of 
citizenship since its origins,” reaching back at least as far as the Greek city-states.308 This 
association became even stronger during the Civil War when the “Sable Arm” of the 
black soldier was invoked in arguments for black male enfranchisement. Frederick 
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Douglass optimistically declared, “Once let the black man get upon his person the brass 
letter, U.S., let him get an eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder and bullets in 
his pocket, there is no power on earth that can deny that he has earned the right to 
citizenship.”309 Gender historians have critically examined this twinning of military 
service and citizenship because women, denied the obligation to participate in the armed 
forces, were likewise denied many of the rights of citizenship.310 The struggle for black 
men’s enfranchisement was successful in part due to their participation in the Union 
Army. During peacetime, however, black soldiers’ continued service in the regular army 
did not lead to further gains in terms of political or social inclusion, even in spite of their 
unusually low rates of desertion.311 In fact, soldiers, both black and white, were not 
regarded as particularly special members of the polity in the post-Civil War period. 
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Scholars have highlighted the ways this linking of citizenship and military service 
marginalized certain groups – women and slaves – but they have been less attuned to the 
ways actual military service seemed to undercut the promises of citizenship.  
Soldiers themselves questioned whether they enjoyed the rights guaranteed to 
citizens by the Constitution. They asserted their status as citizens, invoking it to demand 
better treatment and respect, but at times they also felt their standing as citizens was 
threatened by the army’s disciplinary and labor regime. Barred from joining together to 
protest unjust conditions, they were subject to a host of special regulations and tried by 
military tribunals made up of officers, not juries of their peers. At the same time labor 
activists charged that wage labor stood contrary to the values of a republic based on 
citizenship, enlisted men were likewise finding the demands of their work incompatible 
with democratic principles.  
Rather than being seen as valiant heroes like their wartime counterparts in the 
Union Army, “regulars” were regarded with suspicion by respectable society, associated 
more with crowded cities, immigrant hordes, and worthless drifters than with the 
American flag. Most soldiers were drawn from the working class and were assumed to 
share the vices imputed to that class. The New York Sun proclaimed that the army was 
“composed of bummers, loafers, and foreign paupers.”312 Soldiers themselves sometimes 
echoed such negative appraisals, such as the man who wrote the Army and Navy Journal 
to say, “We still get drunkards, tramps and runaways, with sometimes a liberal sprinkling 
of good men who ‘weather the storm’ and are ‘faithful to the end.’”313 But another writer 
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for the New York Times took issue with such prevailing characterizations of the rank and 
file. “The soldiers of the regular army are constantly written and talked about as if they 
were the scum of creation.” He disagreed, insisting that “the men who carry the rifles are 
not the shiftless, drunken roughs they are so often represented to be.”314 But his was an 
unorthodox view, and even in his dissent the journalist confirmed the widespread 
assumption: immoral chancers were the norm and honest soldiers the exception in the US 
army.  
The bourgeois public’s interest in desertion reflected widespread anxieties over 
labor radicalism, immigrants, and vice-infested cities in the Gilded Age. As a result, the 
issue of desertion colored the large public discourse about all soldiers, any of whom 
might be potential deserters. Deserters, one writer believed, came from the “floating 
population of our large cities.”315 In this classic Jeffersonian rendering, cities were 
hotbeds of immorality. Army officers repeatedly urged the recruiting service to 
concentrate on enlisting more young, wholesome men from the countryside. Colonel 
Benjamin Grierson, in his report on desertions in the Department of Arizona for 1889, 
advised, “Recruiting parties should be sent to towns in the interior of states where men 
free from city vices can be found.”316 Northern cities, however, remained prime 
recruiting grounds because that was where large concentrations of men without work – 
those most likely to enlist – could be found. Perhaps more intriguing, soldiers and would-
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be deserters were frequently characterized as drifters, part of the rudderless mass of men 
who wandered aimlessly across the countryside. One writer to the Army and Navy 
Journal asked, “is there a vagabond in the country that has not at some time or other 
entertained some idea of enlisting in the Army?” These degenerates were a menace in 
civil life as well. He continued, “As citizens they fill up the jails and workhouses, and as 
soldiers they are forever in the guard-houses, and disgrace the uniform they wear and cast 
opprobrium upon the better class of soldiers.”317 According to this view, prisoners, 
soldiers, and “vagabonds” were drawn from the same population; one was likely to be or 
become another. Such accounts did little to differentiate the steadfast, trustworthy 
soldiers from the deserters who plagued both military and civil society. 
A preoccupation with “bummers,” “tramps,” “vagabonds,” and the “floating 
population” runs throughout descriptions of enlisted men. This accords with pervasive 
worries in the late-nineteenth century about the increasing mobility of working people in 
general. As Jackson Lears writes, this was the era of “the ‘tramp problem,’ which 
respectable commentators discussed with increasingly fretful urgency as the lurching 
business cycle repeatedly threw masses of men out of work, adding them to the army of 
casual laborers that took to the roadways every spring and fall in search of seasonal 
employment.”318 Indeed, the unprecedented movement of people across the globe was 
one of the defining aspects of this period: Eric Hobsbawm called the nineteenth century 
“a gigantic machine for uprooting countrymen.”319 People were also on the move within 
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the borders of the United States. The growth of industrial capitalism in American cities 
demanded more bodies for its factories, but it was not only urban areas that drew 
workers. Factory hands needed to be fed. The dispossession of Native Americans brought 
millions of acres under intensive agricultural cultivation across the American West in the 
1870s and 1880s. The agricultural cycle thus dictated the movements of thousands of 
men and women who picked, harvested, and logged from California to the Great Lakes to 
the Gulf of Mexico and beyond.320  
Military enlistment and desertion were among the ways some workers responded 
to the economic fluctuations and crises so prevalent in the late-nineteenth century. Many 
high-ranking officers, including General Sherman and Philip H. Sheridan, suspected that 
men enlisted for the sole purpose of arranging free transportation to the West, and then 
deserted upon their arrival. Such theories were borne out by experience. The Board of 
Survey at Fort Stanton, New Mexico, charged with investigating the causes of desertion 
at its post, saw economic opportunity as the reason John Graham, a new recruit in the 
Thirteenth Infantry, left the service in 1883. The report stated, “the Board is of the 
opinion that he enlisted for the purpose of getting transportation to the mining regions of 
the West, expecting to desert after his arrival here, as he has done.”321 Soldiers also 
deserted in response to seasonal economic prospects, inspiring the term “snowbirds” for 
men who enlisted in the fall and deserted in the spring when they found better-paying 
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work as civilians.322 The relationship between desertion, enlistment, and economic 
change underlined the fact that soldiers were, fundamentally, workers.  
By equating them with “vagabonds” and “tramps,” both officers and the general 
public denied soldiers the respect of worthy, productive men. Grouped together, soldiers, 
strikers, and the mass of floating men in search of work garnered the condescension of 
bourgeois opinion-makers. Even as the nation celebrated its Civil War veterans, it 
diminished the service of soldiers associated with the regular, peacetime army. As one 
enlisted man lamented in a letter to his former officer, “Do you realize how little the men 
who wear the uniform of a ‘regular’ are appreciated?”323 Unlike the valiant heroes of the 
late war, enlisted men were more like workers who went on strike and the mass of 
floating men in search of work; all were described as lazy and unsavory. Furthermore, all 
soldiers were potential deserters, runaways from their contracts and menaces to civil 
society. The regular army was indeed an army of workers, and as a result they 
experienced much of the contempt and suspicion that respectable society felt toward the 
working classes. 
Soldiers’ Resistance, Workers’ Resistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Coffman, Old Army, 372. 
323 Quoted in Coffman, The Old Army, 400. Coffman attributes the different treatment of regulars to several 
factors, including the belief that volunteers and not regulars had won the Civil War; the perception that 
soldiers were lazy and drunken; the larger percentage of immigrants and African-Americans that made up 
the regular army; and the belief that the army was costly. For a discussion of negative public perceptions of 
regular soldiers, in contrast to the respect accorded Civil War (volunteer) veterans, see Coffman, The Old 
Army, 400-404. 
The literature on Civil War veterans is large. For a recent collection, see Larry M. Logue and Michael 
Barton, eds., The Civil War Veteran: A Historical Reader (New York: NYU Press, 2007). Although much 
has been written about the celebration of veterans and its part in the post-war “reconciliation,” this 
literature does not deal with differences in popular perceptions or depictions of Civil War veterans and 
regulars in the peacetime army.  
	   	  
	  
	  
171 
The experience of soldiers and workers was linked by more than popular 
discourse or the perception of outsiders. Soldiers’ behavior also resembled that of 
workers in other industries, especially in the ways enlisted men joined together and acted 
individually to resist the army’s labor regime. This resistance has usually been seen 
through a military lens and termed insubordination or desertion. But when the veneer of 
martial language is stripped away, such incidents reveal the ways soldiers pushed back 
against what they saw as unfair demands from officers or the army at large. By 
threatening to stop work and, most acutely, by deserting, soldiers tried to set limits on the 
exploitation of their labor. The unique restrictions of military life circumscribed soldiers’ 
ability to resist, but like other workers in coercive labor arrangements, soldiers also found 
opportunities to undermine their overseers. 
One such opportunity came to soldiers working at the Fort Davis pinery in 
September 1883. Several pineries existed to support the incessant building and repairing 
undertaken by soldiers in and around the fort in western Texas; these lumber camps 
moved when the supply of timber ran out at a particular site.324 In addition to work in the 
lumber mill, troops were also assigned there to build roads that connected the pinery to 
Fort Davis. Lieutenant C. R. Ward, commanding the “Camp at the Pinery” near Fort 
Davis, Texas, received a dispatch from his superiors at the central post: “it is reported 
that the men of the Infantry at your camp have stated that they were not sent out to the 
pinery to work on roads and that they would not do so.” This sounded like the makings of 
what, in civilian life, might be called a strike, but in military parlance it was a potential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Loyd Uglow, Standing in the Gap: Army Outposts, Picket Stations, and the Pacification of the Texas 
Frontier, 1866-1886 (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 2001), 168-169. 
	   	  
	  
	  
172 
mutiny. The missive continued, “The Comdg Officer directs that you require all the men 
of both Cavalry and Infantry to do the work designated in your orders, and that if any of 
the men refuse to work, to work them under guard.”325  
The report of the infantry’s insubordination came at a time of change and 
upheaval at the pinery. Troop D of the African-American 10th Cavalry had been 
stationed there since April 1, and a detachment of white soldiers from Companies I and 
K, 16th Infantry, was sent to relieve them on August 30.326 Cooper’s letter notes that 
“men of the Infantry” were refusing to work on the roads, based on their understanding 
that they were not sent to the pinery for road-work. Road building in that part of western 
Texas, through the Davis Mountains, was arduous – “difficult and extremely tiresome,” 
in the words of one historian.327 Yet infantry regiments were typically assigned to fatigue 
duties such as road-building more often than the cavalry. It is unclear from the official 
correspondence whether white soldiers objected to working alongside black soldiers or 
simply objected to the grueling road assignment. Companies I and K of the 16th Infantry 
had only recently arrived at Fort Davis in May 1882, so this would have been their first 
introduction to the regime of labor at the pinery.328  
Not only was the guard changing at the pinery, but the 10th Cavalry soldiers were 
in the process of completely relocating the lumber mill due to “the scarcity of water and 
timber at the present location of the mill.” Cooper sent word on August 21 that the men 
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of Troop D were instructed to move the mill and “property and material pertaining 
thereto to the vicinity of the permanent spring at the head of Limpia Creek.” The 
commanding officer was informed that the men should move all the material and quarters 
they presently occupied to the new mill site for the “construction of buildings &c at the 
new camp, and the remainder piled at a convenient point to this post hereafter.”329 Two 
days later Cooper wrote again clarifying his orders. “It is intended that you move the mill 
engine and everything pertaining thereto from your present camp to the sight [sic] 
designated in letter of instructions of the 21st inst,” he wrote. “It is not intended that your 
troop build [quarters] for Lieut Woodbury’s command, or make a new road from your 
permanent camp to the new one except what is necessary to get the mill into position if 
you have time to do so.”330 Colonel Benjamin Grierson, commander of Fort Davis, was 
anxious to get the lumber operation moving again, but he simply wanted the 10th Cavalry 
soldiers to move the mill engine and materials; he most likely already anticipated sending 
the infantry detachment to relieve the Troop D cavalry men who had been stationed at the 
pinery for close to five months.  
This was not the last alarming news Grierson would hear about the pinery. On the 
same day he wrote Ward about the infantry’s recalcitrance, he also sent word to the 
commanding officer at the pinery, reminding him that the men were supposed to be 
constantly at work. “The Comdg Officer directs me to inform you that all the Officers 
and men of your command will be required to continue the work daily at the Pinery until 
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the mill is established, and a road completed thereto, and that neither officers, nor men of 
your command, (except details of enlisted men sent in for supplies) will absent 
themselves from camp or the work designated without authority from the Comdg Officer 
of this Post.”331 The new lumber mill and the road leading to it required soldiers’ 
undivided attention. But apparently men had been taking advantage of the pinery’s 
distance from the main post and slipping away from their assignment. Grierson sent an 
additional company of men under Lt. Woodberry to help speed along the work and 
potentially to keep a closer eye on the command.  
The infantrymen’s attempted strike could not have come at a worse time as far as 
Grierson was concerned. In his early letter directing that the mill be moved, Lt. Cooper 
wrote that Fort Davis was “greatly in need of lumber and material for the water tanks and 
for building purposes.”332 His tone became more dire in light of the soldiers’ 
insubordination. He reminded Lt. Ward that “the completion of the road, and 
establishment of the mill as directed must be completed with the least possible delay” and 
“nothing must interfere with the early completion of the work.”333 In fact the urgency of 
the work demanded more men to stay at the pinery than anticipated, and Grierson ordered 
the 10th Cavalry soldiers to remain at the subpost. On September 1, Cooper sent word 
that the men of Troop D were to “remain a few days longer at the Pinery camp to 
complete the work of removing the engine and repairing the road.”334 For the first week 
of September, both African-American soldiers from the 10th Cavalry and two companies 
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of white soldiers from the 16th Infantry occupied the pinery. Finally, after over five 
months of labor at the pinery, fifty-nine men and their commanding officer of 10th 
Cavalry returned to Fort Davis on September 10, but the 16th Infantry remained.  
Court-martial records are filled with the testimony of soldiers who became 
resentful of the army’s strict military and disciplinary measures. One deserter in 1883 
explained his decision to run away by saying that “he had enlisted to be a soldier and not 
a slave.”335 Edward Carbery, a private in the 8th Infantry stationed at Fort Brown, Texas, 
believed he was “imposed upon by being made to perform the duties of Company 
Blacksmith without in return receiving the pay of that grade.” Moreover, “in matters 
pertaining to my work I was constantly interfered with by the 1st Sergeant.” He was 
“Harassed to such a degree” that he took to drinking. Carbery was a skilled soldier and he 
felt entitled to “extra duty pay” for the special services he provided the government. The 
combination of harassment, the injustice of being denied the extra pay due him, and the 
influence of “intoxicating liquors” led him to desert on May 16, 1880. Five days later, he 
was arrested and placed in the guard-house. Carbery’s trial was speedy. He pled guilty to 
desertion and received what was, by 1880, the standard sentence: dishonorable discharge; 
forfeiture of all pay due him; and confinement “at hard labor” for two years. On July 12, 
1880, Fort Leavenworth Military Prison was designated as the place of Carbery’s 
confinement, but he did not reach Leavenworth until December 20. Further 
correspondence related to Carbery’s case reveals that he was held in a “dark cell” at Fort 
Brown for the intervening five months before his transfer to the military prison at 
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Leavenworth. Mitigating circumstances – this confinement as well as the fact that the 
first-sergeant in question in the case had since been suspected of embezzlement – led to 
his early release, approximately a year before the expiration of his sentence.336 
Soldiers unhappy with the army’s labor demands had few alternatives. In some 
cases, they staged work stoppages or slow-downs, as in the case of the 11th Infantry men 
assigned to the Fort Davis pinery. In that case, soldiers joined together to protest a work 
assignment they believed was unjust. But Private Carbery’s response was probably much 
more common: like other marginalized workers, soldiers usually expressed their 
unhappiness individually rather than collectively. The predominant expression of 
soldiers’ dissatisfaction was quitting, or in the army’s vocabulary, deserting. Between 
1867 and 1891, one-third of new recruits and one in seven of all enlisted men deserted 
the army.337 The desertion epidemic reflected the intensity of discontent among regular 
soldiers. In this way, even though desertion was a fundamentally individual act, it 
registered at a high level, attracting the attention of top military commanders as well as 
the general public in the late-nineteenth century.  
Desertion was attributed to a variety of factors. The boredom and monotony of 
army life, the poor character of recruits, and low pay and meager rations were often 
mentioned in discussions of the phenomenon. But another factor inevitability ranked high 
in explanations of desertion: the army’s labor regime. The military brass agreed that 
manual labor was a leading cause of desertion among enlisted men. In 1870, Colonel J. J. 
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Reynolds of the 25th Infantry, then commanding the Department of Texas, wrote in his 
annual report, “In my opinion many desertions are caused by the varied calls made upon 
our soldiers for labor in getting out lumber, quarrying stone, marking adobes, running 
saw-mills, burning brick and lime, driving wagons, &c, &c, which are not in their 
engagement when they enlist, and which, in fact, unfit them for soldiers.”338 While not 
endorsing desertion, Reynolds made it clear that not only did such manual labor lead to 
desertions, but it was also bad military policy, detracting from drilling and training and 
weakening the nation’s military preparedness. In 1877, Major General John Pope wrote 
in his annual report to the Secretary of War about the heavy demands for labor placed on 
troops in the Department of the Missouri. He lamented the fact that soldiers spent so 
much of their time building, repairing, hauling, and chopping that posts were, essentially, 
“garrisoned by enlisted laborers rather than soldiers.” Pope believed this transformation 
of the soldier into a laborer was deleterious for the army as a whole. “It is impossible to 
combine the soldier and the laborer or mechanic with good results to either. The work is, 
of course, unsatisfactorily done, and the discipline and condition of the troops suffer in an 
even greater degree,” Pope wrote.339  
Even General Sherman echoed such cautionary notes. He agreed that soldiers 
spent “a great part of their time as laborers on public buildings, roads, and other work 
which disqualifies them as soldiers, besides preventing them from scouting the frontier as 
much as would otherwise be the case.” Sherman acknowledged,   
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as a matter of course, soldiers must labor in taking care of themselves and of their 
necessary supplies, but to build permanent works or roads in which they have but 
a partial interest, is a kind of labor that ought not to be imposed on our reduced 
establishment. I would advise the Secretary of War to prescribe some plain rule, 
drawing a clear distinction between these two kinds of labor, and to publish it to 
the Army in orders or regulations, so that it would enter into the contract of 
enlistment, and soldiers would not, as they frequently do, plead this cause in 
justification of desertion.340  
 
Sherman admitted that a certain amount of manual labor had always fallen to soldiers 
throughout history; this included the cooking, cleaning, and chopping wood that must be 
done to sustain troops. But he also recognized that the labor now assigned to soldiers 
extended far beyond such chores. Building telegraph lines, guarding railroad crews, and 
other work “in which they [had] but a partial interest” caused particular discontent among 
soldiers. In the post-Civil War era, the army was engaged in major infrastructural 
projects, and their bearing upon national defense was not always clear, making it difficult 
for soldiers to understand why they spent more time using the proverbial picks and 
shovels rather than guns.  
Desertion was such a persistent and serious problem that it attracted attention 
from the broader public. A rash of articles commenting on the causes of desertion 
appeared in major national newspapers between 1888 and 1890, leading up to the passage 
of “An Act to prevent desertions, and for other purposes” on June 16, 1890.341 Several 
newspapers treated the causes of desertion as obvious, a reasonable response to the 
conditions of soldiers’ labor. A New York Times reporter remarked, “Of course, so long 
as men are detailed to build quarters, wagon roads, telegraph lines, and such work on a 
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commissary ration discontent and desertion will be rife.”342 Many newspapers claimed 
the wisdom of army insiders in an effort to lend credibility to their diagnoses of the 
problem without naming specific individuals. In 1889, the Los Angeles Times printed a 
report from “a correspondent, who claims 20 years’ experience in the regular army.” This 
correspondent insisted that the “large amount of menial labor which soldiers are 
compelled to perform around officers’ quarters” explained the high rates of desertion. 
“Men do not enter the army to become laborers, but soldiers,” the informant explained.343 
Another insider provided the New York Times with a rationalization for desertion 
grounded in the political economy of the West. In a piece entitled “Uncle Sam’s 
Deserters,” a writer claiming to be an army officer described the relative pay of soldiers 
stationed near mining districts “where labor commands extraordinary wages.” According 
to this writer, the soldier simply recognized the superior wages he could command as a 
civilian and made the rational economic calculation to desert. “A soldier often finds 
himself at the post working as a laborer, teamster, blacksmith, or carpenter, when a few 
miles distant men, no better workmen than he, are being similarly employed at from $2 to 
$4 per day,” the correspondent wrote. “It is strange that the soldier rebels?”344  
Another sergeant, stationed at a recruiting depot, argued that the enlistment period 
needed to be shortened if soldiers were to be made into common laborers. He noted that 
“men who enlisted for soldiers object to being made mere day laborers, and next that the 
term of enlistment is too long…if he is put to making roads, digging ditches, and building 
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houses instead of soldiering, he would be wiling to stand it three years, where five seems 
more than he can endure.” Like others before him, this non-commissioned officer 
compared the plight of the soldier to that of a civilian worker and found it lacking. 
“There’s too much work besides soldiering in the Army. If men want to make roads and 
build houses and bridges, and work at shoe making and other trades they can stay in civil 
life and have more liberty,” he told the Washington Post.345 The idea of a shorter 
enlistment contract had been gaining traction within the army for some time, and the 
option to leave the army after three years was one of the recommendations finally 
incorporated into the 1890 legislation.  
A cacophony of voices added their specific and sometimes eccentric two cents to 
the national conversation around desertion. “The causes of desertion” became a regular 
feature of articles, editorials, and letters in the Army and Navy Journal, the popular 
weekly periodical dedicated to all things military. One reader calling himself “Final” 
wrote the journal in 1875, “I have just been told that the subject has been completely 
exhausted, that ‘Desertion, its causes and its remedies,’ as material for speculation, has 
no more vitality than the average bean soup of the company mess; in short, that it has 
been literally written to death.” Apparently rumors of the topic’s death were greatly 
exaggerated because desertion, speculation about its causes, and prescriptions for its 
alleviation continued to pour into the journal, reflecting widespread preoccupation with 
the issue into the 1890s. As the “Indian Wars” drew to a close, one private wrote to the 
Army and Navy Journal in 1889, “I do not want to thrash old straw over about the manual 
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labor the soldier is compelled to perform, outside of his military duty.”346 “Old straw” or 
not, the “labor problem” within the army remained severe.  
Secretaries of war, generals, and judge-advocates were forced to reckon with the 
galling phenomenon of desertion. Yet despite the attention lavished on the subject, the 
army struggled to stem the tide of desertions throughout this period. Officers like 
Sherman, Pope, and Reynolds believed that reforming the army and lessening the amount 
of manual labor soldiers were forced to undertake would improve morale and reduce the 
number of desertions. The army, however, faced declining budget appropriations 
throughout the post-war period and was not in a position to make the type of structural 
changes necessary to reduce the labor demands on soldiers, such as hiring civilians. Still, 
the army attempted a variety of reforms to alleviate the problem, not always to great 
effect. When Congress slashed wages in 1871, rolling them back to the 1861 levels, 
desertions spiked. Approximately one-third of the army deserted that year and again in 
the next.347 In 1872, Congress responded by modifying the pay structure to encourage 
“longevity.” It passed legislation that increased soldiers’ pay by one dollar per month in 
the third year of enlistment, two dollars in the fourth year, and three dollars in the fifth 
year. The army retained the additional pay at four percent interest, which was due the 
soldier only if he completed his entire five-year enlistment and was discharged 
honorably.348 Desertion, however, continued to plague the army. Congressional action in 
1890 gave soldiers the opportunity to purchase their discharge early for the first time. 
After serving three years, enlisted men could apply for a discharge, giving them “a legal 
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method of leaving the army two years prior to the expiration of an enlistment.”349 These 
changes came slowly, but soldiers forced them on an intransigent military by the sheer 
number of desertions. While these changes may have helped some soldiers, they did not 
eliminate the problem. In 1905, the secretary of war called desertion a “most persistent 
evil.” He admitted that “so far no very effective results have been attained” in eradicating 
it, and he was not optimistic about the prospects for doing so in the future.350  
 The phenomenon of desertion points to two related aspects of the army’s labor 
regime that scholars have overlooked. First, desertion constituted enlisted men’s chief 
means of protest against the conditions of army life, especially its labor regime. 
Desertion, in this sense, represents a particular type of workers’ resistance. The 
grievances expressed by deserters as well as the response of army leaders allow us to 
sketch the contours of an ongoing negotiation between those who carried out the labor of 
soldiering and those who commanded them. Second, and more broadly, desertion 
highlights the coercive nature of military labor. When compared to evolving notions of 
“free labor” in the late-nineteenth century, soldiering more closely resembled other 
coercive labor arrangements such as convict and contract labor. The rest of the chapter 
explores the place of military labor in the larger context of debates over the meaning of 
free and unfree labor in the post-Civil War era.351 
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351 Paul Foos acknowledges the ways military labor and “free labor” were diverging in the antebellum 
period. He is also attentive to the importance of desertion as a way soldiers registered their dissent with the 
army. I have come to many of the same conclusions about the significance of desertion in understanding 
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Unfreedom in the Wake of Emancipation 
 Comparing the terms of soldiers’ labor to the expectations about “free labor” in 
civilian life reveals that military labor did not measure up to popular and legal 
understandings of “free labor,” which had evolved to exclude specific performance, 
physical punishments, and imprisonment for breaches of contract.352 Outside of the army, 
workers could not be held to jobs even if they agreed in a contract to a certain length of 
service. Furthermore, ordinary workers, unlike soldiers, could not be imprisoned if they 
quit their jobs. Legal historian Robert J. Steinfeld writes, “After the 1830s, penal 
sanctions played no role in the lives of adult white wage or contract workers in the United 
States. Indeed, in many circles, the idea of penal sanctions to enforce labor contracts 
became unimaginable because they were thought to transform ordinary labor contracts 
into contracts of slavery.” The “significant exception” to this statement, according to 
Steinfeld, were merchant seamen, although he also noted that “People of color were 
subjected to penal sanctions for labor contract breaches.”353 Yet there was another 
“significant exception” that Steinfeld overlooks: soldiers.  
Non-pecuniary penalties – off-limits for the majority of civilian workers – 
continued to be used against soldiers. Deserters, after all, were simply those workers who 
exited the service prior to the end of their five-year enlistment contract. In the absence of 
the option to simply quit a job – an avenue available to all “free workers” by the end of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
army in the antebellum period. See Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social 
Conflict during the Mexican-American War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).  
352 Specific performance is a court order to carry out the terms of a contract. See “Specific Performance,” 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/specific_performance, accessed February 25, 2014. See Robert J. 
Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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353 Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor, 254. 
	   	  
	  
	  
184 
the nineteenth century – soldiers were left with the alternative of desertion. When 
soldiers deserted, they were registering their opposition to the army’s demands on their 
labor in the way indentured servants and slaves had from time immemorial – by running 
away. If they did desert, the range of punishments available to the state to compel their 
labor extended far beyond those afforded to other employers after 1865. As Steinfeld 
explains, most American workers (and seemingly all white workers) would have faced, at 
most, wage forfeiture in the same situation. But soldiers were subject to prison terms (the 
standard sentence was two years throughout this period) and wage garnishment. The 
army abolished flogging in 1861, and branding – a typical military punishment – came 
under fire in the 1870s. In the course of debates over the establishment of a military 
prison, James Garfield, a representative from Ohio and future president, raised the issue 
of punishments within the army, and representative John Coburn of Indiana, a former 
Union Army officer, spoke of “the abominable cruelties occasionally inflicted upon 
soldiers by sentences of court-martial or by orders of Army officers.”354 The next month 
Congress made it “illegal to brand, mark, or tattoo on the body of any soldier by sentence 
of court-martial.”355 Nevertheless, other physical reprimands continued. Edward Coffman 
writes, “[Officers] strung up soldiers by their thumbs, forced them to carry logs or heavy 
weights and march about for hours, or spread-eagled them with hands and feet tied to the 
ground or to a caisson wheel.”356 Deserters also received sentences that included head 
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shaving. Such penalties stand in sharp contrast to the contract remedies available to 
civilian employers.  
Soldiers were fully aware of the gulf separating the terms of their labor from their 
comrades in civil society. After all, the new recruit William Bladen Jett who enlisted in 
Baltimore in 1881 called himself “a slave in Uncle Sam’s service.”357 What did it mean to 
be a slave in post-Civil War America? The metaphor Jett reached for to describe his 
experience in the army – enslavement – was not accidental. While his situation differed 
from that of an enslaved person in fundamental ways, his word choice was part of a 
potent discourse about the ambiguity of “free labor” and the persistence of coercion in the 
nineteenth century. During the 1830s and 1840s, “white slavery” became a prevailing, 
though shifting and unstable, image for wage-earners to evoke their powerlessness within 
the emerging capitalist order.358 Even after the destruction of slavery in the South, labor 
activists continued to compare the plight of the wage-earner to that of the slave. In 
demonstrations throughout the 1870s and 1880s, workers embraced the term “wage 
slavery” as a badge and symbol of their degradation. Like the army corporal Jett, a 
member of the Knights of Labor testified before a Senate committee in 1884, “The 
working people feel they are under a system of forced slavery.”359  
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In the antebellum U.S., southern chattel slavery stood as the convenient opposite 
to free labor. But in the wake of the Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, slavery no longer represented free labor’s opposite, leaving an ideological 
and political void at exactly the time when conflicts between labor and capital were 
reaching a fever-pitch. As both Amy Dru Stanley and Gunther Peck have pointed out, the 
era of slave emancipation coincided with the expansion and intensification of industrial 
capitalism in the U.S. “The anxieties and dilemmas produced by North America’s rapid 
industrial and urban growth were profound and enduring,” Peck writes. “The Thirteenth 
Amendment may have officially ended all forms of slavery and coercive labor in the 
United States, but it did little to secure the precise meaning of wage labor for growing 
numbers of newly dependent wage earners.”360  
There was never a single, monolithic definition of free labor; instead, it was a 
dynamic and malleable ideology.361 In practice, defining “free labor” meant setting limits 
on the means of coercion available to employers. In the decades after the Civil War, these 
efforts often sparked violent confrontations between those who bought and those who 
sold labor. Not only in the U.S., but around the world, workers and capitalists were 
waging war over questions of power and rights. The 1870s were marked by the fiercest of 
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such confrontations to date.362 In this context, the meaning of “contract” became an 
ideological battleground. Stanley writes, “In the age of slave emancipation contract 
became a dominant metaphor for social relations and the very symbol of freedom.”363 
Workers, however, began to question whether contracts truly guaranteed them their 
liberty. Economists, jurists, and the clergy argued that contracts made labor “free,” while 
spokesmen for the growing labor movement charged that contracts transformed workers 
into “wage slaves.”364 Although Enlightenment-inspired thinkers presumed that two 
parties entered a contract on equal footing of their own volition, in practice contracts 
often masked vast asymmetries of power. The marriage contract, as Stanley’s work 
shows, symbolized the “fundamental freedom denied to slaves,” but it also perpetuated 
the continual subjugation of women to their husbands. Labor contracts did not necessarily 
grant workers the type of freedom they sought either. The commodification of labor and 
the absence of any sense of “mutuality” between labor and capital underscored the basic 
antagonism at the heart of the contract relation.  
Military labor was both exceptional, diverging from accepted standards of “free 
labor” in the late-nineteenth century, and part of a broader landscape of coercive labor 
relations. Yet military labor is seldom compared to other types of unfree or coerced labor. 
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The special respect accorded patriotic “service” has prevented a comparison between 
military labor and other forms of exploitation such as debt peonage or “coolieism,” both 
of which have attracted considerable attention from historians. The assumption that 
soldiering is unique – a patriotic vocation rather than a job, service to one’s country 
rather than servitude – was profoundly entrenched in popular and legal attitudes. It 
remains so today, explaining why contemporary scholars rarely acknowledge that 
soldiers were (and are) workers. The exception among historians is Peter Way, who has 
argued that soldiers in the eighteenth-century British army must be understood as “war 
workers.” Drawing on Robert J. Steinfeld’s insights about a spectrum of unfree labor, 
Way emphasizes the “unfreedom” enjoyed by British soldiers and asserts that soldiers 
had much in common with indentured servants. Way writes, “As workers in the war 
industry, [soldiers] were regimented and rendered unfree for the duration of their 
enlistment, subordinated as laborers, and subjected to a cruel work discipline, their 
alienated labor producing value by accumulating land and subordinating others.” 365 In 
their own time, soldiers’ complaints that they were “slaves” or otherwise exploited were 
dismissed as the grumbles of the lazy and unpatriotic. By recognizing that soldiers were 
in fact workers, it becomes possible to see how the terms of their labor diverged from 
acceptable standards in civil society and to understand their grievances as more than the 
superficial complaints of unhappy young men.  
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Soldiers, like their counterparts in the labor movement, tested the limits of 
common understandings of free labor. Given the centrality of contract to labor conflicts at 
this time, it is not surprising that the meaning of the enlistment contract – the basis for 
soldiers’ relationship with the state – was a prominent terrain of conflict. Edward 
Coffman notes that a “lack of understanding of the difference between the enlistment 
oath and an ordinary job contract” was often cited as a primary reason for desertion.366 A 
reporter for the New York Times wrote in 1888, “In many cases it is difficult to instill in 
the minds of recruits that the crime of desertion is anything more than a breach of 
contract. From a military point of view it is regarded as a heinous offense.”367 John W. 
Atherton, a private in the 5th Cavalry, claimed such confusion when he faced a military 
court. In April 1872, Atherton was tried for desertion and violation of the 22nd Article of 
War, which prohibited deserters from reenlisting in the army. At his court-martial at 
Camp McDowell, Arizona Territory, Atherton pled guilty to the charges leveled against 
him, but in a written statement he asked for leniency. He explained that “the cause of my 
act of desertion was the reduction of the pay of the army, by which I was led to believe, 
that the Government having broken their contract with me I was not forced to fulfill 
mine.”368 Atherton had agreed to contract his labor to the government for a certain 
amount of money, and when the government cut wages and failed to fulfill the terms of 
that agreement, he felt the contract was nullified, enabling him to leave the service. But if 
he thought the soldier’s contract was like any other labor contract, he was sorely 
mistaken. When he faced court-martial, Atherton implored the officers to show mercy to 
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someone unfamiliar with military law, saying, “I was then very ignorant of the rules 
which govern the army, it being my first enlistment, and had no idea that I was doing any 
actual wrong.” Atherton’s claims of ignorance did not count for much because he 
received what was a standard punishment for the time: dishonorable discharge, the “loss 
of all pay and allowances” except $20 to be paid at the end of his sentence, and 
imprisonment “at hard labor in such Military prison as the Department Commander may 
designate for the period of two (2) years, wearing a twelve (12) pound ball attached to his 
left leg by a chain four and one-half  (4 1/2) feet in length.”369 
Atherton’s case highlights a divergence in understandings of what a “contract” 
meant in the army. The behavior of soldiers like Atherton suggests they did not accept 
there should be a meaningful distinction between a soldier’s contract and a worker’s 
contract; if there was no mutuality between the soldier and the army, why was it called a 
contract at all? High-ranking officers, however, insisted that the soldier’s contract was 
nothing like a regular labor contract. In his report to the secretary of war in 1882, General 
Sherman wrote, “The desertion of his comrades in danger is, and ever should be, 
construed as the basest and most heinous crime possible to a soldier, whereas of late 
years, under the benign influence of the Bureau of Military Justice, it has grown to be 
considered as of little more concern than for a laborer to quit his employer without 
notice.”370 Sherman insisted that a different standard applied to the soldier’s contract 
because war-making was a special kind of a labor: deserters left their “comrades in 
danger.” Sherman invoked the wartime setting for desertion, but were soldiers at war? 
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What dangers did they face? In reality, most desertions occurred far from any 
battleground. Nevertheless, it was essential for Sherman and the army at large to vilify 
desertion as a crime of the highest order. By asserting that desertion in peacetime was 
cowardice rather than simply a means of quitting a job, the military brass continued to 
deny that soldiering was labor.  
Even within the military community, however, opinion-makers acknowledged the 
contractual relationship between soldiers and the army. Their remarks implied that 
enlisted men were not entirely amiss in protesting their treatment as manual laborers. In 
1884, the Army and Navy Journal published a piece about the multitude of construction 
and maintenance duties undertaken by soldiers. In what became a common refrain, the 
editors argued that such duties “interfere[d] with the military duties and instruction” and 
hampered the enlisted man’s development into “a good soldier.” Moreover, echoing the 
claims of soldiers themselves, the editors continued: “It is hardly fair or just to him, as it 
is not laid down in his contract with the Government.”371 Here the editors, although they 
condemned desertion in all its forms, suggested that soldiers’ contracts did not include 
the level of manual labor commonly demanded of them. In referring to contracts and 
slaves, soldiers took part in a broader conversation about the meaning of free labor in the 
post-Civil War era.  
The Landscape of Coercion 
While military labor did not fit contemporary standards of free labor, it was also 
not entirely exceptional in the late-nineteenth century. Rather, the unfreedom of soldiers 
brought their experience close to that of other workers, particularly in the South and 
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West. When compared to other labor practices, such as Chinese “coolieism” and convict 
labor, it becomes clear that military labor was part of a broader landscape of coercion in 
the nineteenth century. Indeed, a range of coercive arrangements organized work in 
fields, mines, and homes in the post-Civil War era. Although the Thirteen Amendment 
clearly prohibited slavery and “involuntary servitude,” a great number of practices 
proliferated that did not neatly match contemporary understandings of “free labor.” 
Gunther Peck has emphasized the instability of the “free labor” ideology in the post-Civil 
War period, writing, “wage labor relations during this half century [1880 to 1930] were 
not truly free but comprised a spectrum of consensual and coercive elements.”372 The 
diversity of coercive practices was nowhere on greater display than in the North 
American West, where, as Howard Lamar has argued, the availability of abundant free 
land exacerbated the challenge of securing a labor force.373  
Competition between immigrants and white workers often sparked conflicts and 
led to allegations of enslavement and forced labor, adding to the confusion over what 
constituted free labor. Recently, historians have begun to question whether “coolies,” the 
name given to the supposedly unfree Chinese laborers, ever really existed in the form 
alleged by white workers and reformers. Moon-Ho Jung argues that “coolie” was never a 
legal term but rather “a conglomeration of racial imaginings that emerged worldwide in 
the era of slave emancipation.”374 Similarly, Stacey L. Smith sees both peons and coolies 
as “imagined” and “invented” by white workers in California who competed for mining 
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with jobs with recent immigrants. Even though “coolies” did not exist as “a real group of 
people or a real legal category of workers,” according to Smith, the invention of these 
pathological figures served to galvanize white working-class solidarity and contributed to 
new legislation designed to curb the deleterious influence of these foreign workers.375 
The heated discourse over “coolies” resembles in many ways the use of the term “wage 
slave” and “white slavery” by labor activists throughout the nineteenth century. Yet 
simply because white workers exaggerated the servility of Chinese workers for political 
ends does not mean that the methods used to transport and keep them at work in 
American mines were not coercive. Mae Ngai, while also skeptical of dominant 
portrayals of Chinese “coolieism,” has written that “the so-called coolie question needs to 
be analyzed both discursively and empirically.”376  
The experience of other groups of workers in the West suggests that various 
forms of coercion were used liberally, especially with immigrants and non-English 
speakers, to compel their labor. Whereas planters in Central and South America imported 
contract workers from Asia to meet their needs, contracting faced special challenges in 
the West. Because of labor laws that allowed workers to quit their jobs at will, workers in 
the U.S. were not bound to their contracts and did not face the same criminal penalties as 
workers who broke their contracts in places like Brazil and Australia.377 Legislation 
passed in the 1880s, including the Chinese Exclusion Act and the Foran Act, also placed 
restrictions on contract laborers and undercut the influence of brokerage firms. Such 
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challenges impeded the emergence of a single or dominant model for securing workers 
for labor-hungry firms, but they did not mean that the West was a bastion of free labor. 
On the contrary, it meant that “a variety of recruitment systems sporadically flourished 
for unskilled immigrants after 1865, each of them compromising workers’ freedom with 
debts, contracts, and geographic isolation.”378 New methods of securing workers 
flourished after the Foran Act of 1885, which outlawed the importation of skilled contract 
workers into the U.S. In his study of padrones, Peck shows that immigrant labor brokers 
responded to new corporations’ need for labor and circumvented federal laws by 
facilitating the movement of skilled and unskilled workers from Europe and Mexico to 
their operations in places like Utah and Texas. Padrones reached the height of their 
influence around the turn of the century, but they were part of a much longer history of 
efforts to secure workers for the labor-scarce West. “With the discovery of each new 
commodity in the land – be it copper or sugar beets,” writes Peck, “the problem of the 
frontier was confronted anew: how should one assemble a labor force in a remote and 
relatively unpopulated countryside.”379 Political pressure from labor unions led to the 
passage of legislation, including but not limited to the Foran Act, aimed at excluding 
contract workers and certain immigrant groups. But while the federal officials spent time 
and money on enforcement of these laws well into the twentieth century, in other ways 
the government abetted unfree labor practices.  
The use of soldiers to build roads, guard railroad crews, work in lumber yards, 
deliver mail, and perform a host of other duties should be seen as another means of 
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securing workers in the labor-scarce West. In the case of soldiers, the “recruitment 
system” was organized by the federal government, which effectively used “debts, 
contracts, and geographic isolation,” like Peck’s padrones, to tie soldiers to their labor 
contracts and guarantee a supply of workers for the army’s building and infrastructure 
projects. The fact that the federal government was the sole arbiter of the labor of soldiers 
distinguishes it from most other systems of unfree labor that the United States tried to 
limit or eradicate in the late-nineteenth century. But the state played supporting roles in 
abetting other types of unfree labor, particularly in its use of convict labor. For example, 
convict as well as contract labor was essential to the construction of the Texas state 
Capitol. In 1885, the state of Texas agreed that contractors could use the state’s convicts 
as a labor force, paying the state sixty-five cents per day for each convict’s labor, while 
the state provided the prisoners’ food and lodging. Between 1885 and 1887, nearly 500 
white and Mexican convicts built the railroad connecting the building site to supply lines, 
constructed housing for the prisoners, and cut granite for the Capitol. The American 
National Granite Cutters’ Union (NGCU) boycotted the building project on account of 
the use of convict labor, but their efforts to protect their members from cheap and unfree 
labor were undermined by yet another source of exploitable labor. As Ethan Blue 
recounts, the stone cutters’ union joined with the Knights of Labor and enjoyed some 
success in blocking the supply of skilled workers for the project. Rather than pay union 
scale wages in Texas, the syndicate of investors and builders behind the Capitol project 
sought cheaper workers abroad. The contractors traveled to Aberdeen, Scotland, and 
recruited workers there. These actions seemed to violate the Foran Act, which 
“prohibit[ed] the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or 
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agreement to perform labor in the United States.”380 Union representatives and federal 
law enforcement officials met the group of Aberdeen workers at the port in New York 
and questioned them about the terms of their agreement with the Capitol Syndicate. They 
were unable to establish at that time that the Scotsmen had been brought to the U.S. under 
contract and therefore in clear violation of the Foran Act. While the officials persuaded 
some of them not to travel to Austin as strike-breakers, the majority of the workers, 64 of 
them, continued on to their destination in Texas. The U.S. Attorney finally brought a case 
against the Capitol Syndicate in 1889 – “the first real test of the Foran Act” – but the case 
was gutted of most of its significance by that point. Only the syndicate’s agent, Gustav 
Wilke, was tried and convicted, and he was fined just a fraction of what the law specified 
for violations of the Foran Act. Blue writes that the workers’ “legal victory came in name 
only.”381   
 The Texas Capitol was not the only project that employed convict labor in the 
country or even in the state of Texas. Blue explains that while Mexican and white 
prisoners were assigned to construct rail lines and lodging and work in the granite pits in 
Austin, most black prisoners were leased out to private individuals, who put them to work 
on “malarial” cotton and sugar farms where they sometimes died from disease and 
overwork.382 Beyond Texas, other states implemented various systems of prison labor in 
the post-war decades. In Georgia, Alex Lichtenstein shows, prisoners were put to work in 
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industries that epitomized the modern, forward-looking “New South.” Laboring in 
southern coal-fields and iron furnaces, the predominately black convict-laborers 
contributed to the “modernization” of the region and the expansion of new economic 
enterprises in postbellum South.383 While the southern convict-lease system has attracted 
the most scholarly attention, western territories and states also established similar means 
of profiting from prisoners’ labor. The story of Arizona’s attempts to institute a labor 
regime at its territorial penitentiary accords with Lichtenstein’s portrayal of the convict-
lease in the South. As in Georgia, prisoners in Arizona were also employed in modern 
infrastructure projects. In 1897, convicts were put to work digging ditches for the State of 
Arizona Improvement Co., one of several private companies engaged in constructing a 
large canal system near Yuma. (The Supreme Court later ruled that the prisoners were not 
allowed to be leased to this company.) In another parallel to the southern convict-lease 
system, Arizona’s prisoners were disproportionately Mexican and poor, more often 
listing “laborer” as their previous occupation than white prisoners. Because of its 
stratification along racial and class lines, Paul Knepper calls the Arizona territorial prison 
the “functional equivalent of a Southern prison.”384  
More than any other system of labor, convict labor most closely resembled the 
army’s labor regime, apart from the fact that soldiers voluntarily enlisted. The use of 
prisoners as workers was part of California’s penal regime from the very beginning. San 
Quentin, the state’s first prison, was leased to private interests when it was built in 1851. 
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Ward M. McAfee writes, “Under the terms of the contract, the state funded the 
construction of San Quentin prison, and the lessees staffed the facility with guards and 
fed, clothed and provided medical care for the prisoners. In exchange for these services, 
the lessees worked the convicts for their own profit.” A few years later, James Madison 
Estill leased San Quentin and convinced the authorities to pay him $10,000 per month for 
the prisoners’ upkeep. He also kept all profits from their work.385 This scheme was 
unpopular with California’s burgeoning labor movement as well as the general public, 
and Estill lost his contract. In the 1870s, the Workingmen’s Party took aim at convict 
labor by comparing it to the despised Chinese “coolie” labor. McAfee writes, “Labor 
organizations petitioned the convention to ‘prohibit the employment of convict labor in 
any pursuit detrimental to the interest of free labor.’” Eventually labor activists persuaded 
the state to pass legislation prohibiting prisons from hiring out convicts to private 
interests, but this, too, would be a “Pyrrhic victory.”386 The state soon established a new 
“contract system” whereby all work was done within the penitentiary walls. California’s 
state prisons became manufacturing and industrial centers, with prisoners manufacturing 
jute in a factory at San Quentin and granite in quarries at Folsom.387 The location of work 
shifted in response to labor’s demands, but convict labor would continue to compete with 
civilian workers. 
 Although the Civil War settled the fate of slavery in the trans-Mississippi West, it 
did not instantly create a world of “free labor,” much to the chagrin of the Workingmen’s 
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Party and other workers. On the contrary, the histories of both convict and contract labor 
suggest that the late-nineteenth century witnessed a resurgence of new forms of coercion 
and unfreedom. Gunther Peck has argued that the padrone was not a fixture of the Old 
World but a creation of the new, modern, and industrial West: such immigrant labor 
brokers served the interests of large, multinational corporations like the Canadian Pacific 
Railway and the Utah copper mines. Alex Lichtenstein paints a similar picture in his 
account of prison labor in Georgia. He asserts that, “the convict lease was not the 
persistence of a ‘precapitalist’ form of labor coercion, but the extension and elaboration 
of a new forced-labor system wholly compatible with regional industrial development 
and the continuation of racial domination.”388 The use of convicts on the extensive canal 
project in Yuma, Arizona, and on Texas’ massive building project in Austin shows that 
prisoners were used to support the expansion of new settlements and industries in the 
southwest. Far from holdovers from an archaic past, the emergence of new industrial 
enterprises in the late-nineteenth century and the scarcity of labor combined to encourage 
new forms of bondage and obligation.  
The U.S. army’s labor regime bears striking resemblance to these other coercive 
arrangements. As in the case of penal labor, soldiers had long been required to do a great 
deal of manual labor. Armies the world over were often tasked with building their own 
barracks, preparing their meals, and clearing land for military roads and supply lines. 
Likewise, other states had coerced their incarcerated populations to labor for their own 
support and for the enrichment of the state. Two important characteristics of the 
American military labor regime in the late-nineteenth century warrant note. First, as in 
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the case of Georgia’s convict lease and western contract workers, soldiers in the 1870s 
and 1880s were put to work on behalf of new industries and enterprises that characterized 
the expansion of capitalist investment in the West. Soldiers’ labor advanced the work of 
railroads, mining operations, and new ranches, all financed with eastern and European 
capital. While soldiers were not “leased” to companies like their convict counterparts, 
they were assigned as security details to private corporations, including railroads and 
mail delivery services. Second, soldiers in the decades after the Civil War vocally 
protested the conditions of their work in the language of rights, citizenship, and free 
labor. They resented the imposition of the army’s demands as unsuited to their status as 
free men. For while Peck’s miners and railroad workers were recruited from places like 
Italy, Greece, and Mexico, and Lichtenstein’s convicts were predominantly African-
American, a large number of the soldiers who complained that “they ‘did not enlist to 
carry the hod,’” were white and native-born.389 In the army, soldiers – whether white and 
black, immigrant or native-born – were subject to the same labor demands. Yet many no 
doubt agreed with one enlisted man, tasked with transporting buckets of water for Lt. 
Ernest Howard Ruffner’s 1876 Red River expedition into the Texas Panhandle, who 
complained the work he was forced to do was “regular convict labor.”390 He was not so 
wrong: the military oversaw a vast army of workers who lacked the same rights as other 
free workers. Unable to quit or protest their working conditions, soldiers, like prisoners, 
were enmeshed in a state-sanctioned regime of coerced labor.  
* * * 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Rickey, Forty Miles a Day, 96.  
390 Quoted in William Thomas Hagan, Charles Goodnight: Father of the Texas Panhandle (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 35. 
	   	  
	  
	  
201 
This chapter has argued that the army managed to retain a way of organizing 
labor that was increasingly problematic in civilian society after 1865. While other 
employers were barred from penal sanctions for contract breeches, the U.S. army 
continued to imprison soldiers for desertion and other infractions directly related to their 
role as laborers. Of course, the army was not the only pocket of “unfreedom” that 
survived the Civil War. Debt peonage and sharecropping developed as means of 
guaranteeing a supply of workers to southern plantations.391 Looking beyond the former 
Confederacy, it becomes clear that employers continued to take advantage of a range of 
coercive measures for securing labor. Both Howard Lamar and Gunther Peck have 
argued that various forms of unfree labor relations were more characteristic of the West 
than the ideal of free labor. Contrary to Frederick Jackson Turner’s insistence that the 
availability of land in the West promoted freedom and democracy, employers sought to 
curtail workers’ ability to move in search of better opportunities, often using padrones or 
other labor brokers who “could traverse those spaces and regulate the geographic 
mobility of workers.”392 The North American West, like other parts of the globe where 
land was readily abundant and labor was limited, seemed to demand such mechanisms for 
employers to bind their workers and prevent them from seeking greener pastures 
elsewhere.393 The Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery and peonage, but coercion 
persisted and even proliferated in new forms. 
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The U.S. army was adept at harnessing the labor of its soldiers for a range of 
ambitious building projects. Measured in terms of roads, telegraph wires, and railroads 
built, its model of coerced labor was a great success. At the same time, the challenges the 
army faced from its “enlisted laborers” attest to the way the labor movement was 
transforming the expectations of workers. The greatest challenge came in the form of 
desertion, but soldiers also articulated their grievances as citizens deserving of certain 
rights. Changes in the enlistment contract, pay, and rations policies stand as concessions 
to the demands of this special group of workers subject to a state-sanctioned labor 
regime.  
Despite soldiers’ resistance, the U.S. army continued to exploit soldiers’ labor. 
Criticism from enlisted men was often dismissed in part because of the gulf separating 
soldiers’ perceptions from those of army officials and the wider public. Then as now, 
soldiers were not seen as workers: paradoxically, their special status – the fact that they 
were worked for the government rather than private employers – deprived them of the 
rights of ordinary citizens. Rather than enhancing their status, soldiers’ patriotic identity 
meant they were expected to endure greater deprivations and more severe limits on their 
ability to quit, organize, and petition than workers in other industries. While soldiers 
expressed solidarity with and often acted like regular workers by threatening work 
stoppages or running away, they did not enjoy even the rights of their compatriots in the 
growing labor movement. Their resistance was termed insubordination or desertion, and 
what their actions said about the army’s labor regime, then and since, has been 
overlooked.  
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The fact that soldiers constituted a coerced labor force, subject to the oversight of 
the federal government, complicates our understanding of the central state’s role in the 
late-nineteenth century. The same state – indeed, the same army – responsible for 
enforcing the rights of ex-slaves in the South during Reconstruction was simultaneously 
engaged in compelling the labor of soldiers for a variety of ends. At the same time, while 
the federal government passed legislation aimed at curbing the importation of contract 
workers, it saw no problem with coercing the labor of soldiers for building and 
infrastructure projects, particularly in remote corners of the West where labor was scarce 
and wages were high. Ignoring the fact that soldiers were workers, in peacetime as well 
as war, has allowed scholars to overlook their important role at the intersection of forced 
labor and state power. As Peter Way writes about eighteenth-century Britain, “Soldiers 
constituted both instruments and objects of imperial authority.”394 As instruments, they 
enabled the state to expand its reach across western lands and peoples, performing the 
work of “accumulation by dispossession” crucial to the advance of capitalism.395 As 
objects, they experienced the same type of exploitation as coerced workers in other 
industries. Soldiers’ labor on modern infrastructural projects that served to promote the 
expansion of capitalism challenges the assumption that capitalism and free labor are a 
natural, even necessary, combination. Soldiers, like the Greek miners who contracted 
their labor to padrones, submitted to binding labor contracts and a variety of other 
limitations on their labor and mobility. Even convicts, whose status was defined by 
unfreedom, contributed in key ways to the emergence of modern industries in the West 
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and South. Furthermore, recognizing that soldiering was coerced labor challenges 
assumptions about the liberal state’s role in the development of capitalism in the trans-
Mississippi West. Laissez-faire may have been the ruling slogan back east, where 
capitalists wanted the government to stay well clear of their business practices, but 
further west, they relied on the strong arm of the state in the guise of the U.S. army and 
its legions of soldier-workers. This story, too long relegated to the backwaters of military 
history, opens up new avenues of inquiry about some of the key topics in the nineteenth 
century: capitalism, the state, and the fate of labor after the Civil War. 
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CHAPTER 4 
“A Despotic Machine:” Labor and the Imperial Project 
  
In 1906, a few years after his troops built a major military road through the 
southern Philippines, Major General Robert L. Bullard reflected on the wider significance 
of that undertaking: “It was here for the Americans to open these ways: for here, as 
perhaps over all the earth, road-making was to be the first step, and to merge with 
government-making and civilization.”396 The road itself facilitated U.S. military 
operations in what became known as the Moro Province. Bullard, however, believed 
“road-making” – the construction of the road perhaps more than the road itself – did 
more: it enabled the extension of “civilization” among the “savages.” Key to “road-
making” was the management of laboring populations, including indigenous people and 
the army’s own soldiers. This chapter examines ideas about labor and labor practices on 
army construction projects in the southern Philippines. It argues that labor was a crucial 
arena for the articulation of American power in the colony. Indeed, the process of 
creating and managing a workforce in this outpost of empire was constitutive of the 
imperial project itself.397  
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officials were eager to use construction projects as a way to introduce wage labor to the Filipino people, 
part of the process of introducing “civilization” among their colonial charges. See Bankoff, “Wants, 
Wages, And Workers,” Pacific Historical Review 74, no. 1 (2005): 59–86; and Bankoff, “‘These Brothers 
of Ours’: Poblete’s Obreros and the Road to Baguio, 1903-1905,” Journal of Social History 38, no. 4 
(2005): 1047-1072. For a direct engagement with labor in a military context, see Justin Jackson, “The Work 
of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Making of American Colonialisms in Cuba and the Philippines, 1898-
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The American colonial period in the southern Philippines has been largely 
neglected by U.S. historians. The U.S. army had been in the south since the outbreak of 
war with Spain, and in 1903, the Philippine Commission established the Moro Province, 
a special designation giving the army almost total control over the territory in civil as 
well as military matters. The single comprehensive monograph in English focusing on 
this time and place, while detailed and useful, is based largely on American army sources 
and written from the perspective of the military-colonial governors.398 Scholars working 
in the Philippines have been more attentive to the special circumstances of the south, but 
their accounts often focus on that country’s internal dynamics, particularly the 
development of Filipino nationalism and the emergence of separatist ethnic and cultural 
identities in the south.399 Yet the southern Philippines presents an ideal context for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1913,” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2014). On the importance of infrastructure to the Philippine 
Commission’s vision of economic development in the archipelago, see Glenn Anthony May, Social 
Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), chapter 8. See also Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: 
Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 
314-317. 
 
Mary Renda’s discussion of the “American Idea,” in the context of the U.S. military occupation of Haiti, 
provides a potentially useful point of comparison to the situation in the Philippines. Renda shows how 
policymakers and military officials believed the construction of infrastructure was essential to attracting 
capitalist investment and encouraging the development of wage labor, which they interpreted 
paternalistically as benefiting the Haitians rather than serving American interests. Her book offers a cultural 
history of the occupation and does not explore in depth the actual construction of infrastructure or the 
organization of labor under American military rule. See Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation 
and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2001), 117-119. 
398 Peter G. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920 
(Quezon City; Detroit, Mich.: New Day Publishers, 1983).  
399 See Patricio N. Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine 
Nation-State (Quezon City: Ateneo University Press, 2000). Abinales is interested in the colonial 
antecedents for the twentieth-century history of Muslims in the Philippines. While he devotes two rich 
chapters to the American colonial period in Davao and Cotabato, the real story for him is about rebellions 
launched by the Moro National Liberal Front and the Communist Part of the Philippines in Mindanao in the 
late-twentieth century. Michael Hawkins focuses on the American military period, but his central concern 
is how the American military period shaped Moros and their self-conceptions and cultural identity. His 
book is nonetheless valuable for its Moro-centric perspectives and stories. See Hawkins, Making Moros: 
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exploring some of the central issues in the study of American imperialism. It was there 
that the raw power of the army was most clearly on display and where, for the longest 
time, the U.S. committed its resources to remaking the political, economic, and social 
lives of its subjects. At the same time, the so-called Moros were long accustomed to 
repelling the designs of foreign powers; they had successfully resisted the Spanish and, 
before them, older expansionist states in the Pacific. Furthermore, the Moros became for 
the Americans “as archaic and colorful as the army’s former opponents, the American 
Indian,” reminding soldiers of that older frontier and the “romantic” battles in the 
continental U.S.400 Events in the southern Philippines, therefore, help us understand the 
longer narrative of American empire. Moreover, the army’s emphasis on economic 
development and its struggles to organize a labor force were taken straight from the 
playbook officers had long used to guide their operations in the continental U.S. 
The army’s plan for extending American sovereignty in the Philippines relied on a 
specific vision of economic development and the establishment of new labor relations to 
support that vision. Refashioning the region’s political economy was key to its military 
objectives as well. As in remote corners of the trans-Mississippi West, parts of the Moro 
Province required extraordinary expenditures of labor, time, and money in order to make 
them accessible to soldiers. But in the army’s overseas empire, indigenous people were 
also forced, through taxation, incarceration, and brute military power, to provide labor for 
American construction projects. As in the continental U.S., military labor overseas was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines’ Muslim South (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2012); 
400 Linn, Guardians, 35. See chapter 6, this dissertation, for an extended discussion of how army officers 
compared Native Americans and Moros in their writings.   
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part of the army’s broader efforts to reshape the political economy of the territory it 
occupied.   
This chapter focuses on the army’s involvement in construction projects in the 
southern Philippines from their early days prosecuting a war in Mindanao and continuing 
through the army’s administration of the Moro Province. The first part provides an 
overview of the U.S. presence in the region. It then looks at the construction of one 
important thoroughfare, the Iligan military road. Although portrayed by officers as a 
shining success of labor management, the Iligan road exacted steep concessions to both 
enlisted men and Moro workers from the army. The second part explores how problems 
of labor management continued to shape American governance after the establishment of 
the Moro Province. Army officers, charged with administering the province in addition to 
prosecuting a war, hoped to bring peace and prosperity to the region. Their efforts to 
foster free-labor practices met with resistance and exposed the limitations of the U.S. 
resolve to remake the political economy of the southern Philippines.  
“Uncle Sam’s Soldiers, Road Builders”: The Iligan Military Road 
 
American troops waged a ferocious war in the southern Philippines, but the U.S. 
was not the first colonial power to try to subjugate the region and its inhabitants. In 1565, 
Spanish conquistadors established their first imperial outpost in the Philippines. They 
encountered the fiercest resistance from the Muslim warriors in the southern islands of 
Mindanao and Sulu. They called these fighters “Moros” after their erstwhile enemies, the 
Moors. Americans continued to use the term. Islam had first come to the archipelago in 
the thirteenth century, brought by traders from the Arabian peninsula, and the process of 
“Islamization” continued over the next several centuries. In his study of the American 
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military period, historian Peter Gowing writes, “not in three and a third centuries of 
trying did [the Spanish] effectually subdue the Muslim sultanates in the south.” They 
tried nonetheless. As a result of their failure, however, Gowing argues that “the Moros 
developed their culture and society somewhat cut off from the rest of the Philippines.”401 
American authorities also treated the region differently from the rest of the archipelago. 
They determined the people of the south incapable of civilian government and instead 
imposed a military government on the region for over a decade. In 1903, the U.S. created 
a new designation, in addition to the Military Department of Mindanao, called the Moro 
Province, discussed below. Distinct from the civilian government established for most of 
the rest of the Philippines, the Moro Province was not, however, an insignificant corner 
of the American empire. Patricio Abinales, a leading historian of the southern 
Philippines, notes, “With over 38,888 of the 111,860 square miles within the total 
Philippine landmass, the Moro Province was the largest administrative unit in the entire 
colony.”402 The population included Muslims, Christians, and animists (whom the 
Americans variously called “Pagans,” “tribal people,” and “hill peoples”). The largest 
group numerically were the Muslim “Moros,” themselves divided into several different 
cultural-linguistic groups, sultanates, and kinship networks. In addition, there were an 
estimated quarter-million animists. The smallest group included roughly 60,000 
Christians, including Hispanicized Filipinos and emigrants, who were concentrated in the 
city of Zamboanga and a few other towns. In all, nearly half a million people, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Peter Gordon Gowing, “Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-
1920,” PhD diss., Syracuse University, 1968, 36 and 63.  
402 Patricio Abinales, “The U.S. Army as an Occupying Force,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire in the 
Making of the Modern American State, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison, Wis: 
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majority of them “non-Christian,” lived under a military government established by the 
U.S. army for over a decade.403  
The army’s efforts to militarily subdue the southern region cost hundreds of 
thousands of lives. Parts of Mindanao and Sulu remained in open hostility toward 
American rule until the Moro Province was declared “pacified” in 1913.404 The landscape 
itself presented a challenge to the troops: thick jungles, mountains, and the absence of 
good roads hindered military operations. Road-building was essential to extending 
American sovereignty over this difficult terrain, but the work was arduous. Brian Linn 
describes “the prodigious efforts necessary to maintain combat forces in the archipelago’s 
jungles, swamps, and mountains.”405 The Spanish, in their quest to subjugate the Moros, 
had tried to improve infrastructure by instituting a system of corvée labor. “Generations 
of nineteenth-century Filipinos served their forced-labor obligations building roads and 
bridges and repairing them,” Ken de Bevoise writes. Such infrastructure as they were 
able to build was already in decline by 1888, when Valeriano Weyler, governor-general 
of the Philippines, declared, “there is not a single kilometer of road that is in passable 
condition.”406 As soon as they arrived in Mindanao, the Americans went to work – and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 The population of the Moro Province was a subject of some debate among American military officials. 
They rejected Spanish estimates as too high; see Report of the Philippine Commission, part 2, 1903, 788. In 
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that Christian inhabitants were estimated at 65,741; Moros at 250,000; and they reported no direct 
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404 For an account of the army’s ongoing military operations in the Moro Province, see Linn, Guardians, 
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put others to work – improving and expanding this transportation system.407 Patricio 
Abinales writes, “A network of roads, telegraph lines, military outposts, and naval patrols 
was set up to ‘pacify the Moros’ and bring the technology and ‘reach of the [modern] 
state’ to southern Mindanao.”408 By 1902, the army, using Moro workers, had established 
telegraph lines throughout much of the Cotabato River Valley, and had built almost 200 
miles of roads in Davao province.409 “The infrastructure facilitated brutal military 
campaigns against resistant Moros, a limited campaign of disarmament against others, 
and the judicious use of ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics among disunified Muslim communities 
generally,” Abinales writes.  
Roads, however, were more than means to achieving military goals. They were 
not only part of the physical infrastructure of military occupation and conquest, but part 
of the ideological edifice of U.S. imperialism. As early as 1901, the Taft Commission 
declared the construction of roads and railroads “of the first importance” throughout the 
Philippines. The commissioners touted not only their obvious military purpose but their 
value as “an educator of the people”: “It may be asserted as a truism that a people without 
roads are necessarily savage, because society is impossible; and just to the extent that 
roads are lacking or defective, real progress is retarded and prosperity hindered.”410 
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Officers in the southern Philippines also embraced this vision of prosperity through road-
building.  
In 1902, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lee Bullard took charge of troops assigned to 
construct a major military road from Iligan to Marahui on the shores of Lake Lanao. Born 
in Alabama just months before the bombing of Fort Sumter, Bullard was a career army 
officer who led troops in New Mexico, Kansas, and Nevada before moving to the far 
West. When he arrived in the Philippines, the area surrounding Lake Lanao was one of 
the volatile regions in the archipelago. Since at least 1900, Lake Moros had violently 
opposed the presence of American soldiers. Ill-feeling had intensified, both between 
various Moro groups and between them and the Americans. In the spring of 1902, Moros 
attacked a group of soldiers on an exploring mission around the southern part of the lake, 
killing one enlisted man.411 Other attacks on soldiers persuaded military commanders in 
the region to undertake a broader campaign involving 1,200 soldiers in April and May 
1902. In the Battle of Bayan, 300 to 400 Moros were killed, compared to seven American 
casualties. Following the engagement, the army established Camp Vicars, a post intended 
to help the U.S. extend its presence south of Lake Lanao.412 Bullard’s road-building 
assignment was intended to support military operations in the region while keeping his 
men focused on construction rather than war-making.413  
Throughout the American administration of the Philippines, colonial officials 
emphasized the importance of roads to their civilizing mission. Of course roads answered 
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413 For a reproduction of a map of the road as well as other photographs from the National Archives and 
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ordinary, prosaic needs: to move men and materiel, to facilitate trade and stimulate 
capital investment. But even in the context of military operations, men like Bullard 
portrayed the work of empire in far more heroic terms. A few months after the 
completion of the road, Bullard wrote in the Atlantic Monthly about the importance of 
this undertaking for the Lake Moros, the Malanaos, rather than in terms of the 
Americans’ military interests in the islands. “The making of these [roads],” Bullard 
declared, “means the civilization of the Malanaos.”414 For Bullard, this project 
encapsulated one of the great transformations of a people anywhere on the globe. The 
Moros living around Lake Lanao were clearly “savages.” Yet it was necessary for the 
Americans to civilize them. The reasons were self-evident for Bullard: 
‘Because civilization has better things for them.’…Because they are part of us, we 
must fetch them forward with us; we cannot leave them behind. Because savagery 
and civilization cannot exist side by side; either all Mindanao must be turned over 
to the savagery of the aggressive Moros, or all be taken over to civilization. 
Because, finally, as savages the Moros stand in the way of our destiny, and we 
cannot permit that.415 
 
Building this road meant more than transporting supplies or winning a series of battles 
against hostile, hold-out Moros. By casting the problem in terms of “destiny” and 
“civilization,” Bullard imbued his task with significance, even righteousness. It was not 
simply that the road itself would facilitate American military expeditions, which would in 
turn introduce the Moros to “civilization.” Instead, he believed that the process of 
building the road – recruiting Moros to labor on it and inculcating in them habits of work 
and thrift – would “fetch them forward.” Like many of his contemporaries, he hoped to 
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change the habits and beliefs of the Moros while at the same time harnessing their labor-
power for the U.S. army. Yet Bullard underestimated the opposition he would face in 
Mindanao. While officers loudly proclaimed the greatness of American imperialism in 
the southern Philippines, the army faced steep resistance from both enlisted men and the 
indigenous population.  
In early days Bullard was full of optimism about the work before him. Aboard the 
vessel transporting him and his men to Iligan, he noted the “lovely weather, smooth, 
serene sea.” The mood of the soldiers matched their surroundings: although the ship was 
crowded, the men were “not uncomfortable and certainly in high spirits and good humor 
at the prospect of field service. Oficers [sic] and men are at work informing themselves 
about the Moro country and people. They are certainly full of enthusiasm.” The next day 
Bullard, impressed with the “beautiful dark green jungles and mountains,” remarked on 
the “high spirits, fine weather and enthusiastic  command.”416 When they finally arrived 
in Iligan on October 13, 1902, Bullard discovered “deep green mountains and shore, 
cocoanut groves and dense tropical forest, fine timber, trees ‘hard’ wood showing their 
white trunks on mountain sides.” Despite auspicious beginnings, this captivating 
environment soon presented Bullard and his men with a variety of challenges. When he 
began investigating the territory around Iligan, Bullard found a foreboding landscape 
rather than the tropical paradise he had seen from the boat. “Rode out six miles over trail 
my battalion is to open to the hostile Moro country,” he wrote in his diary. “[V]ery 
mountainous, very steep, difficult and dangerous if Moros but knew how to use it. It is a 
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tropical tangle, vines, briars, shrubs, trees and giant grass.”417 But Bullard was skeptical 
about the Moros’ ability to “use” the territory to their advantage. Days earlier he had 
remarked that the Moros he had met “didn’t impress me as very formidable or dangerous. 
I can hardly tell male from female.”418 Having written the Moros off as effeminate, he 
had already decided they would not factor into his plans for subduing the jungle. The 
“serene” and beautiful backdrop he had observed on arrival had transformed into a more 
challenging, “difficult” canvas for his labors. Bullard embraced the challenge, concluding 
his diary entry with the optimism of a colonial officer: “I think there is work here for 
good six months. It will be no easy job; it will be hard work but worth the doing.” 
Labor became a source of concern almost immediately. Six officers and 344 
enlisted men were assigned to the project.419 When cholera broke out among the Moros 
near Iligan, Bullard’s plans to recruit local labor were put on hold. The Moros believed 
the white soldiers had brought the deadly disease with them, and for the most part they 
avoided the soldiers. Army doctors had likewise counseled Bullard to “cut the 
acquaintance and association of all natives.”420 He was forced to concentrate his efforts 
on his soldier-workers. Concerned about poor morale among the troops, Bullard joined 
with C. C. Bateman, the regimental chaplain and an “intelligence officer” with the Third 
Battalion, to help raise spirits. Bateman’s job involved cheering on the road-workers and 
publicizing the army’s achievements. He accomplished the latter by writing magazine 
articles about the army’s activities in the Moro Province. Bullard, however, appreciated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Bullard Diarybook 2, October 19, 1902. 
418 Bullard Diarybook 2, October 13, 1902. 
419 Allan Reed Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-
1925 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), 169. 
420 Bullard Diarybook 2, Oct 24, 1902. 
	   	  
	  
	  
216 
Bateman for his efforts encouraging the men. The night before construction began, he 
remarked, “Regimental chaplain Bateman is doing good work with the men in preparing 
officers and men to face the work with manhood.”421 The next day when troops went to 
work on the road, Bullard said they were in “a fine humor for work. Chaplain C. C. 
Bateman’s lecture last night on the soldier’s work did great good. The Chaplain is a 
valuable man.” Bateman was on the construction site at 6:30 a.m. when the soldiers 
began “with a photographer and had suitable pictures made of the beginning of the 
work.”422 Bateman, however, was one of the first to suffer from the heat. On October 28, 
just a few days after work began, Bateman fainted. Bullard confided to his diary, “I fear 
he will not hold out long. He is writing this work up in notes and I should hate to lose 
him also on account of his general value and influence for good humor and willingness 
among the men.” Bateman stayed on long enough to observe the backbreaking labor 
required for the road project. In one of two articles he published in the Journal of the 
Military Service Institution of the United States, Bateman wrote, “The work was 
necessarily laborious, but well done. The higher we got the more difficult the work 
became. After the timber was slashed away the steep mountain sides lay strewn with 
huge boulders of volcanic origin and extremely hard.” The work was slow, too. “Months 
were required to finish a few hundred yards,” Bateman recalled.423  
The demands of the construction project soon tested everyone’s resolve. By mid-
November, just two weeks after the project began, the heat and hard work began to take a 
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toll on the troops. Bullard fretted to his diary, “Sick report increasing; ordered one hour 
cut off of labor. heat great now every day and telling on men.”424 Bullard’s biographer 
writes, “As the work became harder – lumbering, digging, and dynamiting – the troops 
dwindled from illness and expired enlistments. In less than six weeks the construction 
force fell to two hundred and seventy-six men.”425 Although Bullard acknowledged the 
extreme heat, he also blamed the decline in productivity on the work ethic of the men and 
tended to attribute slow progress to deficiencies of character rather than the harsh 
conditions of work. He wrote, “On the road. 10th Inf. cos. are a little inclined to loaf and 
need to be watched. -- Road work is slow. Many men are sick, heat extreme, 85*-95*F in 
shade and 100*-115* in sun.”426 The infantrymen were “trifling,” on the 15th of the 
month, and “still not doing as much work as ought” on the 22nd. But despite these 
shortcomings, Bullard was not in a position to push the men harder. Instead, he tried to 
raise their spirits. “Work on road on hardest place on ascent of mountains. So difficult 
that men were plainly discouraged. To guard against this, have concentrated command in 
one work place for tomorrow so that progress made will be manifest to all, and encourage 
all.”  He believed, briefly, that the demonstration had improved morale.427 This was 
short-lived, and Bullard continued to despair over the slow pace of progress. “The work 
on road is lagging. I shall have to take a new grip.” But nothing seemed to work, and 
Bullard became increasingly critical of the soldier-workers, men who were “loafers” and 
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took up his time with their complaints. He wrote with exasperation, “Taken altogether I 
believe this command of regulars is worse than any of volunteers I ever had.”428  
The slow pace of progress forced Bullard to make accommodations to these 
disappointing workers. Early on, he had made adjustments – trimming an hour off the 
work day, concentrating men at one task so they could see their work take shape. But it 
was not enough. Initially, soldiers had worked in twenty-minute shifts. “The system,” 
Chaplain Bateman wrote, “was not easy to enforce. The willing workers did more than 
their share, the less willing still less. But the chief objection to it was that men were kept 
too long in the sun, and began to break down, not so much from the burden of toil as 
from the excessive heat.”429 In response to poor morale and even poorer results on the 
road, Bullard instituted a new work regimen. Beginning on January 2, 1903, the soldiers 
worked on the road only in the mornings, and they rested during the hottest part of the 
day. Bateman wrote sanguinely, “More and better work was done in the mornings than 
was accomplished during the entire day under the old system, which had been borrowed 
from somebody’s experience elsewhere.”430 
Historians have followed the lead of Bullard and Bateman, portraying changes in 
the work schedule as progressive and intelligent responses on the part of army officers. 
Bullard’s biographer describes in glowing terms the results of the new regimen: “Sick 
call dropped, morale picked up, and progress on the road improved.”431 But both 
contemporaries and historians have finessed the edges of this story – largely because they 
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fail to treat it as an episode in the labor history of the colonial Philippines. Military 
construction projects, like the Iligan road, were labor negotiations between the workers 
(enlisted men) and management (officers). Because Bullard needed these soldiers and had 
few alternative sources of labor, the regulars had the advantage. “Management” was 
forced to make accommodations. When Bullard changed to the daily routine, he was 
making concessions to the demands of his soldier-workers. Simple morale-building 
through the chaplain had failed to sufficiently motivate his troops to do backbreaking 
labor in extreme heat. Without other workers, such as Moros, to use as back-ups or as 
leverage to pressure the regulars to work to his standards, he was unable to “fire” or 
replace them, in spite of their subpar performance. Instead, Bullard devised a way to 
improve productivity by adjusting his demands. 
Even these changes did not eliminate sickness and poor morale. While the overall 
health of the battalion may have improved, malaria, which accounted for a large number 
of soldiers on the sick list, continued to beleaguer the operation. Mosquito nets and 
quinine were distributed to the men, but Bullard remained concerned – and irritated – 
about the sick list, which he took as a personal affront. On January 14 he wrote, “Work 
slow but new scheme is proving satisfactory, but sick report is very heavy, about 13%. It 
seems that I’m always destined in these islands to be in places where my men fall sick.” 
Other illnesses also plagued the troops. On January 20, James C. Rutledge, an army 
surgeon stationed near Iligan with the road-building troops, sent an urgent letter to the 
28th Infantry’s adjutant. He reported that the men were “surrounded by infections and 
contagious diseases,” and the camp was quarantined due to the presence of smallpox. In 
addition, he referred to “a considerable number of cases of Dysentery, Diarrhea, and 
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veneral [sic] diseases in the command.” Rutledge requested additional hospital staff, 
arguing that “A lack of trained assistants will tend toward spread of these diseases.”432 
Bullard changed the work schedule to keep the men out of the blazing sun during the 
hottest part of the day, but he could not completely insulate them from the presence of so 
many diseases, each of which cut into the battalion’s productivity and impeded progress 
on the road. 
 Conditions specific to the Moro Province – the heat, unfamiliar terrain, and 
prevalence of disease – distinguished this road-building project as particularly arduous. 
But in other ways, it exemplified the army’s longstanding practice of using its enlisted 
men to do manual labor. The Manila Times captured the essence of their service as 
laborers with the headline, “Uncle Sam’s Soldiers, Road Builders.” The paper explained 
the special challenges faced by soldiers of the Tenth and Twenty-Eighth Infantry on the 
road-building detail:  
they are opening up the cuts, widening the trail into a road, laying the ballast and 
grading the highway just as a force of street laborers would do in the United 
States, the only difference in the conditions being that the street laborer in the 
States has the benefit of a tolerable climate, good food and a comfortable place to 
sleep, whereas the soldier road-builders in Mindanao must labor under a tropical 
sun, supported by a ration, which, if accounts be reliable, is not the most 
nourishing.433 
 
Furthermore, soldiers were tired from “a long campaign against the Moros” and “racked 
by disease and emaciated and weakened by a long season of duty under the broiling heat 
of a relentless tropical sun.” The newspaper expressed sympathy with the troops for 
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presumably doing work far beyond their typical responsibilities as soldiers. It lamented 
the fact that the infantrymen were “required to turn from their military status and perform 
the labor that the government generally has done by men employed from civil life.” On 
the one hand, the Manila Times recognized an important fact about the military’s duties 
in the southern Philippines: troops were being used as laborers in building this 
thoroughfare, and the work itself was challenging. However, this turn of events was 
nowhere near as novel as the newspaper pretended. Instead, the infantrymen working on 
the Iligan road were part of a long tradition of soldier-laborers. Like their predecessors in 
the American West, they were assigned to cut trails, grade roads, and labor in extreme 
weather. They did this work because it was essential to the army’s occupation of hostile 
and unfriendly territory where alternative sources of labor were scarce. These troops in 
Mindanao were indeed “Uncle Sam’s…Road Builders,” but they were far from the first 
American soldiers to do the work of “street laborers.”   
Most of the stories told about the Iligan road portrayed it in celebratory terms: the 
Manila Times praised the herculean efforts of soldier-workers; Bateman told about 
brilliant adaptations to the challenges of the tropics; and Bullard spoke of civilization’s 
great rewards. In private, however, Bullard was deeply disappointed and frustrated in his 
men. The contrast between the narratives produced for public consumption – for 
newspapers and magazines – and the record Bullard left in his personal diary is striking. 
But another record of the Iligan road also remains, one left by enlisted men. The song “In 
Mindanao” tells the story of the soldiers transferred from Luzon to build the road. Dating 
from 1902 or 1903 and preserved in a collection of reminiscences and songs published in 
1914, the song highlights the travails of the work and the pleasures of drink. It also 
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communicates some of the issues of morale, loafing, and illness that so frustrated 
Bullard. Set to the tune of the “The Girl I Left Behind Me,” the singers announce, “We’re 
going up to the Lake Lanao, / To the town they call Marahui.” Of course, the soldiers 
who sang this song included colorful descriptions of the dangers they faced: “a kris... in 
your liver” and a “bolo fist” – but they also highlighted the bawdier dangers of too much 
fun. In the first stanza the soldiers explain, “for Mindanao we took our vow / In a glass of 
foaming booze.” This helps explain some of the more unpleasant experiences later on, 
such as the “jim-jams and the fever” mentioned in the third stanza. (Jim-jams, or jitters, 
were often due to “delirium tremens” caused by alcohol.) 
“In Mindanao” was more than a drinking song, however. In it soldiers reflected 
on the rigors of their assignment.  
We’re blasting stumps and grading bumps, 
Our hands and backs are sore, oh! 
We work all day just dreamin’ of our pay, 
And damn the husky Moros! 
 
Perhaps most revealing, given Bullard’s struggles to curb the sick list, the final stanza 
describes how soldiers dodged the hard work of road building and tried to recover from 
their “sore” bodies and aching heads. It concludes,  
When you’re pulled from bed with a great big head, 
And a weakness o’er you stealing; 
The sick report is a fine resort, 
To cure that tired feeling. 
 
Whether the “great big head” was caused by too much “booze” or too much “blasting” 
and “grading,” the singers do not say. Regardless, this song provides a different 
perspective on the challenges Bullard faced from his position supervising the troops. The 
soldiers who arrived in Mindanao to work on the Iligan road found themselves “camped 
	   	  
	  
	  
223 
in the sand of a foreign land” and surrounded by a dangerous enemy. They took refuge in 
drinking, “loafing,” and in song. This particular ballad shows how at least some of them 
felt about their assignment: “When the road is built and the Moros ‘kilt,’ / They’ll none 
of us be sorry.”434 While Bullard and his other officers hoped the road would be a 
monument to the U.S.’s civilizing mission in the Philippines, enlisted men were simply 
trying to get through days of hard work. As “In Mindanao” reminds us, their experience 
was that of ordinary laborers “dreamin’ of…pay.” 
Beyond the Iligan Road, enlisted men constituted an essential source of labor in 
the southern Philippines. Soldiers cut lumber and built quarters, just as their predecessors 
had in Texas and Arizona. 435 As in the American West, the maintenance of many small 
posts scattered across great distances became a drain on army personnel and resources. In 
its overseas territories, however, the army attempted to take advantage of a new 
population of workers: the indigenous people. In 1904, Leonard Wood, the first governor 
of the Moro Province, lamented the fact that American soldiers spent too much time on 
non-combat duties. “The men,” he wrote, “are largely occupied in duties other than 
military – in fact, the result from a standpoint of military excellence and economy is not 
desirable.” This had been a familiar refrain for the nineteenth-century “frontier army.” In 
the Philippines, however, the army had an alternative labor pool, which could relieve 
American soldiers from menial labor. Wood suggested using the native Philippine 
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Constabulary for maintenance duties, freeing up American soldiers for the “performance 
of their duties in war.” The implication of Wood’s argument was that Filipino 
constabulary soldiers were better suited for chores like boiling water for drinking. “It is 
believed that much of the work which has hitherto been performed by troops should be 
done by this police force and that troops should be used only for serious work,” Wood 
wrote. With the Filipino Constabulary available to boil drinking water, maintain the 
barracks, and deal with petty skirmishes and other “police work,” the regular army 
officers would be able to concentrate on “serious work.”436  
Officers envisioned a hierarchy of laborers with American soldiers at the top. 
Enlisted soldiers were employed as “skilled laborers” on “public works of the Moro 
Province,” receiving “a daily or hourly wage” in addition to their regular monthly pay.437 
Furthermore, in 1905 the Philippine Commission reported that soldiers were serving as 
foremen on road-building projects. They earned $80 to $100 per month for this work, 
dramatically more than both local laborers as well as enlisted men.438 Of course, because 
American foremen cost the government so dearly, the report emphasized that “as few…as 
possible” were employed on the public works.439  
In addition to their “enlisted laborers,” the army also tried to employ indigenous 
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people in Mindanao. In and of itself, this was routine; the army had employed locals, 
including Native Americans, in the trans-Mississippi West.440 The situation in the 
southern Philippines presented different challenges and opportunities. First, the army was 
at war in the Moro Province – at war against the same people, broadly speaking, it sought 
to recruit as workers. Hostilities were not declared over until 1909, and the military only 
turned over administration of the province to civilian authorities in 1913.441 Second, the 
Americans saw the Moros as “savages” unfamiliar with the responsibilities of both 
capitalism and civilization. Yet they still hoped the Moros would be able to help them in 
their demanding construction projects. Ideally, the local population – Moros and animists 
as well as Filipinos and Japanese – would relieve American soldiers of some common 
labor, leaving the Americans to provide leadership and specialized skills. Although the 
army sought to take advantage of a readily available and less expensive labor force, they 
also portrayed the employment of Moros as part of the U.S.’s civilizing mission. In one 
report, for example, engineers in charge of provincial building projects “emphasized the 
fact that the large amount of military and civil public works in the province has been the 
best sort of an industrial school.”442 Moros were pupils rather than workers, learning from 
their labor rather than surviving by it. In this image of colonial tutelage, American 
soldiers became valuable teachers as they “instructed” the local people in the arts of hard 
work. However, as events on the Iligan military road also make clear, this “industrial 
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school” had its share of conflicts. 
“The Moros Will Not Labor”: Road-Building and Resistance   
 
The army brass had expected Moros to do much of the work of carving a road 
through the mountains and dense forest from Iligan to Marahui. With $20,000 ear-marked 
for their pay, Bullard hoped to recruit Moros early on, but an outbreak of cholera 
coincided with the battalion’s arrival, impeding those efforts.443 The Manila Times 
blamed the indolent Moros for the fact that American soldiers were performing such 
thankless work as road-building in the South. Under the headline, “The Moros will not 
labor,” the newspaper reported that despite offers of cash, “the Moros could not be 
prevailed upon to perform such menial labor as road construction.” As a result, “soldiers 
were impressed, and now they are performing the work that the Moros did not have the 
heart to attempt.”444  
Convincing Moros to work on the road became one of Bullard’s chief occupations 
in 1903. He tried to curry the favor of the datus (the hereditary elite, discussed below) 
and make clear the superiority of the American military without directly coercing labor 
on the road. Not long after the project began, Bullard wrote in his journal: “Today first 
blows on mountain ascent of Agus river. Moros invited yesterday and today by men, 
witnessed impressive object lesson dynamiting stumps and trees.”445  This “object lesson” 
was supposed to display the full power of the American military – not in battle, but in 
remaking the natural world, blasting away rock and paving roads through mountains and 
building bridges across rivers.  
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Even this demonstration of superior firepower did not convince the Moros that 
they should join the Americans doing such work. Bateman wrote simply, “Native labor 
was not available because Moros were not pleased with the enterprise.” Colonial officials 
had a variety of explanations for why the Moros “were not pleased.” One obvious reason 
was that the Americans appeared to have brought a deadly disease with them. Others felt 
that the Moros were simply barbaric and opposed the Americans because they challenged 
their traditional ways of doing things. Whatever the reasons, Bullard needed to head off 
Moro opposition to the road and enlist their labor as well. He seemed generally surprised 
that the Moros were not more welcoming of the American road-building crews, even 
after cholera had begun to subside. “It appears that neighboring Moros are not as friendly 
as they were and this in spite of every effort to cultivate good relations,” he wrote in his 
diary on November 20. “Almost all have disappeared from nearby town,” and “they do 
not visit this camp as much as they formerly did.” Bullard sounded hurt when he wrote, 
“today the Sultan of Momungan actually dodged, almost declined an invitation to stop in 
at camp to see me,” especially since this was one of the Moro leaders who had specially 
come to see him earlier in October.446  
Evasive datus soon became the least of Bullard’s problems. By the first of the 
year, Moro resistance became more pronounced and began to genuinely interfere with the 
construction project. “Moro hostility,” he wrote, had “been manifested” in fairly minor 
ways, but the signs of their unfriendliness were increasing: “in their general bearing, 
skulking about camp and work places on road, disappearance from vicinity on road, a 
readiness to give up social relations and their rumored blame of Americans for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Bullard Diarybook 2, November 20, 1902. 
	   	  
	  
	  
228 
appearance of cholera, dragging off road scraper, chase of my interpreter and shooting 
two shots in camp Xmas day.” In early January, these hostilities escalated. Bullard 
described “an attack by two Moros with Krises on soldier a few yds off road. Soldier 
little hurt and Moros escaped.” A guard fired “two ineffectual shots” but the perpetrators 
were not apprehended.  
This account shows a progression of “Moro hostility” – escalating from what 
might be called a “bad attitude” into theft, harassment, and outright violence in the camp. 
What is worse, these attacks happened in the midst of Bullard attempting the new work 
schedule for the regulars. It also coincided with the arrival of General Davis and Sumner. 
With them came pressure to make friends and, more importantly, workers of the Moros. 
Bullard noted that Davis “very expressly desired” him to secure Moros for road work. 
But Bullard, who was fully aware of these progressively bold attacks, was pessimistic of 
ever making the Moros into allies, much less willing workers. “I fear it is impossible. 
They don’t want to work, though full of declarations to the contrary and all kinds of 
promises to come,” he wrote.447 Yet the task of persuading Moros to join the Americans 
became central to their understanding of the imperial mission. As Bullard wrote, “They 
have no traditions of work. Among them labor is generally the part of slaves, women, and 
children. It is accordingly looked upon with contempt by Moro freemen.”448 Changing 
this cultural orientation and inculcating values of hard work in the Moros came to be seen 
as one of the great gifts the Americans could give their less advanced brethren.  
Recruiting Moro workers was an issue of ideological as well as practical 
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significance. Of course, the army wanted Moro labor because it would help complete the 
project more quickly and cheaply than a road built entirely by enlisted men. But the army 
also sought the recognition and affirmation that Moro labor seemed to stamp on the 
American occupation writ large. Bullard was not alone in seeking this affirmation. A few 
years later in 1905, George T. Langhorne, an army officer serving as the provincial 
governor in place of Leonard Wood, reflected happily on the work performed by Moros 
on behalf of the U.S. army. “The Moros are being encouraged to get out timber needed 
by the military authorities in the construction of posts,” he wrote. Langhorne pointed to 
Camp Keithley as an example of Moro industry. There they had built “over 70 barracks, 
quarters, and other buildings of grass and bamboo.” They also “furnished logs for the 
quartermaster sawmill” and “corduroy for the roads and fuel for the Overton ice plant.”449 
When discussing Moros’ enthusiasm for military labor, Captain Langhorne described a 
mutually beneficial relationship between the army and the local laborers. The army had 
“encouraged” them to supply timber, but they had responded energetically based on their 
own desire for work and money. “The natives have many prosperous looking settlements, 
and as they have a great desire to make money they are anxious to work and to trade,” 
Langhorne wrote.450 Elsewhere in the same report, he likewise portrayed the Moros as 
overly eager to work on behalf of the army. “The Moros throughout the province have 
shown a great desire to work.” Sometimes they even produced more than was necessary. 
Unfortunately for those industrious Moros, they “cut more wood for the quartermaster, 
put in more poles for corduroy on the Lanao road, and brought more coral rock to 
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Zamboanga from adjacent islands than has been called for.”451  
Officers like Langhorne were careful not to overstate Moros’ qualifications as 
laborers. He remarked on the Moros’ enthusiasm for work without giving them credit for 
being industrious or steady laborers, instead attributing their hard work to the military 
men who supervised them. Their productivity at Camp Keithley, for example, “was due 
largely to the energy, tact, and fair dealings of Captain Davidson, quartermaster there.” 
Another officer, Major Hardie at Overton, was so popular among the indigenous leaders 
and labor brokers, at least, that they wrote to the department commander to “request his 
retention” when he left. He acknowledged that they “worked well…when handled with 
tact and fairness.”452  
The issue of Moros’ suitability as workers was crucial to the American imperial 
project. In fact, as Paul Kramer explains, the question of Filipinos’ “capacity” for both 
work and self-government animated imperial politics throughout the U.S.’s 
administration of the Philippines. Colonial administrators were especially concerned with 
Filipinos’ capacity for labor given their interest in attracting capital investment to the 
archipelago. However, officials had to be careful not to exaggerate or understate their 
subjects’ ability to work well. “Attributions of Filipino laziness frightened away foreign 
capital, but claims of energetic Filipino labor – so closely tied to notions of thrift, 
prosperity, and self-restraint – could easily be mistaken for recognition of Filipino 
capacities, perhaps including those for nationality and self-rule,” Kramer writes.453 Most 
officers, including Leonard Wood, were not even entertaining the notion of Filipino 
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independence, much less any type of self-rule for the Muslims and other non-Christians 
in the south.454 All the same, officers like Langhorne were careful to note Moros’ 
helpfulness, while at the same time emphasizing the importance of American 
management in handling these workers.  
The willingness of Moros to work on army-led projects served as an endorsement 
of the Americans’ presence. In this sense, the success of Moros as workers served less to 
bolster their own “capacity” for self-government or self-management, and more to 
validate the Americans’ civilizational mission in the southern Philippines. In the case of 
the Iligan road, three thousand Moros did ultimately work for the army, despite 
inauspicious beginnings. Their eventual embrace of American work opportunities was 
touted beyond the military: Bullard and Bateman published celebratory accounts of Moro 
labor in popular outlets including the Atlantic Monthly. In private, however, Bullard 
divulged another story of the Iligan road – one far more frustrating and far less 
triumphant. Toward the end of January, a few Moros began coming into camp to work. 
“42 Moros went to work day before yesterday, 1/3 boys; yesterday about 30 worked, 
about half boys; today none worked,” Bullard noted. Millett writes, “For such a hard task 
as the datus could clearly see American road-building was, they sent only slaves and 
boys.”455 Despite these additional workers and the arrival of new companies of regulars, 
Bullard admitted that “work on road is now very slow.”456 He felt increasing pressure 
from his superior to recruit Moro laborers and began to approach the task with the zeal of 
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a personal obsession. He wrote, “Now I am on the Moro proposition, trying to induce 
these savages to work on the road….I’m going to make it work too or bust.”457 A few 
days later, however, he confessed he was “Still struggling with the problem of securing 
Moros to work on road.” By that point he had 70 to 75 Moros at work. The effort was 
time-consuming, but it had the potential to pay significant dividends in savings to the 
army. Bullard wondered whether they could be persuaded to work for the wages offered. 
“It will be remarkable success,” he wrote, “if they can be secured at the present price 
which is about half what they received from the U.S. for like work a year or two ago 
cutting out brush on the old Spanish trail.”458 
Recruiting a Moro workforce involved a good deal of political negotiation and 
diplomacy. Bullard found himself engaged in endless meetings with the Moro leadership, 
reaching out to various datus and trying to persuade them of the benefits of sending men 
to work on the road. He found these meetings frustrating. “A great many Moro chiefs are 
coming in to visit and talk with me about road work but they are ever ‘on the talk,’ rarely 
‘on the work,’” he wrote with exasperation.459 The datus’ penchant for talking and 
consuming Bullard’s time may have been more than a whim. Instead, by drawing out 
dialogue with Bullard, they may have been attempting to curry favorable treatment from 
him while they decided whether or not to work on the road. Even months later, after 
Bullard had succeeded in getting significant numbers of Moros to work on the road, his 
days were still consumed with such conferences. “I’ve lately had so much worry with 
Moros, that I’m tired,” he wrote in April. He found himself arbitrating between different 
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leaders competing for road work, and he admitted it was “hard to avoid becoming 
entangled in their quarrels.”460 In a typical entry he wrote, “A week of cracking stories 
and talking with dattos, things about equally tiresome.”461 Even though Bullard was 
presumably in charge of the whole project, he still could not avoid such “tiresome” 
conversations. The employment of Moros was important to the army, and if entertaining 
and visiting with them was necessary to keep them at work, Bullard had to oblige them.  
These efforts began to bear fruit in March. By that point Bullard had already been 
employing some Moros, and he found it somewhat easier to induce others to join the 
construction project as the troops progressed toward Lake Lanao. Bullard visited Pantar 
in advance of the construction crews in hopes of recruiting Moro laborers and preparing a 
camp for the troops. He had the good fortune to find a friendly welcome there. “I was 
visited within a few hours after my arrival by half a dozen Datoes of the neighborhood. I 
found them informed as to the good treatment and prompt pay of their fellow country-
men, who had been working with us at Camp #1. The Pantar Datoes showed themselves 
quite friendly and I had no trouble in inducing them to agree to clean up the Camp site, 
bring in the necessary wood and poles to start the camp and to cut all the grass and brush 
in the road between Pantar and Tiradores Hill, four miles back toward Camp #3.” Bullard 
was optimistic that he would soon “be able to secure all the Moro laborers that can be 
worked to advantage from that camp.”462 He was beginning to feel satisfied with his own 
accomplishments regarding the Moro labor problem. “I’ve been able somehow to make a 
success in the employment of the Moros, which is the all important matter on this work,” 
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he confided to his journal. But the work was far from over, and Bullard had ambitious 
plans: “I hope to have at least 300 Moros at work on road here within 10 days.”463 By the 
end of the month, Bullard declared optimistically, “Relations improving all the time with 
Moros.”464  
Improvement aside, the labor situation was far from ideal on the Iligan road. The 
Moros were never the steady, reliable workers the army hoped for, and the regular 
soldiers fell short of expectations as well. “The progress on this work done by the two 
companies during the past week is far from satisfactory,” Bullard wrote the adjutant at 
one point. In the same letter he asked permission to keep two companies at Camp 1 to 
finish some work, including replacing two culverts, “a little rock work (in gutters), a 
slight amount of pick and shovel work, considerable slashing” and “grubbing out several 
stumps still left in the roadway and gutters.” Bullard needed these additional troops to 
stay behind to complete these “finishing touches” because initial work had been 
inadequate. By this point Bullard had succeeded in recruiting quite a few Moros to join 
his construction crew, but they were of limited help. In no way was it possible to 
completely replace soldiers with Moro workers because the latter were “incapable” of 
doing certain types of work to Bullard’s specifications. For example, he asked for two 
companies of regular soldiers from Camp 3 to relocate to Camp 4 because “the bridge is 
of such character that it will be very difficult to utilize natives to any great extent.” 
Bullard also coordinated assignments between the regulars and the Moros, making sure 
that whatever work the “natives” did was then revisited by soldiers. “[A]lthough the work 
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done by them decreases by so much the work done by the soldiers yet each foot done by 
natives should be again gone over by soldiers hence the request to leave a portion of the 
Infty at each camp,” he wrote. The Moros reduced the overall workload but did not 
entirely replace soldier-laborers.465 
Bullard was often more eager to accommodate the Moros than they were keen to 
work on the road. His request for supplies for his workers at Pantar reflected the urgency 
of retaining the Moro workers. Bullard wanted 1,000 pesos and 2,000 pounds of rice 
“sent…as fast as possible” by pack train. “We are going to have lots of Moros and I do 
not want to let them loose for a minute. If money and rice be not on hand, they ought by 
all means to be got quick. If the money is in Manila, I urgently ask that you make a [?] 
call for it. If I ever have to let these Moros go now, I’ll never be able to get them back as 
before.”466 The next day, he wrote from the camp at Pantar assuring the adjutant that “the 
employment of Moro Labor is very promising.” Many “important” datus had committed 
their people to work on the road. Yet timing was of the essence. Bullard wanted to get 
started immediately before he lost them. “I consider it important to get settled and get 
hold of these Moros as quickly as possible while they are in the humor for work,” he 
wrote.467 Here was a top army officer in command of an extensive construction operation 
– but he was concerned about the Moros’ “humor for work.” Bullard was far from in 
control of the Moros; rather, he desperately requested supplies and transportation out of 
fear that men he called “savages” might change their minds about working for the army.  
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The challenges of managing this workforce were exacerbated by the fact the 
Americans were at war in Mindanao. As much as Bullard emphasized that his work was 
“pacification” rather than war-making, the potential for violence frequently threatened to 
derail his project. When they first began the road work, Bullard issued a general order 
about the “Moros and Natives” now employed by the army. Soldiers were “cautioned not 
to interfere in any way or attempt to give any Orders to these laborers unless they have 
been put in charge of them by proper authority.”468 The fact that Bullard wanted to 
protect his workers from harassment from other soldiers indicates the importance of their 
continued labor on the road. Despite such warnings, friction between soldiers and Moros 
threatened to upset the delicate relationship between Moros and the army. At the end of 
March, another officer arrived with 100 soldiers after Bullard held “a long conference” 
with the “Sultan of Marahui.” He believed that the arrival of the soldiers “startled all the 
Moros of the vicinity,” leading them to believe they might be under attack. Bullard took 
immediate action: “Feeling sure that his conduct was going to give the lie to all my peace 
talk I went out after him and found him.” The officer and his contingent were “hunting” a 
group of hostile Moros, but Bullard resented his alarming presence near the worksite. He 
wrote, “This whole undertaking, to build this road in peace was on the verge of being 
ruined by a man who did not know what he was about or what a complicated question he 
was tackling. I couldn’t permit it.”469 Another incident in August 1903, near the end of 
the project, further underlined Bullard’s precarious relationship with Moro workers. Yet 
again, he blamed American officers for not exercising sufficient restraint in dealing with 
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the Moros. Bullard wrote from Camp Marahui about the colossal task of moving the 
camp “from the bottom to the hilltop.” Two-hundred and fifty Moros labored to move the 
camp in a task of strategic and symbolic moment. “Having reached the last stage of the 
work, I felt that we were now at last to test the Moros. If we had no difficulty ascending 
Marahui ridge, then we never would have any trouble,” Bullard wrote. Unfortunately, 
they had trouble. He noted that before the move, he had summoned his officers and 
enlisted men and “cautioned” them. The next day, however, “a fool officer…so nagged 
the sentinel” about allowing the Moros to stand while Bullard spoke to them – an 
apparent show of disrespect. The sentinel “struck” three of the Moros to discipline them 
for standing. This show of force was ill-timed and dangerous. “We came very near 
having a fight, and we did face the most serious situation we have ever had on this work.” 
Rather than being able to use the hundreds of Moros he had recruited for the work, he 
“had to call for wagons from Iligan” – where the road originated – “to move half a mile 
up the hill, most of the Moros refusing to work.” Again Bullard had to act the diplomat 
toward the Moro workers: “It has taken me two weeks to smoothe [sic] things over,” he 
wrote with exasperation. He recommended punishing the “bad” Moros and rewarding the 
others. He would “get the good will of Moros by gifts (in accordance with Moro customs) 
to heal the sore hearts of those who in our fights have lost friends.” Bullard did not 
elaborate on who these “lost friends” were, but his diary entry suggests that the American 
response to this particular labor disruption was severe.470  
Bullard blamed these incidents on the incompetence and poor judgment of 
individual officers. But the potential for such discord was systemic rather than personal, a 
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consequence of the fact that the army was enlisting the labor of Moro people at the same 
time it was trying to subdue “hostility” among them. Bullard was not the only officer 
attuned to this difficulty of balancing war-making and pacification. In a circular dated 
November 16, 1902, Colonel Noble issued orders instructing commanding officers to 
secure arms and ammunition from theft by Moros. But the circular went on to caution 
officers about the treatment of Moros by their men. It cited a case of a Moro robbed by 
two soldiers. “The policy of the United States is peace, not strife; this should be borne in 
mind by all, and endeavors made to adhere strictly by acts, as well as words to this one 
idea,” Noble declared. “The natives desire peace, and unless greatly provoked by lawless 
acts on our part will not begin the strife. No interference will be permitted with natives 
following their various avocations, nor going to, or returning from town.”471 
Violent episodes periodically undermined the assertion that “the natives desire 
peace.” When Bullard first visited Pantar to scout a location for his camp and recruit the 
locals to work on the road, he met “many Dattos, who expressed willingness to work 
upon the road.” He was optimistic about the prospect that possibly 150 Moros could be 
recruited. In the same report, however, he described a violent encounter between “a small 
party” of engineers mapping the area and “a large party of Moros armed with knives and 
lances.” The Moros told the engineers to turn back and return to Pantar. Later, Bullard 
received a report from “two runners” of a neighboring, friendly datu, that the soldiers 
should expect an attack from a group of 150 Moros. From Bullard’s report it seems the 
attack never materialized, but he included an account of the incident because it indicated 
to him the “strategic value” of Pantar, at least in the minds of the Moros. “Resistance, if 
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made, will be the most serious here,” he wrote.472 It was not the only time or place the 
road-builders encountered “resistance.” Over the coming weeks Bullard noted various 
incidents – one of Moro “prowlers” who snuck into camp, assaulted a guard, and stole 
some implements which they then resold at a nearby market.473 In another case, he 
blamed a “careless guard” who had his gun stolen from him by two Moros.474 These 
incidents, while minor, reminded Bullard and his troops that they were not merely 
building a road. Rather, they were attempting to construct a military thoroughfare in 
occupied territory, surrounded by people who opposed their very presence in the country. 
Bullard never succeeded in completing subduing the violent undercurrents of his Moro 
workforce; hostility remained latent, under the surface, ready to explode.  
The story that emerges from Bullard’s diary and official reports reveals the 
difficult work of getting the Moros to work. After the work stoppage at Camp Marahui, 
he wrote, “The more I see of the world and especially of its unusual work,” he wrote, “the 
more I know that few men are fit to manage it, the more I am of the opinion that Gen 
Davis did right to help Pershing at work with these Moros instead of sending some fool 
who is ignorantly supposed that he could come in in an offhand manner and manage 
these savages.”475 Bullard believed that managing the Moros required extraordinary skill, 
even though Moros were “savages.” Certainly this was a bit of self-aggrandizement 
consistent with a colonial official’s sense of cultural and intellectual superiority. But 
Bullard’s actions show that he was forced to accommodate the Moros in a variety of 
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ways because their labor was deemed essential to the military’s success. To that end, he 
talked with their leaders for hours – an activity he found personally exhausting. He 
worried about getting the necessary implements, equipment, and pay while they were in 
the “humor” for work. He tried to shield them from the war-making activities of his 
fellow officers because he worried they would be frightened away from the road. And he 
tried to “smooth things over” and diffuse tense situations. Despite his assumed 
superiority, Bullard – and the U.S. army – did not hold all the cards in this complex 
diplomatic game.  
In contrast to Bullard’s diary, a completely different narrative emerges from the 
official accounts written for the American public. In an essay titled “Road-Building 
among the Moros,” published in late 1903, Bullard described the laudable transformation 
of the Moros into steady workers. “The civilizing, educational effect was 
marked....Altogether it was a great stride for savages. They had become peaceful 
workers. They finished the road and opened the way to their own civilization.”476 Such 
declarations elided the difficulty of persuading Moros to offer their labor. The discourse 
of civilization, moreover, obscured the military purpose of the road. In another article, 
Bullard emphasized the fruits of civilization. The army wanted to share with the Moros 
“the advantages, the benefits, of peace, order, and government, -- things which they had 
not.”477 Nowhere in these accounts is any hint of the American need for Moro labor. 
Bullard left out of his public accounts the desperation with which he pursued these 
workers. Instead, he referred to his many meetings with datus as part of a larger work of 
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diplomacy. Rather than trying to persuade them to act as labor brokers for the army, he 
was merely attempting to demonstrate the U.S’s beneficent intentions in Mindanao. “I 
told them of the might, but assured them of the friendly intentions of the Americans; that 
we had not come to fight, but to open roads, so that the Moros could come to buy, sell, 
trade, work with the Americans and grow rich; that we had come to bring the Moros all 
the valuable and useful things which they saw we had,” Bullard wrote.478   
Contact with civilized people would expose the Moros to goods they would want 
to possess themselves; in turn, they would embrace labor as a means of satisfying their 
new desires. This was how civilization was supposed to work, at any rate. In this 
narrative, the Americans did not need the Moros, but the opportunity to labor was one of 
the gifts of civilization the army brought these “savages.” Pacification, as Bullard 
envisioned it, meant economic opportunity – for the Moros.  “Pay for work was sure, and 
the burning desire for arms began to be forgotten in an awakened love of gain. A new 
force was at work among Moros, and what, in civilized men, we rail at as low and vile, 
became in these savages a saving virtue, making for peace and progress.”  By presenting 
the Moros with the opportunity to work, the Americans exposed them to the notion of 
earning money, persuading them to replace their love of firearms and war with a love of 
“gain.” And gain was synonymous with “peace and progress.” For Bullard, this was the 
heart of his road-building endeavor: the army was not exploiting the Moros’ labor; the 
Americans were not even the chief beneficiaries of the Moros’ labor. Rather, by allowing 
them to work on the road, earn money, and experience financial gain, Bullard and his 
compatriots were bringing civilization, “peace and progress,” to the jungles of Mindanao.  
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 Even within the army, reports on the labor dimension of the project finessed the 
rough edges of Bullard’s attempts to recruit Moro workers. In the official report to the 
Secretary of War, Brigadier-General Samuel S. Sumner, commander of the Department 
of Mindanao, wrote, “At first no native labor could be secured and the soldiers did all the 
work, but as we got into the country the Moros began to seek employment, and at the 
present time a large number are regularly employed.”479 Likewise when Bateman 
narrated these events in The Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United 
States, a magazine for American military personnel, he minimized the difficulties Bullard 
faced in trying to recruit Moro workers. He wrote simply, “An invitation was sent out far 
and wide. The response exceeded all expectations.”480 Bateman converted months-long 
struggle into quick and simple episode. The chaplain and intelligence officer praised 
Bullard for learning the Moro language and easily winning over the “natives” who were 
eager to work for such a popular American; any sense of the Moros’ significance in the 
relationship disappeared. Instead, the Americans obliged the Moros, deigning to employ 
them in order to introduce them to civilization. Bateman emphasized that the Moros were 
made to feel their support was not crucial to the Americans; they were relatively 
unimportant. “They were told by General Sumner that their services were desired at good 
wages, but their help was not essential to the completion of the task in hand,” Bateman 
wrote.481 In this rendition of events, the Americans merely demonstrated their superiority 
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– even to mastering the Moros’ own language – and the inferior people flocked to them 
to offer their services.  
A photograph published with the article reflects the pedagogical nature of the 
military project. The picture shows two army officers with several half-naked Moro 
adults and children standing in a clearing, evidently one of their own making. The Moros 
are holding picks and shovels, the implements of their labor. The caption reads: 
“Teaching Moros the ‘Arts of Peace.’” All indication of resistance to the American 
military presence or the demands of hard labor are erased from this scene. Instead, the 
infantilized Moros, grouped together without distinction of age, are willing students, 
learning the “arts of peace.” Like the magazine articles penned by Bullard and Bateman, 
this photo showed the U.S. army in the best light. The soldier pictured was the type of 
man Bullard would later call “a peace-maker and a peace-preserver.”482  
In 1903, Samuel S. Sumner wrote about various road-building projects in the 
Department of Mindanao. Soldiers had recently built a 22-mile road from Malabang to 
Camp Vicars in the Lake Lanao region, “the theater of active military operations.” 
Sumner praised it as “a monument to the energy and skill of the American soldiers.” It 
represented, he said, “months of hard work and daily discomfort, which was borne 
without complaint.”483 He also acknowledged the construction of the Iligan road under 
Bullard’s leadership. We know that, whatever happened on the road to Camp Vicars, the 
work on the Iligan military road was not “borne without complaint.” But despite shirking 
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and occasional outbreaks of violence, it too became a “monument” to U.S. imperialism 
in the southern Philippines.  
The construction of these roads, while not “conspicuous service,” in Sumner’s 
words, was nonetheless essential to the army’s larger mission, “making possible the 
holding and gradual extension of our authority in the lake country.”484 Roads, however, 
did more than enable the army to transport men and materiel. By laboring on the Iligan 
military road, Bullard believed the Moros had “opened the way to their own civilization.” 
While smoothing over the conflicts at the heart of the undertaking, Bullard and 
Bateman’s narratives of progress through labor, of American superiority finally 
triumphing over barbarism, fit with the officers’ larger understanding of its role in the 
Philippines. Labor, organized and managed by the U.S. army, would bring “civilization” 
to the “savages” of the south.  
“The civilizing of the Moros”: Roads and Economic Development 
 
Road-building continued to be central to the U.S. occupation of the southern 
Philippines for years after the Iligan military road was finished. In fact, military 
administrators became even more focused on the social and political dimensions of such 
infrastructure. In 1907, 2nd Lieutenant Roger G. Powell of the engineer corps reported on 
a proposed road in his district in Sulu. He did not describe the road’s value in terms of 
military necessity, but instead emphasized its potential to facilitate trade among the local 
people. “The construction of the Jolo-Maibun road will be of great benefit to the western 
end of the island as well as to the town of Jolo,” Powell wrote. The new road, he 
believed, “will encourage the natives to buy carts, and the people in Jolo will have better 
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chances to see and become acquainted with the natives of the interior. It will be a factor 
in the civilizing of the Moros.”485 The road, in short, would “civilize” the Moros by 
fostering economic and political development in the region. Powell and his fellow 
officers believed the army should not only subdue “hostiles” but also “civilize” the 
Philippines by remaking its political economy. The construction of modern infrastructure 
– roads, bridges, and wharves – was central to their vision of this imperial mandate.  
The army exercised an unusual degree of power in the southern Philippines. The 
U.S. declared peace throughout much of the Christianized Philippines with General 
Orders 152, dated July 7, 1902, but large parts of Mindanao and Sulu were excluded from 
this directive.486 In the south, the population was majority “non-Christian,” and included 
Muslims as well as “pagans” or animist groups. Civil and military officials argued that 
these non-Christians were too backwards for any measure of self-government, even to the 
extent such structures were put in place throughout the rest of the archipelago. As Charles 
Burke Elliott, a jurist and one-time member of the Philippine Commission, wrote in his 
history of the Philippines, “It was admitted that there was a racial and religious 
antagonism between the Moros and the Filipinos which made it impossible to associate 
them together for purposes of government. It was not pretended that the Moros were 
sufficiently advanced in the ways of civilization to justify granting them any substantial 
part in the work of operation a modern government.”487 Furthermore, the U.S. army 
remained at war in Mindanao and Sulu, where various groups of Muslims and animists 
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resisted the imposition of U.S. rule.488 On June 1, 1903, the Philippine Commission 
created a new political designation – the Moro Province – and placed the U.S. army in 
control of it. Coterminous with the boundaries of the army’s Department of Mindanao, 
the new Moro Province was ruled by a cadre of military officials who maintained largely 
autonomous control for over a decade after civilian government was established for the 
rest of the Philippines. Act No. 787, “An Act Providing for the Organization and 
Government of the Moro Province,” stipulated that the Civil Governor of the Philippines 
would appoint six officials, including a provincial governor, to administer the province. 
These six officials made up the Legislative Council, the law-making body of the Moro 
Province. The provincial governor was also a military officer who simultaneously 
commanded the Department of Mindanao. The first three provincial governors were 
General Leonard Wood (1903-1906), General Tasker H. Bliss (1906-1909), and General 
John J. Pershing (1909-1913). The other main positions were also usually staffed by 
military officers.489  
The U.S. army dominated the political structure of the Moro Province. In his 
history of Mindanao in the American colonial period, Peter Gowing writes, “for the 
greater part of the period 1903 to 1913, there prevailed over Moroland what the 
Spaniards would indeed have called a ‘Politico-Military Province,’ that is, a province 
which had many of the same offices and functions of government of a civil province but 
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which was controlled and staffed by military personnel.”490 In a similar vein, Patricio 
Abinales emphasizes the “unprecedented autonomy” army officials enjoyed in the South. 
“What emerged,” he writes, “was a small clique of American army men, insulated from 
social forces below them and given an almost-free rein by its superiors.”491 Indeed, 
General Bliss, the second governor of the province, said it best in a 1907 letter to his 
predecessor, General Wood: “I do not think that the War Department realizes its 
responsibility in the government of the Moro Province. After all is said and done, it is a 
military government conducted by officers of the army.”492 The extraordinary latitude 
exercised by military personnel in the Moro Province provides a striking view of the 
army’s efforts at state-building in the early twentieth century.  
The extent of the army’s influence in the Moro Province was not wholly 
exceptional. Although the province’s administrative structure was specially designed to 
suit conditions in the southern Philippines, the army had prior experience occupying and 
administering territory in American South and West. Circumstances in the Philippines 
provided the army with new opportunities and challenges. The army used its position, 
authority, and resources in ways very similar to its previous occupational duties. Building 
infrastructure that would both enhance military operations and promote trade and 
commerce ranked high on its list of priorities. In all their duties, army officers deployed a 
discourse of “civilization” to justify their work of both construction and destruction. The 
“Old Army” also continued to rely on its experience as a manager of labor-power in 
carrying out its new mission to build a Pacific empire. Finally, in another similarity to the 
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“frontier” army of the nineteenth century, the army’s troop strength frequently seemed 
inadequate to the great expanse of terrain it was supposed to control. About 4,000 
enlisted men and one- to two-hundred officers were stationed at a handful of posts spread 
out across Mindanao and Sulu, an expanse of 36,540 square-miles.493  
As in these prior occupations, the army in the southern Philippines supported 
road-building because of its purported benefits for the economy. In this officers joined 
their civilian colonial counterparts in Manila, who had made the relationship between 
infrastructure and economic development clear from the earliest days of American 
occupation. Members of the Philippine Commission also touted railroads as essential to 
economic development. In 1900, the Commissioners wrote to Secretary of War Elihu 
Root, “Railroads will at once revolutionize life and business in these wonderfully rich, 
beautiful and healthful tropical Islands. Forty five miles of railroad under negotiation will 
give access to large provinces rich in valuable materials…Railroad construction will give 
employment to many and communication will furnish market to vast stretches of 
agricultural land.”494 They “called for extensive systems of railroads on Luzon and 
Mindanao, which, they claimed, would stimulate the production of tobacco, copra, sugar, 
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and ‘other tropical products.’”495 Historian Glenn May points out that the Commission’s 
advocacy of roads and railroads was “a typically American response to Philippine 
underdevelopment” since internal improvements had been so important to the U.S.’s own 
trajectory in the nineteenth century.  
Army officers advocated railroad construction as part of their larger vision for the 
Moro Province as well. Officers, including Henry C. Corbin, adjutant-general of the 
army, and two provincial governors, Leonard Wood and Tasker H. Bliss, proposed 
building a railroad through the Lake Lanao region for several years. In 1904, Corbin 
wrote to the Secretary of War regarding the proposed railroad. He compared the initial 
cost of constructing a wagon road versus a railroad, as well as the annual savings 
accruing to the army from each. While a railroad would be more expensive to build, it 
would save the army more over time. But the railroad was also preferable because it 
would provide superior benefits to the local people. Corbin noted that the “development 
of the large area of fertile country” depended on access to Marahui, which a new road or 
railroad would provide. Moreover, “The construction of the railroad would save to the 
farmer the enormous time and expense which wagon transportation demands over 
railroad transportation. It would be by far a more potent factor than a good wagon road, 
in assisting the farmers of the lake region in getting their products to a sea-port, and 
hence in developing that country.” He recommended the railroad “because of the greater 
economy and of the increased advantages to the natives.”496 Leonard Wood’s letter to the 
adjutant general of the Philippines earlier that year echoed similar themes. He urged the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 May, Social Engineering, 138. 
496 H.C. Corbin to the Secretary of War, 30 December 1904, Leonard Wood Papers, Library of Congress. 
	   	  
	  
	  
250 
construction of a railroad from Overton to Marahui. “Such a railroad,” Wood wrote, 
“will do much to open up a very rich section of country now entirely undeveloped, and be 
a potent factor in civilizing a large number of people.”497 In Wood’s telling, civilizing 
natives and promoting economic development opportunities, presumably for white 
settlers and investors, went hand in hand with the army’s infrastructural projects.  
 Over the next two years, officers in Mindanao continued to urge their superiors in 
the War Department to authorize funds for the construction of the railroad in the Lake 
Lanao region. Captain Langhorne, as acting governor of the province in Wood’s absence, 
praised the region and its prospects: “The lake region furnishes a splendid resort, with a 
cool climate.” The population was 40,000, “a number apt to increase,” and he was 
confident that “a large garrison will undoubtedly occupy it as a hill station.” The military 
roads, Langhorne added, had already facilitated increased trade in the region, with “the 
Lake Moros bringing much produce to Iligan and Malabang.”498 The next year, touting 
the railroad’s prospects for economic development, Bliss spoke of “open[ing] up a most 
healthy and desirable section of country.” Not only would the railroad jumpstart the 
region’s economy, but it would also benefit the local population. The railroad, Bliss 
wrote, “will also give employment to many Moros, and put a considerable amount of 
money in circulation among them, thereby accomplishing much for the betterment of the 
Moros and the establishment of a permanent condition of good order in this region.”499 In 
Bliss’s thinking, economic development would bring stability to the region, thereby 
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complementing the army’s work and promoting peace. Furthermore, the army’s use of 
local labor would actually be a boon for the Moros – “giv[ing]” them “employment.”  
The army’s faith in the civilizing power of the railroads was not new or unique to 
their occupation of the southern Philippines. Instead, it harkened back to the days of the 
“Indian Wars” in the West. In 1908, Bliss wrote optimistically: “The construction of a 
railroad to the lake will bring about its immediate occupation by natives of all classes and 
will settle the Moro question forever.”500 Bliss’ language closely echoed the nineteenth-
century assertion that the transcontinentals represented the “final solution” to the “Indian 
question.”501 The similarity in language reveals important parallels between these two 
imperial projects, separated by roughly forty years. The railroads were the “solution” in 
both cases because the army officers saw their adversaries in analogous terms. Sherman, 
Sheridan, and their subordinates in the officer class thought Native Americans were a 
doomed race of “savages” who were unsuited to the modern world. They believed the 
railroads, by linking the Atlantic and Pacific, would bring even more settlers to the 
Natives’ territory and decisively change the political economy of the Plains. They looked 
forward to these developments, believing that the transcontinentals would assist them in 
eliminating the Native American “problem” from the West. Decades later, a different 
generation of army officers encountered what they understood to be a similar situation in 
the Philippines. Like the Native Americans, the Moros were a backward, uncivilized race. 
Either they would change and adapt to the modern world, or they too would be destined 
for the dustbins of history. Bliss, similar to his military forebears, believed that the 
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railroads promoted economic development and would link the Lake Lanao region to a 
larger, dynamic economic universe – connecting its inhabitants to networks of trade and 
prosperity elsewhere in the archipelago and beyond. For both groups of army officers, the 
railroad symbolized modern economic development – anathema, they thought, to the 
savagery and backwardness of their enemies. For both, it made military sense to support 
the extension of these lines, which would help the army accomplish its mission with little 
bloodshed. Yet a key difference distinguished early-twentieth-century army officers in 
the Philippines from their predecessors: Bliss and his contemporaries did not tend to 
speak in terms of the Moros’ inevitable annihilation. Instead, they hoped that under their 
tutelage, the Moros would gradually “advance” and embrace the promises of American 
civilization in the modern era.502 
Domestic observers also made the connection between the army’s work in the 
Philippines and its nineteenth-century antecedents. In 1903, Outlook magazine praised 
the military’s infrastructural duties, linking them to the greater work of spreading 
civilization. “The modern army is inspired with the ambition of construction, and is 
displaying remarkable ability in construction. On its banner it might well bear the double 
legend, ‘House-wreckers and house-builders.’” The watchword for Outlook magazine 
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was “civilization:” “The army not only established the outposts of civilization, which 
gave security to the early settlements and cleared the way for the advancing tide of 
civilization, but it has staked out the paths civilization was to follow, from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific.” After a brief account of the army’s historic work surveying land, building 
transportation, and opening “nearly all great routes of internal communication in the 
interests of commerce,” the magazine moved to a closer examination of the army’s “more 
dramatic” labors in the U.S.’s new empire. The Outlook article concentrated on Puerto 
Rico, describing the military’s “constructive” work in building prisons and schools, 
setting up elections and instituting legal reform, combatting disease, and administering 
poor relief. The army, according to this account, had helped lay “the foundations of a 
modern, well-organized society” in its southern colony.503 Observers at home, such as the 
editors and readers of Outlook magazine, appreciated the “constructive” work of empire. 
The seemingly bloodless work of road-building was inherently more popular than reports 
of casualties. Moreover, by linking the army’s duties in the Philippines and Puerto Rico 
to the army’s historic contributions to the settlement of the American West, the magazine 
sanctioned the “new” imperialism by reference to a familiar domestic legacy.  
Roads and railroads were physical manifestations of a reaching, growing 
American empire: proof of the U.S.’s ability to reshape the physical terrain. But the 
process of building this infrastructure also required a range of social and political 
interventions, primarily related to the deployment of labor. Managing labor became a key 
terrain for the articulation of American power in the Moro Province. Army officers also 
saw labor as a crucial site for the expression of American values and power. Leonard 
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Wood, in a private letter to William Cameron Forbes, portrayed labor as an opportunity 
for the people of the Philippines: “We want to give the Filipino a chance to work and to 
make him an industrious person. This must be the foundation of everything in these 
islands.”504 But laying that foundation entailed destroying the local power relations the 
Americans encountered when they arrived in Mindanao. It involved army officers in 
collisions with indigenous elites as they sought to refashion Moro labor systems and 
remake them in an American image. In this way, roads and other infrastructure did not 
merely facilitate the extension and execution of American sovereignty; the very process 
of building these thoroughfares became a site of conflict between army officers, enlisted 
men, and various groups of indigenous Moros. The next section describes the political 
and social structure of the Moro societies and how Americans attempted to remake them 
through the imposition of new labor practices.  
Free-labor, Slavery and Power in the Moro Province 
 
To American eyes, the people of Mindanao lacked any sort of government or 
recognizable political organization. General Wood remarked, “the Moros and other 
savage peoples have no laws – simply a few customs, which are nowhere general, 
varying from one valley to the next, from one island to another. Such laws as they have 
are many of them revolting and practically all of them utterly and absolutely undesirable 
from every standpoint of decency and good government. The Moros are, in a way, 
religious and moral degenerates.”505 Major General Bullard struck a more optimistic note. 
He believed the army could elevate the Moros by introducing them to the benefits of 
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civilization. But like Wood, Bullard agreed that Moro society was basically tabula rasa 
when it came to the basic precepts of government. He wrote, “There was no 
government….Manifestly here not only had the foundations of government and order yet 
to be laid, but the very places for them were to be made and prepared.”506 Both Wood and 
Bullard believed it was the U.S.’s responsibility to establish government among the 
Moros. 
The Americans were not the first outsiders to try to impose their version of 
government on the various peoples of Mindanao. The Spanish arrived in the Muslim 
South in the sixteenth century, and they established a garrison in the city of Zamboanga 
in 1635. Spain continually tried to subjugate the Moros throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century with limited success.507 The difficulty of ruling the region was 
exacerbated by the diversity of peoples living there. According to one count, the Muslim 
population alone – not including the various animist tribes – was made up of ten different 
ethnolinguistic groups.508 The largest three were the Maguindanao occupying the 
Cotabato River Valley, the Maranao centered around Lake Lanao, and the Tausug of the 
Sulu archipelago.509  
The political and social organization of Moro society also complicated American 
efforts to rule the territory. Army officers dismissed the idea that any type of government 
prevailed among the Moros due to the fact that power was widely dispersed and the 
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various Moro principalities and domains were often in conflict. In fact, however, these 
groups were organized in a similar way, despite differences in language, subsistence, and 
culture.510 Anthropologists have described Moro societies as pyramids, with a sultan – the 
supreme political and ecclesiastical leader – nominally at the top. Below him were a large 
number of other chiefs and officials, members of the hereditary datu class, who attended 
to various political and religious duties. In fact, these datus held much of the power in 
Moro society, particularly outside of Sulu.511 The frustration Bullard expressed over his 
seemingly endless conferences with datus on the Iligan road reflects some of the 
challenges American officials faced in negotiating the Moro political structure.  
Moro society was divided into three main classes: datus (the hereditary 
aristocracy), freemen, and slaves. Being born into the aristocratic datu class bestowed 
prestige, but in order to actually acquire political power, an individual had to amass 
wealth and followers. People, rather than land, were the meaningful political currency in 
Moro society. Melvin Mednick writes, “It is important to note that this structure operated 
primarily in terms of persons and groupings, and that territory was only of secondary 
importance. Authority was over people, rather than places, and a leader reckoned his 
power in terms of the number of his followers, rather than in terms of villages, per se.”512 
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Individuals were born into the datu class, but in order to gain real political power, they 
needed followers. “The datu’s power stems from the willingness of his followers to 
render him respect and material and moral support, to accept and implement his 
decisions, and to obey and enforce his orders, and is limited by the consensus of his 
peers,” W. H. Scott writes.513 The relationship between datus and their retainers, 
followers, and slaves involved a variety of obligations. It was not only slaves who owed 
services to a datu: freemen also attached themselves to a datu for protection. “No person 
could exist in Moro society who was literally free,” Mednick writes. “Every individual 
had to place himself under one leader or another in order to protect his life and 
property.”514 Followers, whether freemen or slaves, paid tribute to their datu. They also 
joined with their datu in military maneuvers and fought on his side at times of war. The 
datu, theoretically, protected his followers and provided other services. “The datu 
receives more or less material support from his community… [he], in turn, is expected to 
succor his followers in time of financial emergency, and to provide both material and 
military aid in time of danger.”515  
When American army officers began to govern the Moro Province, they identified 
the datus as one of the major obstacles to the imposition of American institutions and the 
extension of “civilization” into Mindanao. The very existence of the datu class presented 
a challenge to American ideas of government because the mass of Moros had no relation 
to a central state but only to their immediate datu. Furthermore, labor had long been one 
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of the chief ways a datu exacted his price from his retainers, whether slaves or freemen. 
The existence of slavery along with other forced labor obligations offended American 
sensibilities, smacking of barbarism and backwardness. Americans thought construction 
projects that employed Moros at wages, rather than corvée labor, presented opportunities 
for destabilizing the traditional power of the datus. Leonard Wood championed the 
payment of wages by the U.S. army as a promising instrument for undermining the power 
of the datus and winning the support of “the people.” In a letter to Secretary of War Taft 
in 1905, Wood explained how construction projects were facilitating the extension of 
American authority into Moro communities. He wrote: 
The Moro people as a whole are rapidly coming to the side of the government. It 
was only the other day that one of the largest dattos in the Lake region told me 
that his people were down on the road at work, and requested authority to force 
them to return to him, or pay him a large portion of their wages, stating that unless 
he could do this there was no use in his being a datto. This statement really 
represents the core of the whole Moro trouble. Once the people understand the 
purpose of the government the petty ruler will disappear and trouble will end very 
largely.516 
 
Wood recognized that the datu class derived its power, in part, from control over the 
labor-power of followers. The datu in question was used to collecting the wages of his 
followers and then dispersing them as he saw fit. If the U.S. could detach the followers 
from the “petty ruler,” the advantages of American-style government would become clear 
to the Moros. Wood envisioned a new arrangement of power: the army would replace the 
savage datus with modern, civilized American managers in the form of the officer corps. 
By undercutting the power of these archaic leaders, the U.S. army could accomplish its 
political project of attracting Moros to the government while also introducing them to the 
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virtues of wage labor. The wage relation, instituted through employment on army 
building projects, was central to Wood’s vision of U.S. colonialism. 
Issues regarding labor and American sovereignty were inextricably connected 
from the earliest days of the American occupation. The existence of slavery, particularly 
in Sulu, encapsulates this relationship between labor practices and the type of colonial 
power the U.S. hoped to exercise in the southern Philippines. Initially, the U.S. patterned 
its administration of Sulu on the British model of indirect rule in the Malay states where 
slavery had been abolished gradually. In 1899, General John C. Bates concluded an 
agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, which “explicitly recognized U.S. sovereignty, called 
for the suppression of piracy,” and maintained the “law of the sultanate,” according to 
Michael Salman. In addition, the Bates Treaty provided for the self-purchase of slaves 
from their masters. This tacit recognition of slavery, incorporated into the treaty 
provisions, did not sit well with President McKinley or other American policymakers. 
Further correspondence sent to the sultan over the next several months sought to clarify 
the U.S.’s opposition to slavery. Yet the vagueness of the agreement and American 
ambivalence on the nature of Moro slavery complicated relations with the sultan. While 
they initially described Moro slavery as “mild” or familial, by mid-1902, Leonard Wood, 
General Davis, and others began to emphasize the harshness and barbarity of the 
institution. As colonial policymakers tired of working through the Sultan of Sulu, they 
became more forceful in their denunciations of slavery. In 1904, the U.S. officially 
abrogated the Bates Treaty.517  
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American officials continued to work through the datus, but they distinguished 
these relationships from those the British maintained under their version of “indirect 
rule.” General George W. Davis, commander of the Department of the Philippines, urged 
that “‘no sultan or king over all the Moros…or over other datos be recognized,’ but that 
‘hereditary datos be recognized as headmen.’”518 Leonard Wood wrote his British friend, 
the newspaperman John Strachey:  
You [the British] are quite content to maintain Rajahs and Sultans and other 
species of royalty, but we, with our plain ideas of doing things, find these 
gentlemen outside of our scheme of Government, and so have to start at this kind 
of proposition a little differently. Our policy is to develop individualism among 
these people and little by little, teach them to stand upon their own feet and 
independent of petty chieftains. In order to do this the chief of headmen has to be 
given some position of more or less authority under the Government, but he 
ceases to have any divine rights.519 
 
Styling himself a simple republican, Wood contrasted the Americans’ “plain ideas” to the 
“species of royalty” that the British were apparently comfortable with using to prop up in 
their colonial empire. The “policy” Wood referred to involved incorporating the datus 
into the American government through the tribal ward system. The non-Christian or 
“uncivilized” population of the Moro Province was organized into five districts and then 
into 51 “tribal wards.” The provincial governor appointed district governors, who in turn 
chose “headmen” to govern the tribal wards. The wards theoretically encompassed, as far 
as possible, a single “tribe” or ethnic group, and the headman, typically a datu, was 
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supposed to represent that group.520 The system, according to Abinales, was intended to 
“assist provincial authorities in making possible the transition mainly by the Muslim 
groups from the religious (i.e., Islamic) savagery to ‘western’ civilization.”521 Not all 
datus, of course, embraced incorporation into the American colonial government. As it 
became clear that the U.S. meant to interfere with local political economies and cultural 
practices premised on slavery, several datus – most prominently Datu Ali – intensified 
their resistance to American rule, prompting increasingly violent military operations in 
the region.  
Labor policies went hand-in-hand with political and military efforts to subjugate 
and “civilize” the Moros. Wood particularly believed the payment of wages could 
become a major weapon in the Americans’ fight against hold-out datus. In the same letter 
to his British associate, Wood wrote, “It is interesting to see how quickly the people show 
a desire to get out of a condition of slavery; they want to be freemen and the question 
always is, ‘are we going to be allowed to work’? and ‘shall we get the money for our 
work, or shall we have to give it to our chiefs’? As soon as they ascertain that they are to 
receive the money they earn, the power of the old slave holder is gone.”522 With labor 
relations structured around the payment of wages rather than the exaction of tribute, U.S. 
officials could help modernize and civilize the Moros while meeting their own needs for 
labor. In a letter marked “strictly personal” to Cameron Forbes, Wood reflected on the 
prospects for turning Moros into valuable employees: “While these people are not as yet 
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what we would call skilled laborers or even as good laborers, except in special cases, 
they will, I believe, work with comparative steadiness and with fairly good results when 
well handled and regularly paid.” Wood also emphasized that success with Moro workers 
depended largely on the skill and tact of their supervisors; they needed to be managed 
and supervised. More significant, his reference to “regularly paid” Moro laborers 
underlined the ideological importance of the wage to American colonial efforts. 
Free-labor ideology was central to the American conception of colonial rule in the 
Moro Province, but in practice, the Americans fell far short of their goal of dismantling 
the datu system and abolishing forced labor. Despite Wood’s faith that the U.S. army 
could undermine archaic labor – and political – relations, the army continued to use datus 
as labor brokers for its public works projects. The labor at Camp Keithley, for example, 
had been procured “by contract with Moro chiefs and laborers.”523 Bullard believed that 
the payment of wages on the Iligan military road contributed to the “waning” power of 
the datu, but all the same, he admitted that “we employed, worked, and paid them always 
through the datto.”524 Thomas McKenna, in his ethnography of Cotabato, shows how 
“collaborating datus were often able, relying on traditional power relations, to call out 
corvée labor in order to avail themselves of new opportunities to enrich themselves 
during the early colonial period.” He relays the story, told by a surviving datu in 
Cotabato, of how Datu Piang helped the Americans – and helped himself – by supplying 
workers for a building project: 
Datu Adil tells of a road that Datu Piang contracted to build for the Americans 
across a swampy tract in the upper valley for twenty thousand pesos. ‘Piang called 
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on his [client] datus to assist him. They arrived with their followers and enough 
food to feed them. The road took more than two months to build but Piang never 
shared any of the money received with his datus.’525 
 
Working with the Americans could be profitable: Piang,“America’s Great Friend,” as 
well as other datus in the Cotabato Valley, were able to capitalize on their relationships 
with the Americans to accumulate significant wealth. Some profited from the expansion 
and intensification of rice production during the American occupation; such 
“intensification” depended on datus’ ability to exploit their laborers and the persistence of 
traditional power relations.526 Datus also kept their banyaga (or foreign and non-Muslim) 
slaves and gained additional local slaves through debt relations.527 
Men like Wood wanted to eliminate the datus, but they also depended on them. 
The U.S., after all, was far from prepared to introduce direct political participation among 
the vast majority of the population. The policy of working through datus began during 
combat operations and continued once the Province was formally established. Donna 
Amoroso writes, “like the military commanders who preceded them, the governors of the 
Moro Province suffered a shortage of American personnel and needed the datus to keep 
the peace. Accordingly, datus were selected to represent U.S. authority to the people they 
already led. This recognition of leadership was a practical expediency, not a legitimation 
of indigenous authority.”528 Other datus welcomed opportunities to participate in the 
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colonial government when they thought such incorporation would benefit them.529 
Abinales notes, “The reception of these administrative measures [the tribal ward system 
and the “Moro Constabulary”] by many traditional chiefs was positive, and army officers 
reported enthusiastic support from Muslim communities.” Some of these leaders had seen 
their fortunes decline during the period of late Spanish colonialism, and they thought the 
U.S. might enhance their power and economic opportunities in the broader Southeast 
Asian world of maritime commerce of which they were a part.530   
The official U.S. policy was antislavery. As Michael Salman has shown, the 
practice of slavery among the Moros was part of the ideological justification for 
continued military rule in Sulu.531 In 1904 Wood declared, “The Moro chiefs do not like 
our occupation of their country, because it means the end of their disgustingly brutal 
exercise of authority which characterizes their conduct of affairs.”532 Yet the contrast 
between Wood’s remarks and the actual exercise of military power highlights the 
distance between policy and practice in Mindanao. Anthropologist Jeremy Beckett writes, 
“At the outset it looked as though the American administration would break the power of 
the datus; instead it came to rely on them.”533 While army officers denounced slavery, 
they looked the other way when datus provided the requisite laborers for government 
building projects. Ultimately, the datu class adapted to and even profited from the 
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changes brought about by U.S. occupation. “Despite the context of profound 
socioeconomic changes…the basic character of political relations between Magindanaon 
datus and subordinates changed hardly at all between 1890 and 1968,” McKenna writes. 
Allies of the U.S. “were able to maintain traditionally based followings and exercise 
control over followers in much the same way as they had in precolonial times.”534 Not 
only did coerced labor and slavery persist into the American period, but the colonial 
system actually extended the life of these traditional practices.  
“Men of long term and bad character”: A Convict Workforce 
 
American colonial officials spoke of the barbarity of Moro slavery, while using 
datus as labor brokers and relying on them to supply labor for their public works. Such 
labor was hardly “free.” At the same time, while speaking eloquently of the importance 
of wage labor, the army continued to make use of a fundamentally unfree labor force: 
prisoners. American-run prisons provided a supply of workers – a surplus population 
created, and then used, by the colonial state.535 When Leonard Wood attempted to 
persuade Secretary of War Taft that the army should build a railroad from Overton to 
Marahui, he pointed to convict labor as a cost-saving option.536 A year later, he was still 
making the case for such a railroad to Taft. The main expense, according to Wood, would 
be the “skilled labor” necessary to build the train itself. On the other hand, the islands’ 
prison population could supply the unskilled labor. Wood wrote, “The Civil Government 
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has at least a thousand civil prisoners, probably more, whom they are anxious to place 
outside of Manila. I have had 500 of them, and know that they can be used successfully.” 
These 500 prisoners were already assigned to work on the Overton-Marahui road.537 
Wood thought he could “get” at least 1,000 additional prisoners for the railroad project, 
with minimal expense to the War Department. Prisoners would be used to “prepare and 
grade the road-bed,” cut timber from the vicinity, and build bridges. “The Civil 
Government will clothe and feed them,” Wood continued. “I can guard them with Scouts, 
shelter them under tentage, of which we have considerable which has seen service and 
can well be used for this purpose, and furnish them medical attendance at the hands of the 
medical officers on duty with the Scouts guarding them.”538 Wood’s proposal made use 
of multiple labor pools in the Moro Province, including Filipino scouts and the surplus 
prison population in Manila.  
Convict labor remained part of the army’s vision for constructing the line. In 
1908, Bliss wrote Wood, now his superior as commander of the Philippines Division, 
with an update on the proposed railroad. “From all that I can hear, it seems as though 
preliminary work on the Overton-Keithley railroad may begin before very long. In that 
case I assume that you will have Bilibid convicts sent there, and at least two companies 
of Scouts will be needed to guard them and public property.”539 A railroad to Lake Lanao 
was never built, but convict labor continued to be invoked by army officers as a potential 
solution to chronic budget constraints. Like his predecessor, Bliss often touted the 
advantages of convict labor. He argued for the use of prisoners to construct new buildings 
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at Camp Keithley, pointing to the fine work other convicts had done elsewhere in the 
province. Indeed, in his praise for convict labor, Bliss came very close to equating them 
with enlisted men. “The work does not require skilled labor except for direction and 
supervision,” he wrote. “It could be done by convict labor or even by labor of the troops.” 
Were American troops less skilled than Filipino convicts? Bliss did not elaborate, but he 
spoke with admiration of the public edifices built by prisoners. “All our concrete stone 
work in our new provincial building at Zamboanga has been done by Calarian convicts. 
They soon learned how to do the work with practically no supervision whatever.”540 
Workers who labored at almost no cost to the government and required very little 
supervision: convicts appeared to be the ideal labor force. 
Prisoners were forced to work on a variety of public works during the army’s 
occupation of the Moro Province. In most cases, their labor was unremarkable – that is, it 
did not attract much attention from army commanders. For example, Bliss only briefly 
noted in his diary on June 27, 1906, that “Convicts employed Iligan-Lake Lanao road left 
Camp Overton for Manila.”541 In other cases, however, convict labor became 
problematic. First, prisoners were not always the docile and tractable workers that Bliss 
described. In 1905, Wood wrote to General Henry Corbin with concerns about his five 
hundred convicts working on the Overton-Marahui Road. Most were “men of long term 
and bad character.” Wood had only one company of scouts to guard the convicts, and he 
regretted that the convicted demanded “every moment of the time of the scout officers, so 
that neither one of them are able to assist in the road work.” Wood hoped Corbin would 
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not call away his officers to any “detail of any officers outside the Department.”542 His 
request underlines some of the basic problems of supervising convict labor in 
construction projects. Prisoners also seemed particularly susceptible to disease. The 
prevalence of illness at Bilibid Prison in Manila motivated Cameron Forbes, 
commissioner of commerce and police, to place prisoners on public works projects 
throughout the Philippines. “I am more eager than I can tell you to get the one thousand 
men sent down to your work,” Forbes wrote Wood.  In 1905 alone, at least one thousand 
were working outside the walls in Manila, Albay, and at the penal colony in Puerta 
Princesa. Despite these measures to reduce the prison population in Bilibid, 
overcrowding and tuberculosis remained major problems.  
Prisoners sent throughout the province to work did not always enjoy better 
conditions than their counterparts who remained in Bilibid. The same year, an outbreak 
of beri-beri among the prisoners threatened to sidetrack the construction of an important 
road. Unprepared for the prisoners’ arrival, “much time and some money was expended 
in constructing the proper shelter for them,” according to one report. Then after the 
outbreak of the disease, “a large number” had to be returned to Manila. “A few died, but 
the percentage was less than the death rate in other places,” the officer continued.543 Beri-
beri already had a tragic history in the Philippines before the U.S. army arrived. The first 
major outbreak took place in 1882, the year of a severe cholera epidemic. Although 
unrelated biologically, beri-beri often followed in the wake of cholera. The disease, 
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caused by a thiamine deficiency, was prevalent among people whose diet consisted 
primarily of polished rice. Times of epidemiological stress, such as during the cholera 
outbreak, limited people’s food supply and contributed to the escalation of nutritional 
diseases such as beri-beri. As Ken de Bevoise explains in his history of public health in 
the colonial Philippines, the archipelago began importing polished rice in the nineteenth 
century. Reflecting the Philippines’ accelerating incorporation into systems of global 
commerce, the islands’ dependence on imported rice made more of the population 
susceptible to beri-beri, particularly at times of acute malnourishment. Both the cholera 
epidemic of 1882 and the war with Spain and then the U.S. produced conditions of 
instability and poverty, leading to more cases of beri-beri.544 Americans recognized the 
relationship between beri-beri and prisons, even though they did not necessarily 
understand what actually caused the disease. “Prison conditions in a tropical climate 
seem to be especially favorable for the development of this peculiar oriental disease,” 
according to the 1903 census.545 Army officials were aggravated by the 1905 outbreak, 
which “demanded larger expenditures…to counteract the evil influences of the 
disease.”546  
Historians have suggested that the army helped usher in a new regime of wage-
based labor relations. Greg Bankoff, for example, writes that officers initially adopted 
local labor practices – working through datus, who supplied the army with a workforce 
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for “large-scale enterprises.” But, he suggests, this practice of using intermediaries was 
short-lived. In the case of building the Benguet Road, he writes, the army first used 
“impressed local Igorot tribesmen under U.S. foremen, but military authorities soon 
stopped such practices” and instead agents were sent to recruit laborers on their own. 
Although Bankoff acknowledges that U.S. officials reinstituted the Spanish corvée in 
order to recruit a sufficient labor force for their public works projects, he nonetheless 
argues that, due in part to “the creation of a wage-labor market,” “the Philippines was the 
first truly modern state in Southeast Asia, infused by the logic of capitalism and informed 
by market mechanisms.”547  
This narrative suggests a much cleaner transition to wage-based “free labor” than 
actually took place in the southern Philippines. Although army leaders like Wood wanted 
to break the power of the datus by paying wages directly to the workers, they often found 
it more expedient to rely on datus to supply them with workers. Furthermore, American 
officials happily exploited the unfree population of their colonial prisons. Despite rhetoric 
touting the revolutionary potential of the wage relation, military officials – many of them 
heirs of an abolitionist generation – sustained traditional power relations and instituted 
new forced-labor practices in the Moro Province.  
“A Despotic Machine”: Taxation, Labor, and the Colonial State 
 
 Under military auspices, the colonial state in the southern Philippines extended its 
reach over the labor-power of the population in other ways as well. Taxation became an 
especially crucial tool for leveraging labor in the service of colonial building projects. In 
1901, the initial legislation setting up municipalities and provinces for the Philippines 
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provided some funding for roads and maintenance, but it soon became clear that these 
provisions were inadequate to meet the Americans’ ambitious plans for road construction 
and improvement.548 One of the Legislative Council’s first steps was to pass legislation to 
finance public works. Act Number 5 of the Legislative Council stipulated that every male 
person between the ages of 18 and 55 would pay a cedula (or head- or registration-tax) of 
one peso per year. The act exempted U.S. soldiers and sailors, diplomats, and non-
Christians other than Moros (in other words, members of animist or “pagan” tribes).549 
Initially, American policymakers thought the cedula, or head-tax, would be another way 
the U.S. could undermine the datus by instituting a uniform, modern, and bureaucratic 
system of revenue-collection in place of the datus’ antiquated tribute system. But in 
practice, officers continued to consider new ways of working through, rather than 
replacing, the datus. In August 1906, Bliss explained to Lt. L. J. Mygatt, Municipal 
President of Parang, that the Legislative Council had allowed the District Governor of 
Sulu to arrange with the “headmen,” or datus, to provide labor in lieu of paying the 
cedula. He suggested a similar system might be developed with the indigenous leaders in 
Parang. The “headman” – or rather, those working under him – “would perform a certain 
amount of useful labor on public works which, in his judgment, would be fair equivalent 
to the value of the cedula tax. After the performance of the work the datu who did it was 
to receive a free cedula for all his people who, under the law, should take out one.” Bliss 
underlined to Mygatt that the colonial government would issue the cedula to the datu 
rather than to each individual Moro. He explained,  
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You will observe the scheme did not involve the taking of a census of the actual 
number of individuals engaged on the work and giving cedulas to them alone. 
The arrangement was to be between the government and each headman who 
controlled a certain number of people. For example: A certain datu is known to 
control five hundred men. The District Governor figures out that the construction 
of a certain length of road would be a fair equivalent to the cedula tax paid by five 
hundred men. The Governor says to the datu ‘as soon as you finish a certain 
section of road, which I stake out, and will agree to keep that road in order for one 
year, all of your people will receive a free cedula.’ 
 
Despite the U.S. government’s official opposition to longstanding forms of slavery and 
peonage in Mindanao and Sulu, Bliss here notes with apparent approval that the 
construction work would be carried out by contract with the datus. The fact that “a 
certain datu is known to control five hundred men” was not regarded as a problem; on the 
contrary, it would expedite the work and the exaction of labor demanded in lieu of the 
cedula. Bliss noted that the “scheme” had not been attempted in Jolo “for the reason that 
they are beginning to pay the cedula tax in very satisfactory numbers.” But he thought 
that Mygatt might be able to carry out a similar arrangement elsewhere in Sulu. Colonial 
officials, Bliss thought, needed to emphasize to the datus that the cedula was “not 
arbitrary tribute,” but “an ordinary tax to be expended for the benefit of the people 
themselves.” Bliss promised to bring it up with the Legislative Council at the next 
meeting. He encouraged Mygatt to explain this plan to the headmen at their monthly 
meeting and “report to [Bliss] by name those who are willing to construct roads and trails 
in lieu of the cedula tax.”550 It is unclear whether such an arrangement was carried out in 
Sulu or elsewhere, but the “scheme” reflects the willingness of Bliss and other army 
leaders to work through datus.  
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Bliss may have been willing to work through the datus because of how poorly the 
implementation of these colonial taxes had been received by the inhabitants of the Moro 
Province. When army officials first proposed the cedula, they wrote glibly about how the 
Moros would come to accept it. Unlike the “arbitrary” tribute exacted by datus, the 
American system of revenue collection would be regular and predictable. Proceeds from 
the cedula would also be expended locally, in the tribal wards in which they were 
collected, so the people could see how the taxes were spent to benefit them. General 
Wood wrote optimistically in 1904, “It is believed that this system will be much 
appreciated by the Moros as soon as they thoroughly understand it.”551 But opposition to 
the cedula was more virulent than the army anticipated. The cedula appeared just as 
arbitrary, if not more so, than traditional forms of tribute. Moreover, at least some Moros 
interpreted the imposition of the cedula as payment to a Christian state and saw it as a 
sign of their conquest by infidels.552  
Such an interpretation was not wholly incorrect, as the cedula demonstrated the 
U.S.’s intentions of replacing its own sovereignty for that of the indigenous elite. Leonard 
Wood admitted as much in a letter to Secretary of War William H. Taft, updating him on 
conditions in the province: “The Moro leaders everywhere have, of course, objected to 
control; they have objected to the cedula tax and other little things, not because they had 
any real objection to these things, but because they saw in them the virtual end of their 
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arbitrary rule over their people.”553 Michael Salman argues that the cedula undermined 
the traditional prerogatives of the datus while establishing new, unmediated connections 
between individuals and the colonial state. He writes, “The cedula tax individualized the 
population as common taxpayers in relation to the state. Its introduction was 
accompanied by colonial restrictions on the datus’ power to levy fines, which had 
frequently produced debt bondage and judicial enslavement.”554 While the cedula may 
have signified the U.S’s intentions of undermining the datus’ traditional prerogative, in 
theory establishing a direct relationship between the colonial state and the individual 
Moros, in reality we have seen that the army continued to mediate their dealings with the 
local people through the datus. Bliss’ 1906 proposal (discussed above) to use the datus to 
harness Moro labor-power in place of the cedula suggests the limits of this process.  
The army sought in other ways to use taxation to harness the labor-power of the 
Moros in the service of the colonial state. As early as 1905, Luke E. Wright, Governor-
General of the Philippines, wrote about the “imperative” need for “a compulsory road-tax 
law.” The roads became “bogs during the rainy season,” and were impassable for much 
of the year. The Philippine Commission, of which Wright was a member, advocated a 
road-tax that would require “every able-bodied male inhabitant” to work five days per 
year on the roads, or pay the equivalent sum in cash. “It is but right,” the governor-
general wrote, “that the people who are to enjoy the benefits which will inevitably be 
derived from new and improved highways should lend their aid to their building and 
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maintenance.”555 The proposed road-tax legislation was part of a larger initiative to 
promote economic development in the Philippines. In November 1905, the Philippine 
Commission passed the Reorganization Act, which changed the political structure of the 
islands, limiting the power of the provincial governments and strengthening central 
authority in Manila (except in the Moro Province). Moreover, according to Paul Kramer, 
“Its second element was what came to be called the policy of ‘material development’: 
regime priorities would focus on the construction of roads, bridges, harbors, and other 
infrastructure essential to opening the Philippine economy to export-oriented 
exploitation.”556 The road tax fit perfectly into these “regime priorities.” Similar in its 
basic outlines to the system of corvée labor instituted by the Spanish, the Commission’s 
road tax proposal aimed to improve and expand infrastructure, which would in turn 
support the U.S.’s goal of attracting capital investment to the islands.  
Military officials in the Moro Province hoped the road tax would extend to the 
south as well. Leonard Wood wrote William Cameron Forbes, Secretary of Commerce 
and the Police – and architect of the policy of material development – with his 
endorsement of the law.557 “I do not think that the Moro Province should be excluded 
from the working of this act,” Wood wrote. He assured Forbes that the province’s 
legislative council had “a long time, been considering the passage of a similar act.” He 
continued, “I believe the act will be of great value in building up the system of public 
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highways and trails, and it will be an easy way for people to pay their road tax.”558 At the 
time of this writing this letter, Wood had already moved on to his next assignment as 
commander of the Philippines Division. But his successor, Tasker Bliss, also endorsed 
the road tax. “I do not see how the justice or desirability of such a [road tax] law can be 
disputed,” Bliss wrote in 1906.559 
In all their enthusiasm for this legislation, both military and civilian leaders 
grossly underestimated opposition to the proposed road-tax. In a particularly upbeat 
assessment of Filipinos’ attitudes toward the idea, Governor-General Wright declared 
that in his travels throughout the islands he and his companions “found no intelligent 
opposition to the establishment of this tax in the provinces; indeed, on the contrary, many 
of them urged its adoption at once.” Reflecting the instability in the Moro Province, 
Leonard Wood admitted in his private correspondence to Forbes that, “There will, 
probably, be the usual amount of opposition, but, I believe, the act is a good one and one 
that should be adhered to.”560 Tasker Bliss described “a noticeable reluctance to enact 
laws of this character in view of the known opposition of the natives,” but he believed it 
was part of Americans’ responsibility in administering the islands to carry out such 
beneficial legislation regardless of native opposition.561  
The exaction of a road-tax turned out to be a protracted affair throughout the 
Philippines. In 1906, the Commission passed a road-tax law along the lines Wright 
described the previous year. Although the legislation stipulated the tax could be paid in 
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labor or hard currency, in effect it established what Paul Kramer calls “a corvée labor 
system,” quite similar to those under Spanish colonial rule. Despite their hopeful 
pronouncements, the Commissioners actually “anticipated opposition,” according to 
Kramer. They “sought to make the law ‘less offensive to the Filipinos’ by putting it into 
effect only after it was endorsed by provincial boards, which would be elected the 
following year.”562 None of the boards passed the law. Colonial policymakers eventually 
succeeded in their efforts to pass legislation aimed at financing road work – and this time 
they did not leave it up to the provincial boards to carry through the measure.  
In the Moro Province, colonial officials did not even attempt to garner popular 
support for the law; it was simply passed by the Legislative Council. In his 1907 report 
Bliss wrote, “the law seems to have been accepted in the Moro Province in a public 
spirited way, and no trouble is anticipated in enforcing its provisions.”563 The following 
year the tax yielded “about 37,000 [Filipino pesos] in cash, as well as a fair amount of 
labor in kind” for road work. Bliss wrote optimistically that, “Several of the influential 
dattos of the province have shown considerable interest in the improvement of the trails 
leading into their country and have promised to use their influence toward the extension 
of the road work during the coming season…This year the provisions of the law will be 
applied to several other tribal wards, and a considerable addition to the mileage of 
improved trails in Moro country is confidently anticipated.”564 Similar to their portrayals 
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of Moros as enthusiastic workers, U.S. officials like Bliss tried to downplay Moro 
opposition to the road-tax and other symbols of American rule. Peter Gowing, however, 
admits that this law “was found to be ineffectual and impractical in many parts of the 
Province.”565  
Not all Moros submitted peacefully to these new incursions by the colonial state. 
In what became one of the bloodiest shows of resistance, 600 Moro men, women, and 
children occupied a volcanic crater at Bud Dajo in 1906. They were upset, in part, about 
the new cedula. General Wood responded by sending 800 soldiers and Constabulary to 
Bud Dajo. After intense shelling as well as an infantry assault on the crater, hundreds of 
Moros, including women and children, lay dead. The army, and most subsequent 
accounts of the event, called it the “Battle of Bud Dajo,” but many Moros still call it a 
massacre. Whatever the label, it was one of the deadliest encounters between the U.S. 
army and Moros during the entire occupation, attributable to Moro defiance in the face of 
new American taxes.566 
During Pershing’s administration, the province passed a new law combining the 
cedula and the road-tax. In 1912, the Legislative Council also expanded the reach of the 
road law, requiring “non-Christian” men between 18 and 60 to pay a cedula of three 
pesos annually or provide ten days’ labor.567 Pershing wrote confidently of the new 
legislation, “Moros and other non-Christians have learned the benefits of good roads, as 
is shown by the decreasing difficulty of obtaining road labor. Hundreds of days of labor 
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have been given to the provinces during the year by Moros anxious to have roads 
through their part of the country.”568 Gowing, again, points out that the Moro embrace of 
these measures was not as wholehearted as American official reports suggested. He 
writes, “there may have been more trouble collecting the tax (it amounted to a mild form 
of forced labor) than Pershing’s reports indicated.” He notes, for example, that the Moros 
on Jolo “actually refused to pay the road tax.” They built cotas (earthen forts) on the side 
of Mount Talipao, setting up a situation similar to the one on Bud Dajo years before. 
Again, force of arms resolved the situation. “The Philippine Scouts fought two brief 
engagements with them in August and October 1913. Thereafter, no further trouble was 
encountered in Sulu regarding the payment of the tax,” Gowing writes.569 Yet again, the 
imposition of American authority in the Moro Province required direct military action. 
While continuing to rely on the indigenous elite, the army also made some 
attempts to substitute the sovereignty of the American colonial state for the authority of 
the traditional datu. Resistance to those attempts forced army officials to baldly profess 
their aspirations for the American colonial project. A few short months after the Bud 
Dajo “battle” or “massacre,” Tasker H. Bliss wrote with resolve about the American 
mission in the southern Philippines. Speaking in reference to the proposed road-tax law, 
Bliss acknowledged the “reluctance” to pass laws which “the natives” opposed. He 
criticized such reluctance, pointing instead to Americans’ responsibility to carry through 
such important work, regardless of opposition. Bliss’ meditation is worth quoting at 
length: 
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But no official of the American Government of the islands can deny that he is 
part of a despotic machine, that he is himself in greater or lesser degree a despot, 
though we may hope that he will become known in history as one of that class of 
despots who have left a part of the world better than they found it. His only 
excuse – and that of the Government which has put him here – for playing this 
part is that he is ruling these people for their own good….If the Government is to 
do nothing against the will of the people in their present state it might as well 
abdicate at once.570  
 
To embrace the role of a despot, to go against “the will of the people” in the name of 
bettering their condition – this was the mission Americans such as Bliss had embraced. 
Although less poetic, he sounded much like another spokesperson for empire: “Take up 
the White Man’s burden-- / And reap his old reward / The blame of those ye better / The 
hate of those ye guard.”571 Kipling had written these words only a few years earlier about 
the Philippines. Bliss and his fellow officers occasionally had to remind themselves of the 
virtues of despotism, as they continued to push through laws, taxes, and other measures 
designed to “better” the islands. In doing so, they reaped many of the same “rewards” 
Kipling had anticipated in 1899. 
Conclusion 
The U.S. army experimented with and exploited a variety of labor practices 
during its administration of the Moro Province. While touting the political and economic 
benefits of wage labor, officers also embraced the use of convict labor. Other policies 
such as the road-tax and cedula helped the military-colonial state extend its reach further 
into the southern Philippines. The labor provided by soldiers, convicts, and ordinary 
Moros working under datus was far from “free.” Nonetheless, spokespeople for 
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American imperialism, from Bullard to Bliss, justified this “despotism” in the name of 
civilization.  
Officers believed roads and railroads would facilitate the extension of U.S. 
sovereignty into remote parts of Mindanao. Military infrastructure like new posts would 
also expand the American presence in difficult-to-access areas. But labor was not simply 
a resource that the colonial state used to carry out its infrastructural projects: the 
management of laboring populations was integral to the colonial project itself. Attempts 
to control laboring populations became a terrain for the exercise of U.S. power and the 
articulation of sovereignty. Sometimes Moros and American soldiers were sullen and 
recalcitrant workers; at other times officers emphasized their enthusiasm for work. In all 
cases, handling workers was a test and a sign of the army’s authority, both over its own 
enlisted men and over colonial subjects.  
 The army’s administration of its “far West” in the Philippines harkened back to 
its conquest of the trans-Mississippi West. Commerce and civilization went hand in hand 
in both “Wests.” The U.S. army’s vision of colonial rule in the Philippines involved 
stomping out resistance to the American occupation, but it also hinged on “develop[ing] 
the resources of the country,” as Colonel Benjamin Grierson had said about western 
Texas. Development took the form of constructing roads, bridges, wharves, and railroads 
– infrastructure with an economic purpose as well as military value. As Chaplain 
Bateman wrote about the Iligan military road, “the Moros rejoice in the new way to 
market…The military roads of Mindanao are worth more than they have cost as means to 
	   	  
	  
	  
282 
coveted ends of peace.”572 Both markets and roads were part of the American vision for 
ruling the Philippines.   
Yet roads did not always lead to peace, at least not immediately. In 1908, Tasker 
Bliss spoke of “an unusual and growing number of such acts of violence on the islands of 
Basilan, Jolo, Cagayan de Sulu, and other places in the southern part of the department.” 
As a solution he called for “an abundance of water transportation” that would allow 
regular patrols to various islands in the province. His diagnosis of the problem, however, 
went far beyond these specific incidents. “Neither the nature nor the disposition of the 
Moro has changed in an appreciable degree during the eight or nine years of American 
occupation,” Bliss wrote. “He is as ready to fight now as he ever was.” “Peace,” 
according to Bliss, was maintained by “letting him alone and at the same letting him see 
some of the evidences of the Government’s power.” Unfortunately, the army’s attempts 
to provide such evidence of its power had come up short. According to Patricio Abinales, 
the system of roads, telegraph and telephone lines built during the military occupation 
meant that the U.S.’s “‘reach of state’ was far more extensive and successful” than 
Spain’s.573 Nevertheless, the army’s control over the Moro Province was never complete. 
Bliss summed up the situation simply: “there are many Moros who have never seen an 
American soldier.”  
Bliss did not say whether he thought it was possible to change the Moros’ “nature 
[or] disposition” – what army officers today might call “winning hearts and minds.” 
Instead, Bliss thought the Moros needed more constant reminders of the Americans’ 
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presence and authority. Yet again, the army looked to infrastructure for solutions: more 
vessels, more patrols, more inroads into the remote backwaters – literally – of the 
province. Bliss recommended more regular patrols “so that no Moro can feel that he is 
ever beyond the power of the Government.”574 It was a never-ending mission: one that 
called for ever more workers and ever-more work, all under the auspices of the U.S. 
army. In the early years of the twentieth century, soldiers had successfully extended the 
reach of the American state beyond continental boundaries, but they were finding, not for 
the last time, that the projection of American power required prodigious, endless labor. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“Two million industrious laborers:” 
Military Dreams of a Plantation Colony 
	  
Shortly after his appointment as the province’s first military governor, General 
Leonard Wood wrote to an associate about the challenges and opportunities Americans 
faced in the region. “We have here an extremely complex problem, and one which will 
require a good many years to settle,” Wood explained. “The inhabitants of Mindanao 
embrace races all the way from tree dwellers to fairly highly civilized Philippines. There 
is a large Mohammedan population, a large savage population and a comparitively [sic] 
small Christian population.” Wood believed this diverse assortment of “races” 
complicated efforts to “establish… a uniform government for all.” But the province also 
presented promising opportunities. The governor and military commander continued, 
“The country is healthy; the climate excellent and the land rich and productive. It is 
difficult to conceive of a better country for the growing of hemp, coconuts, and other 
tropical products. What we want here is money, and money will only come under the 
stimulus of proper inducement and a reasonable prospect of gain.”575 General Wood and 
the other military colonial officials believed it was their responsibility to provide such 
inducements. In his official report for 1905, Captain G. T. Langhorne, acting provincial 
governor, wrote: “As the success of the province depends on trade and the development 
of its natural resources, it has been the constant effort of the government to encourage 
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and assist all of the inhabitants agriculturally or commercially engaged.”576 Although the 
army tried to help “all of the inhabitants” working in agriculture or commerce, they took 
a special interest in supporting American planters. Officers like Wood and Langhorne 
believed the region should focus its attention on “trade and the development of its natural 
resources,” especially the production of “hemp, coconuts, and other tropical products” on 
a large scale. In pursuing that vision, army officers helped advertise and promote the 
Moro Province to potential investors; advocated for liberal land and immigration laws; 
and directed the personnel and resources of the provincial government toward recruiting 
plantation workers. As a result of these activities, the army became entangled in conflicts 
over work, religion, and land. Indeed, as Wood had anticipated, officers found 
themselves dealing with “extremely complex problem[s]” for “a good many years.” 
This chapter examines the army’s attention to economic development, particularly 
its involvement in labor arrangements, during its occupation of the Moro Province. It 
argues that the U.S. army played a crucial and unappreciated role in its efforts to foster 
the plantation economy. Officers tried to promote planter interests through marketing, 
outreach, and political influence. Army officials also worked locally to recruit workers 
for plantation labor, and they mediated on behalf of planters in dealing with the 
indigenous population. At the same time, however, the army also had to confront growing 
resistance to the plantation complex. Through religious demonstrations, political 
organizing, and acts of assassination against the provincial government, the people of the 
Moro Province threw obstacles in the way of American attempts to establish a planter 
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colony in Mindanao. Ultimately, the U.S. army found itself at odds with the planters they 
had originally welcomed to the province and the indigenous people hostile to their 
presence. In all events, officers became involved in activities far removed from the 
traditional arts of war, yet central to the work of empire.  
The first section of the chapter explores ideas about economic development that 
motivated army officers. It then looks at military initiatives intended to attract American 
capital investment, including fairs, markets, and publicity. The second section examines 
the development of plantation agriculture and the formation of a planter class in the 
district of Davao, the heart of hemp cultivation in the province. The third and final 
section focuses on the murder of the district governor and another official in Davao. 
Along with the emergence of new religious practices, these murders signified mounting 
resistance to the presence of both the U.S. army and the American planters in the Moro 
Province. 
 “The onward march of civilization” and the plantation economy  
In 1902, General George W. Davis wrote confidently about the future prospects of 
the Moro Province: “If the Moros are handled properly…in a generation the existing 
million of fanatical Moro and pagan savages will be two million industrious laborers, as 
industrious and peaceable and contented as the subjects of Raja Brooke in Sarawak.”577 
Brooke, sometimes called the “white rajah,” was an Englishman who was made governor 
of the province of Sarawak in Borneo in 1841. Such a romantic figure, often regarded as 
the real-life model for Conrad’s Lord Jim, no doubt inspired the military colonizers who 
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hoped to turn Mindanao and Sulu into such an “industrious” kingdom.578 The generals 
who led the province shared Davis’ faith in the ability of the Moro people to become a 
colonial labor force. They also believed Mindanao could become a lush garden producing 
valuable commodities for export. Not long into his tenure as the first governor of the 
Moro Province, General Leonard Wood wrote about the great prospects for the economic 
development of the region: “The province has great natural resources, which are almost 
entirely undeveloped. There is an almost unlimited amount of valuable timber, a great 
deal of it easily accessible, and there is a very large amount of fine agricultural land, well 
adapted to coconut, hemp, rice, sugar – in short, most of the island products. Rubber 
plants and rubber trees exist in large numbers; also gutta trees, although a comparatively 
small amount of this is at present being brought out. Nearly all tropical fruits grow well 
in the province. All that is wanted is some one to develop and make use of its almost 
inexhaustible resources.”579 Military administrators had ambitious designs on these 
“resources.” They believed that with the proper support, the Moro Province would 
become a plantation paradise, yielding profits for investors and settlers and introducing 
its backward inhabitants to the charms of civilization. It was the responsibility of the U.S. 
colonial government to support such efforts. General Tasker H. Bliss, the second 
governor, declared, “The dominant idea of the [provincial] government has been and is 
economic progress – progress entirely of a material nature – as only in this way can a 
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sure foundation be laid for future advancement along social, moral, and intellectual 
lines.” In fact, the creed of “economic progress” became the army’s fundamental mission 
in governing the Moro Province, providing the answer to a range of ills including 
continued guerilla fighting and political resistance among the Moros and animist tribes.  
The army pursued efforts to promote “economic progress” at the same time as it 
waged an ongoing war in the southern Philippines. While peace was declared throughout 
most of the Philippines in 1902, the U.S. army remained at war in Mindanao, Sulu, and 
other parts of the archipelago. As military historian Brian McAllister Linn writes, “The 
official declaration of the end of the Philippine insurrection on July 4, 1902, did not end 
the violence. Indeed, in some areas, particularly in the predominantly Muslim Mindanao-
Sulu region (referred to within the army as ‘Moroland’), armed resistance to American 
authority dramatically increased. This phase was even more diffuse and disconnected 
than had been the ‘war’ of 1899-1902.” Linn describes fighting in the Muslim South as “a 
series of sporadic and largely unconnected punitive campaigns against either charismatic 
leaders (Datu Ali), fortified cotas (Pandapatan and Bayan in 1902), or communities of 
believers (Bud Basak in 1913).” Resistance was not limited to Mindanao, and rebels 
fought U.S. forces in southern Luzon and Visayas for years. Fighting in Mindanao and 
Sulu was part of what Linn calls “a long war of attrition” in the Philippines after the U.S. 
declared the end of hostilities. Fighting was most intense in the South and resulted in the 
only major battles with large-scale causalities between 1900 and 1903.580  
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The officers in charge of the Moro Province believed that “economic progress” 
would complement their military operations, and that peace and prosperity would come 
to Moroland together through the expansion of plantation agriculture. They hoped that 
capitalist labor relations and a regular labor regime would ultimately lead the violent, 
warlike Moros to settle down and embrace peace and civilization. In his final report as 
governor of the province, General Wood emphasized that Mindanao’s economic potential 
could help solve its political problems. “I believe the greatest portion of unrest existing 
among these people to-day, which after all amounts only to petty disorders, is due to the 
depression in agriculture,” Wood wrote. “The people are not vicious or intractable. They 
are simply undeveloped.”581 Wood believed large-scale agricultural production for the 
world market would “develop” the people. Embracing the agricultural metaphor, Wood 
told a group of Sulu datus in 1906: “During the three years I have been here we have had 
a large crop of fights, and in General Bliss’ time I want you to have a large crop of hemp, 
rice and coconuts.”582 Bliss shared Wood’s confidence in the power of plantation 
agriculture to promote peace. He insisted that Moros who planted hemp – one of the 
tropical products for which the southern Philippines was particularly well-suited – would 
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“have neither time nor inclination for insurrection.”583 He believed the army could help 
the Moros beat their swords into ploughshares. Speaking about a native leader Bliss said, 
“If we are going to make a datu out of him, I would rather that, instead of having a couple 
of crossed lantakas on his coat-of-arms, he should have a couple of hoes supporting a disc 
harrow imposed upon a plow and the whole superimposed on a field of rice.”584  
Army personnel played a crucial role in shaping and carrying out policies 
intended to promote economic gain, focusing on the expansion of the plantation sector. 
Historian Peter Gowing writes, “General Wood and his Legislative Council well 
understood that the success and viability of the Moro Province depended on the 
development of natural resources and the promotion of trade. The provincial government 
sought to give whatever encouragement and assistance it could to those engaged in 
agricultural and commercial activities.”585 This work led Wood, Bliss, and Pershing to 
focus their efforts on two fronts: attracting capital and recruiting labor for the plantations. 
Throughout his tenure as provincial governor, Wood advocated for policies to promote 
the production of lucrative tropical goods. In a letter to Day Allen Willey, a writer and 
editor based in Baltimore, he expressed his convictions about the great need for capital: 
“What we want here is money, and money will only come under the stimulus of proper 
inducement and a reasonable prospect of gain. The further from home one gets, the 
greater must be these inducements.”586 In a letter marked “economic matters” to 
Philippine Governor Luke E. Wright, Wood further outlined what these “inducements” 
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should be. He recommended investments and improvements in shipping lines and 
transportation; greater funding for the government-run experimental farm at San Ramon; 
reduced taxes on native lumber; and the liberalization of land laws. Wood advocated in 
no uncertain terms that the U.S. foster export agriculture in the southern Philippines. He 
wrote that the superintendent at San Ramon should be “instructed to devote himself 
especially to the production of hemp and coconut plants for sale to planters, especially 
hemp plants.” The plants should “be sold cheap, in order to promote the establishment of 
hemp plantations in the Southern Islands.” Regarding land laws, one of Wood’s chief 
concerns, he wanted settlers allowed “at least 200 acres. 300 acres would be better.” He 
thought the present allotment of forty acres had been tried for long enough: “A sufficient 
time has already elapsed to show the desirable settlers are not coming.” The only 
alternative was to expand the allotment in order “to tempt the only class of men capable 
of establishing these industries.”  
Despite constant pressure from the Philippine Commission and military 
administrators of the Moro Province, land laws were not liberalized to attract more 
foreign investment and settlement. Shinzo Hayase explains this was mostly due to 
pressure from U.S. agricultural interests, particularly the beet sugar lobby, which feared 
competition from Philippine sugar imports. American anti-imperialists also opposed 
increasing the cap on landholdings.587 Other scholars, however, have emphasized the way 
American colonial laws nevertheless helped dispossess Moros of their “ancestral lands.” 
In 1904, for example, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 718 “an act making 
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void land grants from Moro sultans or dattos or from chiefs of non-Christian tribes when 
made without governmental authority or consent.” The act extinguished any claims based 
on grants to Moro or tribal leaders under the Spanish or American colonial 
governments.588 In 1905, certain parts of the Public Land Act were extended, under 
certain circumstances, to the Moro Province. This act opened up the possibility that some 
squatters could have their land claims verified by the Land Registration Office, but there 
were exceptions and the bureaucracy involved was labyrinthine. The Philippine 
Commission’s resolution in extending the Public Land Act to the Moro Province included 
the provision that “That the legislative council of the Moro Province is directed to make 
known throughout the province the foregoing resolution and particularly the limitations 
imposed by the Public Land Act as to the time within which native settlers may obtain 
free patents by virtue of Chapter IV of the Public Land Act.” Of course, as military 
administrators freely admitted, the provincial government did not have contact with a 
vast number of the province’s people. Distance, inadequate transportation, language 
barriers, and general hostility prevented the legislative council from communicating the 
stipulations of this and other land laws with the province’s Moro and tribal populations. 
Historian Samuel Tan argues that the U.S. “further accelerated the acquisition of lands by 
individuals, groups, or corporations” by “democratiz[ing] the process.” He writes, “for 
the indigenous people including the Moros, who were ignorant of the legal process and 
had nil access to legal remedies in a highly competitive and expensive democratic 
system, the alienation of their ancestral land continued and, if they coopted to apply for 
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homestead, the individual application was eventually limited to only four hectares with 
no prospect or security guaranteeing their hold on the piece of their ancestral lands.”589 
In addition to the challenges presented by the limitations on land purchase, 
colonial administrators also worried about the quality of the labor force available in the 
Moro Province. “Capable” white American men could serve as plantation owners and 
managers, but they needed indigenous people to provide the labor. Unfortunately, Wood 
believed the “present inhabitants of these islands” did not show any “inclination to take 
up and improve the land.” “They have had several centuries of opportunity to show 
capacity for this sort of thing, but have not as yet given any general indication of a very 
strong tendency in this direction,” Wood wrote.590 Despite their lack of “inclination” and 
“capacity,” he thought the people of the Moro Province would eventually become useful 
workers. In a letter to William Cameron Forbes, Secretary of Commerce and Police, 
Wood explained his assessment of their prospects as plantation laborers. While the 
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people of the islands were not yet “skilled” or “good laborers,” they had potential. “We 
want to give the Filipino a chance to work and to make him an industrious person. This 
must be the foundation of everything in these islands, and in order to do it we have got to 
bring the people here who have the ‘wherewithal’ to hire labor on a large scale and 
continuously. A class to develop plantations, timber, industries, etc.” Portraying 
plantation work as a “chance” or opportunity, Wood suggested that plantations would 
serve as schools for American values. In fact, plantations would teach the Filipinos (and 
Moros) more than the provincial government could offer. “There is nothing that we have 
done that is going to promptly transform the Filipino into an active and energetic laboring 
man, nor will a few government experimental farms scattered about the islands be of any 
great practicable advantage to him,” Wood wrote. “He has got to see with his own eyes 
and have in his own vicinity examples of intelligently and economically conducted 
plantations and business concerns[.] Each one of these on which he labors will be an 
education to him in the use of improved methods, improved machinery, and incidentally 
will increase his taste for luxuries and his desire to better his condition.”591 Years later, 
historian U. B. Phillips would argue that antebellum plantations in the U.S. South served 
as schools for black enslaved laborers. Here, writing in the context of the American 
imperial mission abroad, Wood anticipated this argument, likewise describing plantation 
work as a type of education, capable of transforming backwards, “undeveloped people” 
into “industrious” workers. Rather than businesses organized for the purpose of enriching 
their investors, plantations would educate the natives and contribute to the Americans’ 
civilizational project in the islands.  
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Army administrators believed that the plantation-as-school would help resolve 
social and political problems while also enhancing the economic prospects of the Moro 
Province. “Idleness,” Wood believed, was the source of the “petty disorder” which 
characterized the province. Moros lacked the motivation to work because they were 
uncivilized. White settlers committed to plantation agriculture would teach the Moros 
both how to work and how to want. “We cannot expect great industry on their part until 
their wants increase,” Wood explained to an associate in Boston. “They are, at present, a 
largely undeveloped people, but the building up of good plantations and agricultural 
industries in the Islands and the possession by the owners of these estates, of those things 
needed and usually had by civilized people, will do much towards waking up in these 
people an appreciation of what educated and civilized people need to make life 
attractive.”592 In his last report as the governor of the Moro Province, Wood reiterated 
this belief that the Moros would develop more advanced consumer tastes through the 
example of white settlers. “People forget, in discussing the development of the 
Philippines, that the great bulk of the people here are quite satisfied with what they have; 
that their wants are few and simple because they know little of the needs which go to 
make up the sum total of a cultured and highly civilized people.”593 Wood insisted that 
American and European settlers would provide a valuable “example” for the indigenous 
people, introducing them to the “needs” of “a cultured and highly civilized people.”  
The army’s most public efforts – those they showcased to the wider world – were 
directed toward attracting white settlers to the Moro Province. They hoped to entice men 
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of capital, those who had the “‘wherewithal’ to hire labor on a large scale,” in Wood’s 
words. The army worked with local newspapers, chiefly the planter-oriented Mindanao 
Herald, to advertise the islands’ advantages for tropical agriculture. Officers also 
organized fairs and expositions designed to showcase the province’s natural resources 
and healthy climate. These activities, undertaken as part of the civil administration of the 
province, helped the army become a valuable partner for private interests in the islands. 
The Jolo Agricultural and Industrial Fair, held in the fall of 1906, exemplifies the 
type of event organized by military officers to promote their districts and the province as 
a whole. The Jolo fair featured both exhibits and sports intended to educate and entertain. 
The military nature of the colonial government was front and center during the festivities. 
Beginning with a “Grand Procession” and “Review of Troops by the Governor,” the fair 
continued with an address by E. Z. Steever, colonel of the 4th Cavalry and governor of 
the District of Sulu. But the fair also showcased “native” arts and performances, and 
included “Moro Music” and “Magtung-tung (A Moro Game).” The following days 
brought more Moro demonstrations, including “Maksipah (a kind of a Moro Foot Ball 
with Moro Music),” “Moro Dances and Spear Dance” and “Moro Races,” and Moro boat 
races. American soldiers also took part in the festivities, with the 4th Cavalry leading 
“Horse Gymnastics.” Although Colonel Steever was disappointed the provincial governor 
had been unable to attend, he assured Bliss that the fair had been “a pronounced success.” 
Revealing how tenuous the army’s hold over the region remained, Steever noted with 
apparent pride that there had not been “a single breech of the peace” during the six days 
of the exposition. 
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These were years of great interest in such fairs. In 1906, a committee of the 
province’s leading political figures began to organize a fair to take place in the provincial 
capital, Zamboanga, the following year. John P. Finley, a captain in the 27th Infantry and 
the governor of the District of Zamboanga, began to draw up materials and draft an 
agenda. Finley made clear the fair’s dual mandate – to attract foreign capital and entice 
the local people to work on American plantations. He wrote that the event “will certainly 
tend to promote a wholesome and progressive industrial spirit among the natives and to 
draw the attention of desirable colonists and working capital to the rich resources and 
golden opportunities of the Moro Province.”594 Exhibits focused on livestock and plants 
indigenous to the region, showcasing the resources and opportunities of Mindanao. 
“Exhibits must show the best possible development in manufacture and cultivation, and 
in the preparation of the raw products for market,” Finley wrote.595 
The fair’s agenda reflected the organizers’ intention of showcasing “native” arts 
along with American power. The military band would open the festivities by playing the 
United States national anthem. A “special drill” by the Constabulary would display 
cooperation between the Filipino troops under their white American officers. The 
violence of the American occupation and the ongoing war against recalcitrant Moros was 
transformed by the fair’s agenda into entertainment: a Moro Spear Dance was followed 
later in the day by a “Bayonet Exercise contest” with three entries by American soldiers. 
The goal of the fair, however, was to advertise the province’s agricultural strengths. 
Following the pattern set by county and state agricultural fairs in the United States, the 
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Zamboanga Fair would exhibit the finest examples of various “native” livestock, 
including cattle, carabaos, ponies, goats, sheep, pigs, and hogs, including a “presentation 
of foreign stock.” In keeping with the prescriptive, educational mission of these fairs, 
there would be a “Display of Agricultural Implements and demonstration of their use for 
the benefit of the natives.” Contestants engaged in competitive hemp-stripping, coconut 
tree-climbing, and several activities devoted to “throwing and tieing” caraboes and native 
cattle. In another indication of the export-orientation of the province’s agriculture, 
contestants were expected to catch, tie, and “place[] hogs in shipping baskets.” 
The executive committee of the Zamboanga Fair sought to represent the diversity 
of peoples living in the Moro Province within prescribed limits. The second day of events 
opened with a performance of music by a “Native Band.” Attendees could witness the 
“Riding of Native ponies by natives” followed by the “Riding of American horses by 
Americans.” A “Tug of War, Filipinos and Moros” would show these inveterate enemies 
engaging in a playful contest of strength. There was a Moro running race and a Filipino 
running race, “competitive bamboo weaving,” and “Fancy Dancing by Filipinos.” 
Reflecting the organizers’ efforts to attract Hispanic Filipinos, Moros and Americans to 
the fair, the advertisements for the 1907 Zamboanga Fair were printed in three parallel 
columns with writing in Spanish, Arabic, and English. Unfortunately, we do not know 
how these activities were received by participants and spectators. Army officers, 
however, hoped these performances would communicate the virtues of peace, prosperity, 
and plantation agriculture to the Moros, Filipinos, and members of other tribes who 
attended the Zamboanga Fair.  
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Army officers took other steps to try to involve the indigenous people in the type 
of agriculture and trade they believed would “develop” the Moro Province. Captain 
Finley was also one of the leading proponents of another program – the Moro Exchanges 
– designed to incorporate the Moros and animists into American development efforts. 
These exchanges, or markets, were established throughout the province as places where 
members of the animist tribes and Moros could meet to buy and sell goods. Army officers 
believed that the non-Muslims, or “pagans,” had long been abused and even enslaved by 
stronger and better organized Moro groups, and that this history of fear prevented the 
development of market relations among the “backwards” people. In a celebratory 1913 
article, “The Commercial Awakening of the Moro and Pagan,” Finley wrote that these 
“natural and long-time enemies” had “found a common ground on which they can get 
together, and profit more by friendly association and business ventures than by the 
process of slavery and extermination.” The Moro Exchanges, according to Finley, had 
introduced slaves to “the first thrills of freedom and the quickening impulse of self-
control,” helping them throw off the shackles of their owners. He expressed the 
confidence, shared by his fellow military administrators, that trade was a crucial tool in 
the imperial mission. Like Wood and Bliss, he believed that by “awakening the 
commercial spirit of the uncivilized tribes,” the Americans could promote “peace and 
unity” at the same time as they made money.596  
Fairs, expositions, and exchanges encouraged trade and business within a local 
orbit. These events were an important part of the army’s program of outreach to Moros, 
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animists, and European and American planters. But their scope was limited. To attract 
settlers from abroad – men from the U.S. who might uproot their lives and start over in 
the remote corners of Mindanao – the army joined forces with English-language 
newspapers and journals. Two publications demonstrate the central role played by army 
officers in seeking to advertise the province. In 1906, the Far Eastern Review, a journal 
edited by an American, George Bronson Rea, published a “Special Edition Devoted to 
the Industrial, Commercial and Agricultural Development of the Moro Province, under 
the American System of Colonial Government.” The cover of this special issue featured a 
photograph of Leonard Wood, with the caption “Major General Leonard Wood, U.S. 
Army, First American Governor of the Moro Province, Philippine Islands, whose 
Progressive Administration of Civil Affairs has Opened up that Country to Immigration, 
and Industrial, Commercial and Agricultural Development.” Inside, the general’s essay, 
entitled “The Policy of the Government of the Moro Province,” appeared first. As the 
leading piece in the journal, Wood’s article described the many ways the military 
provincial government supported planters and investors. The general made clear the 
army’s commitment to expanding the plantation sector in the Moro Province: “One of the 
principal objects of the provincial government has been, and is, to build up the agriculture 
of the province, realizing that the entire question of prosperity and development depends 
upon this. The undeveloped wealth of the province is very great, especially in timber and 
jungle produce, the former including most of the best woods in the Philippine Islands, in 
large quantities.” Rubber, hemp, cacao, coconuts, rice, coal, mango, and pearls were just 
some of the products waiting to enrich investors in Mindanao. “This whole section of the 
Philippines presents a field of great and almost untouched natural wealth, which needs 
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only the energy of the settler to develop it.” “Undeveloped” and “untouched,” the riches 
of the Moro Province were just “waiting” for the intervention of Americans. Yet Wood 
did not portray the region as virgin or empty territory. Instead, he acknowledged the 
indigenous population but assured readers that these people would play a positive, helpful 
role in the transformation of the province. “The wild people are, as a rule, willing 
workers, and when properly handled give good results,” Wood wrote. The labor problem 
was almost entirely absent from Wood’s account: “The Moro is a ready worker, anxious 
always to make money, and strong and energetic. He is, perhaps, the best laborer found in 
the Philippines.”597 A far cry from popular images of the Moros as fierce, violent 
warriors, Wood portrayed them as “willing workers,” “a ready worker,” and “the best 
laborer.” They were simply “waiting” for the guidance and “handl[ing]” of American 
investors. 
The army’s presence in the Moro Province was reflected throughout this 
celebratory edition of the Far Eastern Review. A map of Mindanao, prepared by the 
provincial engineer, appeared, as did an article entitled, “Unique Provincial 
Government,” by Captain George Langhorne, U.S. Army. The editors took particular 
interest in Davao, which they touted as “the first and only American settlement in the 
Philippines.” A headline proclaimed “District of Davao: Magnificent Section of the Moro 
Province where Hemp is King and Coconut Crown Prince, and where the White Man is 
Playing an Important Part in Agricultural Development.”598 Pitching the region to would-
be investors in the U.S., the journal assured readers that “The District of Davao is the 
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land of promise for the white settler.” It told the story of one of the earliest settlers, 
Captain J. L. Burchfield, who came to Mindanao as an officer with the volunteers. A 
native of Kentucky, Burchfield was “of the pioneer stock that reclaimed from jungle and 
savage the Great West,” and he “believes in the civilization of the American plow and 
sawmill.” The magazine noted that there were 35 American-owned plantations in Davao. 
These “hardy Americans” were not merely enriching themselves but doing magnificent 
work on behalf of humanity. “Incidentally they are carrying civilization into the mountain 
fastnesses of the savage tribes of Midnanao, teaching these simple people the use of the 
hoe and ax, and the value of industry. Thousands of these mountain people are now living 
in good houses, eating good food, and adapting civilized dress. They are laying aside 
their spears and kris, engaging in agriculture, and, in some cases, sending their children to 
school.” While The Far Eastern Review highlighted the importance of native labor and 
portrayed Moros and other tribespeople as peaceful, they also assured readers that the 
Americans were truly in power in Mindanao. As Leonard Wood wrote in his opening 
essay, “The controlling influence of the Moro Province is, in every sense, American…In 
comparison with other countries in the Far East, it is believed that the Philippines, and 
especially the Southern Philippines, as represented by the Moro Province, offers the best 
field for white settlers, at present, in the East.”  
In 1909, Mindanao’s leading newspaper published a special edition intended to 
attract settlers to the province. Celebrating ten years of U.S. occupation of the southern 
Philippines, the Mindanao Herald Decennium combined boosterism, history, and 
ethnography in an expansive paean to the American presence in Mindanao. The Herald 
had long been devoted to the interests of planters. This special edition also highlighted 
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the prominent role of the army in promoting exactly those interests. After the editor’s 
introduction, General Bliss’ piece, “The Government of the Moro Province and Its 
Problems,” emphasized the responsibility and duty of Americans to the islands. He 
gestured toward the latent wealth of the province: the islands were “rich in gifts of 
nature” and “splendid returns await the pioneers who have the courage to venture in these 
fields.” He urged settlers to come to Mindanao to take their part in the “onward march of 
civilization.” “The uplifting of these savage races requires the best energies that a strong 
nation has to give,” Bliss wrote.”599 The Decennium included other pieces prepared by 
army officers, including “interesting articles on Jolo Moro traditions, commerce, music 
and dancing…taken from the compendium of First Lieutenant Edwin D. Smith, 4th Field 
Artillery.” The editors explained that these articles were part of “a very exhaustive report 
repaired under the direction of Captain Chas. B. Hagdorn, Secretary of the Moro 
Province, for use in the Military Information Bureau.”600 The pages of the Decennium 
were littered with photographs of and articles written by officers of the regular army and 
the Philippine Constabulary. Indeed, the publication demonstrated visually the overlap 
between the commercial interests and military government of the province. The extensive 
section devoted to Davao, for example, began with a profile of District Governor Allen 
Walker, captain in the Philippine Scouts. Next to a photograph of Governor Walker in 
uniform, the Decennium described the governor’s unwavering commitment to the 
advancement of the plantation economy in Davao. In an oblique but unapologetic 
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reference to the coercions employed in harnessing the labor of indigenous people for 
plantation labor, the editors wrote of Walker: “He happens to know the name of every 
man in his district and pursues a most embarrassing course of finding out what he is 
doing. He says that so long as there is plenty of rich land to plant he means to make 
agriculture look good to the residents who are not employed in other useful pursuits.”601 
Tellingly, the Decennium concluded with a “Station List of the Army in Mindanao,” 
listing each station, troops, and officers assigned to the Department of Mindanao. The 
army’s presence in the Moro Province was clear from beginning to end in what was 
essentially a 90-page booster pamphlet advertising the commercial possibilities of the 
islands.  
Army officers tried to attract private investors to the province as part of their daily 
administrative duties. Publications like the Far Eastern Review and the Decennium were 
instrumental to this work. In 1910, John J. Pershing, the third and final military governor 
of the Moro Province, wrote General Clarence R. Edwards, the newly installed chief of 
the Bureau of Insular Affairs. “Dear Clarence,” he wrote, “I am taking the liberty of 
sending you by express two hundred copies of the Mindanao Herald, a periodical 
published in Zamboanga something over a year ago, ‘commemorating a decennium of 
American Occupation of the Land of the Farthest East and the Nearest West.’” Pershing 
hoped that his friend might have “an opportunity of distributing these publications where 
they will do some good. You will no doubt have many opportunities for placing them in 
the hands of investors or of mailing them to persons making inquiry regarding the 
Philippines.” Pershing himself had already sent copies of the Mindanao Herald 
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Decennium to various trade journals and chambers of commerce in the U.S., but he 
thought Edwards, through his position in the insular government, might be able to spread 
the message even further. For Pershing, as for his predecessors Wood and Bliss, there 
was no conflict of interest between the role of provincial governor and business booster. 
On the contrary, these men believed it was their duty to attract settlers and capital 
investment to Mindanao. Pershing told Edwards, “This Province certainly has a great 
future and we are very anxious to do all that is possible to encourage American capital to 
come here for investment. As you know, there stands the great, rich Cotabato Valley 
ready to make millionaires out of men who have the courage to judiciously invest a few 
dollars. Besides this, we have great opportunities for the cultivation of rubber, hemp, 
tapioca and rice, to say nothing of our forests and grazing lands.” Pershing expressed 
optimism about the prospects for continued economic growth led by U.S. investors: 
“There is considerable new capital coming into the Province, and I look for an era of 
prosperity hitherto unknown in the Islands.”602 Edwards responded by telling Pershing he 
would be more than happy to receive the materials and would “make the best possible 
distribution” of them. He assured Pershing that, “The Bureau of Insular Affairs never 
loses an opportunity to put in a good word for the Moro country, because we believe in it, 
as you do.”603 
Army officers took seriously their work attracting white settlers to the province. 
They believed the expansion of the plantation sector, under American ownership and 
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leadership, was necessary for the political stabilization of Mindanao and key to the 
economic future of the province. By organizing fairs and markets, publicizing the 
province abroad, and writing to friends and associates in the U.S. about the islands’ 
commercial potential, men like Wood, Bliss, and Pershing contributed what resources 
and influences they could to promoting the plantation economy. But the army went 
beyond pamphlets and marketing in order to promote the province’s plantation economy. 
Events in Davao, the heart of provincial hemp production, demonstrate how army officers 
used their authority to leverage labor for nascent American plantations. Planters, 
however, did not always get the unqualified support they would have liked from their 
allies. Instead, officers found themselves mediating between local laborers and American 
planters and pursuing a line of policy all their own.  
Turning “Cutlasses into Scythes”: Creating a Labor Force  
 
 “What the military and missionary forces for centuries have failed to accomplish 
bids fair now to respond to the efforts of the planter,” declared the Mindanao Herald. 
“Thousands of wild men who three years ago were living in trees and palm leaf booths, 
who on sight of the white man would take to the brush like wild deer, are now 
comfortably settled on hemp and coconut plantations where they daily learn the art of 
living useful lives.” The heroes who were rescuing these “wild men” and introducing 
them to the comforts of civilization were planters in Davao in southeastern Mindanao. 
One of five districts established as part of the Moro Province, Davao in 1909 was 
undergoing a particularly rapid and extraordinary transformation as Americans began to 
arrive and establish abaca, or hemp, plantations. Hemp was an important component for 
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making rope, and it quickly became the major export from the Philippines to the U.S.604 
The potential for making huge profits from hemp, as well as other cash crops like rubber 
and coconuts, attracted investors and would-be planters to settle around the Gulf of 
Davao. According to historian Patricio Abinales, 1906 to 1909 were years of the “abaca 
boom.”605 The army only deemed the district ready for settlement in 1905, but it did not 
take long for Americans to arrive. Abinales explains, “From virtually nothing in 1900, the 
[abaca] industry grew to forty-two plantations by 1911, covering 16,410 hectares. Hemp 
production rose from 308 tons (1902) to 8,592 tons (1910) to become the province’s top 
export.”606 An enormous demographic shift accompanied the expansion of hemp 
production. In 1901, American officials estimated Davao’s population, made up of 
Muslim as well as “pagan” or animist peoples, at between four and six thousand. Davao 
was also “the most isolated district of the Moro Province and one of the farthest from 
Manila.”607 In less than a decade, the population essentially doubled in size with the 
emigration of 5,000 Americans into the district by 1909.608  
These new American and European settlers soon began to express the self-
consciousness of a planter elite. In 1905, fifteen American and Spanish planters formed 
the Davao Planters Association; by 1909, the organization had grown to 60 members.609 
The members were politically active. The Decennium editors wrote proudly, “The 
Association has been instrumental in securing much needed legislation for the District. 
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Their recommendations are always given a thoughtful hearing by the Provincial and 
Insular governments, and in nearly every case their requests granted.” They met regularly 
to discuss issues of interest, and the association had bought land near the docks for “a 
bodega and weighing scales.” They also hoped to contract with buyers in England and the 
U.S. for Davao hemp, thereby cutting out middlemen brokers. Promotional materials took 
pains to portray these planters as altruistic as well. Echoing the claims of other 
representatives of the American colonial establishment, the Mindanao Herald insisted 
that the Davao Planters were committed as much to “developing the social and material 
interests of the District,” as they were to their own financial gain.  
The Davao Planters’ Association was also inflected with a military flavor. In 
addition to Captain Burchfield, other planters had also come to Mindanao as soldiers 
during the war. William Henry Gohn, who managed and operated a plantation under his 
own name, had served two terms of service with the 17th Infantry in the southern 
Philippines; Corporal Gohn was discharged in Zamboanga in 1904, after which he 
established a plantation in Santa Cruz.610 Loren Day, the manager of the Tagum 
Plantation Company, was a member of the Davao Planters’ Association. Before settling 
in Davao, however, he had also served as a musician and “bandmaster” in the 11th U.S. 
Volunteer Cavalry.611 The successful transformation of one enlisted man even attracted 
the attention of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. In 1926 the 
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chamber ran a story in its journal under the headline “From Army Clerk to Plantation 
Owner: One Man’s Winnings from Davao Jungle.” The subject of the story was Henry S. 
Peabody, who had come to the Philippines in 1898 as a clerk with 7th California 
volunteers. After the war, he returned to the islands as a stenographer with the Bureau of 
Science. With a few other partners, Peabody established the Lais Traiding & 
Development Company devoted to hemp production.612 Many of these planters were also 
connected to the military government in the province. Orval Hughes managed the 
Malalag Bay Plantation Company, but before that he had served in the 17th Infantry with 
Edward C. Bolton, the district governor.613 The provincial government was encouraged 
by the number of military personnel who chose to stay in Mindanao after their terms of 
service, believing that it promoted good relations between planters and the government. 
“The attitude of [American] settlers toward the local government has built up mutual 
respect and confidence,” wrote Captain G. T. Langhorne, acting provincial governor, in 
his 1905 annual report. “Their wants are frequently anticipated by the government; when 
made known they receive prompt consideration and action. Many former soldiers who 
have saved a small capital during their army life, upon discharge have settled and are 
doing well, either as planters or as merchants along special lines.”614 Other officers 
invested in plantations at the same time they served as colonial officials. Military 
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governors disagreed about whether this involvement was beneficial or detrimental to the 
successful administration of the region.615 But even in this, officials in Mindanao were 
part of a longer tradition of army officers investing in the regions they were assigned to 
govern; the “empire-builder” Colonel Benjamin Grierson in Texas was only one such 
example in the trans-Mississippi West.  
Despite their growing numbers, influence, and connections to the military 
establishment, Davao planters struggled to attract reliable workers to the district. 
European and American settlers provided capital and some expertise, but they had no 
intention of performing the manual labor necessary for the operation of a tropical 
agricultural enterprise. U.S. laws barred the importation of Chinese laborers, so planters 
looked to local populations, as well as Filipinos from elsewhere in the archipelago, for 
their workforce.616 In Davao, planters tried to recruit “hillpeople,” or members of the 
mountain-dwelling animist tribes, to work on their hemp farms. But as Shinzo Hayase 
writes, they faced severe challenges in adapting these people to the rigors of plantation 
work. “[I]t was difficult to persuade hill people to come down to the coast for any length 
of time. They were timid and not used to disciplined hard work measured by the clock. 
They knew nothing about the value of time as money. Even when they had worked on a 
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plantation for quite some time, the majority of them would occasionally take a week or a 
month off without prior notice to hunt in the mountains or trade with neighboring 
tribes.”617  
The labor problem even drew the attention of observers in the U.S. In 1911, the 
Washington Post ran an extensive feature on plantation agriculture in Mindanao entitled 
“Persuading the Bloody Moro Pirates to Convert Cutlasses into Scythes.” Significant 
changes had taken place in the islands, and the article singled out Davao for special 
mention as the place where “the largest colony of Americans” and “the finest hemp 
grown in the islands” could be found. Yet labor remained a hindrance to the successful 
development of the region. The Post reported, “The labor problem is at present the most 
serious with which the Mindanao planter has to deal...The planters have organized [the 
Davao Planters’ Association], whose chief object is to corral sufficient labor to develop 
their plantations. To accomplish this result they have scoured the islands, and failing to 
induce the Moros to lay down their spears and carving knives, have brought down what 
laborers they have from the northern islands.”618 Despite their best efforts, the Americans 
struggled to persuade the Moros and “pagans” to beat their bolos into ploughshares.  
Planters found a valuable ally in the U.S. army as they sought labor for their 
nascent operations. Army officers shared planters’ goal of recruiting locals for plantation 
work. The military administration believed that regular labor and clock discipline would 
acquaint indigenous people with the benefits of civilization while helping the army 
accomplish its goal of pacifying the Moro Province. In 1904, Governor Wood boasted 
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that over a million hemp plants and a thousand coconut trees had been planted in the 
district. However, a dearth of workers retarded progress. “At the present time the amount 
of hemp growing in this district is greater than can be harvested with the laborers 
available,” Wood explained. “There are comparatively few Moros in the district.”619 
While the problem was widespread throughout the Moro Province, the labor shortage was 
particularly acute in Davao. The district had “received the largest investment of labor and 
capital for agricultural development” by 1907, but it was historically one of the least 
populated areas of Mindanao.620 The next year Governor Bliss noted that Moros in 
Zamboanga would not work for the planters, preferring to labor for the government even 
when planters paid higher wages, raising uncomfortable questions about why Moros 
avoided plantation labor.621 Expressing the desperation of colonial officials as well as 
planters, he wrote, “The crying need of the Moro Province to-day is for workers.”622  
The military administration tried to help planters more directly by suppressing 
wages on public works projects in order to make plantation labor more attractive. In 
1904, Leonard Wood reported with a mixture of alarm and anger at the rising wages 
earned by workers. “There has been a great increase in the cost of living and in wages in 
this as in other provinces, an increase which has not been accompanied either by 
improved methods or increased production,” he wrote. “The cause of this increase can be 
traced in most cases to the foolishly high prices paid by army officials for labor.” Farmers 
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were unable to afford the higher wages demanded by workers, leading to a “trying” state 
of affairs for “the farmer and producer,” according to Wood. He anticipated a return to 
“normal conditions” – that is, lower wages – because the army would soon employ fewer 
workers and pay them less.623 Wood, however, blamed the army for putting private 
employers, namely planters, at a disadvantage. Rather than seeing the influx of cash into 
the economy as beneficial for the local people, he believed the army’s higher wages put 
an unfair burden on other employers. The next year the army took steps to reduce the 
wages it paid. In 1905 it set a “uniform wage….on all government work, both civil and 
military.” Most workers – “ordinary labor” – received 75 centavos for a nine-hour work 
day. Native carpenters earned one and half Filipino pesos while Japanese carpenters 
received two. These wages represented a “reduction” over the previous year, and officials 
believed they would continue to decrease. The army hoped its wages would soon 
“conform to what can be afforded by the planters, which, except in Davao, is not to 
exceed 150 centavos.”624  
Army officers also shared planters’ desire to relocate people from the mountains 
to the coast. In 1907 General Bliss wrote, “The district officials, acting under instructions 
from the Government of the Province, have been making every effort to get the wild 
tribes to come down from the mountains and settle along the coast, where we can more 
easily bring them under civilising influences.”625 These influences included living in 
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settled communities, attending schools, and learning the benefits of private property.626 
Bliss and his contemporaries argued that permanent settlements, preferably near 
plantations, would foster stronger community ties and introduce the people to the benefits 
of civilization and modernity. “The one great aim of the American planters and of the 
government,” according to Bliss, “has been to induce [the Moros] by just treatment to 
settle in fixed communities along the coast, where their labor will be of equal value to 
them and to the planters, where schools can be established among them, and where the 
spread of the merest rudimentary notions of sanitation will result in a rapid increase in 
their numbers.”627 Coastal settlement would seem to benefit everyone: planters would 
have access to labor, the Moros would be less prone to wage war against the American 
government, and the hill people would enjoy greater material and physical security. 
General John J. Pershing was more direct about the necessity of relocating laborers: 
“These wild people are timid, suspicious, irresponsible and untrained,” he wrote in 1910. 
“So long as the laborer lives in the mountains an employer cannot control him.”628 
Employment on American-owned plantations apparently held little appeal for 
most indigenous peoples, as the grumblings of planters and officers reflected. The 
mountain-dwelling people resisted American efforts to relocate them to the gulf region. 
According to one plantation manager, it took him “over a year to get the natives to come 
down from their mountain resorts and work,” and he finally succeeded in persuading 50 
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families to settle on the plantation he managed.629 For those that did attempt plantation 
work, a common complaint was that the natives would not labor steadily. Planters and 
army officials alike remarked on their “disinclination to steady labor” and the “unreliable 
character” of their work.630 General Wood recognized the fundamental problem: the 
Americans needed the indigenous workers more than they needed the Americans. He 
wrote, “People forget, in discussing the development of the Philippines, that the great 
bulk of the people here are quite satisfied with what they have; that their wants are few 
and simple because they know little of the needs which go to make up the sum total of a 
cultured and highly civilized people.”631 Certainly this problem was not isolated to the 
southern Philippines: colonial masters in plantation societies elsewhere in the world faced 
similar challenges in maintaining a regular labor force in the absence of slavery or some 
other form of coerced labor. Following slave emancipation in Jamaica, for example, 
planters struggled to regain the type of social as well as economic control over their 
workers they had enjoyed under slavery. Former slaves tried to establish freeholdings and 
become market gardeners with only occasional forays into the export economy.632 In the 
Moro Province, where the native population had never been accustomed to plantation 
work, the challenges were perhaps greater. General Wood and his contemporaries 
believed the problem could be solved by simply inculcating new desires and habits in the 
Moros and “wild people,” but American military officials would end up adopting many 
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of the same coercive strategies for securing a steady plantation labor force that colonial 
officials in the Caribbean had also used. 
The animist peoples living in mountain recesses of the Moro Province largely 
existed beyond the reach of the colonial state. In helping persuade them to resettle along 
the coast, military administrators helped support planter priorities. At the same time, 
army officers had reasons of their own for pursuing this course: they wanted to make the 
indigenous population more accessible, or “legible,” to the colonial state. James C. 
Scott’s study of the so-called “stateless peoples” of southeast Asia illuminates the 
processes at work in American colonial policies in Mindanao. Scott argues that many of 
the demographic patterns of southeast Asia reflect the fact that large numbers of people 
have sought, over centuries, to evade the reach of the state and its coercive policies. 
“Living within the state meant, virtually by definition, taxes, conscription, corvée labor, 
and, for most, a condition of servitude; these conditions were at the core of the state’s 
strategic and military advantages,”633 Scott writes. Throughout southeast Asia, stateless 
people were often hill-people; they fled to remote, inaccessible, and mountainous regions 
where it was difficult for the “lowland” states to reach them. Highlighting the state’s 
coercive policies makes it easier to see why many populations have preferred nomadic or 
semi-nomadic lifestyles. Instead of seeing such groups as uncivilized or barbaric, Scott 
argues, we should see their evasion of state living as a “political choice.”634  
In the Moro Province, the increased reach of the state meant additional burdens on 
the Moro and animist peoples. The colonial government imposed new taxes, helping 
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press colonial subjects into wage labor. Those who tried to evade the tax could find 
themselves forced to labor regardless. Shinzo Hayase points out that the imposition of the 
road tax under the American military government complemented planters’ efforts to 
attract workers: “Those who would not work were tried before magistrates and sentenced 
to labour on public works. The introduction of taxes among tribal societies in Mindanao 
created the need for money, which in turn forced an ‘uncivilized’ people to seek 
employment.”635 Furthermore, the establishment of the tribal ward system, touted as a 
means of civilizing the “wild” peoples, was also a means of collecting tax revenue. 
According to Macario Tiu, “The principal function of the tribal ward was to collect the 
annual cedula or head tax amounting to P12.50 for every able-bodied male aged 18-50 
years. If a resident was unable to pay, he could be sentenced to work on the public roads 
for which he received fifty centavos per day to pay off his cedula.”636 Essential to all 
these activities is what Scott calls legibility. Appropriating the resources of a subject 
population, whether through cash, crops or labor, required legibility. “The policy of 
encouraging or imposing legible, agrarian landscapes of appropriation seems hard-wired 
to state-making. It was only such landscapes that were directly beneficial and 
accessible.”637 Hill-people’s swidden agriculture and roving lifestyle posed a challenge to 
the American colonial government’s efforts to make the Moro Province legible for 
extraction and governance purposes. Even census-taking, one of the most fundamental 
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activities of the state, proved difficult among people living in the mountains. The first 
U.S. census of the Moro Province in 1903 estimated there were about a quarter-million 
people living in the province, far fewer than the Spanish figure of 700,000 to a million. 
Historian Peter Gowing suggests that the Americans underestimated the population while 
the Spanish had overestimated it. The discrepancy over the census numbers reflects the 
difficulty of counting and registering such a dispersed – and possibly evasive – 
population. Furthermore, the Moros responded poorly to the census-taking. “The rumor 
spread rapidly that the Americans were going to tax the people and take their land,” 
Gowing writes.638 Such fears were not completely irrational, as the census formed the 
basis of future government efforts to make the Moro Province accessible to colonial 
efforts like taxation.639  
Plantation agriculture contributed to the overall goal of legibility, at least from the 
perspective of the American colonial government. Scott points out that monoculture 
farming, with its settled population of cultivators, makes appropriation by the state, in the 
form of taxation and labor, much easier than the slash-and-burn agriculture practiced by 
many of the hill-people in the Moro Province. Although it was not the official policy of 
the province, some army officers issued edicts requiring the people under their 
jurisdiction to plant cash crops. Before going on a temporary leave, Captain R. O. Van 
Horn of the Seventeenth Infantry made sure to tell his superior, provincial governor 
Leonard Wood, of his orders in this regard. “The verbal order of mine given to all Moros 
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to plant, each and every one of them, a few coconuts and hemp once a month should be 
enforced,” he told Wood. “It will show results in time.”640 Army officers believed export 
agriculture would bring economic development and prosperity, but they also wanted the 
“natives” to take up sedentary living because it accorded with their goals for governing 
the province and exacting tribute from the colonial subjects. For the most part, the goals 
of the colonial government and the goals of the planters overlapped. 
The colonial government’s efforts to resettle the population and support the 
plantation economy placed military officers in frequent contact with the diverse peoples 
of the province. As Bliss wrote, “The governor and his subordinates in their ceaseless 
journeys through the tribal wards constantly preach the doctrine of work.”641 The people 
proved poor converts; most were either indifferent or plainly hostile to these Weberian 
sermons. Yet thanks in part to the indefatigable work of army officers, the plantation 
sector began to make inroads into the province, particularly in Davao. The result, 
however, was not a more peaceful, pacified province. On the contrary, just as planters 
were beginning to enjoy some success in recruiting workers, a conflagration erupted in 
the heart of hemp country.  
“What Men Will Do on a Remote Frontier”: Regulating the Plantation Sector 
 
 In the spring of 1906, Lieutenant Edward C. Bolton, governor of the Davao 
district, began hearing whispers about a new religious movement among some of the 
Muslims and “wild tribes” in his region. He received word that members of several tribes 
were taking part in a new religious dance and even paying admission in order to 
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participate. There were also reports about a witch, Simbanan, who distributed charms 
among the Tagacaolos, one of the major indigenous groups in Davao. Such rumors about 
unknown religious leaders and practices were common enough, but American planters in 
the area were becoming nervous about these large gatherings. Governor Bolton, as the 
military and civil authority in the district, felt obliged to respond to their concerns. He 
investigated and arrested two of the datus, or leaders, involved, but he found no basis for 
alarm.642 Nevertheless, in June he decided to make a tour of the area in question in order 
to personally reassure the planters who had written him “urgent letters.” The night before 
he departed, Bolton wrote a friend, “The American at Malalag thinks his village is going 
to be attacked by Tagacaolos and Manobos, several neighboring planters and the District 
Secretary have gone there but I do not put much stock in this scare rumor. These planters 
pay too much attention to the talk of their irresponsible and imaginative laborers and get 
rather morbid and inclined to look for misfortune.”643 In a show of confidence, Bolton 
decided to travel unarmed, and he even stayed two nights with Mungalayan, a deputy 
tribal headman who had told several people he wanted to kill Bolton. A few days into the 
journey, Bolton set out with another planter, Benjamin Christian, Mungalayan, and 
Mungalayan’s brother to visit plantations in the area. That afternoon, while Bolton and 
Christian took a nap on the beach, they were killed. Officials who saw the aftermath 
described a brutal scene: “each of them were almost decapitated by a single blow from a 
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Bolo or other large knife,” and Bolton’s body was “horribly mutilated.”644 A few days 
later, the army launched a full-scale manhunt for Mungalayan and the witch Simbanan. 
 These murders were not random acts of violence. The assassination of Bolton, 
both a representative of the colonial government and a planter, and Christian, a planter, 
were acts of political resistance. They formed part of a religiously-inflected protest 
movement aimed at eliminating the American presence in the Moro Province. Events 
surrounding the murders, including the army’s response, reveal mounting tensions in 
Davao as the plantation sector and U.S. influence in the region expanded. They also 
expose the deepening fault lines between the colonial state, American emigrants, and the 
indigenous population of the Moro Province.645  
In the days and weeks following the murders, Bliss along with other district 
officials and constabulary officers tried to reconstruct the events and understand what 
triggered the outbreak of violence. As Bolton wrote to a friend right before he left 
headquarters, he had received “urgent letters” from American planters concerned about a 
new religious movement in their area. The district secretary, Orville V. Wood, had 
received similar reports from the planters, and he also traveled to Malalag at the same 
time as Bolton to investigate. On June 9, three days after the murders, Wood reported to 
Bliss that, “This killing was the result of a disturbance existing among these people for 
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the past three or four weeks… Mungalayon and Balawag, the heads of the tribal 
organization, had joined forces and were going to kill all Americans on the coast and rob 
their stores.”646 Panic spread throughout the planter community as news reached them 
about this plot targeting foreigners. Captain Waldo B. Williams, senior inspector of the 
Constabulary, wrote, “reports had reached Malalag, that Mungalayan had threatened to 
kill the Governor and other americans or all the americans [sic] on the south-west coast 
of the Gulf, and had caused some unrest among the planters nearest to him.”647 Bolton 
himself was warned early on that Mungalayan had bragged he was going to kill him and 
Max McCullough, the assistant district governor and a fellow planter. “Governor Bolton 
was convinced that there was no danger, and laughed at the idea of caution,” Wood, the 
district secretary, recounted to Bliss. Wood also “became sure that there was not much 
truth” in the rumors about a murder plot and returned to Davao, while Bolton set off for 
Malalag, planning to travel unarmed through Mungalayan’s ward.648 Bliss blamed Bolton 
in part for exposing himself to such danger. “Bolton’s death seems to have been due to 
over-confidence,” he wrote General Leonard Wood. “It seems to be difficult for officers 
in such situations to show all outward signs of confidence and at the same time be 
carefully on their guard.”649 Mungalayan, meanwhile, might have regained his self-
confidence through the murder of Bolton. Reports came in that “he boasted afterwards, 
‘Now that I have killed the American Governor I am a man again.’”650 Other reports said 
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that Mungalayan and his brothers told another native named Lumbanan that “they had 
killed the two Americans and were again brave men.”651  
Tensions within the colonial power structure had contributed to the murder plot. 
The province’s Legislative Council had created a “tribal ward system” as a way to 
incorporate the indigenous people into the colonial government. The council crafted two 
different political structures: “municipalities” for the more urbanized and “civilized” 
inhabitants and “tribal wards” for the supposedly less civilized people, namely Muslims 
and members of animist or “pagan” tribes. Thus approximately 65,000 “civilized” people, 
including Christian Filipinos, Americans, and other expatriates, lived in municipalities. 
The majority of the population, however, was organized into 51 tribal wards throughout 
Moro Province. A district governor presided over all the tribal wards in his district, and 
he appointed a “headman to be his representative or deputy.” Each headman was then 
authorized to appoint deputies who “constituted the police force of the respective 
wards.”652 The wards theoretically encompassed, as far as possible, a single “tribe” or 
ethnic group, and the headman was supposed to represent that group. For example, the 
Bagobos, one of the so-called “wild tribes,” in a district were assigned into one ward, and 
the Moros to another. The stated purpose of the tribal-ward system was to introduce 
limited opportunities for self-government among the Moro people. General Bliss noted, 
“In the appointment of the headman preference is given, unless there are strong reasons 
for the contrary, to that member of the race or tribe within the ward who is recognized by 
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the people as their chief.”653 Headmen and their deputies received a salary from the 
American government, and they enjoyed influence and latitude over the tribespeople in 
their ward. Patricio Abinales writes, “These wards, together with the tribal courts, were 
also envisioned to assist provincial authorities in making possible the transition mainly by 
the Muslim groups from the religious (i.e., Islamic) savagery to ‘western’ civilization.”654 
The tribal ward system also supported planters’ goal of securing a dependable labor 
force. As Hayase writes, “The machinery of the tribal ward was seen as a handy device 
for recruiting and organizing a plantation labour force.”655  
Bolton was in the process of establishing the tribal wards in Davao before his 
death. According to Colonel W. S. Scott, director of the fifth district of the constabulary, 
Bolton had set up the Tagacolo tribal ward in February 1906. He appointed Balawag as 
the headman and made Mangalayan his deputy. Furthermore, he “placed him, a Tagacolo, 
in charge of a settlement of Manobos.” In the coming months planters in the vicinity 
began to hear rumors from their workers about plots to assassinate both Bolton and Max 
McCullough, a planter who also served as the assistant district governor under Bolton. 
McCullough was in charge of the Tagacolo ward, even though Balawag and Mangalayan 
had been made headmen and deputy headmen, respectively. Scott wrote in his report, 
“The mutterings grew louder and extended to the proposed killing and robbing of all 
Americans from Digos to Kibulan. The planters became alarmed and reported these 
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things to the authorities in Davao.”656 These were the rumors that Bolton thought were 
exaggerated, but he was investigating them at the time he was killed.  
American military officials believed that Mungayalan, unhappy about his loss of 
power and prestige under this new tribal ward organization, killed Bolton and Christian 
out of jealousy. Yet there are conflicting reports regarding Mungayalan’s specific 
governmental position. Scott, the constabulary director, reported that he was a deputy 
headman of the Tagacola ward but in charge, under McCullough, of the Manobos. Shinzo 
Hayase writes that “traditional tribal social organization was swept aside and replaced 
with a single headman -- a European planter.”657 Constabulary inspector Williams wrote, 
“Mungalayan is ‘headman’ of the Tagacaola Tribal Ward, and lives near Malalag, he has 
for some time past had a dislike for Governor Bolton, and, Mr. McCullough, who is 
assistant to the Provincial Governor, and whose territory is the Tagacaola Tribal Ward.” 
Yet most reports state that Mungalayan resented the diminution of his stature under the 
Americans. Even if local tribespeople were placed in positions of nominal authority 
within the tribal ward system, they may well have felt that American planters such as 
Bolton, McCullough, and Christian actually held the reins of power. Bliss reported to his 
superior, Leonard Wood, now commander of the army’s Philippines Division, “Bolton’s 
body was horribly mutilated while that of Christian was not touched except by the blow 
that killed him, this gives some countenance to the story the that Mungalayan had a 
personal feeling against Bolton. The reports all agree in saying that Mungalayan had 
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repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with his position, apparently thinking that he was 
losing his influence and becoming degraded in the eyes of his people.”658 Bliss noted in a 
private letter to his wife that Mungalayan was “jealous of [Bolton’s] influence,” and that 
is why he killed him.659  
Bolton’s death raised questions about whether white officials, particularly 
planters, should serve as headmen. Bliss initially justified the decision to appoint 
foreigners as tribal headmen in Davao. The people of Davao, he said, were not ready for 
the responsibility of appointing an indigenous headman. “This organization of the wild 
tribes into tribal wards is a delicate matter, and is effective only when the people so 
organized have become somewhat acquainted with the white man and understanding 
something of his methods of government,” Bliss wrote. “There are 14 tribes within the 
district of Davao, and in them all there is not one datto whose influence extends over any 
large area, nor is there any tribe which acknowledges any one man as its head. They seem 
to have perfect confidence in a white man and are well content to take his orders, but 
their tribal customs make them unwilling to have one of their own people over them.” In 
light of Bolton’s recent murder, Bliss’ remark that the tribespeople had “perfect 
confidence in a white man” seems far-fetched. At the same time, the general also 
acknowledged that appointing planters as district officials also heightened jealousies and 
sparked conflicts, and years after Bolton’s murder he took steps to limit this practice 
(discussed below).  
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As reports came in regarding Bolton’s death, an official narrative vindicating the 
American military project in the Moro Province began to take shape. Stories about 
Mungalayan’s vendetta against Bolton made the event appear isolated, the result of 
personal jealousy rather than widespread opposition to the presence of Americans in the 
Davao region. In the 1906 military report, submitted to the secretary of war, Bolton’s 
murder was characterized as an exceptional incident – one that actually reflected the 
army’s accomplishments in the Moro Province rather than any underlying hostility 
toward the American military project. Bliss, writing this time in his role as brigadier-
general commanding the Department of Mindanao rather than as the governor of the 
Moro Province, portrayed the murders as the result of Bolton’s success rather than the 
weakness of his position: “Certain headmen became jealous of Lieutenant Bolton’s 
growing prestige and influence among their people. They feared, naturally enough, the 
ultimate loss of all their power, sapped away not by military force, but by the patient and 
tactful methods of a man born to be the leader of such people out of barbarism.” Bliss 
described Bolton as a “man of rare genius,” and he praised him for his ability to convince 
tribespeople to come down from the “mountain jungles” and settle along the coast where 
they “were beginning to learn the value of labor.”660 Bolton, he argued, was killed 
because he was becoming too popular among the people of his district. For Bliss, anxious 
to vindicate the army’s mission in Mindanao, it was essential that the Bolton incident be 
attributed to the jealousy of one man and his influence among a small group, rather than 
indicative of any larger movement among the indigenous people. General Wood agreed. 
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He summed up the matter simply in a letter to Bliss: “I look at the killing of poor Bolton 
as simply a case of murder, and do not attach any special significance to it as indicating 
an uprising on the part of the people around the Gulf.”661 
Despite such vehement denials of an “uprising,” the army took vigorous steps to 
squash what, in the days following the deaths of Bolton and Benjamin, began to look like 
exactly that. In his initial report of June 9, the plantation manager and district official O. 
V. Wood estimated Mungalayan’s supporters at between seventy and one-hundred and 
twenty. The next day, however, he wrote again to Bliss with new information: “I 
underestimated the strength of Mungalayon in my report of yesterday… Each day he is 
getting more recruits and the longer this is allowed to run the more trouble there will be 
in suppressing it.” Wood had gone with Max McCullough, another planter as well as the 
assistant district governor, four Americans (most likely planters), and a small contingent 
of constabulary to McCullough’s plantation, the Davao Trading and Development 
Company in Kibulan. There they found the plantation store “sacked.” The day before 
Mungalayan and the “witch” Simbanan arrived with two hundred men who “in about 2 
hours got together about P1500 worth of cloth and rice which they carried back to the 
hills.” McCullough had been mentioned along with Bolton as a potential target, so it was 
unsurprising that they would go to his plantation for supplies and reinforcements. The 
murders had bolstered Mungalayan’s support among the people. According to Wood, 
“All the bad men along the coast were waiting to see whether the ‘medicine’ was going to 
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work against the Americans. When Governor Bolton, and Mr. Christian were killed all 
these men went to Mungalayon. Thus, he is well supported.”662  
As the army and constabulary forces pursued Mungalayan and his cohort, 
evidence of a larger conspiracy – one with a religious flavor – emerged. O. V. Wood 
telegrammed to Bliss early on, “No motives for killing except incitement of Simbanan, a 
witch.”663 Later, following the robbery at McCullough’s plantation, he reported, 
“Simbanan is furnishing them all with charms to enable them to kill Americans.” These 
charms were likely the “medicine” that, apparently, had worked against Bolton and 
Christian. But the movement was not isolated to Simbanan and his associates. Captain 
Williams of the constabulary reported that “Religious fanatics have been working all 
around the Gulf, during the last month; dancing and other demonstrations have been held 
in many places.”664 Likewise, Wood telegrammed Bliss that a “religious craze has 
extended all over the gulf.” He requested a launch, one thousand rounds of ammunition 
for .38 revolvers and ten Krag carbines as “absolutely necessary to meet emergencies.”665 
The extent of the religious activity in the gulf became more apparent to officials as the 
pursuit of Mungalayan lagged. Two weeks after the murders, George T. Langhorne, 
captain of the U.S. Eleventh Cavalry and secretary of the Moro Province, was 
investigating the rumors about this new dance “craze.” He wrote, “Have been to Davao 
and have visited several places, where Anitos are said to have been exciting the people 
and selling them charms, etc.” Now it was not only Simbanan, but other anitos, or 
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spiritualists, all over the gulf who were disseminating the talismans of this new religion. 
Langhorne assured Bliss that they had “the worst agitators in jail at Davao,” but several 
datus continued to host these dancing rituals at their homes. He commented ruefully, 
“Bolton did not realize the influence of Simbanan, and the degree to which the credulity 
of the people could be worked upon. He was warned by everyone but laughed at them 
all.” It was clear to Langhorne, at least, that Bolton had underestimated the threat that 
Simbanan and his followers posed to American interests in Davao.666  
 The army, with support from the constabulary, launched an offensive that resulted 
in the death of Mungalayan in early August as well as the arrest and interrogation of 
many others. This investigation, relying on a network of “spies,” uncovered a growing 
movement aimed at expelling not only Americans but all foreigners from Davao. Bliss 
described “a combination, which was getting more and more widespread” well before 
Bolton’s murder; the movement apparently included not only Moros (Muslims) but “the 
wild tribes,” too, although officials had not been able to establish a concrete link between 
the two groups. As part of the investigation, officers had rounded up a number of datus 
from the region and put them “under surveillance,” although not under arrest. Eventually 
one confessed to being part of a conspiracy, “the ultimate object of [which] was to kill or 
drive out all the Americans and Spaniards and then to enslave the Filipinos and the wild 
tribes. He said that the first step, when everything was right for the movement, would be 
the death of Governor Bolton.” After the initial confession, another 25 or 30 datus 
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confessed to the same account.667 This movement centered around a spiritual dance in 
which participants worshipped a god named “Lavi” or “Labi.” W. S. Scott, the 
constabulary director, reported that this god “would also bring good crops and plenty of 
fish; bolos and axes would do their work while the Moros sat by; fishing even with a 
short rod would be productive of plenty of fish; sickness would disappear, etc.” 
Participants made donations in order to curry the favor of Lavi, and a school had been 
established to train practitioners.668 It was not entirely clear to the Americans that this 
dance movement, which Bolton had also been investigating on his last journey, was 
directly related to Mungalayan and Simbanan, the healer. Scott wrote, “it is possible that 
these two schemes were connected…but we have so far absolutely failed to establish 
such connection.” In recent years, a scholar in the Philippines researching these events 
through interviews with present-day inhabitants of the Davao region and descendants of 
those involved in these religious practices has concluded that they were indeed related 
movements.669 
Bliss’s account of the movement reveals the seriousness with which officials 
regarded the religious practices of the natives as well as limitations in officials’ 
understanding of the people they governed. Bolton knew about “the spread of a dancing 
craze among the Moros,” and before his death he arrested two datus believed to be 
involved. Nevertheless, he failed to understand the networks of people involved or the 
purpose of the movement. Bliss wrote, “The strictest inquiry which he could make 
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developed nothing beyond the declaration that it was purely a religious movement. 
[Bolton] believed that there was something underneath it, because with these people the 
sudden development of a fanatical religious spirit always has some political object.” 
Certainly in this case there was a “political object” involved. Strangely, however, when 
Bolton heard about “the spread of unrest among the wild tribes, he did not connect it in 
any way with the religious craze among the Moros.”670 Failing to guess that both the 
Tagacaolos and the Moros might find solidarity in their animosity toward the Americans, 
Bolton proceeded recklessly, meeting his death. American officials took steps to squash 
the movement quickly. Bliss believed that the movement had spread over a wide 
geographic area, from Davao down the coast to Padada, a community nearly fifty miles 
south of Davao. Even more disturbing, the conspirators were well supplied with arms. 
“Everywhere that we have been we have found the natives in possession of bamboo tubes 
full of ammunition which they have purchased from [American planters] Cook and 
Watson.”671 Their plot had proceeded from the planning stage to stockpiling firepower. 
For army officers like Bliss and Bolton, the ghost-dance movement among the 
Sioux and the Wounded Knee massacre of 1890 came quickly to mind when trying to 
make sense of these religious movements in the Philippines. In his annual report to the 
secretary of war, Bliss drew on an analogy that would have been all too familiar to his 
military contemporaries: “By ways not unlike in principle the ghost-dance craze among 
the American Indians, [Mungalayan and his supporters] fomented among some of their 
people, but by no means among all, a feeling of hostility against the American and 
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foreign planters.”672 Bliss referenced the Sioux Ghost Dance, knowing that his audience 
would understand the importance of his command’s strong response to the potential 
threat posed by the religious movement fomenting in Davao.673 It was not the first time 
military or colonial officials had emphasized the Moros’ religious fervor or linked it to 
the Sioux uprising. Earlier the same year, after the horrific slaughter of Moros at Bud 
Dajo, Dean Worcester, secretary of the interior, declared, “It was no more possible to 
avoid killing women and children here than it was to avoid killing them in the Wounded 
Knee fight in the United States.” General Wood believed all the Moros at Bud Dajo, 
including the women and children, were “religious fanatics,” which is why they were also 
killed along with the male fighters.674 Likewise, Bliss and his contemporaries began to 
understand the uprising in Davao in terms of a “religious craze.” 
The relationship between the army’s perception of the Moros and Native 
Americans remains a murky subject for historians. It can be easy to put too much 
emphasis on the parallels contemporaries drew between colonial subjects like the Moros 
and the army’s erstwhile enemies in the American West. Historian Paul Kramer advises 
caution in this area. Too often, Kramer argues, scholars have assumed that ideas formed 
in the domestic context – in relation to Native Americans, African-Americans, or 
Chinese, for example – were applied wholesale to colonial peoples. “Transfer, export, 
projection – the Philippines as seen through Indian territory – were not reflexive or 
default responses, but strategies in particular contests whose terrain, combatants, and 
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stakes merit historical inquiry.”675 Kramer is rightly skeptical of attempts to explain U.S. 
policy and actions in the Moro Province entirely in terms of precedents learned in battle 
against Native Americans, but here Bliss’ invocation of the Sioux Ghost Dance points in 
a valuable direction. Bliss and Bolton were alarmed by the Davao dance movement not 
simply because they assumed its practitioners were dangerous savages, but because they 
recognized the political portent of the movement. Army officers remembered the Sioux 
Ghost Dance as a time when a religious response to American military policy had ended 
in violence and bloodshed. In making this comparison, Bliss acknowledged that the 
protest embodied in the Davao dance was similar to that expressed by the ghost dancers 
at Wounded Knee.  
Like the dance movement in Davao, the Sioux Ghost Dance represents a 
particular type of religious and political expression in a distinctly colonial setting. Jeffrey 
Ostler, in his study of Wounded Knee, argues that the Sioux Ghost Dance must be 
understood in the context of the U.S. army’s colonial project in the American West. 
Furthermore, he relates it to other religious movements in comparable settings 
worldwide. The ghost dancers’ “project of cultural revival resisted government policies 
of assimilation and imagined nothing less than the end of colonial relations,” Ostler 
writes. “Like many similar movements throughout the world, then, the Ghost Dance is 
best understood as an anticolonial movement.”676 While perhaps the best known by U.S. 
scholars, the Sioux Ghost Dance was far from the only such movement. Joel W. Martin 
has advocated moving “before and beyond” the Sioux Ghost Dance to consider other 
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“prophetic” and “millenarian” movements. Surveying a variety of Native American 
movements, he finds that these prophetic religions “emerged most often within the kind 
of unequal and exploitative relations that characterized full-fledged colonialism.” At the 
same time, Martin stresses that while these movements often arise out of difficult and 
violent periods, they reflect native people’s resilience and creativity.677  
The dance movement in Davao in 1906, while arising out of specific local 
conditions, also shares many similarities with other “messianic movements” across the 
world in the nineteenth and twentieth century.678 It was not even the only such event in 
Davao during the American occupation. A brief account of a similar disturbance further 
underlines the relationship between religious expression and anticolonial politics in the 
Moro Province. In 1908, a plot was uncovered in Mati, another town in Davao, that 
centered around a religious dance also called the “Labi.” Some two hundred Moros 
gathered regularly for months to dance and worship a new deity, “a ‘True God’ who 
would help them to destroy their enemies, [and] raise good crops without manual labor.” 
Further investigations revealed that animists as well as Moros were attending these 
dances. To the considerable alarm of American officials, the adherents testified that “they 
had organized a company of soldiers of forty-four (44) men…for the purpose of killing 
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the Municipal officials and an American planter, Mr. Henry Hubbell, of Nayo; after 
which it was thought it would be an easy matter, under the protection of their God, to set 
up a government and administer affairs as they saw it.”679 Yet again, the issue of work 
was central: the new god promised to relieve its acolytes of the burdens of manual labor. 
The end goal of this religious movement was political revolution, the expulsion of 
Americans, and the establishment of a new, indigenous government. 
While small-scale local events, these “dances” and “plots” connect Davao to a 
larger constellation of anticolonial politics globally. They show how people in Mindanao 
shared in the common experiences of personal and communal dislocation, political and 
economic disruption, and the social upheaval that accompanied both the spread of 
European and U.S. colonialism and capitalism around the globe. While we know far less 
about these events in rural Mindanao than we do about more famous events like the 
Sioux Ghost Dance, it is clear from army officers’ accounts – and the anxiety and 
apprehension they felt – that even these minor gatherings threatened to unleash a deep 
reserve of anticolonial and anti-American feeling. These movements were dangerous 
because they helped organize adherents for particular political ends: the murders of 
Bolton and Christian on the one hand, but also the unfulfilled plot to kill planters and 
officials and establish a new government in 1908. It is not difficult to discern the 
“political object” of these religions: they aimed at the violent overthrow of the American 
planter-military establishment and the empowerment of the religious movements’ 
adherents. Army officials recognized the political nature of the dance movement, but they 
also discounted the political understanding of the indigenous people who took part in it. 
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By classifying it as a “craze” and portraying the Moros as “fanatics,” like the Sioux in 
their own American West, men like Bliss were able to discount the political legitimacy of 
the movement. Yet even in their official reports, American officials connected these 
uprisings to the social and political changes they were instituting. Scott, the constabulary 
officer, noted that among the reasons Mungalayan may have killed Bolton was that he 
“resented the discipline which was being placed on him and his people by restricting their 
roving from place to place and being required to settle down in a particular locality. This 
seems probable from the fact that the resentment extended to Mr. McCullough, the 
official directly in charge of the Tagacolo tribal ward.”680 Indeed, the political 
restructuring of the tribal wards, intended to supply American planters with labor by 
“settling” the population near the plantations, had inflamed tensions and led to the 
assassination of two people responsible for the economic and political changes taking 
place in the gulf region. 
In the short term, the army responded to the murders of Bolton and Christian by 
containing whatever threat the perpetrators posed. They moved first to track down 
Mungalayan and Simbanan, and then began rounding up suspected datus and extracting 
intelligence from them about potential conspiracies. Yet even before U.S. forces reported 
Mungalayan killed by soldiers of the 6th Infantry on August 3, the army began to 
consider the possibility that relations between planters and the local population deserved 
their attention.681 Bolton himself, after all, was aware of allegations of planter abuse in 
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his district. In a letter to a friend written just days before his murder, the district governor 
alluded to a volatile situation in Digos. There, an American was said to be “threatening 
and abusing his laborers” and had “threatened to kill some of them.” The threats were 
linked to a larger, nefarious plot: the plantation foreman, O. B. Watkins, was attempting 
to intimidate the workers “for the evidence they [gave] concerning the sale of gun powder 
and firearms.”682 Apparently a group of American planters, including the president of the 
esteemed Davao Planters Association, had been importing arms and powder and selling it 
to the indigenous people. The plot was exposed a few months later, after Bolton’s 
murder, and the ringleaders deported from the province.683 Bolton, however, was aware 
of the general outlines of the plot by late May, and he told his friend he planned to 
investigate and “hope[d] to heavens sake the District can be gotten rid of Cook and his 
gang” (the arms-dealers).684 
Tensions between planters and natives were not isolated to this one incident, 
however. W. S. Scott was the first to suggest that the mistreatment of indigenous workers 
by Americans was widespread and may have contributed to the outbreak of violence in 
Davao. “There are rumors of fanatical preachers elsewhere but our investigation does not 
prove that they have exercised any influence on the situation,” Scott wrote to Bliss on 
June 22. Whereas other reports stressed the “incitement” of Simbanan and the deleterious 
influence of new religious ideas on the people, Scott saw more earthly factors at work. “I 
believe that further investigation will prove that other influences have been at work to 
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cause trouble, namely; abuses of the people by the planters, regarding land for one thing 
and maltreating them in other cases.” Scott wanted to investigate, but quietly: “I state this 
to you confidentially as [these rumors] have not yet been substantiated and may not be.” 
He suggested a “careful investigation” and counseled discretion in looking into the 
matter.685 
Something about Scott’s letter struck a chord with Bliss. By mid-June, he had 
read the letter from Bolton to Poillon – “probably the last letter that Bolton wrote” – 
describing the events in Digos and he was aware of threats and intimidation used against 
indigenous workers.686 Even while the search for Mungalayan was ongoing, Bliss asked 
Scott to “carefully and quietly investigate” relations between the planters and their 
laborers. He agreed that it was “very probable” that the planters’ “harsh treatment of 
natives” was part of the reason the natives resented and disliked Americans. In light of 
recent events, it was clear to Bliss as well as Scott that the way planters treated their labor 
force had repercussions for the success of the army’s colonial project in the Moro 
Province. Bliss admitted that he would not be surprised to learn that the planters 
mistreated their workers. “We all know what men will do on a remote frontier, where 
they are removed from the immediate operation of law and from observation and 
criticism, and whose only object is to make money as rapidly as possible,” Bliss wrote. 
“The universal experience has been that they will oppress the native to the extent that 
their opportunities make possible.” Bliss’s admission that planters – American planters – 
would be likely to abuse their workers presents a sharp contrast from the official 
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discourse of military officers concerning the plantation economy. Instead of making 
boosterish claims about the benefits of labor to the progress of civilization, Bliss admitted 
that there was a real danger of plunging the natives into misery on the new plantations. 
He continued, “I am very much afraid that if close attention is not paid to this we will 
find that we have permitted a system of peonage or slavery to grow up under American 
auspices, although that is one of the very things that we are here to prevent.” The army 
retained control of the Moro Province on the pretext of ending slavery, but American 
planters, left to their own devices, may have been perpetuating similar systems of bound 
labor.687  
The quiet inquiry launched by Bliss highlights a fault line dividing the province’s 
military administrators and the planter class. He instructed Scott to find out  
the extent to which native laborers are held under contract, and whether native 
laborers are held under contract, and whether attempts on their part to break such 
contract leads to threats or actual ill treatment from the planters. Do the planters 
pay money wages? Do they expect the natives to spend their money at plantation 
stores? Do they work for their chow and such supplies as the planters give 
them?688  
 
Bliss and Scott were not the first army officers to find themselves as arbiters between 
capital and labor in a plantation setting. A similar range of questions might have occurred 
to a Freedmen’s Bureau agent investigating conditions of peonage on a southern cotton 
plantation in the 1870s. Information did trickle back to Bliss from various sources. He 
received a memo, for example, from A. R. Decker, a stenographer working for the 
provincial government. Decker had heard about Bliss’s inquiry, and he wrote the general 
with some information he had come across while copying financial statements of the 
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Culamen Company, a plantation located in Davao. Under the company’s “assets,” 
Decker had found an item “Credit sales to workmen, P801.38.” Decker wrote Bliss, “The 
above mentioned item of sales to workmen would seem to indicate that these natives 
were in debt to their employers, and as you know, there is little chance of their ever 
getting out. This, I presume, might be called a sort of ‘peonage’ system.”689 It is unknown 
whether or how Bliss responded to this discovery, but he continued to mull over the 
problem of planter-native relations. 
 Bliss’s investigation led him to a broad critique of economic conditions in Davao. 
In late July, he wrote General Wood to report his firm conviction that labor troubles were 
at the root of the Davao disturbance. He told Wood that just a few days after Bolton’s 
murder, he began to hear reports that “confirmed a growing suspicion that…some of the 
planters (of all nationalities) were responsible for some part of the evident feeling of 
hostility of the native tribes.” Bliss again referred to a type of “universal” behavior that 
might explain the planter-native relations. “Knowing a little of human nature, anyone 
could reason out pretty accurately the kind of relations that in some cases had grown up 
between the planters and their native laborers.” The problem, according to Bliss, arose 
from the economic imperatives at work on the Davao plantations.  
The planters are absolutely dependent on the uncertain labor of the natives for 
their financial success. As you know, they cannot keep these natives at work 
unless the latter are perpetually in debt. For some strange reason, the native will 
stick at his job so long as he is in debt; otherwise he will work for a few days and 
then at a critical period of the crop will go off into the mountains for a month, 
leaving the planter in the lurch, and there is no doubt that even while working off 
his debt (which he never succeeds in doing) he frequently attempts to desert the 
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planter and take to the hills, a movement which the latter prevents only by 
threats, and possibly in some cases, by ill-treatment.690 
 
In short, the planters needed workers more than the natives needed the planters. While the 
army had enjoyed some limited success in getting the tribespeople to settle in the coastal 
areas in closer proximity to the plantations, such movements did not always ensure that 
the workers would stay at work throughout the season. Agricultural work, which depends 
so much on labor at certain critical moments of the season, required a reliable labor force. 
The indigenous people of Davao, who had sustained themselves quite independently from 
plantation agriculture for centuries, did not need the wages or support of planters, 
accounting for their propensity to “take to the hills” when it suited them. The 
mountainous terrain in Mindanao presented many potential hideaways where indigenous 
people could find cover from the planters – maroon communities beyond the reach of the 
Americans. Bliss recognized that planters would resort to “ill treatment” in order to keep 
their workers; many, after all, had strong financial motives for doing so. Bliss noted that 
“very few of them have any capital. They must begin to earn money at the earliest 
possible moment or they lose money.” He also acknowledged that “some of the planters 
are rather rough characters,” which combined with the profit motive led to “native ill-
feeling.”691  
 Oral histories recorded in the Davao region confirm that many indigenous people 
did not want to work on the plantations. In 2000, a descendant of a Spanish planter told 
an interviewer, “They (planters) needed people to work, but they could not make the 
natives work. The natives would not work….The natives did not like to work because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690 Bliss to General Wood, 25 July 1906, Vol. 44, Bliss Papers, LC. 
691 Bliss to General Wood, 25 July 1906, Vol. 44, Bliss Papers, LC. Emphasis in original. 
	   	  
	  
	  
343 
they had everything in the forest. Plenty of fish in the river, and in the sea.”692 Literature 
scholar Macario Tiu points out the labor required would have been extremely arduous. 
The Americans were endeavoring to establish plantations in the forests, ordering their 
workers to fell ancient trees and then pull them out of the soil. Another informant 
described the suffering of his grandfather, a member of one of the so-called pagan tribes: 
“Anybody they met, they arrested and then made to work. They were supplied with food. 
Rice, dried fish. But if you ask them, they did not like that kind of work because it was 
very hard.” Punishments were swift. “And then if it took too long to uproot the tree, the 
American would get angry. And then he would remove two men, and then whip them 
with the ikog sa pagi (tail of the manta ray).” Workers ran away, but if they were 
apprehended they were put in prison. According to this informant, runaways who were 
captured were “tied up and put in the cage with the chickens. With the chicken shit.”693  
The 1906 murders alerted Bliss to the potential for abuse inherent in the planter-
native relationship. He saw that planters exercised considerable influence over their 
workers and recognized that such influence could lead to resentment and, ultimately, 
violence. In time, Bliss became even more outspoken in his condemnation of planters 
who attempted to coerce and intimidate their workers. In early 1907, he wrote Wood with 
concerns that planters were discouraging the indigenous people from having 
freeholdings, believing that any attempt on their part to work their own land would 
detract from the labor pool available on the plantations. The planters, according to Bliss, 
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“make a protest against any effort to have the natives take up land and cultivate it for 
themselves. Of course the Government cannot sustain them in that view, and if it were 
believed in the United States that that is the attitude of American settlers towards the 
natives, it would not be tolerated for a moment. It would mean that the only chance of 
success here is to keep the natives in a state of peonage.” Bliss told the Davao Planters 
Association at one of their meetings that it would be to their advantage to encourage the 
natives to settle near the plantations and to pay them in cash. He also explained to Wood 
that improved hemp-stripping machines would eventually alter the relationship between 
planters and workers. In time, Bliss believed, Mindanao would resemble sugar-growing 
regions of Cuba where the “Central” bought sugar from “the Colono.” In the Moro 
Province, the planters with the machinery would buy hemp grown by natives on their 
small plots. The planters “would then find how much to their interest it will have been to 
have encouraged the native in the habit of working his own land,” Bliss wrote.694 
Despite Bliss’s inquiries, allegations of abuse continued to reach his desk. In the 
fall of 1908, a few Davao planters, including Fred Lewis and I. H. Rogers, inquired about 
legislation that would enable them to enforce their labor contracts with locals. Bliss wrote 
that Lewis and Rogers “plainly expressed desire to have legislation enacted or present 
legislation so construed as to practically bring about a condition of peonage or debt 
slavery in the District of Davao.”695 Provincial officials reacted strongly against these 
petitions. The provincial attorney, Richard Campbell, provided the legal argument against 
such legislation, writing simply that “no right of action exists against these men [the 
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workers] other than the ordinary civil suit for breach of contract.” But Campbell did not 
leave the matter at that: he explained that even the suggestion of such legislation flew in 
the face of the U.S. Constitution. The attorney perceived in the request some idea that 
labor contracts in the islands, or among non-white people, might be treated differently – 
an idea he roundly condemned.  
There is no provision of existing law in the Philippine Islands or in the United 
States, or in any other civilized country, by which one man can be compelled 
against his will to work for another. The law makes no distinction in this respect 
between white men, brown men, wild men, Christians or non-Christians. Neither 
is there any law permitting imprisonment for debt. Imprisonment for debt is 
prohibited in express terms by the constitution of the United States, and this 
provision of the Constitution is specifically applied to the Philippine Islands by 
the Act of congress of July 1, 1902. No native there fore, can be compelled to 
work for a white man or for any other employer of labor unless said white man or 
employer can convince the native that it is to his advantage to do so.  
 
Here Campbell went further than merely stating the law as it applied to this case; he 
expressed his own sense of outrage over the potential for abuse inherent in the inquiry. 
“Americans ought not to ask for more than this. To penalize the class of cases set forth in 
the attached letter would be simply to restore the old system of Datu debt slavery, the 
eradication and suppression of which has been the principal and underlying cause of half 
the blood shed in the Moro Province since American occupation.”696  
 The issue of slavery remained uppermost in colonial officials’ understanding of 
the province and their role in administering it, even in 1908. Any suggestion that such 
relations were being reinstated under American auspices would embarrass the colonial 
authorities and threaten the imperial project itself. Bliss, writing the district governor of 
Davao, Allen Walker, declared that the planters’ letters “would be a disgrace to a Georgia 
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slave-driver seventy-five years ago. They indicate the exact spirit of a slave-driver.” 
Bliss did not believe that such feelings and ideas were widespread, but he thought their 
publication would play into the hands of “certain unscrupulous agitators” who would like 
to get the district – or possibly the province – “turned over to the Philippine Assembly.” 
Such agitators had used “this very question of maltreatment of natives, whether Filipinos 
or wild people” and the issue of “debt slavery” as evidence of the need to place the Moro 
Province under the control of the Philippine Assembly. Bliss urged Walker to talk to the 
other planters and point out that their best interests would be served by rooting out bad 
planters. He thought there might be “one or two isolated cases” – perhaps men like 
Rogers and Lewis – who indeed wanted to reestablish such a system of peonage, but 
these men could tarnish the reputation of all the planters. He suggested that Walker “in 
conversation with planters individually, and when you meet them collectively at their 
Association meetings” should “constantly impress upon them the danger which threatens 
their entire body by the actions of one or two people.” Beyond this, Bliss himself 
threatened to take action against abusive planters. “ If such a thing should again be 
brought to my attention as the deliberate statement of a planter that he has whipped a 
native, the Government of the Moro Province will direct his arrest and punishment, not 
by a fine in a tribal ward court, but by prosecution before a Court of First Instance.”697 
 Bliss promised to use judicial authority against erring planters because he 
believed the integrity of the political system should be prioritized above the short-term 
interests of planters. He asserted that the U.S. army, as both the military and political 
authority in the province, needed to stand apart from both planters and natives, 
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representing a neutral bureaucratic power. Yet Bliss found, much to his chagrin, that 
other military officials – namely his superior, Leonard Wood – did not share his vision of 
a clean divide between planters and officialdom. Not long after Bolton’s murder, Bliss 
began to express misgivings about planters serving in political office. In January 1907, 
the governor communicated with Wood about complaints made by planters about their 
workers being enticed away. It turned out that the planters had exaggerated their concerns 
and misrepresented what the constabulary officer had told the natives. “The whole 
trouble grows out of the fact that public officials engage in business within the limits of 
their districts.” Bliss told Wood, “I know that your view has been that this should be 
encouraged, and I admit the arguments in favor of it. But it does not work out well in 
practice, – at least in these places where there is keen competition. As you know, the 
burning question in the Davao District is the want of labor.” Bliss went on to explain that 
the district officials had been “making every effort to get the wild tribes to come down 
from the mountains and settle along the coast.” This was in keeping with the goals of the 
province. But officials who were also planters themselves may have been using their 
influence to persuade the indigenous people to settle near their own properties. “If that 
official happens to have a hemp plantation in that locality it is immediately charged by all 
the other planters (and with tolerably good reason) that he is using his official influence 
to secure labor for his own plantation,” Bliss wrote. “This has been the cause of the 
charges and counter-charges that have been made in the Davao District for the last two 
years. It was the sole cause of poor Bolton’s trouble.” He went on to name several 
officials who had been accused of using their political positions in order to harness labor 
for their own operations. Bliss wrote pragmatically, “It makes no difference whether an 
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official uses his power wrongfully or not. All the other planters believe that he does do 
so.” The appearance of a conflict of interest was enough to undermine the neutrality of 
the government, and Bliss badly wanted the provincial government to appear law-abiding 
and disinterested. Despite Bliss’s forceful arguments, Wood remained unconvinced. In 
fact, he insisted on the contrary that officials who were also engaged in business would 
be more committed to doing beneficial work there. “We want to get men who are 
interested in the country and who will grow up with it,” Wood wrote. Besides, the 
overlap between business and politics was certainly not unique to the Moro Province. 
“They do the same thing all over the United States; in fact, many of the important public 
offices are held by men whose real occupation is outside,” Wood wrote. “I have found, as 
a rule, that a man who goes into agriculture in the Moro Province strongly advocates 
good order, the building up of business, and improvement of conditions in his vicinity.” 
Wood said nothing of whether such men also advocated coercing their workers through 
debt and intimidation. Instead he said simply, “I am not inclined to think that any of our 
officials have abused their authority.”698  
 Bliss did not succeed in changing Wood’s mind, and Wood continued to insist 
that planters made good district officials. Bliss, however, exercised considerable 
influence over the appointment of officials to positions within the provincial government. 
In a letter marked “confidential,” Bliss instructed the district governor of Davao that 
planters would not be appointed as tribal ward headmen. Again deploying arguments 
about the appearance of impropriety, Bliss insisted that headmen should be members of 
the tribes they were intended to represent. It was not that he believed natives were 
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superior in ability to American planters; on the contrary, he admitted that it would be 
better from the standpoint of government if white men dominated positions of political 
authority. “If you ask me the question ‘Is it not better to appoint well qualified Americans 
or Europeans to these positions than to appoint ignorant natives?’ my answer is ‘From the 
theoretical point of view that course is undoubtedly the wisest.’ But we have to consider 
the question from the point of view of practical politics.” Practical politics dictated that 
the provincial government had to avoid the appearance that planters enjoyed unseemly 
power. Again Bliss worried about pressure to place the Moro Province under the control 
of authorities in Manila. “If, as is understood, the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly 
accompanies the Governor-General on his proposed visit in the near future to the Moro 
Province, and if his attention should be called to the fact that the immediate control of the 
natives in your District is entrusted to various planters there, it will give color to all sorts 
of charges (some of which are even now being made in the native papers in Manila) and 
which it will be difficult to refute,” Bliss wrote. He was also worried about such a 
situation reaching the newspapers. Referring to the letters from planters Lewis and 
Rogers suggesting that native workers be required to complete contracts, Bliss cautioned 
Walker: “You can imagine the effect upon the public opinion should these letters ever be 
published in a Manila or American newspaper. It would be impossible then to say that 
some planters are good and others are bad and that the good should not be condemned 
along with the bad. There is absolutely no safety except in the absolute separation of the 
planters from any direct or indirect official connection with the Government.”699 
Apparently the subordinate officer did not completely understand the strength of Bliss’ 
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conviction on this matter. He responded to Bliss explaining why it was necessary to 
appoint such white men as headmen, but the provincial governor was unmoved. “As I 
stated to you in my previous letter, I have personally no doubt whatever as to the wisdom 
of your appointments, provided all the politicians in the world were dead,” Bliss told 
Walker. But they were part of a political world, and Bliss remained convinced that 
“hostile politicians” and “disgruntled planters” could bring “malicious attention” to the 
fact that the headmen in Davao were also planters. Such a scandal could “wreck the 
District Government.” Bliss, more than many of his contemporaries, expressed a hard-
nosed but nuanced view of power and its workings on this colonial frontier. He solemnly 
told Walker, “I think that it is wise to remember that people will always believe that a 
man will do that which he has the power to do, provided it redounds to his own 
interest.”700 
 The expansion of the plantation sector in the Moro Province presented the 
military government with difficult challenges. Bliss firmly believed that export 
agriculture would improve the social and material well-being of the islands and the 
indigenous people. He also agreed with his fellow officers that white men had superior 
abilities and should govern over the natives. They could shepherd the province forward 
and introduce their workers to the charms and responsibilities of civilization. But the 
colonial government also needed to preserve the appearance of impartiality; it needed to 
protect itself from criticism so it could continue to develop the islands’ resources. “I 
know that it seems hard not to be permitted to utilize the services of intelligent and just-
minded planters to hasten the work of redeeming the wild natives from their savagery,” 
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Bliss told Walker. But he took the longer view of events in Davao. In order to preserve 
the colonial government, Bliss was willing to take some power away from the planters. 
He looked forward to a day when the “good” planters would be rewarded for their 
patience and kindness toward the less advanced Moros. His vision of the future was 
informed by the past, by a historical narrative about another western “frontier” where 
labor relations between white and brown people had played out differently. “It is to the 
interest of the planter in Mindanao to preserve the native and not to destroy him as was 
the case with the North American Indian,” Bliss wrote. “The latter would not work in the 
fields, while the settlers could so work. It was therefore to the interests of the latter to get 
rid of the Indian. In Mindanao where the white settler cannot take off his coat and work 
from dawn until dark in the fields, generation after generation, as he can do in the States, 
it is a matter of obvious self-interest to him to preserve the native who can, and who, 
under just treatment and proper inducement, is ready to work for him.”701  
The story of Native Americans provided a cautionary tale for those interested in 
the future of Mindanao. Bliss hoped that the indigenous population of the Philippines 
could be preserved not because American planters were more altruistic; he understood, 
after all, “what men will do on a remote frontier.” Rather, he was optimistic that, with the 
help of the army and the colonial government, they would simply recognize what was in 
their “obvious self-interest.” In such a way the Moro Province and all its people could 
move forward – at least that was Bliss’s goal. In the event that planters did not recognize 
their “self-interest” in treating the indigenous people well, Bliss was ready to use the 
power of the U.S. to enforce the laws and ensure their proper treatment. Paradoxically, 
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his suspicions about the planters reinforced his faith in the army’s benevolent purpose. 
Believing that all men, given a certain combination of opportunity and necessity, would 
exploit their workers, Bliss insisted that the army was essential to ruling the territory. He 
invoked “law…observation and criticism” as the qualities that would allow the colonial 
experiment to succeed. The army would be the watchdog of the plantation system, 
ensuring that planters cared for their workers and the system yielded beneficial results for 
everyone. At no point did Bliss call into question the army’s vision of economic 
development through export agriculture or wage labor. The planters simply required 
some oversight, which the army would provide. 
 The deaths of Bolton and Christian heightened Bliss’s apprehension about the 
plantation economy in Davao. Nevertheless, basic colonial policy in the Moro Province 
remained unchanged: the road to civilization for the indigenous people was paved with 
hemp and lined with rubber and coconut trees. American-financed plantations were the 
bedrock of the army’s developmental vision for the southern Philippines, and the military 
presence shielded the natives from the rapacious greed of planters. All the more reason, 
then, that the U.S. army should remain in control of this lush paradise – to make it 
profitable while protecting the interests of the natives. If anything, the potential abuses of 
planters only vindicated the army’s presence and underscored its benevolence.  
 Despite Bliss’s faith in the advantages of military government, the army’s days as 
the ultimate authority in the Moro Province were numbered. In the U.S., the election of a 
Democratic president, Woodrow Wilson, and continued political agitation in the 
Philippines created pressure for a transfer of power from the military to civilian 
authorities in the South. General John J. Pershing was the last military governor of the 
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Moro Province. In the latter years of his administration, he took steps to replace military 
officials with civilian administrators, largely because he believed the frequent transfer of 
army officers caused too many disruptions. In 1913, Pershing was succeeded by a civilian 
governor, Frank Carpenter. From 1913 to 1920, Carpenter oversaw the continued 
integration of the Moro Province into the greater Philippines, with more American 
officials replaced by Christian Filipinos and some Moros and tribal representatives. Yet 
the transition to civilian rule was by no means a move toward independence or an 
endorsement of the population’s political advancement. In one of his last reports as 
governor, General Pershing wrote about the province’s political backwardness: “Eighty-
five percent of the population of the Province are non-Christians who are savage or semi-
civilized, and who are entirely ignorant of the principles of popular government.” He 
likewise disparaged the Filipinos’ capacity for government, declaring that “a large 
majority of the Filipinos themselves have no conception of the right of suffrage.” As a 
result, Pershing was unequivocal in belief that the province required a colonial 
government. “These Moros and other non-Christians have never known any other than 
purely autocratic rule and must remain subjects of a strong centralized government for 
many generations to come.”702 Indeed, “generations to come” would reckon with the 
implications of that decade of U.S. military government and the “purely autocratic rule” 
it had brought to the southern Philippines.703  
Conclusion  
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 A few weeks after Bolton’s murder, Leonard Wood wrote sanguinely to the 
Boston philanthropist Henry L. Higginson: “The Moros are going to make an industrious 
and hard-working people…I do not think that we shall have much more to fear in the way 
of organized resistance on their part, certainly not resistance of any consequence.”704 
Some scholars have echoed Wood in portraying the relative peacefulness of the province 
under American rule. Historian Patricio Abinales, for example, argues that the extent of 
Muslim resistance to the American occupation has been exaggerated for contemporary 
political purposes. Pointing to one list of anti-American military engagements that 
included just nineteen incidents, he writes, “Contrary to nationalist and pro-Muslim 
separatist arguments, these incidents of ‘struggle against the Americans’ were really 
feeble and few…In effect, there was no consistent opposition to American rule.”705 
Events in the Davao province, however, suggest the need to take a wider view of both 
“resistance” and “opposition.” While it is true that there were only periodic outbreaks of 
large-scale violence, the Moros and animist peoples opposed the American occupation of 
the South in various ways. In addition to the murders of Bolton and Christian, other 
conspiracies, such as the one associated with the Labi dance of 1908, were uncovered 
before they could lead to American deaths. Furthermore, the persistent labor shortages in 
the plantation sector point to another type of resistance to the U.S. colonial project. In 
1910, John J. Pershing, the third and final governor of the Moro Province, was still 
writing about the need for planters to treat their workers well so more natives would 
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relocate from the mountains to the plantation region.706 The labor problem remained so 
acute in Davao that most American planters were forced to abandon their ventures; by 
1918, the Japanese dominated hemp production in the province.707 Although tribal and 
Muslim peoples did not succeed in expelling all foreigners from their communities, they 
did severely test the commitment of many Americans to the colonial enterprise by 
withholding their labor from the plantation sector.708 
 This chapter has told the story of army efforts that did not come to fruition. 
Hamstrung by restrictions on immigration and unfavorable land laws, and stymied by 
indigenous resistance, the U.S. army failed to establish a plantation colony in the Moro 
Province. In their efforts to do so, however, army officers drew on decades of experience 
managing the labor of their own soldiers and other subject populations. Just as they had 
in the American South and West, the army made labor relations central to its military 
occupation of the Moro Province. In Philippines, however, officers believed they could 
improve on those previous experiments by sparing the indigenous people and cultivating 
a local workforce. If they were less successful than they had hoped, officials nevertheless 
succeeded in demonstrating the U.S.’s commitment to using the military as a flexible, 
wide-ranging administrative force. The army did more than scout territory and fight 
insurgents. Soldiers organized fairs and carried on public relations campaigns; they 
learned foreign languages and studied Islam; they negotiated with datus and entertained 
American settlers; they canvassed the mountains recesses and lowland jungles in order to 
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establish relations with “wild peoples;” they built roads and laid telegraph lines. Yet 
again, behind this exercise of “soft power” was the ever-present threat of violence.  
The army’s occupation of the Moro Province cast in it in some unfamiliar roles, 
but in other ways, officers and enlisted men continued the work their predecessors had 
undertaken for decades on the North American continent: expanding the reach of the 
American state and furthering the interests of American capitalists. Moreover, this was 
far from the last time the army would embrace such a role; it has continued its global 
work of remaking labor arrangements and promoting new economic relations well into 
the twenty-first century. 
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CHAPTER 6 
“Our Indian wards in the southern Philippines:” 
Colonial Rule and the Labor of Ideas 
 
 Leonard Wood had been at his post as governor of the Moro Province for about six 
weeks when he wrote his friend, President Theodore Roosevelt. Wood explained to the 
president that his “impressions of the islands and the people are just beginning to take 
definite shape.” As Wood began to build his staff and organization, making plans for the 
military subjugation of the region and its civil administration, he looked for precedents 
and experiences that would guide his work in the southern Philippines. He informed 
Roosevelt that he had already visited North Borneo and met with British officials there. 
Wood was also convinced that the army’s experience with Native Americans would 
prove valuable in Mindanao. He told Roosevelt he hoped Hugh Lennox Scott, an old 
Indian fighter, would succeed him as governor. Wood believed him “splendidly fitted by 
his experience with the Indians” to manage the Moros in their “semi-savage state.”709  
 In this one letter, Wood laid out that universe of comparisons and references that 
guided American military officials as they sought to govern the region and its people. 
Army officers looked both to their European counterparts – to British and Dutch colonial 
projects in the Pacific – and to their own experience with Native Americans in the trans-
Mississippi West as they undertook new imperial responsibilities. Drawing on examples 
from the U.S.’s own expansionist past and looking to Europe for inspiration, army 
officers believed they were positioned to build a different kind of empire in the twentieth 
century.  
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This chapter explores the ways army officers tried to make sense of their colonial 
role in the southern Philippines. It examines the comparisons they made and the 
distinctions they drew. By looking at the way officers thought and wrote about the Moros 
and their mission in Mindanao, this chapter also highlights another dimension of military 
labor: the labor of ideas. When officers wrote one another, penned official reports and 
policy, or authored pieces for military or popular publications, they articulated and 
defined a new, expansive role for the army beyond the continental borders of North 
America. Just as roads and telegraph lines helped the U.S. expand its reach and power 
across new peoples and territories, so too did ideological labor help strengthen the U.S.’s 
continental and global empire.  
The first part of the chapter examines officials’ reports and correspondence to 
understand how army officers thought about the U.S.’s role in the region, the Philippines, 
and the world. It focuses particularly on the comparison officers drew between Mindanao 
and the American West. The second section looks carefully at the intellectual production 
of two army officers who wrote for popular and academic audiences. Taken together, 
these efforts at understanding and comparison highlight how U.S. army officers 
desperately tried to make sense of their mission and their country’s place in the world at 
the dawn of the twentieth century.  
Countless Comparisons: Understanding the Moros  
 In the summer of 1902, after President Theodore Roosevelt declared the war over 
in most of the archipelago, U.S. forces continued to fight in Mindanao and Sulu. 
President Roosevelt’s proclamation of “pardon” explicitly did not apply to the southern 
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region.710 The Moros, who fought among themselves and vied for territory, slaves, and 
other resources, were just one of many groups living in the vast areas known as 
Mindanao and Sulu. In addition to the notoriously war-like pirate Moros who had 
terrorized Spanish and other European fleets for centuries, a variety of animist groups 
lived in the mountains and along the coasts. Some made their living as fishermen or 
pearl-divers; others practiced forms of swidden or slash-and-burn agriculture. The 
province also included some Christian Filipinos and Chinese merchants who mostly lived 
in towns and larger settlements. The diversity of peoples and the difficult terrain 
presented grave challenges to American military leaders in the region. 
 At the helm in Mindanao was Major-General George W. Davis, a Civil War 
veteran who had served as the military governor of Cuba before his transfer to the 
Philippines. He later continued his career in imperial administration as the first military 
governor of the Panama Canal Zone.711 While in the Philippines, however, Davis found 
time to write extensively about the U.S. mission among the Moros. In October 1901, he 
submitted a “report on Moro Affairs” to the Adjutant General, Division of the 
Philippines, included as an appendix to the War Department annual report. The next year, 
after his promotion to commander of the Division of the Philippines, he wrote “Notes on 
the Government of the Country Inhabited by Nonchristians in Mindanao and the 
Neighboring Islands,” also included as an appendix to the War Department annual report. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710 “Proclamation on U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s Pardon of the People of Philippine Archipelago, 
S. 1902 | GOVPH.” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. Accessed January 28, 2016. 
http://www.gov.ph/1902/07/04/proclamation-on-u-s-president-theodore-roosevelts-pardon-of-the-people-
of-philippine-archipelago/.  
711 On Davis in the Canal Zone, particularly his contention that the military nature of American power in 
the Canal Zone justified the use of deportation against American workers, see Julie Greene, The Canal 
Builders: Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal (New York: Penguin, 2009), 88. 
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In both these pieces, Davis reflected on the future of American rule in the southern 
Philippines. His reports reveal how a top military commander thought about the next 
global phase of U.S. imperialism among “Nonchristians,” highlighting in particular the 
special role the army would play in promoting U.S. objectives and the spread of 
“civilization” among less advanced peoples. 
In his first extensive report, published before the war officially ended in Luzon 
and while hostilities were ongoing in the South, Davis attempted to place the situation in 
Mindanao in a comparative, historical framework. He began with a brief discussion of the 
relations between the Spanish and the Moros since the sixteenth century, and then noted 
the existence of the Bates Agreement between the U.S. and the Sultan of Sulu in 1899. 
Overall, Davis found that relations between the various Moro groups and the U.S. 
remained unsettled. He hoped his “general observations” on the subject would help guide 
American policy toward the people of Mindanao. Indeed, it is remarkable that this 
document, about five pages in length, dealt almost entirely with the people of the 
southern Philippines, chiefly the Moros, of Muslim population – and only indirectly with 
the resources or strategic value of the islands they inhabited. In his first attempt to frame 
the population, Davis turned to the example of Native Americans. “So far as I can judge,” 
he wrote, “our treatment of the Mindanao Moros and the pagan tribes is based on the 
same general rules that have always governed our actions in intercourse with the Indian 
tribes on our Western frontiers.” He found similarities in what might be termed a “hands-
off” policy. The United States, according to Davis, allowed Native Americans to 
“regulate their own interior tribal affairs according to their native rules and customs.” The 
U.S. had left them to practice their own religions and to resolve conflicts in their own 
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ways. Furthermore, “The Indians paid no taxes, and if individuals and bands passed and 
repassed our frontiers with dutiable goods we ignored the transaction.” The other side of 
this laissez faire policy was that Native Americans were prohibited from reaping any of 
the benefits of representative government. They were barred from participating in 
elections, and Davis continued, “We would never recognize as valid the titles to lands 
which reservation or wild Indians might attempt to convey.” In this version of events, 
which strangely omitted any mention of decades of ongoing warfare between the U.S. 
and Native peoples, the Indians lived out their lives in relative autonomy. Unlike other 
military officials, Davis neglected to mention the Indians’ reputation for ferocity in battle 
or their hostility to American society. In the version of Native history Davis told, the 
chief feature of Native American life in the midst of the United States was separateness 
and autonomy. In the southern Philippines, the U.S. found itself with a similar 
opportunity to govern another indigenous people. “The Army has encountered in 
Mindanao aboriginal and nomadic races not materially different from those with which 
our troops have long been familiar,” Davis wrote. “There are many natives of the great 
island of Mindanao who, although grown to manhood, have never seen a white man.” He 
called them “land nomads” living in a vast, largely unpopulated region. With this 
understanding of the Moros and their similarity to the American Indians, Davis turned to 
how the U.S. should govern them.  
 Davis’ reflections speak to the burden military commanders felt to shape national 
policy on questions of governance. They also reflect early-twentieth century thinking 
about civilization, scientific racism, and the development of “backward” peoples. 
Military commanders like Davis imbued the current thinking of the time, and his analysis 
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of the Moros took him far from battlefield science, tactics, or any other training he may 
have received at West Point. Instead, he gestured toward history in order to justify his 
views on what the U.S. government and the army should do in the southern Philippines. 
“The question has been asked, ‘What form of government should take the place of this 
one we see in operation?’” For Davis the answer involved both knowing something about 
the Moros but even more about the longer history of human “races.” He continued, 
The student of history knows that the transition from patriarchal forms and 
medieval feudalism to a government of law was slow in the extreme even with the 
Caucasian race. How many of us have seen the failure of attempts to make self-
governing citizens quickly out of the breech-clouted, named savages. It seems to 
me the worst misfortune that could befall a Moro community, and the nation 
responsible for good order among the Moros, would be to upset and destroy the 
patriarchal despotism of their chiefs, for it is all they have and all they are capable 
of understanding.  
 
Davis was not alone in believing that progress would come slowly, inferior as the Moros 
were to “the Caucasian race.” William H. Taft believed Filipinos, who were felt to be 
more advanced than the Moros, would “need the training of fifty or a hundred years 
before they shall even realize what Anglo-Saxon liberty is.”712 Davis and his fellow 
colonial administrators drew on decades of academic and common-sense understandings 
that non-white peoples were intellectually and physically inferior to “Caucasians” and 
“Anglo-Saxons.” Davis, however, believed that his understanding of Moro inferiority 
would ultimately lead to more humane treatment. By expecting less from the Moros, 
Americans could shape policies that would take into consideration their particular 
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“racial” characteristics.713 For Davis, any attempt to convert these “savages” to 
Christianity would likewise end in disappointment. “Christian missionaries have utterly 
failed to make converts anywhere among the Mohammedans,” he wrote. Expressing a 
grudging respect for the intransigence of their faith, he compared Muslims to “the Medes 
and Persians” in their “adherence” to “their laws.” Pragmatically Davis admitted that 
even if the Americans “refuse[d] to recognize their rules,” they would still never 
“eradicate a deep-seated religious conviction.” The U.S. could avoid “failure” and 
“misfortune” by learning from past mistakes. Rather than trying to convert the Moros or 
to “civilize” them in a few years, he thought Americans should continue to use the datus, 
relying on the “patriarchal despotism of their chiefs.” Later military officials, such as 
Leonard Wood, would harshly criticize just such despotism as fundamentally un-
American and inimical to democratic principles. Davis, however, drawing on European 
examples, wanted to turn their inherent despotism to American purposes. “It seems to be 
our duty to respect this conservatism and deeply rooted prejudice, to utilize it and to use 
these datos in our efforts to lead these people away from slavery, polygamy, piracy, and 
despotic rule, just as the Dutch have in Java and the English in India.”  
 Davis was fascinated by other colonial powers, particularly by the Dutch in Java. 
He saw two potential paths open to the Americans in governing the Moros. His first set of 
recommendations did not build on the Dutch example. Instead, he suggested first that the 
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U.S. abrogate the Bates Treaty. Rather than working through the sultan, the U.S. should 
strip him of his power. The U.S. could continue to work through minor datus as 
“headmen,” but they should not be paid a “pension or subsidy.” In a further move 
intended to disempower the sultan, Davis suggested the trade within the Philippines be 
exempt from taxation or duty – a free trade policy for the Moros within the archipelago. 
Next, he urged that the region remain under military government. The army should invest 
in infrastructure including wagon roads, military roads, and railroads in order to open the 
region, particularly around Lake Lanao, to commerce. These were ambitious plans, but 
Davis believed they were one set of solutions to the challenges the U.S. faced. “This 
would take some years to accomplish, and would cost two or three million dollars, but it 
will solve the Moro problem in Mindanao, and lead ultimately to the commercial 
development of this great island, of which one-half is now dominated by savages who are 
much more savage and intractable than the Igorrotes and Mandayans,” he wrote. 
 The U.S. closely followed the plan laid out by Davis in this 1901 document. In 
1904, the U.S. abrogated the Bates Agreement. A military government remained in place 
in the southern Philippines for over a decade, and the army continued to work through the 
lesser datus. As previous chapters show, the army followed Davis’ recommendations by 
building infrastructure, including a major military road to Lake Lanao, for both military 
and commercial ends. The development of commerce remained a cornerstone of U.S. 
policy and its plans to civilize the people of the Moro Province. Yet Davis’ 1901 piece is 
remarkable, too, for the alternative vision it espoused. After listing the aforementioned 
recommendations, Davis admitted that the U.S. could go in a completely different 
direction with the Moros. “There is an alternative method of procedure, and this is to 
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profit by the example set by England and Holland, especially the latter power – for the 
Dutch govern more Malays in Java than the aggregate of all the rest in the world, and 
among them are a million Mohammedans.” This “alternative” meant embracing the 
model of indirect rule practiced by the Dutch. “The Dutch did not, and do not, overturn 
the native rulers, nor do the English in India and in the Straits Settlements; neither do 
they make treaties with them.” Davis proceeded to describe with admiration a 
“successful” plan instituted in 1834 whereby the Dutch appointed a “resident” to advise 
the local kings and rajahs. While maintaining the native rulers, “this Dutch adviser was 
the real power behind the native throne, and the rajah knew it.” Meanwhile, the Dutch 
avoided military intervention in Java while vastly increasing trade revenues and the 
population of their colony.  
 A third possibility was the establishment of a settler colony in Mindanao. While 
Davis believed this would be ideal, he did not think it was possible given the climate of 
the Philippines. “If Anglo-Saxons, Irish, Italians, Germans, Danes, and Swedes could be 
induced to emigrate to the Moro country in tens and hundreds of thousands, and take up 
and possess the earth as these people have done in the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the Argentine Republic, the Moro problem would soon be solved, but there 
can never be such invasion of these tropical jungles by white men.” For better or for 
worse, Davis believed the “native races” would continue to make up the vast majority of 
the residents in that part of the globe, “probably for ever and ever.” Davis’ language 
evoked the image of the eternal tropics, a lush and productive place insulated from the 
movement of time. “They will be fishermen and pearl divers as long as the sea yields its 
support. They will gather wax and jungle products as long as the forests remain, and sail 
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the seas in their vintas as long as they can find trunks of trees out of which to fashion 
them,” he mused. “They” – the many peoples of the south – might be “taught rice and 
coffee and sugar cultivation.” But their progress would be slow. Even the Chinese could 
not be persuaded to emigrate to Borneo, and the Christianized Filipinos did not want to 
come either. As a result, Davis saw two remaining options: the course he recommended 
was to militarily subjugate the Moros. The Americans could work through the datus and 
hereditary elite to slowly change backwards practices (such as a polygamy and slavery), 
while avoiding any direct attempts to convert the Moros to Christianity. The other option, 
the road not taken, would be to follow the Dutch and British example and establish a 
system of indirect rule.  
 The next year Davis issued a second report, entitled “Notes on the Government of 
the Country Inhabited by Nonchristians in Mindanao and the Neighboring Islands.” Far 
longer than his first report, in this 1902 effort Davis further developed his ideas about the 
Moros and the proper way for the U.S. to administer the province. At this point the war 
was officially over in the rest of the archipelago. But in Mindanao, hostilities continued 
and the army remained in power. Davis’ “notes” may be seen as a response to this 
unusual situation – an explanation and justification for the perpetuation, indefinitely, of 
military rule. For these reasons, Davis’ comparison of the Moros to Native Americans 
becomes more frequent and more crucial to his analysis. The Moros were like “our 
Indians,” except they were “more intelligent.” Logically, then, the army’s role in 
Mindanao should resemble its duties in the American West. “Martial law prevails in all 
this country and the writ of habeas corpus is unheard or unthought of” in most of the 
region.  He explained that “the region in question may be regarded as we formally 
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regarded an Indian reservation whose inhabitants were hostile or unruly, and where the 
President was obliged to call in the Army to discipline and govern hostile or unfriendly 
savage inhabitants.” Here the equivalence between Mindanao – a region of approximately 
40,000 square miles – and an Indian reservation helped normalize the persistence of 
martial law. Extending the metaphor, Davis declared, “The authority of the local military 
commander over this vast non-Christian reserve is the same as is that of the present 
commanding officer at Fort Sill, who now has under his control on the military 
reservation at that post some hundreds of Apaches – men, women, and children – all of 
whom are restrained of their liberty, i.e., they are nominally prisoners.” Davis described 
that authority as allowing an officer to imprison and punish “bad and intractable” Moros, 
just as the C.O. at Fort Sill might do to a “bad” Apache.714  
Such similarities between the Moros and the Indians provided a way for the 
Americans to build on their experience in the American West to develop appropriate 
policies for governing the Moros in the long-term. Davis, however, believed the army 
could go further and improve on its past relations with Native Americans. He referred to 
“those of us who have spent the best part of a lifetime in observing the failure of 
Americans to civilize and make American self-governing citizens of ‘our Indian wards’” 
who believed that “a mistaken policy and treatment of these nomads” had caused that 
failure.  
We have seen an attempt to establish and maintain a dual government – a military 
one up to a certain point, then a civil one, but with frequent recurrence to the stern 
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rigors of military rule; and this went on for a century as the Indians died off or 
were slaughtered. The result has been disastrous to the aborigines. White men, it 
is true, have secured the Indian lands, and cities have been built over the ashes of 
burned tepees; settlements have grown into countries and States, and there is 
wealth and luxury where these people roamed; but there can scarcely be found an 
intelligent and well-informed human being who knows the real characteristics of 
our Indian policy in this century of dishonor who will not acknowledge that the 
crusade has been as heartless and cruel as any recorded in history. 
 
Davis joined a chorus of observers in the early-twentieth century who criticized U.S. 
Indian policy and mourned the passing of the “noble savage.”715 But in no way did he 
disparage the actions of the U.S. army in the present moment; instead, he saw an 
important, ongoing role for the army in helping protect the Moros from the fate suffered 
by the American Indians. Echoing claims made in a previous generation by officers from 
Benjamin Grierson to William T. Sherman, Davis proudly asserted a world-historical 
mission for the army. Like his post-Civil War predecessors, the commander of the 
Philippines Division believed soldiers should promote white settlement and a specific 
type of economic development. But the army’s role had to be different in the so-called 
“tropics.”  
 The army, according to Davis, would both protect the Moros and promote the 
“development or exploitation of the vast territories inhabited by non-Christians” over 
time. In the same way the “military character of government of California, and what is 
now Arizona, New Mexico, Montana, and Idaho did not prevent or retard the occupation 
of those countries by home seekers,” so would the army in Mindanao not stand in the 
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way of development. “In those regions, as everywhere in the United States Indian 
country, the Army has supplied the advance guard of civilization and all required 
protection until the people were able to protect themselves and to form these settlements 
into Territories and States.” Davis allowed that in time places like Lanao and Cotabato 
may be ready for civilian rule, but he believed that the process would be considerably 
slower than in North America and require a longer period of military government than 
places like California had experienced. On the other hand, however, in his mention of 
Arizona and New Mexico, which remained territories until 1912, Davis referenced the 
long periods of territorial government even in North America, which deprived the 
citizens of those regions of full political participation.  
 In order to avoid the same mistakes that had hindered the progress of Native 
Americans, Davis urged the U.S. to capitalize on the circumstances that distinguished 
Mindanao from the American West and Moros from Native Americans. The chief 
difference, Davis concluded, was the Moros’ value as laborers. The Moros and other 
native peoples represented labor-power – essential, in Davis’ view, to the successful 
exploitation of these islands by Americans or any other group of civilized people. 
“Anglo-Saxons and others of the Caucasian race can not make their homes in these 
jungles as they did in the North American prairies and mountain valleys,” Davis wrote. 
“Those tropical lands can not be exploited without labor, and the white race can not or 
will not supply it. This condition of affairs is a protection to the Moros and the pagans, 
and is all that saves them from invasion otherwise sure to come.” According to this view, 
which Tasker H. Bliss would subsequently adopt, the army became a savior, the “advance 
guard of civilization” but also a protector for the native peoples who would otherwise be 
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destroyed by more developed peoples. Davis continued, “It is therefore not surprising 
that a military man should prefer to pursue a course in the cause of civilization that would 
in his belief spare the Moros from the besetments and influence that have worked the 
destruction of the savage aborigines elsewhere.” Even as U.S. troops continued to fight 
guerrillas who opposed their presence in Mindanao, Davis asserted a benevolent role for 
“the military man” in championing a merciful, protective policy for the Moros.  
 Davis, like subsequent governors of the Moro Province, argued that labor and 
economic development, rather than political rights, should be the central concern of U.S. 
policymakers in the southern Philippines. “If the Moro and pagan lands are ever to 
become productive, the native inhabitants must supply the laborers,” he insisted. “They 
must be taught that labor is honorable and its remuneration certain.” Army personnel 
needed to instruct the Moros in how to labor. He urged that “every effort should be used 
to restrain the savage and bloody impulses of these people, to encourage industry.” In an 
auspicious sign, he noted that Moros had done good work supplying telegraph poles for 
an army project. “Hundreds” had worked on roads and trails in the lake country, and they 
had sold fuel and forage for the troops. But these gestures, while promising, were largely 
a result of the power that the leading datus had exerted over their subjects; they were 
forced to perform such labor under threat of violence, Davis readily acknowledged.  
 While Davis wanted to gradually move the Moros away from their reliance on the 
datus, he did not expect them to join in any form of representative government in the 
foreseeable future. Instead, Davis emphasized the necessity for ongoing military rule in 
Mindanao. “There is no other force available for governing these savage people save the 
Regular Army of the United States, and its action should be regulated in much the same 
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manner as it was in respect to Indian affairs when and where the Indians were hostile or 
unfriendly or intractable,” Davis asserted. He believed that “no form of self-government 
is possible in the country of non-Christians.” It would be “useless to quote the bill of 
rights” [sic] or engage in “voting, a word as meaningless to them as the act would be 
absurd.” Relying on a shared understanding of the Moros as thoroughly “savage,” Davis 
mocked any pretensions to democracy in Mindanao. Over time, the Americans would 
“teach and convince these people that all men are born free and equal,” but that process 
could easily take generations. The datus themselves would, of course, oppose any efforts 
to undermine their privileges. Yet while asserting their inferiority, Davis also emphasized 
their capacity. This confidence in their potential legitimated the army’s ongoing role; 
officers and soldiers were serving not only national interests but humanity in helping the 
Moros achieve better things for themselves. “There is reasonable basis for a hope that the 
Moros may some time become industrious producers and valuable members of the 
community. They are as cruel and bloodthirsty as our plains Indians, but they have more 
intelligence, more acuteness, and already have made more progress in industrial life,” 
Davis remarked. Indeed, the record of colonial governments around the world provided 
“hope” for the Moros. In British Borneo and Dutch Java lived groups of “devout 
Mohammedans.” These workers were “industrious, frugal, hard-working, and honest 
people.” The example of these European colonies should inspire the United States. “If the 
Moros are handled properly they can be started in the same path, and in a generation the 
existing million of fanatical Moro and pagan savages will be two million industrious 
laborers, as industrious and peaceable and contented as the subjects of Raja Brooke in 
Sarawak. Over them, as over the Dyacks, Javanese, and Straits Malays, must be a just 
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rule that is full of vigor, and as they develop a talent and capacity for participation in the 
government they should have the opportunity.” Davis left unanswered the question of 
when the Moros would have such an “opportunity.”  
 In his varied attempts to make sense of the Moros and the prospects for American 
rule in Mindanao, Davis drew on several arguments that had informed military thinking 
for several decades. He asserted the army’s role as a builder of infrastructure, both for 
military and civilian purposes. He argued that the promotion of economic activity and 
commerce would also help solve security problems, making economic development a 
military objective. He insisted on a long, open-ended role for the army. But writing at the 
turn of the century, as the threat from hostile Native Americans receded and the U.S. 
embarked on new military ventures overseas, Davis also drew on a reserve of 
comparisons, metaphors, and examples. Chief among these was the analogy of Moros to 
Indians. This analogy allowed Davis to make some critical claims about the prospects for 
U.S. rule in Mindanao. First, the comparison provided legitimacy for the persistence of 
military rule in the southern Philippines when the rest of the archipelago would soon be 
turned over to civilian rule. Equating Mindanao to an enormous Indian reservation, Davis 
made it seem as if military government was not a foreign concept but something the U.S. 
had been practicing for a hundred years. (The reference to Arizona and New Mexico 
further familiarized such long periods of political apprenticeship.) Second, Davis linked 
the Moros and Indians while at the same time condemning U.S. policy toward Native 
Americans. This move allowed Davis to chart a different course for military rule over the 
Moros. The U.S., he argued, had failed to protect its indigenous people, but it had the 
opportunity to do better in the Philippines. By helping make the Moros into “industrious” 
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laborers, like the Muslims who were prospering under British rule and Dutch rule 
elsewhere in Asia, Davis argued that the U.S. could avoid the “slaughter” and misfortune 
that had befallen Native Americans.  
 Davis’ remarks are especially noteworthy because he offered a relatively mild 
analysis of the Moros. Because he dismissed the prospect of a large settler colony, Davis 
placed great value on the Moro as a worker. Drawing on the example of the British and 
Dutch colonies, he was optimistic that Moros could be come useful workers and help 
make Mindanao a valuable U.S. colony. By comparison, subsequent officers were less 
sanguine about the prospects for civilizing the Moro. Brigadier-general Samuel S. 
Sumner, a veteran of the Civil War and the Indian Wars who served in Cuba before the 
Philippines, believed the Moros were “an essentially different people from us in thought, 
word, and action.” They would continue to attack, kill, and steal – if not in “open 
warfare” then in secret. “So long as Mohammedanism prevails, Anglo-Saxon civilization 
will make slow headway,” he wrote in his 1903 report.716 Leonard Wood largely agreed. 
In 1903, he wrote William Howard Taft, governor-general of the Philippines, that “there 
are practically no native laws worthy of the name.” The situation, he assured Taft, was 
“intolerable from our standpoint.” “The Moros especially have been maintaining a state 
of affairs marked by licentiousness, murder, robbery, slavery, piracy and kidnapping, a 
condition far exceeding in its crimes any which has before come under American 
control.” In his official report as governor of the Moro Province in 1904, Wood reiterated 
this claim that the Moros lacked laws, necessitating the wholesale creation of new 
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American laws for the province:  
After a year of diligent investigation and study of this question it has been found 
that the Moros and other savage peoples have no laws – simply a few customs, 
which are nowhere general, varying from one valley to the next, from one island to 
another. Such laws as they have are many of them revolting and practically all of 
them utterly and absolutely undesirable from every standpoint of decency and good 
government. The Moros are, in a way, religious and moral degenerates.717 
 
As far as Islam providing any basis for their government, Wood believed they had 
neglected most of the essential tenets of the religion. He told Roosevelt, “These 
Mohammedans have forgotten most of their religion, and very little, if any, of the old 
Mosaic law which is so largely embodied in the Koran is found in their practices or their 
laws.”718 Unlike Davis, Wood was not encouraged by their profession of Islam and felt it 
did not elevate them much above the other “savage” non-Christians in Mindanao.  
 Wood also disagreed with Davis about the Mindanao’s potential as a settler 
colony. Davis believed it would have been ideal for “Anglo-Saxons, Irish, Italians, 
Germans, Danes, and Swedes” to emigrate to the islands, but he thought it unlikely that 
they would. As a result, his proposals centered on turning Moros into the workers 
necessary to develop the islands’ resources along more profitable lines. Leonard Wood, 
on the other hand, lobbied heavily for more liberal immigration laws, optimistic that the 
southern Philippines presented excellent opportunities for white settlers. In the same 
report in which he mocked the absence of Moro laws, Wood, as the new governor of the 
Moro Province, called for large-scale immigration. “What is needed to develop this 
portion of the world is a suitable class of settlers, bringing with them knowledge of 
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modern agricultural methods, enterprises, and some capital.” Wood believed that “such a 
class of settlers” would set a positive example for the Moros and introduce them to more 
advanced methods. He continued, “What is needed here is an influx of such people as 
built up the West.” Like Davis, Wood summoned the image of the American West, but 
for him the metaphor was positive. Instead of the destruction of the Native American, 
Wood thought of the white pioneer who would bring advanced methods to Mindanao. 
“The natives,” he wrote, “would be stimulated by their example and educated by their 
work, and the possibilities of these islands would soon be apparent.”719 While Davis took 
some comfort in the fact that the absence of a large settler class might protect the Moros 
from “rapacity,” Wood welcomed those very settlers with open arms. “Such people as 
built up the West” would more rapidly and successfully transform the islands and reap its 
produce than the savage and backwards natives.  
Years later, the second provincial governor, Tasker H. Bliss, expressed fears 
about the long-term consequences of plantation agriculture for the Moro people. By this 
point, the U.S. had succeeded in attracting some white settlers who had invested capital 
into plantations growing hemp, rubber, coconuts, and other tropical products for export 
on the world market. Bliss, more philosophically inclined and considerably more 
skeptical about the good intentions of American settlers than his predecessor Leonard 
Wood, agreed with Davis that the Moros would always dominate the population of the 
region. “I am one of those who believe that the Moro Province will continue indefinitely 
to be the home of the people who now inhabit it,” Bliss wrote. He did not believe white 
people would ever “oust the native from his occupation of the soil.” Nevertheless, Bliss 
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worried that the Moro might be “robbed of all his patrimony” if settlers were not held in 
check by a strong government. “If we destroy [the native’s] gum-producing trees, we 
should have taught him to cultivate new ones and not leave him to look over a fence at 
the only existing trees in the private plantation of a company which will have destroyed 
all his own trees,” he wrote.720 Bliss discussed conservation methods, and he wanted to 
make sure the islands’ valuable natural resources – particularly its gum and gutta-percha 
– were preserved. He did not only have the Moros’ best interests in mind. “The whole 
civilized world has an interest in these products, and neither native nor white man should 
be permitted to destroy the source of supply,” Bliss reminded his superiors. Gutta-percha, 
for example, was widely used for insulating underwater telegraph cables, and rubber 
served several commercial purposes, which were only multiplying as industrialization 
advanced.721 Bliss believed that the U.S. would not directly control these islands forever, 
and his interest in the “patrimony” of the “natives” distinguished him from other military 
governors of the province. At the same time, however, these same concerns only 
strengthened his conviction that the army had to remain in power for the foreseeable 
future, in order to protect the Moro and the region’s natural resources for the “whole 
civilized world.” 
Military personnel like Davis and Wood invoked the image and example of the 
American West and Native Americans for different reasons. For Davis, the trans-
Mississippi West represented the failure of the U.S. government to protect American 
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Indians while developing its land and resources. For Wood, the West presented a 
laudable goal, a place policymakers and administrators in the Moro Province would do 
well to replicate. These leading officers were not alone in associating Mindanao with the 
West. In 1906, an organization of American veterans located in the Moro Province 
received certain items belonging to Lt. Edward C. Bolton, the slain governor of the 
district of Davao. Among these items was Bolton’s own revolver as well as the knife 
allegedly used to kill him. The organization had renamed itself the Bolton Post of the 
Veterans’ Army of the Philippines (V.A.P.) after the martyred official, so it was only 
fitting they would receive what they called “relics” of his life. On this solemn occasion, 
the V.A.P. issued a resolution honoring the slain officer. Here, the veterans declared, 
were “sacred remembrances” and “mementos of a brave, simple, and able officer and 
man” who had devoted himself to building up “that splendid pioneer colony established 
on the furthermore outposts of American territory.” Their words harkened back to 
another frontier, so recently “closed.” Concluding the resolution, members of the V.A.P. 
promised to honor Bolton, “a faithful public servant, a brave soldier, and a pioneer of 
civilization whose name shall be forever linked with the development of the District of 
Davao, as are the names of Louis [sic] and Clark and Daniel Boone with the civilization 
of the great west.”722 Members of the Bolton V.A.P. proudly asserted a connection 
between the U.S.’s colonial project at the turn of the twentieth century and the imperial 
trailblazers of one hundred years before. By invoking the names of Lewis, Clark, and 
Boone, these veterans placed Bolton in a pantheon of American folk heroes who had 
contributed to the great, long work of “civilizing” the backwards parts of the globe. For 
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them, places like Davao were the new “West.” 
Civilians also summoned the image of the American West to describe their work 
in the southern Philippines. Members of the Iligan Chamber of Commerce called 
themselves “tax-payers, law-abiding citizens and pioneers in the opening up, of until 
recently, a wild and uncultivated territory.”723 Another group of boosters went even 
further in stressing the importance of western symbols to their work in the Moro 
Province. “The story of the Davao Planters’ Association reads like a chapter in President 
Roosevelt’s ‘Winning of the West,’” they declared in 1909. “Like the early settlers on the 
frontier of our Great West” and “like the pioneer of the Western plains the Davao 
planters” had “brought the spirit of law and order with them.”724 Not everyone agreed 
that the western spirit had brought “law and order” to the southern Philippines. Colonel 
Alfred C. Sharpe, for example, commander at the post of Parang in Mindanao, wrote in a 
personal letter to General Bliss about an attack on a village. According to Sharpe, “the 
entire country [was] laid west; the whole settlement then stampeded.” The colonel 
continued, “Kali was probably a bad hombre, but the ‘shooting up’ of the whole village 
seems, from all I can learn, to have been utterly wanton.” He was equally distressed about 
an incident later when “at least one poor wretch” was killed unnecessarily when troops 
went in pursuit of “mutineers.” For Sharpe such misfortunes were part of the larger 
context of American activities in Mindanao. He wrote Bliss, “Like all frontier life, there 
is a disposition to be a ‘little too quick on the trigger,’ and until this is wisely controlled, 
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these people will find it difficult to realize the benevolent purposes of the government 
towards them.” Like his friend Bliss, the provincial governor, Sharpe believed the army’s 
role was to keep such wanton excesses in check so that the Moros would be able to 
appreciate the Americans’ “benevolent purposes.” Despite these regrettable events, 
however, Sharpe was optimistic about the U.S.’s long-term role in the southern 
Philippines. “I am thoroly [sic] convinced with you that the Moro is ‘the best fellow’ in 
the whole archipelago,” he told Bliss. “[W]ith judicious management he will some day 
arrive.”725 He probably found a receptive listener in Bliss, who on occasion worried about 
“what men will do on a remote frontier.” Isolated and cut off from “civilizing” 
influences, Bliss feared that American civilians adopted some of the more frightening, 
lawless habits associated with what he called the “wild West.” More than the other Moro 
Province governors, Bliss expressed misgivings about the behavior of the planter class in 
Mindanao, leading him to champion a continued role for the military.  
For many officers, the army’s work in the Pacific was personally related to their 
earlier assignments in the West. Leonard Wood received the Medal of Honor for his 
leadership in some of the final battles with the Apaches, and he played his part in the 
capture of Geronimo. John J. Pershing, the third and final governor of the Moro province, 
also served in the southwest fighting the Apaches, and then fought the Sioux in the 
Dakotas. Hugh Lennox Scott, military governor of the Sulu Province and a high-ranking 
army official, fought against Sioux, Nez Perce, and Cheyenne Indians in the 1870s. He 
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later helped suppress hostilities associated with the Lakota Ghost Dance.726 Legions of 
enlisted men who had served in the West later faced Moros and Filipinos in combat. 
These regulars also drew on their experiences or ideas about the West when trying to 
understand the U.S.’s role in the Philippines. One soldier told a reporter after the Battle of 
Bud Dajo in 1906 that the massacre “was merely a piece of public work such as the Army 
has had to do many times in our own West.’”727 With the word “merely,” the soldier 
dismissed the massacre of six hundred men, women, and children by invoking the 
comparison to the West.  
 Several historians of U.S. imperialism have noted the frequent allusions army 
officers made to Native Americans when describing Filipinos and Moros, but they do not 
agree about what these comparisons mean. In an early, widely cited piece, Walter 
Williams insisted that the United States’ experience with Native Americans directly 
shaped policies undertaken in the Philippines. He argued that the ideas and experiences of 
“governing” indigenous peoples in the continental U.S. influenced the way American 
policymakers thought about taking up the white man’s burden in the Philippines. For 
evidence, Williams quoted Roosevelt, the influential historian Albert Bushnell Hart, and 
Native American policy advocates. Turning toward the army, he claimed that 87 percent 
of generals serving in the Philippines “had experience with Indians in the West.” 
Williams saw the acquisition of the Philippines as part of a much longer history of 
imperial expansion. “Instead of seeing 1898 as a new departure, historians might view 
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Philippine annexation as the last episode of a nineteenth-century pattern of territorial 
acquisition and direct political rule of subject peoples…for the expansionists of 1898, the 
precedents to govern colonial subjects were clear and exact, based on the long road from 
independence to wardship for American Indians.”728 
 Williams was concerned with speeches and policy proposals emanating from 
civilian sources, but other historians have focused specifically on the comparisons army 
officers drew between Moros and Native Americans. Peter Gowing, who authored the 
only full-length treatment of the Moro Province in English, argued that “the Moro policy 
and administrative methods of the White Americans were influenced as well by their 
experience in governing the Indian peoples of North America.” Gowing also based his 
conclusion on the fact that a preponderance of officials, both military and civilian, in the 
Moro Province had experience with Native Americans in North America. “It is not 
surprising,” Gowing writes, “to find that they believed the problems they faced in 
governing a hostile, non-Christian people of a different race and culture in the southern 
Philippines to be similar to those they had encountered in governing the Indians – and 
that these similar problems required similar solutions.”729 More recently, military 
historian Brian McAllister Linn called the Moros “a truly romantic opponent, America’s 
equivalent of the fierce Pathans of British India’s Northwest Frontier.” For “the 
Progressive Era Americans still coming to terms with the end of their own Wild West,” 
the Moros were “exotic” and “as archaic and colorful as the army’s former opponents, the 
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American Indian.” According to Linn, “Service against the Moros allowed the new 
imperial army to maintain, however symbolically, its tie to the old frontier army and to 
march with the ghosts of Custer, Mackenzie, and Crook.”730   
 Despite these resonances, scholars – including Linn himself – have expressed 
skepticism about drawing too clear a line from the frontier west to the “new West” in the 
Pacific. In his piece, “The Long Twilight of the Frontier Army,” Linn devotes most of his 
discussion to comparing “the old western frontier army and the new army of empire” as 
institutional and operational forces, noting that the army continued to be as inefficient, 
understaffed, demoralized, and dissolute in its Pacific postings as in the American 
West.731 But Linn also distances himself from historians who posit a “psychological 
identity” between the two conflicts. Linn doubts that officers in the Pacific saw the 
army’s work in the Philippines or Hawaii in the terms of their experience in the American 
West. He points out that among “distinguished” fighters in the Philippines, “there were 
some who had extensive western frontier service and some with none at all.” Paul 
Kramer likewise urges caution in examining how racial ideas and categories formed in 
the domestic context, such as notions about Native Americans, were marshaled in the 
Philippines. In contrast to other historians like Williams who have asserted clear links 
between Native American and colonial policy, Kramer argues that colonial race-making 
took place within specific contexts that altered whatever ideas were “imported” from the 
U.S. “Transfer, export, and projection – the Philippines as seen through Indian territory – 
were not reflexive or default responses, but strategies in particular contexts whose terrain, 
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combatants, and stakes merit historical inquiry,” Kramer writes.732  
Army personnel frequently referred to the West, Native Americans, and frontier 
service when discussing the southern Philippines; that much is undeniable. But what did 
these references mean? Rather than asking whether the lessons of the American West and 
Native American relations influenced policy at the turn of the century, historians might 
follow the suggestion of Ann Stoler and think more about the act of comparison itself. In 
her call to “historicize the politics of comparison” nearly fifteen years ago, Stoler asked, 
“What did agents of empire think to compare and what political projects made them do 
so? What did comparison as a state project entail?” Stoler pointed out that colonial 
governments “invested in selected comparison with other polities: with highlighting their 
similarities to some and difference from others.”733 The prominence of comparisons to 
the West and Native Americans demonstrate how important it was for army officers to 
place their work in the Pacific in a longer history of the army’s accomplishments and 
responsibilities. In their writings and reports, they helped create a specifically American 
narrative that linked the settlement of the West to its imperial exploits since 1898. These 
comparisons allowed officers to place the army’s work in the Philippines in a broader 
context. Reaching back to the American West, army officers reckoned with some 
decidedly new experiences by making them seem familiar, natural, and just – in keeping 
with the United States’ history of continental expansion. Whatever purposes they served 
for the individual writer or thinker, the frequent allusions to the West highlight the 
connections army personnel were themselves making between these projects. In this way, 
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they help illuminate the longer narrative of American empire and military power that 
army officers were themselves crafting.734  
Brian Linn writes, “It might be well to ask whether the western military frontier 
ended with the Battle of Wounded Knee or continued for another two decades in the 
Pacific.”735 Indeed, many officers saw the army standing again between settlers and 
indigenous people, trying yet again to lead the way to “civilization” under the American 
flag. The army’s experiences in the American West and the Philippines became for them 
part of a single history of U.S. expansion and imperial governance.  
An Imperial World 
 Army personnel did not limit their stock of comparisons to the American past. They 
also looked to Europe for models of colonial governance and for a language with which 
to describe their twentieth-century mission.736 For Leonard Wood, his initial impressions 
of Mindanao were framed by his journey to the islands. On his way to his posting as the 
first governor of the Moro Province, Wood stopped in India, Singapore, Java, and Hong 
Kong before his arrival in Manila. Wood admired the imperial administration of both the 
British and the Dutch in these colonies. To a British associate he wrote that, “Lord 
Cromer has done wonderful work in Egypt, all the more wonderful when one considers 
the mixture of antagonistic and inharmonious sects and races which inhabit the 
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country.”737 He thought “the work in Java done by the Dutch was interesting” and found 
the Javanese to be “peaceful, contented and industrious people” and remarked on their 
“cheerfulness.” Wood’s praise of the British and the Dutch was not limited to letters to 
English friends. Around the same time, a few weeks after his arrival in Mindanao, Wood 
wrote Senator Russell Alexander Alger, a Republican from Michigan, a Civil War 
veteran and former secretary of war under McKinley. He told Alger about his “most 
interesting trip.” He saw “the Egyptian and English troops, as well as a good deal of the 
colonial administration” in Egypt. In Java he also inspected the troops and studied their 
“colonial system.” “The Dutch have done a powerful work in Java,” he wrote with 
admiration.738 To his wife Lou, with whom he carried on an active correspondence, he 
told about a dinner he had enjoyed with Lord and Lady Cromer in Cairo. They had been 
joined by other “principal men…all exceedingly well bred, able interesting people.” In 
Cairo he also met with Count Edward Gleichen, the Sudan Agent and a military man as 
well. From Gleichen, who happened to be the son of Queen Victoria’s half-nephew, 
Wood heard “about the method of control in the Soudan and the methods gradually being 
put in force.” He told his wife, “The Soudanese are all Mahommedans and there are some 
sides of the question not unlike what we shall have in Mindinao [sic].”739 While he often 
acknowledged that the American colonial system would have to be different from the 
British – particularly their willingness to work through local leaders in a system of 
“indirect rule” – Wood clearly hoped to learn something from the British example in 
Egypt and Asia. 
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 Wood was part of a larger orbit of imperial administrators that included not only 
other Americans, but also British and European counterparts living and ruling colonial 
peoples throughout the world. Through travel and correspondence, he joined in a much 
broader, transnational conversation about colonial governance. Paul Kramer has shown 
how “Anglo-Saxon” racist ideology became a “self-conscious bond connecting Britons 
and Americans.” Kramer’s observation that this bond “solidif[ied] at points of elite 
Anglo-American social and intellectual contact” is borne out by Wood’s experience. 
Kramer argues that the “bond” between Britons and Americans weakened after 1902 as 
Americans began setting up their own colonial state in the Philippines. British observers 
criticized the American mode of governance, while American colonial functionaries 
defended their brand of empire-building on nationalist terms. But American colonial 
officials still continued to study European colonies “in search of practical models of 
colonial state building.” Kramer writes, “American colonial officials took their place in a 
network of imperial policy tours and exchanges with colonial officials from the American 
Philippines, Dutch Java and the East Indies, and the British Straits Settlements and 
Federated Malay States.”740  
During Wood’s tour through Egypt and Asia, foreign officials entertained him, 
showing off their armies, their colonial bureaucracies, and their proudest colonial 
accomplishments. Along the way, his ideas about the inferiority of non-white, non-
Christian peoples were further confirmed in myriad ways. He found their customs, 
smells, food, and appearance abhorrent. Furthermore, other American officials traveled 
frequently in the region in an effort to learn from the example of their British neighbors. 
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North Borneo, considered a British protectorate since 1882, was a favorite location and 
point of reference. The 1905 report for the Moro Province, for example, noted that in ten 
years it was hoped that the province would be earning the same revenues as “Sarawak, 
Rajah Brooke’s country [in Borneo], which is run for the benefit of the natives.”741 In 
order to make such aspirations reality, Americans had traveled to observe and learn from 
their neighbors. “A number of the provincial and district officials have visited some of 
the colonies of foreign powers, and at present, due to the courtesy of General Buchanan, 
four of the district governors are on a visit to British North Borneo, the Celebes, and the 
Moluccas,” the report stated.742  
 As his initial journey to Mindanao progressed, Wood shared with his wife more of 
his misgivings about the long-term implications of British rule in Egypt and Asia. He 
believed “no real progress” could come to India without “a change in religion and 
customs.” He condemned the caste system and the treatment of women – a product of 
religious custom – for the lack of progress. “The people are being safely handled and kept 
as well as possible but take England away and the results of her work will vanish as they 
will in Egypt.”743 Over time, as Wood spent more time at sea and en route to Singapore 
and then China, his letters to his wife grew more irritable and critical of “the East” in 
general. Aboard the S.S. “Arratoon Apcar” on the Ganges, he described the heat to his 
wife. “You have to feel this Indian heat to understand it,” he assured her. The climate was 
enervating, “imparting neither life nor energy.” In keeping with some of the latest 
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scientific theories of the day, Wood believed the climate was responsible for some of the 
evident backwardness of the people in India and Asia.744 He sympathized with the white 
people who staffed the colonial governments, telling his wife of their “wretched struggle” 
to educate their children and maintain their own health. Unfortunately, he believed their 
sacrifices were largely in vain. Such challenges would “prevent the development of an 
English colony in the true sense of the term,” Wood believed. “As a place to hold for 
trade, to govern, to come to, to get rich, India is all right but to live in, never....”745 
 Wood’s early positive observations degenerated as he spent more time among “the 
natives.” While he enjoyed the natural splendors of the regions they toured, he found the 
people repulsive. Months later he later wrote a friend that “the view of the Himalayas 
from Darjeeling is worth a trip around the world” and was “the grandest sight I ever 
saw.”746 But during the trip, he expressed decidedly hostile opinions. “The East, by the 
way, is a most distinct disappointment,” he wrote his wife while en route to Sumatra. 
“Everything is dirt and ignorance…Seen once is enough unless for a trip to some special 
portions of the world at the proper season of year.” Wood did not hold back in his 
condemnation of the people they encountered. “Every native quarter is dirty. The people 
are half naked, densely ignorant and little mud idols in silk frocks, etc. or more 
commonly with none crop out in the dirtiest little modern temples…in short, life at home 
mounts higher and higher the more one sees of this sort of thing.”747 Weeks before he 
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reached Mindanao he had made up his mind about Asia, already homesick for the United 
States. He told Lou, “You can be quite sure of one thing and that is that you would never 
want to live in this part of the world any length of time. One does get so thoroughly sick 
of the native and his ways and longs for our own country.”748 Wood would spend the next 
several years of his life working in the Philippines, and return there as governor-general 
in 1921. Before his arrival in Mindanao, however, his travels had already convinced him 
of the superiority of the U.S. and its people. 
American military officials expressed few misgivings about following the 
example of their European neighbors. In certain instances, officers referenced both their 
own American past and their European counterparts when diagnosing a situation 
concerning the “natives.” In 1905, George Langhorne, an army officer and Moro 
Province official, wrote Wood, then in the United States, with a report on the situation 
with Datu Ali, one of the U.S.’s fiercest enemies in their attempts to put down resistance 
in Mindanao. “From experience with our own Indians and the English and Dutch in their 
various colonies, it would seem better to get entirely rid of a disturbing element like Ali. 
It is better for the country that he should cease to exist than to be in a position to create 
further trouble in the future, whenever he might happen to be displeased,” Langhorne 
wrote. “Every concession to an Asiatic, as a general rule, is a mistake. It is only when 
they beg for mercy that they should get, not more than they beg for, if anything, less.”749 
The latter part of the quotation is most often cited as evidence of the U.S.’s harsh policy 
toward Moro militants. But the basis of Langhorne’s argument – his reasoning for an 
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exterminationist policy toward those hostile to U.S. rule – was based on both American 
and European precedent. Langhorne had authored a report based on his travels to Java, 
Borneo, Singapore, and the Malay States the year before. He was one of several military 
officers interested in what their European counterparts were doing in the neighboring 
islands.750  
 Some Americans believed the U.S. should attempt to emulate their European 
neighbors more closely in governing the Moro Province. John McA. Palmer, a captain in 
the 15th Infantry and governor of the Lanao district from 1906 to 1908, sent Bliss a long 
proposal recommending the creation of government colonies modeled on the Dutch 
methods employed in Java. Under his plan, the Moros would farm forty-acre plots under 
the close supervision of American soldiers. Palmer’s colonization scheme was detailed: 
he specified the money to be loaned to the Moros and the labor due to the government in 
return. The Moros would be required to grow subsistence crops along with a certain 
number of export products. In introducing the plan to Bliss, he acknowledged that certain 
aspects of it may cause American officials to bristle. “While the idea of enforced labor is 
rather startling to Americans, its necessity in dealing with people like the Moros must be 
apparent to anyone who has had occasion to study them or similar peoples in Malaysia,” 
he wrote. By this time Mindanao had been under military rule for several years, and the 
province had reported some progress in attracting settlers and increasing export 
production, but the islands were not nearly as profitable as Dutch colonies in Java or the 
British colonies in Borneo. American officials had also been less successful than hoped in 
eradicating bound and slave labor. Palmer continued, “The only industrial system they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750 On the Langhorne report, see Amoroso, “Inheriting the Moro Problem,” 118. 
	   	  
	  
	  
391 
[the Moros] know is the slave system which implies protection and dependence and they 
are not prepared for independent activity. But under the conditions suggested for these 
industrial settlements, the entrance to the colony would be voluntary, and it is believed 
that the people would embrace the opportunity and that they would consider the demands 
of the government just and liberal in view of the substantial benefits conferred.”751 The 
Moro Province never put such a system of forty-acre plots into place. Nonetheless, the 
proposal is one example of how Americans used the study of other colonial populations 
in order to craft governance schemes for their new possessions in the Philippines.   
Several years later, Captain Chauncey B. Humphrey, detailed as an intelligence 
officer, reported back to the third provincial governor, John J. Pershing, on what he had 
found in touring part of the province for over two months. The people he had found in the 
mountains were “not civilized to any degree, 90% being as wild as timber wolves, but as 
savage as a cayote.” Humphrey’s memorandum reflected his sense that the Americans 
were doing nothing but emulating their European predecessors; they simply needed to 
decide which colonial model they would follow. As a result, he told Pershing that there 
were two options open to the Americans in attempting to rule such wild people. In the 
first place, the U.S. could authorize the importation of “coolie class Chinese as laborers.” 
He estimated that between 2,500 and 3,000 Chinese would be necessary under this plan. 
The second option relied on infrastructure, that perennial feature of military labor and 
tool of colonial control. Humphrey argued that by building “excellent roads,” the U.S. 
would make “accessible once and for always” the valuable mountain region. With some 
modesty he told Pershing, “These two methods I name are nothing new as you know, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
751 John McA. Palmer to Bliss, 18 January 1908, Bliss Papers, Library of Congress. 
	   	  
	  
	  
392 
being an English method and the other being a Dutch method for the corresponding 
difficulty.”752 Following the precedent established in its own West, the U.S. army 
continued to pursue the second course in dealing with the southern Philippines. It 
prioritized the construction of roads and telegraphs, believing that better transportation, 
communication, and consequently commerce would “open” the wild parts of the Moro 
Province to the benefits of civilization. Whether or not Humphrey’s rather obscure report 
influenced this policy direction, he gave voice to the persistent importance of European 
models and comparisons in Mindanao as late as 1911. 
To the disappointment of many officers, the army was not able to establish a 
profitable colony in the Moro Province on par with Borneo or Dutch Java. However, 
leading officers traveled around the region and the world in an effort to acquaint 
themselves with colonial methods employed by other European powers. They looked to 
Native Americans and the history of the North American West in order to glean some 
lessons about the new “frontier” in the southern Philippines. As fighting subsided and the 
army turned its attention to establishing a government in the Moro Province, they tried to 
understand the people they governed and the challenges they faced. The importance of 
comparative frameworks for army personnel attempting to make sense of their mission in 
the Muslim South makes it clear that they did not think of their work as “exceptional.” 
While Leonard Wood commented on the inapplicability of certain British methods for an 
American colony, he also tried to learn as much as he could about British colonial rule, 
hoping to replicate the older empire’s successes in the Middle East and Asia. Although 
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different officers used such comparisons to make contrasting arguments about the 
American mission in Mindanao, they always emphasized the importance of labor. Some 
believed, with Captain Humphrey and General Leonard Wood, that immigration was 
necessary. Others proposed schemes for getting the indigenous people to work on 
American-run plantations. Still others believed that Mindanao would flourish because its 
natives were more industrious than the Native Americans had been. In all these 
discussions and debates, army officers helped craft American imperial policies, 
performing the intellectual labor necessary to govern the U.S. colony in Mindanao. 
Voices of Empire: Writing the Imperial Experience 
Army officers, particularly those with positions in the colonial government of the 
Moro Province, wrote extensively. In private correspondence and official reports, they 
expressed their views on matters ranging from army doctrine to the weather to how to 
find a good cook in the tropics.753 These writings illuminate the inner workings of the 
U.S. military-colonial bureaucracy. But officers also engaged in another type of 
intellectual labor: writing for the public. In doing so, they added their perspectives to a 
chorus of voices reflecting on the U.S.’s expanding global empire in the pages of 
newspapers, popular periodicals, and even academic journals. Paul Kramer explains how 
the “publishing revolution” of the late-nineteenth century contributed to the exchange of 
ideas between Americans and Britons, particularly around issues of “race” and 
imperialism. Among the “genteel Anglo-American literary-political magazines” Kramer 
names are the titles of several where army officers from Mindanao published. “The new 
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publishing circuits helped create an ‘imagined community’ of literate, English-speaking 
Americans and Britons with common affiliations and reference points, even among the 
less traveled,” Kramer writes.754 Military personnel also joined in creating this “imagined 
community” through their publications, adding their voices and perspectives to the public 
discourse on U.S. imperial expansion.  This section examines the published writings of 
two army officers associated with the southern Philippines: Robert L. Bullard and John P. 
Finley. While both men reached high rank and earned acclaim in the military 
establishment, they were by no means the region’s most famous officers.755 Moving 
beyond the top brass, the writings of Bullard and Finley demonstrate how less well-
known officers gained a voice in popular and academic outlets. Their experiences in 
certain corners of Moro Province administration gave them a platform that they used to 
present their ideas and perspectives to a broader, non-military public.  
Army officers often appeared in print in the nineteenth century. Long before the 
army traveled to Cuba, Hawaii, or the Philippines, army officers and their families wrote 
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known of all former Mindanao officers was John J. Pershing. The third and last military governor of the 
Moro Province, General “Black Jack” Pershing commanded the American Expeditionary Forces in World 
War I. Pershing remains the only living person to hold the rank of General of the Armies of the United 
States, the highest rank in the U.S. army. Biographies of the generals cover their time in the Moro Province, 
but their most glorious achievements were won elsewhere. See Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood: A 
Biography (New York: Harper & Bros., 1931); Jack McCallum, Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, 
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prolifically about their experiences on the western “frontier.” Despite their unusually 
large literary output, most historians have not regarded military personnel as particularly 
important writers.756 Yet their diaries, letters, and published articles provide a trove of 
insights about their experiences and perceptions. Army officers were employees and 
representatives of the federal government in the West and overseas, and along with their 
families they certainly gained experiences far different from their civilian counterparts.  
Yet in other ways they were typical of the American bourgeoisie in the late-nineteenth 
century. In his influential article arguing against the “isolationism” attributed to the post-
Civil War army by Samuel Huntington, John M. Gates insisted that the army’s leadership 
was enmeshed in the larger American society in many ways, including in the class 
position of its officers. Gates wrote that “officers actually had more in common with the 
ruling elite than with any other societal group in the nation.” The peculiarities of the West 
Point selection process meant that “the vast majority of officers [came] from families 
with better than average incomes, connections, or both.”757 Citing a number of historical 
and sociological studies, Gates concluded that the officer corps shared the same politics 
and general beliefs as civilians.758 That is not to say that army officers were a monolithic 
group or that they always agreed with one another.759 Still, they came from and tended to 
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represent a narrow slice of the American bourgeoisie, one that was particularly well-
educated and well-read.760 Like their predecessors who fought in the Indian Wars, 
officers who governed the southern Philippines “were largely the product of a vibrant 
turn-of-the-century socially conscious segment of American society,” according to 
historian Michael Hawkins. Influenced by “the powerful social currents of progressivism, 
race theory, and the Social Gospel,” the U.S. military leadership was “highly 
representative of a small but critically important slice of America’s ruling class; a class 
that initiated, shaped, and later textually recalled the imperial experience.” 761 As 
Hawkins notes, the same class identity and privilege that led men like Bullard and Finley 
to the top ranks of the military also positioned them to write and publish their ideas and 
experience – to “textually recall…the imperial experience.” 
Army officers were further connected to civilian society through their 
contributions to the media. In his study of the “frontier army,” Michael Tate describes 
military personnel who were frequently in touch with local, regional, and national news 
outlets. Posts often published their own one-page sheets, but they also received 
subscriptions to national newspapers. Military personnel served as correspondents and 
submitted reports on major battles as well as anecdotes and commentary for larger 
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publications. While few officers experienced the fame and renown of Charles King, a 
wildly successful novelist, or the artist Frederic Remington, who also worked as a 
correspondent for Harper’s Weekly, many lesser-known officers published articles in the 
popular press. The Army and Navy Journal wrote in 1877 that military personnel “almost 
form a distinct and literary class, and in periodical literature, for instance, they are a 
recognized and indisputable force.” Kevin Adams writes, “During the 1870s, one-quarter 
of West Point graduates published books and articles on military topics, while others 
wrote on other subjects, gave lyceum addresses, or contributed to newspapers.”762 
Through these publications, officers and their wives helped create enduring images and 
narratives about the West, Native Americans, and the expansion of American power 
across the continent.  
Scholars interested in the writings of military officers have tended to focus on the 
so-called “frontier” period in search of officers’ views and ideas about Native Americans. 
Yet the closing of the frontier stimulated even greater interest in the experiences of 
military personnel. During this period, many retired officers penned memoirs and 
published their papers. “The end of the nineteenth century produced a wave of nostalgia 
about the alleged passing of the frontier, and this newly awakened interest continued into 
the next century,” Michael Tate writes. “Because officers and their wives effectively 
provided fond remembrances of the old army, with its code of personal honor, esprit, and 
regimental loyalty, post-frontier generations came to admire a lifestyle that had otherwise 
disappeared in the bloody excesses of World War I.”763 The frontier period was not only 
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a popular topic for memoirists; it also became a reference point for active military 
personnel engaged in fighting on new “frontiers” in the U.S.’s expanding overseas 
empire. Although Tate does not mention the Spanish-American War, frontier nostalgia 
served a specific purpose when the United States was fighting its first sustained imperial 
wars in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Colonel Robert Lee Bullard, for example, looked 
back not only to the settlement of the trans-Mississippi West, but also to Reconstruction 
in order to provide context for the army’s non-combat role among non-white and often 
hostile local populations in Mindanao. 
Bullard was one of the officers who frequently “recalled” his “imperial 
experience” in the popular and military press. In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
he published more than two dozen articles in various magazines and journals. He cast a 
wide net in terms of topic and publication. For military audiences, he wrote about 
weapons, small maneuvers, and field training. In keeping with an era epitomized by 
Teddy Roosevelt, he penned pieces on antelope, deer, and boar hunting for popular 
outdoorsmen’s magazines. Bullard’s background as a well-traveled army officer 
informed even his lighter pieces. In Field and Stream, for example, he wrote about his 
experience “boar hunting in Mindanao.” But Bullard did not limit himself to musings, 
reminiscences, or entertaining accounts of big-game hunting. In contributions to popular 
magazines such as the Atlantic and Metropolitan Magazine, Bullard helped shape a 
narrative about what the United States – particularly the army – was doing in Cuba and 
the Philippines. Several articles by Bullard about Cuba appeared in both military and 
civilian publications, including the Educational Review and the North American Review. 
In a number of articles for the Atlantic Monthly, discussed in chapter 4, Bullard detailed 
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his experience building a military road in the southern Philippines.764 At the same time, 
he also used his platform to speak on domestic issues, writing about black soldiers and 
race issues in the context of American rule in Cuba. In this way, Bullard, like other army 
officers in the early twentieth century, leveraged his experiences in order to reach to 
reach a larger public with his ideas about U.S.’s role as an imperial power.  
Bullard traced common themes in his articles, even when writing on different 
topics. In 1901, he wrote a piece entitled “The Negro Volunteer: Some Characteristics” 
for the Journal of the Military Service Institute. While this publication had a largely 
military readership, Bullard’s article was reprinted, with excerpts appearing in The 
Nation.765 It was also included in a bibliography compiled by the Library of Congress and 
published by the Government Printing Office on “The Negro Question.” In “The Negro 
Volunteer,” Bullard offered his estimation of black soldiers, informed by his experience 
commanding the African-American 3rd Alabama Volunteer Infantry during the Spanish-
American War. Bullard asserted that black men made outstanding soldiers, concluding 
that the “negro volunteer” would make a “soldier par excellence.” But Bullard was far 
from a progressive on race. His positive assessment of black soldiers rested not on a 
belief that African-Americans were equal to whites, but on his confidence that they were 
quite different from their white brothers-in-arms. It was the sharp differences between 
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white and black men that accounted for the latter’s success in the army. For Bullard, the 
differences between black and white men were “so great that they almost require the 
naturalist and do require the military commander to treat the negro as a different species.” 
Urging officers to “fit his methods of instruction and rules of discipline to the 
characteristics of the race,” Bullard described those racial characteristics in greater detail. 
In the process, he also revealed what he considers the most important aspects of military 
service. 
Bullard began by describing the men he commanded in the 3rd Alabama 
Volunteers. “The enlisted men were negroes. Men with a larger proportion of white blood 
were rejected. True average negroes were gathered, Americans from the towns and 
plantations of Alabama, and Cuba, Jamaican, Mexican, English and African negroes from 
the seaport towns of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana – laborers, loafers, 
tramps, teachers, preachers, educated and illiterate – a great variety of the same article.” 
He noted that he spent nine months with these 1,200 African-American soldiers, closely 
observing their behavior and characteristics. Bullard invoked several well-worn clichés 
about the southern “negro,” insisting they had “the lightest hearts and best humor” of all 
Americans, while rejecting others, such as their laziness. He admitted that as individual 
workers, blacks were liable to “trifle,” but when assigned to work in groups, they worked 
well. In this he emphasized their “most social natures.” And while Bullard acknowledged 
certain weaknesses typical of black soldiers, including their “lack of honor,” he spent 
more time describing the particular strengths they brought to the uniform. He encouraged 
commanders of black troops to appeal to their racial pride and to continually remind them 
of what their service meant to other black Americans. He would tell them, he wrote, 
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“your service is a privilege, an opportunity to show the gratitude, manhood, and worth of 
the negro, an opportunity to raise your race higher and faster in the world’s estimation by 
a few acts in a few months than by all the agitating, talking and voting your whole race 
can do in ten years.” With these words, Bullard left no doubt about his disdain for black 
politics. But he also revealed key aspects of army life. For black soldiers, military service 
was “a privilege” meriting their “gratitude.” At the same time, however, Bullard fully 
admitted the hardships of army life. He wrote, “Bravery is no uncommon quality. 
Soldiers, white and black, are brave enough, however untrained.” Instead of bravery, the 
essential attributes for new soldiers were “respect for authority, obedience, willing and 
loyal subordination to the will of the commander.” Black soldiers possessed such 
qualities in abundance, according to Bullard. He continued, 
By character more submissive to discipline, by nature more good-humored and 
happy, from social position more subordinate, from previous habit of life more 
accustomed to yield respect to superiors, from poverty more used to plain food, 
fewer clothes and comforts, the average negro volunteer comes to the colors with 
more of the first urgently needed qualities of the soldier and readier for service 
than the white. 
 
Bullard meant to praise black men as exemplars of the rank and file – not officers, of 
course, but solid, necessary enlisted men. But in doing so, he also highlighted the 
perennial complaints of the soldiers about the army’s labor regime: its strict discipline, 
low pay, and inadequate food. Rather than calling for improvements in these areas, 
Bullard believed that black men would be more willing to accept the privations of army 
life. Black men’s social and economic marginalization, Bullard argued, made them better 
soldiers than white men who had been raised with more. In his paean to the ideal of a 
docile black soldier, Bullard revealed an unflattering conception of soldiering: a lifetime 
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of hard work, which paid its laborer back with poverty, meager food, and 
“fewer…comforts” than he would find in civilian life.766 Rather than condemn the 
poverty and want that characterized the lives of many African-Americans, Bullard 
believed these poor experiences made them better soldiers. 
Bullard’s experience commanding black troops gave him a platform for writing 
about the supposedly racial characteristics of African-Americans. His article on the 
“Negro Volunteer” was not his only exploration of racial difference, however. In fact, 
Bullard found outlets for essays on Cubans and Moros in a number of different 
publications, and in these pieces he made an understanding of racial differences central to 
his portrayal of the American imperial project. In 1907, his piece entitled “How Cubans 
Differ From Us” appeared in the North American Review. Here again he drew on his 
alleged familiarity with black Americans. “In the wretched mess which we have made in 
handling our negro problem, we have warning against the policy of proceeding in 
ignorance, though we do it with intentions that would honor the angels,” Bullard wrote. 
Again, too, Bullard insisted on the importance of racial distinctions. Remarking that “all 
men are not even such as we are,” he went on to detail the ways in which Cubans differed 
in essential respects from Americans. Understanding those differences was especially 
important as the United States sought to manage its new colonial responsibilities. 
“America is face to face with a still unsolved Cuban problem. To know Cubans, 
therefore, and how they differ from us is now a thing of moment.” The first crucial 
difference, according to Bullard, was the superior relations between blacks and whites in 
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Cuban society. Unfortunately, the U.S. could not model Cuba in this regard, since those 
better relations came at the unacceptable price of racial mixing, of a “negroid race.” 
Bullard also discussed the influence of Spanish colonialism, Roman Catholicism, and the 
proliferation of government functions in Cuba. Of all the myriad differences, the 
fundamental attribute of the Cuban character, and what distinguished Cubans from 
Americans, was their lack of discipline. This lack of discipline made Cubans unable to 
control themselves and their passions; in effect, it made them children. Thus Bullard 
concluded his essay with a strong endorsement of the colonial relationship: The lack of 
discipline, he wrote, “keeps them children. It makes it necessary for a neighbor to take 
them in hand, control, direct and manage their government and public polity. It makes the 
Cuban a Cuban.”767  
Bullard continued to offer his views of white superiority and the benevolence of 
U.S. imperial rule in a series of articles dealing with the southern Philippines. Mindanao 
and the Moros were topics brimming with romance, adventure, and suspense, making his 
essays on these subjects even more appealing for a wide audience. Bullard published his 
first piece on the topic in 1903, when “Road Building Among the Moros” appeared in the 
Atlantic Monthly. Three years later, he followed this with another essay in the Atlantic. 
The second piece, like the first, drew heavily on his experience leading the massive 
construction project near Lake Lanao. But “Preparing Our Moros for Government” was 
also a broader reflection on the imperial project and the best way for the U.S. to foster 
“civilization” in the region. The same year, in 1906, the popular Metropolitan Magazine 
published “Among the Savage Moros.” Finally, in 1909, several years after Bullard had 
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left the Philippines, he published the lengthy essay “The Caliph’s Writing” in Army and 
Navy Life. These reflections on the Moro people, appearing in both the military and 
popular press, reached a wide and diverse reading public.  
Bullard’s writings responded to the American public’s interest in “The Moro 
Problem.” When “Among the Savage Moros” appeared in Metropolitan, the editors 
referenced recent events at Bud Dajo, where General Leonard Wood had ordered an 
assault on a crater where Moros were resisting U.S. authority. American soldiers killed 
six hundred men, women, and children. The editors promised that Bullard’s article would 
help readers attain “a sound understanding of the causes leading to this now famous 
engagement and a clear idea of Moro character.” The character that Bullard sketched in 
both the Metropolitan article and in his 1909 piece, “The Caliph’s Writing,” elaborated 
on the image of Moros as thoroughly savage, inscrutable, and fascinating. Most 
importantly, his assessment of Moro character and society served to justify both hostility 
and war against the Moros. Stressing the savagery of Moros, in 1906 he wrote, “An 
inordinate military conceit is also a dominant quality of the Moro. To him there is but one 
measure of defeat, to wit: annihilation.” He continued, “Herein lies the dilemma of the 
American Government in dealing with them; to subdue Moros it is necessary almost to 
exterminate them.” Coming on the heels of the massacre, Bullard’s remarks provided 
credence to U.S. claims that its troops had no choice but to kill large numbers of Moros, 
both women and men. A few years later, he made a similar assertion, speaking 
specifically to the issue of female casualties. Speaking of Moro laws and traditions, he 
wrote,  
[The Moro] is cautioned not to fight women, but all Moros are enjoined that 
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‘During a battle both women and children are to be killed.’ Such is the custom, 
such the law of war. When, therefore, women and children join in battle, they are 
not simply taking the chances of death, but, as Moros, expect and prefer, even 
seek, death before capture. 
 
Thus explaining the Moro “custom,” Bullard provided a rationale for why women and 
children, generally considered non-combatants, were killed at Bud Dajo and in other 
altercations with the Moros.768  
 Bullard’s writings built a case for ongoing U.S. rule in the southern Philippines 
without explicitly addressing that question. He did so through his characterization of 
Moro society and government. In 1906, he emphasized merely the personal nature of that 
government; in a 1909 essay directed toward a military readership, Bullard described the 
Moros’ social organization as nothing short of chaotic. “Of the mental abstractions, 
government and policy, as separate from persons, they have no conception. It is beyond 
them,” he wrote in Metropolitan. “The words of Louis XIV, “l’Etat c’est moi,” may be 
repeated proudly by all Moro dattos to-day, and there are thousands of them, equal, 
sovereign, independent states, a dozen often within a radius of a mile.” Such a state of 
affairs, along with the Moros’ natural predispositions, led Bullard to conclude by 1909 
that “Moroland is a chaos of personal independence and personal irresponsibility. The 
whole spirit of the people is license, unfettered liberty to do and to live each as he 
pleases.” For Bullard, that lack of government was the defining feature of the Moros. 
“Notwithstanding they have a written language and some knowledge of arts, this lack of 
order and government effectually proclaims them savages.” Whereas the Cubans lacked 
self-discipline and were children, the Moros were violent as well as chaotic, requiring far 
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more than simple tutelage. By making violence and chaos the central features of his 
depiction of Moro society, Bullard effectively offered a rationalization for continued U.S. 
military rule in the region.769  
The Moros, Bullard declared, were “the most primitive and remote of American 
subjects.” Their traditions were derived from the “Arabian Nights’ tales” and full of 
“mythical lore and romantic tales.” But their cultural sophistication, even for “natives,” 
disappointed Bullard. He insisted nevertheless that the Moros could eventually move up 
the civilizational latter, and he made sure to end his 1906 essay with an affirmation of 
their potential: 
We may not, as many thought-less and impatient people do, expect of them, as 
savages, the progressiveness, faith, and honor of civilized men, but we know that 
any man or race of men that will work is not beyond hope of redemption, and the  
Moros, be they what they will, are still a race not wholly averse to work. Savages 
they are indeed to-day; industrians they may as a people become to-morrow.770 
 
It was essential that Bullard assert some latent capacity for civilizational attainment in the 
Moro people. How else to justify the continuation of American rule in this “remote” 
region? It was also no surprise that his vision for Moro progress relied on labor. Bullard, 
who had commanded Moros on the extensive road-building project in the Lanao region, 
returned again to the civilizational powers of labor. Since Moros were “not wholly 
adverse to work,” there remained some hope that they could one day progress beyond 
their current state of barbarity. Bullard’s – and the army’s – abiding faith in work made it 
possible for him to envision the savage Moros, at some indeterminate future time, as 
“industrians.”  
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 Bullard appealed to the public’s appetite for romantic, stirring portrayals of the 
Moro people. His essays also spoke to real policy concerns, such as the persistence of 
conflict between Moros and Americans, the Moros’ capacity for advancement, and the 
length of time they would require American rule. Overall, however, Bullard approached 
the Moros in much the same way he wrote about Cuba and the army in general: he spoke 
from personal experience while appealing to general and military readers. Other army 
officers, however, shared their perspectives and experiences with more specialized 
audiences. Another exemplar of the army officer as public intellectual is Major John P. 
Finley, a district governor in the Moro Province. Finley offered his assessments of the 
Moro people in the pages of academic publications, speaking to growing interest among 
intellectuals in the course of U.S. imperialism.  
 The early years of the twentieth century were a time of tremendous intellectual 
production in the field of colonial administration. Scholars have shown how the 
disciplines of political science and international affairs developed in the context of 
growing interest in the U.S.’s emergent role as an imperial power.771 Leading 
intellectuals, many of them starting to identify themselves as “political scientists,” 
engaged with the question of how the U.S. should best govern its empire and its new 
“dependencies.” The army also took part in the academic world’s growing interest in the 
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tropics, “race development,” and imperial administration. Officers serving as the colonial 
bureaucracy in the Moro Province were valuable sources of information. In late 1904, for 
example, Leonard Wood wrote his friend Alleyne Ireland, of Boston, to encourage him in 
his work on comparative colonialism. “I think the report which you are going to write on 
comparative colonial methods is going to be most interesting and it will give me a great 
deal of pleasure to put it on the list of our provincial subscriptions. I also want a copy for 
myself.”772 Ireland was a world-traveler and author on colonial governance. As a lecturer 
and professor, he was part of this burgeoning movement to analyze, understand, and chart 
the course of empire for Americans and Europeans. According to political scientist 
Robert Vitalis, “Ireland earned his reputation as a pioneer in what he called the ‘science 
of imperial administration’ after publishing Tropical Colonization: An Introduction to the 
Study of the Subject in 1899. In 1902, Ireland was appointed “Colonial Commissioner for 
the University” at the University of Chicago. Frank Ng explains, “While the university 
never created a ‘department of colonial study,’ [as Ireland had suggested] it employed 
him as a professional lecturer on colonial subjects and even sponsored his research and 
travel on colonial administration and policy.”773 In his letter, Wood expressed interest in 
reading one of Ireland’s publications, most likely Ireland’s “ambitious eight-volume 
study, never completed, on colonialism in all the Asian possessions of the United States, 
France, Britain, and the Netherlands.”774  
Army officers also played host to researchers interested in U.S. colonial efforts 
among the Moros and other “native” peoples. During General Tasker Bliss’s 
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administration, Frederick Starr, a professor of anthropology at University of Chicago, 
visited Mindanao as part of a longer tour through the archipelago. When he returned 
home, Starr sent a handwritten note to Bliss, thanking him for his hospitality while he 
visited the Moro Province. He remarked, “what a fine field for study all of the peoples in 
your charge present. Twenty workers could be studying the people of Davao alone.” Starr 
then referred to a conversation he and Bliss had regarding the possibility of appointing 
“special agents” that would conduct research among the native peoples, describing a 
potential partnership between the university and the provincial government. Inquiring as 
to salary and responsibilities, Starr wrote, “I could probably send some young men, 
whose training would enable them to do scientific investigation upon wild tribes at the 
same time that they were doing exactly the work you need done.” It is not clear if such a 
partnership came to fruition, or what “work” Bliss expected from these researchers, but 
Starr promised to send Bliss copies of any future articles he published on the 
Philippines.775  
  In addition to scholars visiting the Philippines, army personnel also reached out 
to broader academic audiences through their written work. In the early twentieth century, 
certain professional associations, universities, and publications emerged as incubators for 
the study of the U.S. empire and its new subject populations. One was the Journal of 
Race Development (JRD), founded in 1910. The journal boasted some of the leading 
minds of its day among its editors and contributors. G. Stanley Hall, one of the founders 
of the new discipline of psychology, was a co-editor; other writers included Ellsworth 
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Huntington, a geographer at Yale and a leading proponent of the view that climate 
helped determine the course of development of various “races.”776 Along with the 
journal’s focus on race development was a strong interest in the problems of governing 
racially inferior people. It also had a global scope; early issues, for example, included 
pieces on China, Korea, India, and the Philippines. As Jessica Blatt explains, the journal’s 
“high-powered cohort of writers generally expounded an expansive vision of America’s 
role in the new century and the possibilities for worldwide progress and peaceful 
coexistence.”777 John P. Finley, a career military officer and then colonial official in the 
Moro Province, may not have been as “high-powered” in academic circles as many of the 
journal’s contributors. Nonetheless, between 1913 and 1916, Finley published four 
articles on the Moros in the JRD. He offered his military perspective and insights, writing 
chiefly about his experience as the governor of the district of Zamboanga. His writings 
represent another variant of the military officers’ intellectual labor: their contributions to 
national and global conversations about the science of imperial administration and 
colonial peoples. 
Finley spent over a decade representing the U.S. army and the American colonial 
state in the Moro Province. In 1913, he wrote his first piece for the JRD, “Race 
Development by Industrial Means among the Moro and Pagans of the Southern 
Philippines.” Coming on the eve of the military’s rule in the region, Finley trumpeted his 
work as governor of Zamboanga, the district that included the capital city of the same 
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name and one of the most urbanized regions in Mindanao. He focused on his 
administration’s grandest accomplishment, the Moro Exchanges – markets where the 
entire population of the district, Muslims and animists alike, assembled to trade, barter, 
and sell their produce and wares. The provincial government funded the program with 
fees it collected from the merchants. Finley himself was not new to self-promotion; he 
wrote about the virtues of this program, which he thought could be emulated elsewhere in 
the province, in the pages of the Mindanao Herald Decennium in 1909.778 But in the 
JRD, Finley went beyond boasting and argued that trade and economic development 
should form the basis of any benevolent colonial policy among such inferior peoples. “It 
was of vast importance to both the coast people and the hill people that their trade 
relations be organized and adjusted on a business basis that would permit of healthy and 
progressive development,” he wrote. Like his military counterparts who supervised road-
building or other labor projects, Finley characterized his program as a “school of 
instruction.” Exchange was the counterpart of labor, providing an outlet for the wares and 
products the people produced. Finley’s exchange system, he argued, would “promote 
agriculture, commerce and friendly relations” and replace differences between the Moros 
and the animists, people living along the coast and in the hills, with the common bond of 
trade. “These longtime enemies have grown to be more tolerant of each other, and the 
more warlike coast dwellers have found that there is more profit in friendly association 
and mutual cooperation, in conducting trade relations than by following the old methods 
of slavery, piracy and extermination.” Given the policies pursued by the Moro Province 
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since its inception, this was the ideal outcome. War and conflict would be replaced by 
trade and economic development. Since military leaders agreed that the violent 
subjugation of the entire province was unappealing, men like Tasker H. Bliss had hoped 
that they could promote peace in the province through economic means, showing the 
Moros and animists that agriculture and peaceful trading were better than war-making. At 
the same time, of course, military leaders sought to raise revenue – something the 
exchanges also helped accomplish. As Finley notes, the exchanges put more currency in 
circulation, giving the participants no excuse to avoid paying the cedula and road taxes.  
The Moro Exchanges demonstrated the subject people’s capacity for 
“development,” but Americans were necessary to facilitate this progress. “Left to their 
own ingenuity they would have continued to wallow in the morass of conflict, oppression 
and despair for an indefinite period of time,” Finley wrote. Portraying the Moros and 
animists as truly dependent peoples, he emphasized the need for a strong but considerate 
colonial policy. Echoing perhaps the work of G. Stanley Hall, who argued that racially 
inferior people were like children, Finley also stressed the paternal relationship between 
the U.S. and the people it governed in the southern Philippines. “These people are wards 
of the government and as such children of the state they should receive paternal care, 
more especially as they ask for it.” Here was a view of American benevolence that may 
well have appealed to a readership concerned with the long-term implications for U.S. 
colonial governance. But the work was far from over. Finley urged the U.S. to embrace 
its world-historical role as an imperial power. By joining the ranks of other great powers 
in the East, Finley expected that Americans would be able to accomplish a great deal in 
Mindanao and in the Pacific more generally. “Italy in Tripoli, Spain in Morocco, France 
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in Algeria, Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia, England in Egypt, India, Borneo and the 
Straits Settlements, and the Dutch in the East Indies are in contact with the Mohammedan 
problem of government, in varying degrees of success,” he wrote, laying the groundwork 
for future essays in the journal on the “Mohammedan problem.” He had opened the essay 
by asserting that “Providence in His omniscient wisdom” had “allotted to the American 
people this new and vastly important task.” He concluded the essay with an even more 
rousing invocation for the country to embrace its God-given responsibilities: 
The United States has made its advent in the East as a new power for good, not 
alone for the island races that come under her care, but also in that great settlement 
of European spheres of influence in Asia, where exists the greatest world problems 
of our day. We must accept the responsibilities of the new situation as a 
providentially imposed task upon a progressive and powerful nation. We can not 
shirk the trust imposed whether for the present or for posterity. From national birth 
to the present time our development has been westward. It is our destiny. Our 
industrial and commercial future is indissolubly linked with the destinies of the 
thousand millions of souls occupying today the oldest empires of the earth.779  
 
The U.S. was not in the Philippines only to promote the “development” of subject 
peoples, but also to advance its own westward development. Employing the 
transcendental language of manifest destiny, Finley proclaimed it the United States’ 
“destiny.”780  
 The U.S. faced unique problems in the southern Philippines that went beyond 
questions of labor and trade. Finley, therefore, devoted his next two articles for the JRD 
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to explorations of “Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines.” In these he described the 
history of the Muslim inhabitants of the Moro Province and offered his assessment of 
how the U.S. should proceed to govern them and their neighbors. Here Finley’s writing 
epitomized that combination of Progressive idealism and racial arrogance that led Jessica 
Blatt to write, “while the JRD generally affirmed the superiority of Anglo-Saxon 
civilization, it rejected some of the more vicious forms of white supremacist thought that 
were widely acceptable at the time.”781 Finley began by explaining the “wonderful 
advance” of Islam from the Middle East into Asia. In keeping with the best scholarship of 
the day and the general thrust of the JRD, he described the racial mixing that took place 
between the Hindus and the Arabs and the influence on the subsequent “stocks.” Overall, 
his assessment of the Moros was positive. True, the Moros were ruthless, conquering 
people, but for Finley those were admirable qualities. “It is told of the Moro, that he was 
a pirate and ravaged the coasts of the other islands; probably he did. If so his name and 
‘praos’ should go down in history beside those of Drake, Raleigh, Cortez and the navies 
of Napoleon and George the Fourth.”782 This bit of cultural relativism notwithstanding, 
Finley did not believe the Moros were equal to Anglo-Saxons – only that the U.S. should 
appreciate the laws, customs, and religion that the Moros possessed. Islam, indeed, could 
be an enormous asset toward helping the Moros achieve a higher level of civilization.  
 The Muslim teachers who came to the southern Philippines had brought a system of 
learning and an appreciation for written texts. Finley praised the Islamic teachers for 
introducing “a written language and methods of industry,” as well as teaching their 
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charges “a systematic cultivation of the soil” and encouraging them “to respect the 
property and family rights of others; to instruct their children in a knowledge of the 
Koran, and how to read and write its characters; to respect all forms of life and to 
surround women and children with many safeguards against vice and physical dangers.” 
Rather than seeing Islam as a savage religion, Finley respected its values and teachings 
and credited its teachers with getting the “natives” to “for[sake] pagan ways and habits.” 
Unfortunately, the Spanish missionaries had ruthlessly tried to suppress this learning – 
going so far as to destroy the sacred texts, a travesty in Finley’s eyes. They had 
mistakenly labeled all Moros “savages,” and the Americans had unwisely accepted the 
Spanish characterization of the Moros, missing early opportunities to form peaceful, 
productive relationships with their leaders. He writes, “we were given to understand by 
the Christians generally that the Moros were savages and we treated them accordingly. 
We were told that a good Moro was a dead one and that they could not be trusted with the 
smallest responsibility; that they were incorrigible pirates.”783 Furthermore, by insisting 
that the Muslim religion was not an impediment to civilization – and by suggesting it 
could be a means of civilization – Finley distanced American colonial government from 
the Spanish precursor. In contrast to the Spaniards, the Americans were not interested in 
conversion. Instead, Finley suggested, the U.S. should foster cordial relations with the 
Moros by respecting their religion. The road toward civilization was a long one, but it 
was not impossible for the Moros. “We are prepared to advance with the Moros along the 
line of his own culture, religion and customary laws, carrying them all without neglect, 
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ridicule, contempt or violence, while continually pointing the way to higher ideals and 
better results in his own system.”784  
 Finley’s remarks show that he, like his fellow officers in the Philippines, frequently 
drew on the precedents set by Native American policy in the U.S. in order to understand 
the problems besetting the Moro Province. Here he referenced the aphorism attributed to 
General Philip H. Sheridan that the “only good Indian is a dead Indian,” this time 
rejecting the claim that “a good Moro was a dead one.” This was not the first time Finley 
made such a connection. In his 1913 article, he explained that the Moro Exchange System 
would provide the type of instruction in trade and cooperation that Native Americans 
never received. “The lack of true appreciation by the science and art of cooperation, 
influenced by the adverse elements of speculation, has greatly retarded the industrial and 
commercial development of our Indian wards in the states, and under similar conditions 
is experienced as an unreasonable restraint upon a like development of our Indian wards 
in the Philippines.”785 Finley’s statement reflected the common-sense acceptance that the 
Moros were the “Indian wards” of the Philippines. He believed, however, that the U.S. 
could improve on its past records with Native Americans. The mistakes of the past, 
unfortunate as they were, could help guide American policymakers and colonial 
administrators toward better results with the Moros. Finley was optimistic. “In the pros 
and cons of this situation we are beginning to cultivate a resemblance to the peculiarities 
that have developed in connection with the solution of our Indian problems in the West,” 
he wrote. Expressing his Progressive-era faith in the potential of “facts,” he continued, 
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“With an immense accumulation of relevant and convincing facts filed away in our 
Indian Bureau, and in the operation of our public societies for the protection of dependent 
Indians, it would seem as though serious errors could be avoided in conducting the 
regeneration of our Indian wards in the Southern Philippines.”786 
 Finley’s writing spoke to exactly those issues that interested the readership of the 
JRD: how differences in racial development influenced colonial administration. He 
argued that “successful control of a dependent subject people of Malayan birth” required 
“a policy of administration” based on “the ideals of such people, as exhibited by the best 
of their native leaders.” Despite the cultural and racial superiority of the colonial peoples, 
policymakers needed to understand the people they governed. He cautioned “that the 
ideas, methods, practices and aspirations of the governing people, however suited to their 
needs and expectations, may be wholly impracticable for the people to be governed.” 
Such understanding was essential if Americans were going to successfully rule people so 
thoroughly different from themselves. Again, Blatt’s observation that the JRD was less 
“vicious” in its white supremacist thought bears repeating. Although Finley’s 
characterization of Moro inferiority may not have been “vicious,” he was still convinced 
that the Moros and similar people were meant to be “subjects” and “governed” rather 
than governors. Ruling them required understanding them, and understanding required 
men like Finley: experts who filled the pages of the JRD. They would study, observe, 
analyze, and understand the “dependent subject people.” Finley continued, “Their 
governors must thoroughly and conscientiously study their habits and aspirations and 
acquire familiarity and sympathy with them.” He argued that policymakers should be 
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“more deliberate in our conclusions and methods” and should “carefully measure the 
probable progress of the dependent people.” Here was the work of scientific imperial 
administration. Still, Finley admitted that “progress is a question largely of evolution and 
less of legislative enactment and judicial process.” Nonetheless, by studying the habits, 
customs, and mores of the “governed,” the “governing” people – that is, Americans and 
Europeans – could more sympathetically and effectively rule the world. 
 In addition to his articles on the Philippines, Finley also penned a fourth piece for 
the JRD on “reasonable preparedness.” Published in 1916, Finley quoted George 
Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Emory Upton to substantiate his claim that the U.S. 
needed a robust national defense and a strong military establishment. Here, too, he 
referenced both the perils of racial degeneration and the responsibilities attendant on the 
U.S. as a world power. “Unadulterated peace leads to slothfulness, over-feeding, dry rot, 
goutiness, heart failure, luxury, race suicide, vice, agitation, discontent, weakness, and 
many other evils which undermine and destroy nations,” he wrote. Furthermore, in 
contrast to other thinkers who heralded 1898 as a sharp turning-point, marking the 
country’s entrance into global affairs, Finley saw continuity rather than change.  “We 
have always been one of the ‘world powers’ in spite of our imagined seclusion.” If the 
U.S. chose not to embrace its “obligations” toward “the family of nations,” he predicted 
ruin. The alternative to world leadership was for the U.S. to “become a subject people too 
weak to hold the reins of an independent government and therefore subject to partition 
and absorption by those people who are equal to the responsibilities of a virile and 
progressive government. We must either advance to the dignity of a governing nation, or 
fall back to the subordinate position of a governed one.”  In this competition for global 
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rank, the U.S. did not have the option of self-imposed isolation; if it shirked its duty and 
failed to develop a strong national defense, it risked becoming a “subject people” 
governed by another, stronger power.787  
 Finley’s burst of publishing came during the twilight of his military career. In 1913, 
his piece, “The Commercial Awakening of the Moro and Pagan,” appeared in the more 
popular North American Review. The same year, he published a book-length scholarly 
account of one tribal group in the southern Philippines, The Subanu: Studies of a Sub-
Visayan Folk of Mindanao, through the Carnegie Institution. Most of his articles, 
including those on the “Mohammedan problem,” were published after U.S. military rule 
in the southern Philippines had ended. The last military governor of the Moro Province, 
John J. Pershing, turned over control of the province to a civilian, Frank Carpenter, in 
December 1913. The following year, the province as an administrative unit was 
dissolved, replaced by the military Department of Mindanao and Sulu. By then Finley 
had already left the Philippines and was serving stateside. In 1918, he retired from active 
reserve due to his age. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed Professor of Military Science 
and Tactics at Columbia, where he was made head of the new Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps (ROTC) at the university.788 By this point, Finley’s writing career seems to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787 John P. Finley, “The Necessity and Wisdom of Reasonable Preparedness against War by the United 
States,” The Journal of Race Development 6, no. 3 (January 1916): 300-314.  
788 “Government Names Unit Commandant,” Columbia Daily Spectator 41, no. 129, April 29, 1918. Finley 
is still waiting for his biographer; a study of his life could illuminate many features of the growth of the 
U.S. army and its varied responsibilities in the late-nineteenth century. Before ever traveling to the 
Philippines, he distinguished himself as one of the first storm forecasters, publishing dozens of articles on 
tornadoes and weather matters for academic and government audiences. See Joseph G. Galway, “J.P. 
Finley: The First Severe Storms Forecaster,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 66, no. 11 
(1985): 1389–95. His interest in tornadoes continued, and he published articles on severe weather in the 
Philippines during his time in the Moro Province. See Joseph G. Galway, “J.P. Finley: The First Severe 
Storms Forecaster - Part II,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 66, no 12 (1985): 1505-1510. 
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come to a close. 
 Although the army’s  military rule in the South was over, the U.S. still had to 
grapple with the Moros and the particular challenges they presented. Finley did not 
foresee the end of American colonial rule in the Philippines any time soon. From his 
vantage point, the “problems” the Americans faced in the Moro Province were part of a 
larger constellation of challenges it would confront so long as its imperial responsibilities 
grew. His publications were intended to help shape not public opinion but expert opinion 
on the proper way to govern colonial peoples. In the pages of the Journal of Race 
Development, Finley’s name and opinions appeared alongside some of the most noted 
and respected intellectuals of the early twentieth century. Certainly less well-known than 
G. Stanley Hall, W.E.B. duBois, or Franz Boas, who all served on the journal’s original 
editorial board, Finley nonetheless published his opinions alongside other eminent 
intellectuals. As a military man, he was able to use his experience and position in order to 
gain entrée to that academic rarefied world, at least in print. 
Conclusion 
Both Bullard and Finley wrote and published while they were serving in Mindanao; 
both men also continued to do so after they left the islands. From their publication 
records, it is clear that these two army officers were conscious of their position at the 
forefront of the U.S. empire. They considered this position carefully, reflecting on the 
meaning of their work for the United States and its place in the world. Their experience 
also suggests there is a larger history to tell. How many other officers published their 
views of American imperialism at this time? How did their military backgrounds shape 
their arguments? Although there are many questions still unanswered, the examples of 
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Bullard and Finley help illuminate the public intellectual labor that army officers 
performed. Their publications spread word of the army’s activities in the Pacific, 
introducing civilians to the varied tasks soldiers undertook as part of the U.S.’s imperial 
expansion. The way they told that story, the way they publicized the army’s work in the 
Philippines, was indelibly shaped by what they considered the mistakes of U.S. Indian 
policy and the lack of credit the army had received for its accomplishments in the 
American West. But their literary output also reflected broader intellectual and political 
currents at the time, reinforcing the fact that military officers were part of a larger milieu 
that included intellectuals and policymakers. 
The work of empire was difficult and multifaceted. The majority of American 
soldiers built roads, went on scouts, and searched for the enemy; that was their day’s 
work. Another type of assignment fell to officers: the intellectual labor of describing, 
explaining, justifying, and publicizing the army’s work in the Philippines. In letters 
home, official reports, and academic articles, army officers addressed the fundamental 
question: Why was the U.S. in the southern Philippines? They answered with zeal, 
invoking “destiny” and “civilization.” Robert L. Bullard did not hesitate to endorse the 
American imperial project, but he also acknowledged the potential risks inherent in this 
national missionary work. He wrote in the Atlantic Monthly, “To reach our civilization 
they [the Moros] must pass a great gulf. In its crossing they may, like the Indian, be lost.” 
But Bullard believed the undertaking was worth the risk. “Because they are part of us, we 
must fetch them forward with us; we cannot leave them behind. Because savagery and 
civilization cannot exist side by side…Because, finally, as savages the Moros stand in the 
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way of our destiny, and we cannot permit that,” Bullard declared.789  
Many officers in charge of the army’s occupation of the southern Philippines 
worried, like Bullard, that the Moros would indeed end up “like the Indian.” They found 
many similarities, both good and bad, between the natives of North America and the 
“Indian wards in the southern Philippines.” Striving to make sense of their mission in the 
tropics, they recognized both the foreign and familiar aspects of their work among these 
wards. Their writings and publications highlight the connection between the army’s 
imperial work in the American West and in the Philippines that men like Wood, Bliss, 
Finley, and Bullard observed. Historians are only just beginning to rediscover and 
reassert the association that the army officers had long recognized between these military 
projects. 
The army’s intellectual work took many forms. Ideas traveled far and wide, in 
letters to well-placed friends – even presidents – to wives, journalists, and senators. 
Officers continued to assert their opinions even after their military careers were over. In 
doing so, they helped create enduring narratives about the United States’ place in the 
world and its and civilizational mission in the southern Philippines.     
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EPILOGUE 
The Savage Wars of Peace 
 
“Today our soldier, the war-maker, has become also a peace-maker and a peace-
preserver,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard in 1910. Gesturing toward the 
army’s recent activities, he spoke of “the work upon which the Army has been mainly 
occupied in the last half a century – reconstruction in the South, the settlement of the 
Indian question in the West, our intervention in Cuba, the pacification of the Philippines, 
Cuba again and the Moros to date….One-half at least of all our soldiers’ business since 
1865 has been pacification; its flood since ’98 has been continuous.”790  
In a few short years, that trend towards peace-making would be shattered. Bullard 
himself would see his share of bloodshed as commander of the First Infantry Division 
from 1917 to 1918. Yet the United States’ preoccupation with “pacification” did not end. 
Bullard defined pacification as “all means, short of actual war, used by the dominating 
power in the operation of bringing back to a state of peace and order the inhabitants of a 
district lately in hostilities. It is not conquest, though it may be the last stage of 
conquest.” He believed it was, essentially, “military government.”791 Based on his own 
experiences, Bullard anticipated that the army’s work would continue to center on 
pacification as the United States extended its influence over “hostile” peoples and new 
territories around the globe. Indeed, military thinkers and strategists have referred to 
Bullard’s writings to understand conflicts from Vietnam to Iraq. 
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The concept of pacification helped Bullard and his contemporaries capture the 
broad scope of the military’s activities. Yet the term itself was problematic. While 
Bullard hailed the modern soldier as “a peace-maker and a peace-preserver,” much of 
what he described was far from peaceful: Reconstruction, the subjugation of Native 
Americans, and the Spanish-American War and Moro conflicts were bloody, protracted 
affairs. Years later, George Orwell used the same word to show how language was 
mutilated and manipulated for political ends. “Defenceless villages are bombarded from 
the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the 
huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification,” Orwell wrote in 
1946.792 Even poets struggled to characterize this work of making peace through 
violence. Rudyard Kipling talked about the “savage wars of peace.”793 The British later 
spoke of “small wars” and Americans of “counterinsurgency.”794  
Whatever the name, soldiers faced ongoing, violent opposition to the growing 
power of the United States. None of this was particularly new when Kipling wrote his 
famous ode to imperialism in 1899, inspired by the U.S. conquest of the Philippines. 
American soldiers had been doing the work of pacification long before they marched 
through the jungles of Luzon or stalked Moro juramentos around Lake Lanao. As Bullard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” Horizon, April 1946. 
http://journalism.nyu.edu/publishing/archives/portfolio/books/book51.html. A major part of the U.S.’s 
strategy in South Vietnam was referred to as “pacification.” The “semi-official” history of pacification in 
Vietnam, and a good place to start, is Richard A Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s 
Hearts and Minds (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1998). 
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of Famine / And bid the sickness cease.” Available online at http://www.pitt.edu/~syd/wmb.html.  
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observed, the army’s duties in Reconstruction resembled their work in the Philippines, as 
soldiers instituted new types of labor arrangements, oversaw elections, rebuilt 
infrastructure, and pursued guerrillas in the South. Years earlier they had also worked to 
establish U.S. sovereignty and put down insurrection in pre-statehood California. They 
faced guerrilla resistance from Native adversaries in the trans-Mississippi West. All this 
work supported the overall goal of conquest, but these were not the traditional battles that 
officers studied at West Point and later glorified in their memoirs. Over a century after 
the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine, American troops continued to do many of these same 
tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan. By then, the work had acquired a new name: “nation-
building.”795 
When Kipling wrote of “the savage wars of peace,” he was troubling the 
distinction between war and peace. This study also troubles that distinction. Much of the 
labor described here took place off the battlefield; it was “non-combat” labor. Yet it all 
contributed to the larger goal of advancing U.S. power, of extending the nation’s 
sovereignty through force over new peoples, land, and resources. Empire-builders like 
Colonel Bullard believed that violence and bloodshed were justified by the higher calling 
of civilization. Yet the price of peace was indeed savagery: the United States’ imperial 
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wars resulted in staggering violence against indigenous peoples, the environment, and 
American soldiers themselves. The architects of those policies worried about the toll the 
work was taking on them. After all, planning and administering an empire was difficult 
work, too. In 1906, Colonel Hugh Lenox Scott wrote his friend, General Tasker H. Bliss, 
governor of the Moro Province. Before becoming the military governor of Sulu, Scott 
had enjoyed a storied career on the North American continent: he cleaned up after 
Custer’s Last Stand, suppressed the Lakota Ghost Dance, and compiled Indian sign 
languages for the Smithsonian. He would later serve as the superintendent of West Point. 
But when he wrote Bliss, he addressed him tenderly. “My dear Bliss,” he wrote, “I hope 
the white man’s burden will not prove very heavy for you…I have the interest of the 
Sultan and all the Moros very much at heart and hope that they will continue to advance 
on the road on which they have started and that your personal success will be duly 
recognized.”796 
*** 
Building an American empire required a prodigious amount of labor from its 
military establishment. Soldiers worked – and they worked at a variety of jobs. In order 
to subdue their opponents, soldiers built roads, escorted mail trains and construction 
crews, monitored elections, mediated disputes, patrolled the countryside and city streets, 
and commanded work details. These war workers – the people who picked at rocks and 
carted them away in order to build the road an officer deemed strategically important – 
have largely been invisible, overshadowed by the more dramatic confrontations typically 
celebrated in military history. But overlooking the army’s “enlisted laborers” also means 
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forgetting the struggles at the heart of the U.S. imperial project. The army’s labor regime 
was riven with conflict: soldiers protested, dragged their feet, and deserted. Decades later, 
the army found itself even less able to control the labor of the nonwhite workers they 
were supposed to manage in the southern Philippines. Commanders like Bullard 
despaired of their ability to ever remake Moro society in their own image. Other officers, 
including Bliss and General Leonard Wood, hoped to transform Moro and tribal people 
into successful plantation workers. These colonial subjects – or perhaps the officers 
themselves – disappointed the army’s expectations.  
The U.S. army’s labor regime, the resistance it engendered, and its contributions 
to the creation of an American empire resonate loudly today. The soldiers who told 
Senator Ambrose Burnside in 1879 that the army “is not a ‘standing army’ but a 
traveling, working, fighting, and suffering army,” would surely recognize the 
contemporary U.S. military.797 “Enlisted laborers” are currently stationed around the 
world, working as electricians, janitors, linguists, and computer scientists.798 
Furthermore, there is growing public recognition that the distinction between combat and 
non-combat labor is meaningless. In December 2015, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 
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reorganization of the army, 488. Italics in original.  
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announced that all military roles would be open to women. Hailed as a “historic 
decision” and a “milestone,” the change reflected an admission that contemporary wars 
were wide-ranging and diffuse. Women, already working in a variety of military roles, 
were exposed to combat situations even if they were not deployed in infantry units. The 
New York Times explained that despite the ban on women in combat, “women have often 
found themselves in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 14 years.”799 Dexter 
Filkins wrote in the New Yorker, “Notions of equality aside, the real factor that rendered 
the ‘non-combat’ distinction meaningless was the changing nature of the wars.” 
Characterizing World War II as “an old-style conflict,” Filkins argued that contemporary 
conflicts exposed all military personnel to potential combat situations: “But in Iraq and 
Afghanistan,” he wrote, “there are no front lines. Or, as the troops on the ground say, the 
front line is where you are.”800  
This civil rights victory for women reflects an important truth about military 
labor. All military work results in violence for someone. While American soldiers in the 
nineteenth century occasionally lamented the fact that they were building roads rather 
than killing Natives, their labor nonetheless advanced state power and resulted in the 
destruction of their enemies. In today’s imperial wars, all soldiers are in combat. 
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Pacification, occupation, military government, and nation-building involve soldiers in all 
kinds of labor, but the lines between combat and non-combat work are more blurred than 
ever. Most of all, the Defense Department’s recent decision underlines another continuity 
with the nineteenth-century military: although the nature of warfare has changed in 
significant ways, armies still make heavy demands of their workers. With the inclusion of 
women in combat units, the U.S. military can cast a wider net for those workers. The 
savage wars of peace still rage. 
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